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This research concentrates on Kurdish films in Turkey with a particular focus on 
understanding the political dynamics of the nation in the realm of cinema, and 
investigates the relationships between ‘cinema and the nation’, ‘film and politics’, 
and more specifically ‘socio-political conflicts and film’, by exploring the issues and 
questions regarding these fields generated by the recent rise of Kurdish films and the 
birth of the concept of Kurdish cinema in Turkey during a period of political 
transformation. While analysing the prominent political meanings in Kurdish films, 
as well as their public reception, my aim is to interrogate the way in which Kurdish 
films incorporate with the political struggle over the future direction of Kurdish 
conflict in Turkey, the way their meanings are affected by this struggle, and finally, 
how they might have an impact on this struggle. How do films that directly address 
contemporary social tensions and political cleavages in a certain society enter into 
dialogue with those areas of socio-political conflict in their immediate context? This 
is one of the key questions I engage with in this thesis. In tackling these issues, I 
develop a contextual film analysis approach in my examination of the 
interpenetration of film and politics in the case of Kurdish films in Turkey, and I 
designate three main axes for this contextual analysis. The first axis concerns the 
socio-political operation of Kurdish cinema as a concept, the second develops a 
context-specific political analysis of individual Kurdish films, and the third 
concentrates on the social circulation and reception of these Kurdish films. And all of 
these axes are developed through close references to the period of political 
transformation in Turkey in the 2000s. 
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This research concentrates on Kurdish films in Turkey with a particular focus on 
understanding the political dynamics of the nation in the realm of cinema, and 
investigates the relationships between ‘cinema and the nation’, ‘film and politics’, 
and more specifically ‘socio-political conflicts and film’, by exploring the issues and 
questions regarding these fields generated by the recent rise of Kurdish films and the 
birth of the concept of Kurdish cinema in Turkey during a period of political 
transformation.  
 
Kurdish cinema correlates with the Kurdish people who are widely recognised as one 
of the largest non-state nations. They have been physically divided into four main 
parts across Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria since the establishment of these states at the 
end of World War I, and they have thenceforth been subject to policies of denial, 
assimilation and oppression in the ‘host’ states. Moreover, as a result of the 
oppressive nation-state policies and the ongoing political conflicts in the Kurdish 
region, Kurdish people have become dispersed not only among these four countries, 
but all around the world, to constitute a widely dispersed large diasporic/exilic 
community. However, despite this picture of fragmentation, Kurdish political 
struggles based on the claim to be recognised as a nation have always been on the 
agenda and Kurdish people have maintained a national consciousness which has 
strengthened over the decades as an adverse effect of the oppression to which they 
have been subject.  
 
Due to the social, political and economic circumstances they have historically 
experienced, the meeting of the Kurds with the medium of cinema was a notably 
retarded one. It was the 2000s when Kurdish filmmakers took to the stage, films 
narrating the Kurdish issue from the Kurdish perspective first came out, and the 
concept of Kurdish cinema came into existence. And the dissemination of Kurds 
worldwide was reflected in the fragmented nature of their cinema. When talking 
 
about Kurdish films, we refer to films from the main host countries, and also, for 
example, a film by a Kurdish filmmaker from Iraq living in Norway, or a film by a 
Kurdish filmmaker from Turkey living in Germany. While ‘Kurdish cinema’ started 
to appear in festival programmes, film criticism, academic studies, as well as within 
political debates on the Kurdish issue, there have always been a cluster of questions 
shadowing the concept of Kurdish cinema. Any argument concerning Kurdish films 
first of all starts from the very question as to whether there is such a distinct and 
coherent group of films to be recognised and named as ‘Kurdish cinema’. And, if so, 
what makes a film Kurdish? Is it the ethnicity of the director, the language, the 
theme, a specific aesthetic style, or a political stance that allows one to recognise it as 
a Kurdish film? Can we talk about a national cinema, ethnic cinema, or a minority 
cinema, or shall we take Kurdish cinema as an example of diasporic cinema, Third 
cinema or ‘accented cinema’?  
 
Because it is a rather new phenomenon, there is a very limited amount of literature 
dealing with Kurdish cinema. The first book on Kurdish cinema (and the only one in 
existence at present) was published in Turkey in 2009 (Arslan 2009). Alongside 
interviews with some Kurdish filmmakers, the book consists of articles that itemise 
and provide information about Kurdish films and filmmakers from the Kurdish 
region and the diaspora (e.g. Kılıç 2009a; Aktaş 2009; Rosebiani 2009), historicise 
Kurdish cinema by referring to films that can be regarded as ‘Kurdish’ in the cinema 
histories of various countries (e.g. Alakom 2009; Bakhchiyan 2009), analyse the 
common textual characteristics in Kurdish filmmaking that unite all Kurdish films 
from around the world (e.g. Arslan 2009a; Kılıç 2009b; Kennedy 2009; Aktaş 2009), 
and focus on certain filmmakers from an auteurist perspective and analyse the formal 
characteristics of the films of individual directors (Kılıç 2009b; Çiftçi 2009; 
Erdönmez 2009; Özdil 2009). More generally, one of the prevailing approaches 
deployed in the articles in this book involve a focus on Kurdish cinema as the 
‘national cinema’ of a ‘nation without a state’, and to analyse Kurdish films from 
around the world with respect to their commonalities, in line with the conventional 
framework of national cinema. Thus the book opens with a preface by Hamid 
Dabashi which begins, “The publishing of this compilation on Kurdish cinema once 
again brings forward the issue of the national cinema of a nation deprived from a 
united state apparatus” (Dabashi 2009: ix; emphasis in the original). 
 	
 
This research differs from this approach and in fact it takes up the 
definition/construction of Kurdish cinema as a national cinema in its analysis of the 
predominant discourses on the concept of Kurdish cinema. In this study, my aim is 
not to favour one of the many possible definitions of Kurdish cinema over another, or 
position Kurdish films in the theoretical framework of a certain established category 
or suggest a new definition. Instead, I find it crucial to emphasise that Kurdish films 
have emerged from a political context which renders the definition of Kurdish 
cinema as open as the status of the Kurdish people. This research holds the view that 
the ambiguity in labelling Kurdish films implies the fact that power struggles over 
the status of Kurds still persist. In this frame, how to approach the concept of 
Kurdish cinema becomes a matter of political stance; insofar as recognising Kurdish 
cinema warrants recognising the Kurds, defining Kurdish cinema means defining the 
Kurds. In this regard, the nature of Kurdish cinema makes it impossible to create a 
fixed definition of it; rather, it necessitates the study of structuring pressures on its 
definition, and thus this research attaches significance to investigating those debates 
that interpret, contextualise and construct the concept of Kurdish cinema from certain 
political perspectives.  
 
Here, it is important to underline that theoretical arguments about the definition and 
identification of Kurdish cinema have been strongly linked to Kurdish collective 
efforts to assist in the growth and recognition of this cinema. In general, from the 
Kurdish political perspective, having an independent cinema functions in the same 
way, for instance, as having a distinct language does, and from this perspective 
Kurdish cinema becomes one of the representatives of a distinctive Kurdish national 
culture. Hence, it is important to note that, concurrently with the emergence of 
Kurdish films, politically motivated Kurdish collective efforts to support and 
promote these films created a discourse around the concept of Kurdish cinema and 
promptly institutionalised it. Thus the aforementioned first book on Kurdish cinema 
was also marked by political endeavours to support and give impetus to the newly 
born Kurdish cinema. The book was launched and edited by a Kurdish activist and 
filmmaker, Mizgin Müjde Arslan, and presented as “a concrete response to the 
ongoing argument about whether or not there is a Kurdish cinema” (Arslan 2009a: 
xiii); in this way, it came into being with the conscious intention of proving and 
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declaring the existence of Kurdish cinema. Following this book, the first ever 
conference on Kurdish cinema was organised in Diyarbakır, the capital city of the 
Kurdish region in Turkey. “As its location and institutional backing attest, the 
conference was endorsed by the Kurdish movement in Turkey” (Şengul 2013:240) 
and thus the idea of organising this kind of a conference was again mainly motivated 
by the idea of constructing a Kurdish cinema. Hence, what I want to emphasise here 
is the fact that the initial theoretical debates on Kurdish cinema have been 
intertwined with a certain political will that aimed to accelerate the rise of Kurdish 
cinema, amplifying its visibility and declaring the birth of Kurdish cinema as a 
national cinema.  
 
Other than the aforementioned book, there are a few recently published articles that 
approach Kurdish cinema from new perspectives. Özgür Çiçek, for instance, focuses 
specifically on Kurdish cinema in Turkey by deploying Gilles Deleuze’s theories 
about minority filmmaking and investigates the “archival potential” of Kurdish films 
“for the unrepresented history of Kurdish life in Turkey” (Çiçek 2011). Suncem 
Koçer on the other hand addresses the construction of Kurdish cinema as a national 
cinema in the transnational space by exploring “how agents characterize Kurdish 
films discursively, seek to nationalize them, and calibrate links and gaps between 
them” (Koçer 2014: 474). Defining Kurdish cinema as a “transnational discourse 
genre”, she focuses on certain actors and institutions that have sought to historicise 
Kurdish cinema and nationalise Kurdish films in the transnational space through 
“discursive strategies” (ibid: 481). In his article entitled ‘The First Kurdish Cinema 
Conference and the National Question’, Ali Fuat Şengül (2013) focuses on the 
aforementioned Diyarbakır conference in an exploration of how Kurdish cinema was 
debated with reference to the national and the transnational by the participants and 
audience at this event. He treats the arguments made at the conference about the 
common textual characteristics of Kurdish films “as a way of negotiating an 
aesthetics for a Kurdish cinema to exist” (2013: 241). These studies are in harmony 
with the perspective of this thesis with reference to the debates on Kurdish cinema. 
However, I must clarify that these issues are related to only one dimension of my 
research, as questions about the definition of Kurdish cinema with regard to 
nationhood are neither the framework nor the main subject of this study. This is one 




those that specifically concern the socio-political operation of Kurdish films in 
Turkey in a period of political transformation.  
 
I formulate my research as an examination of the politics of ‘cinema and the nation’ 
through Kurdish cinema, concentrating on Turkey as an observational field and 
scrutinising the specific issues that Kurdish films evoke in this specific socio-
political context. I identify Turkey as a national scale where the emergence of 
Kurdish films offers a substantial case study laden with various questions regarding 
the relationships between ‘cinema and the nation’, as well as the interactions between 
‘film and politics’ and ‘cinema and society’. In this regard, although this research is 
not a study of Kurdish cinema per se, the arguments about the definition of Kurdish 
cinema with regard to nationhood are relevant and significant for my research where 
I mainly focus on the interactions between Kurdish films and the Kurdish conflict in 
Turkey and examine the political meaning and public reverberations of the recent 
emergence of Kurdish films and the concept of Kurdish cinema specifically in 
Turkey. It is a crucial point for this thesis that while Kurdish cinema as a whole 
raises various complicated questions, these questions take different forms and new 
meanings within the culturally specific context of Turkey in the 2000s during an era 
of political transformation. Kurdish films made in Turkey on the one hand share 
ambiguities and complexities with Kurdish films from elsewhere, but on the other 
hand, questions regarding their position, identification, definition and political 
function have a different dimension, which is a product of the specificities of the 
history of the Kurdish issue in Turkey in general and the political developments in 
the 2000s in particular.  
 
I believe that the theorisation of Kurdish cinema at large would benefit from an 
accumulation of diverse studies focusing on specific localities, specific historicities, 
and specific questions Kurdish films generate in different contexts. In this sense, one 
dimension of this study is still closely connected to the new research area on Kurdish 
cinema in that it asks how the theoretical issues regarding Kurdish cinema 
specifically translate into the context of Kurdish films in Turkey. Nonetheless, 
contributing to the newly born research area of Kurdish cinema studies is not my 
only goal in this thesis. In dealing with Kurdish films in Turkey, this thesis is 
particularly interested in reflecting on broader questions regarding relationships 
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between socio-political conflicts and films that engage with those conflicts. In order 
to explain how I will interrogate these relationships in my thesis and why I suggest 
that Kurdish films in Turkey offer a substantial case study for addressing this issue, 
first I need to briefly explain the political dynamics of the Kurdish conflict in 
Turkey.  
 
As a consequence of the discourses and practices on nation-building and nation-
maintenance enacted by the Turkish state, since the foundation of the republic in 
1923, Kurdish identity has been strictly denied in Turkey. According to the official 
narration, Kurds were ‘mountain Turks’, there was no such thing as a Kurdish 
language (it was simply a ‘dialect’ of Turkish), and anyone claiming otherwise had 
to be financed by and the pawn of the ‘external enemies’ of the Turkish nation-state. 
All Kurdish attempts to break this policy of denial and oppression were violently 
suppressed, publicly speaking about the Kurdish issue was banned, and the Kurdish 
perspective on the issue was completely erased from the public realm. With the 
emergence of the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party), an armed national liberation 
movement inspired by Marxism-Leninism, the Kurdish conflict was transformed into 
a brutal internal war in 1984. While the PKK gained power and popularity amongst 
Kurds over the decades and dramatically changed the parameters of the conflict, the 
war fuelled anti-Kurdish sentiment in Turkish society and led to deep political 
polarisation in the country. 
 
Turks of my generation grew up watching evening news programs that repeatedly 
showed heartbreaking scenes of martyrs’ funerals, celebrated the death of Kurdish 
militants, and damned terrorism. Militarist and nationalist narrations of the conflict 
and the discourse of terrorism were so dominant that the majority of people in 
Turkish society never wondered about the socio-political origins of the Kurdish 
conflict. However, in recent years, the dynamics of the Kurdish issue in Turkey have 
significantly changed. With the emergence of the pro-Islamic AKP (Justice and 
Development Party) in the early 2000s as a new political actor, Turkey witnessed a 
large-scale political transformation. With the claim of breaking the anti-democratic 
state tradition in Turkey, the AKP attempted to erode the power of traditional state 
elites, and in the process the party gradually seized more power in all fundamental 
institutions of the state apparatus and embarked upon efforts to shift some long-
 
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standing state ideologies and official policies regarding key national issues. The 
political transformation Turkey witnessed in the 2000s was a transformation 
concerning the very definition of the nation, national identity, and national history, 
and implementing a new Kurdish policy was one of the pillars of this immense 
political transformation. Emerging at a time when historical developments suggested 
that it would be impossible to sustain the traditional Kurdish policy and when the 
war between the Turkish military and the PKK was in a deadlock, the AKP 
expressed willingness to respond to the new dynamics of the Kurdish question, 
unlike previous traditional state actors. Thus, the AKP promised a reformist Kurdish 
policy which would regard the conflict as an issue of democracy rather than an issue 
of terrorism. In 2009, the government launched the ‘Kurdish Opening’, which was 
not really a concrete plan towards bringing about a political solution to the Kurdish 
conflict but rather official acknowledgement of the invalidity of the prevailing state 
policy towards the Kurdish issue and an official declaration of the government’s 
willingness to develop a democratic solution to the longstanding conflict.  Although 
the Kurdish Opening has been highly controversial and in a short period of time 
proved to be far from capable of ushering in a peaceful solution to the Kurdish issue, 
it nevertheless dramatically changed the course of the conflict. Most importantly, it 
abolished the decades-old policy of denial, officially recognised the existence of the 
Kurds, lifted the ban on speaking about the Kurdish issue, and initiated an 
unprecedented public debate in Turkey about the Kurdish conflict.  
 
Traditional denial policy strictly banning any public representation of Kurdish 
identity and the Kurdish conflict had impinged on the cinema and left behind a void 
of representation in the film history of the country. Apart from a few individual 
attempts to implicitly touch upon the issue, up until recently the Kurdish issue had 
remained unrepresented in the cinema of Turkey. In the early 2000s, when Kurdish 
films started to spring forth worldwide, the first Kurdish films that explicitly 
addressed the Kurdish issue started to emerge in Turkey as well. The international 
growth of Kurdish filmmaking and the recognition of the notion of Kurdish cinema 
worldwide no doubt had a certain influence on the emergence of Kurdish films in 
Turkey. On the other hand, however, the rise of Kurdish films in Turkey was also an 
outcome of the general revival of cinema in Turkey. In the 2000s cinema in Turkey 
started to flourish with the growth of both commercial films and also politically and 
 

artistically ambitious independent films. And Kurdish films benefited from the 
overall revival of the film industry in Turkey; from the new opportunities for film 
funding, the space for independent filmmaking, the growing audience interest in 
domestic films, as well as the considerable media interest in newly emergent 
domestic films.  
 
Apart from these national and transnational cinematic dynamics, it was also the 
general political transformation and the shifting dynamics of the Kurdish conflict 
which played a crucial role in the rise of Kurdish films specifically in Turkey. The 
launch of the Kurdish Opening by the AKP government in 2009 in particular marks 
the beginning of a new era for Kurdish films in Turkey. After the launch of the 
‘Kurdish Opening’, Turkey witnessed what we can certainly call a boom of Kurdish 
films, not only in reference to the growth of Kurdish films in terms of numbers, but 
also to the extraordinary public interest they received. As part of the unprecedented 
public debates on the Kurdish issue, in this period Kurdish films were widely 
promoted in the media and recommended by public figures to the conflict-driven 
society in Turkey with the hope that they can play a role in building communication 
between the Turkish and Kurdish segments of the country and narrow the gap 
between their beliefs, opinions, and emotions concerning the Kurdish conflict.  
 
How do films that directly address contemporary social tensions and political 
cleavages in a certain society enter into dialogue with those areas of socio-political 
conflict in their immediate context? This is one of the key questions I intend to 
engage with in this thesis. Of primary interest to me is the mediation between filmic 
text and the social, and my aim is to interrogate the way in which Kurdish films 
incorporate with the political struggle over the future direction of Kurdish conflict in 
Turkey, the way their meanings are affected by this struggle, and finally, how they 
might have an impact on this struggle. Recent developments in the politics of the 
Kurdish issue and the observable politicisation of film culture in the 2000s in Turkey 
in parallel with political transformation provide an abundance of intriguing material 
for this thesis to reflect on the complicated and recondite interactions between film 





In tackling these issues, I intend to develop a contextual film analysis approach in my 
examination of the interpenetration of film and politics in the case of Kurdish films 
in Turkey. Paul Willemen puts forward a very basic question regarding the text-
context relationship: “Is the relation between a film (or a reading of a film) and its 
contemporary social-historical context so indisputable and so clearly defined that it 
deserves to be taken as a baseline?” (2010: 248). This is a valid question, as most 
studies on film involve a detailed picture of the social-historical context, but not 
always useful for coming up with insights about how that context relates to the 
following textual film analysis. Willemen continues by identifying one of the 
weaknesses in film studies: “By failing to attend to the intricate ways that the 
representation is animated by what it “presents”, our theoretical toolkits have no 
means of assessing the relations between representations and the historical forces that 
speak “through” or “in” those representations” (ibid: 249). Annette Kuhn argues that 
“as a discipline, film studies models itself largely on literary studies, and to this 
extent is predominantly text-centred. […] Even debates within film studies 
concerning the nature of spectatorship in the cinema are predominantly about a 
spectator addressed or constructed by the film text” (2002: 3-4). Michael Ryan and 
Douglas Kellner also argue against the dominance of textual analysis in film studies 
and they write; “films function differently in different contexts [...], and we would 
suggest that the determination of their political meaning may be more complex, 
contested, and differentiated a matter than some structuralist film critics assume” 
(1988: 2).  
 
The battle between textual and contextual analysis constitutes one of the major 
methodological debates in film studies. Andy Medhurst writes:  
 
In the struggle to establish itself as a distinct and dynamic body of 
knowledge, film theory in the 1970s made enormous gains. It achieved a 
radical break from the varieties of crude determinism and lavish aestheticism 
that occupied positions of dominance, but, as in any struggle, there were also 
losses. Most regrettable among these was any sense of the film text as social 
object. In order to gain more rigorous insights into their internal workings, 
texts were wrenched out of history, given autonomy, cast adrift from context 
into a sea of significatory interplay which need never be referred back to the 




Medhurst suggests that we must seek out ways of fusing the two approaches, but he 
also emphasises that “given the massive predominance in recent years of pure 
textualism, the case for the social nature of cultural production still has to be made 
quite insistently” (ibid: 35). John Hill also proposes that “instead of counterposing 
the two approaches, it would be far more useful to attempt to bring them together” 
(Hill 1990: 229). However, in his reviews of a number of books from the ‘Cinema 
and Society’ series published by Routledge, the main thrust of his criticism is that the 
majority of these studies fail to deploy a suitable methodology to carry out the 
promise of the title of the series, and this in fact indicates the difficulty of putting his 
proposition into effect.  
 
From among the thirteen books of the series, Hill praises Annette Kuhn’s approach 
in Cinema, Censorship and Sexualityon the basis that it examines how “the social 
inhabits meaning in the way that film texts are read”, and “demonstrates how the 
‘meanings’ of a text may require extratextual knowledge in order to be fully 
activated, or how extratextual discourses may impose a ‘meaning’ upon a text not 
necessarily underwritten, or implied, by the text itself” (Hill 1990: 229). While Kuhn 
concentrates specifically on the question of spectatorship in her discussion about 
text-context duality, Ryan and Kellner deploy a similar context-centred perspective 
in order to formulate a more general approach to this methodological issue, and they 
note: “We conceive of the relationship between film and social history as a process 
of discursive transcoding. We do so in order to emphasize the connections between 
the representations operative in film and the representations which give structure and 
shape to social life” (ibid: 12). And Barbara Klinger suggests a more elaborated 
contextual analysis approach for studying these ‘connections’:   
 
The relation of text to context is decisively important to a theoretical and 
critical construction of the cinema/ideology relation. Within the semiotic 
jungle produced by the representational manifestations of the ‘culture 
industry’, there are numerous and palpable intertextual interventions between 
a given text and its socio-ideological environ. The context which monitors 
any film’s entry into the world is titanic; among its representational members 
are industrial practices of exhibition and distribution, including promotional 
advertising, and popular or academic criticism. The text, ‘in practice’, is an 
intersection at which multiple and ‘extra-textual’ practices of signification 
circulate. [...] The ‘law’ of the text, then, has to be tampered with to exact a 
 
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less streamlined, and more socially-responsive theory of the cinema/ideology 
relation (1984: 44). 
 
What exactly contextual analysis means in film studies, whether the relationships 
between textual and contextual analysis can be formulated in a less contradictory and 
exclusive way, and how these two basic methodological approaches can 
communicate with each other in film analysis are not easy questions with ready 
answers. However, by setting up a dialogue with the arguments cited above, this 
thesis designates three main axes for the contextual analysis of Kurdish films in 
Turkey in the 2000s. The first axis concerns the socio-political operation of Kurdish 
cinema as a concept, the second develops a context-specific political analysis of 
individual Kurdish films, and the third concentrates on the social circulation and 
reception of these Kurdish films. And all of these axes are developed through close 
references to the period of political transformation in Turkey in the 2000s.  
 
On the first axis, before engaging with individual Kurdish films, I will focus on 
Kurdish cinema as a concept from a context-centred perspective. Here I identify 
Turkey as a national scale where the antagonism between Turkish nationalist 
discourses and practices and Kurdish nation-building discourses and practices are 
reciprocated in the constructions and interpretations of ‘Kurdish cinema’ and also 
‘Turkish cinema’ at a time of political turbulence. I will interrogate how some of the 
key debates in the literature of national cinema apply to the operation and public 
reception of the concept of national cinema, specifically in Turkey in the 2000s, at a 
time when the country experienced a significant political transformation regarding 
the very definition of national identity. Taking on Tom O’Regan’s suggestion that we 
analyse the national cinema of a country as ‘an object of knowledge’, I will draw 
attention to the contextualising power of various social actors and observe how “each 
agent conceptualizes, analyses, recognizes” and calls Kurdish cinema into question 
“in particular ways, for its own practical purposes” (O’Regan 1996: 31-32). 
O’Regan’s emphasis that national cinema is a discursively produced concept, “a 
domain in which different knowledges are produced and brought into relation” 
(1996: 25), is particularly significant in the study of Kurdish films, because I observe 
that the question of “What is Kurdish cinema?” is under constant transformation in 




While investigating the complicated theoretical questions as well as the politically 
oriented public debates in Turkey regarding the definition of Kurdish cinema, I will 
also focus on how Kurdish cinema carries these questions and debates over to the 
concept of Turkish cinema; in doing so, I will discuss how defining Kurdish cinema 
inevitably means re-defining Turkish cinema and how these conceptual questions 
have taken shape under the over-determining impact of the politics of the Kurdish 
conflict in Turkey. When Kurdish films started to become widely public for the first 
time in 2009, they signalled a dramatic change in Turkey. In a country where 
Kurdish identity has been suppressed as it undermined the idea of the ethnic 
homogeneity of the Turkish national identity, the very existence of the Kurds has 
been denied, Kurdish language was decreed non-existent, and even the word ‘Kurd’ 
was banned for many decades, some films called Kurdish films taking part in the 
national competition of a Turkish film festival for the first time stimulated questions 
as to what ‘national cinema’ means (and what it should mean) in the case of Turkey. 
The recognition of Kurdish films as ‘national films’ in 2009 at Antalya Golden 
Orange Film Festival, the oldest and one of the biggest film festivals in Turkey, 
despite their identification as Kurdish films and despite for example needing Turkish 
subtitles to be screened at a national film festival in Turkey, was something that 
confused the definition of Turkish national cinema. Hence, I argue that the concept 
of ‘Kurdish cinema’ emerged in Turkey not only as a question, but also as a 
questioner, inasmuch as its existence complicated and disconcerted the notion of 
‘Turkish cinema’. Hence, following debates triggered by the emergence of Kurdish 
films, a new concept, Türkiye Sineması (Cinema in/of Turkey), was coined as a 
substitution for Turkish cinema and it started to be widely deployed for referring to 
films from Turkey without making any reference to Turkish ethnicity; as a discursive 
solution against the oppressive and exclusive connotations signalled in the concept of 
Turkish cinema. On the other hand, while the concept of Turkish cinema lost its 
legitimacy for a large section of film-related circles, it did not simply fall into disuse. 
Now, Turkish Cinema, Kurdish cinema and Türkiye Sineması are all used in Turkey, 
by different agents, in certain contexts, at different times. They all continue to 
circulate despite the ambiguities they bear, they are all marked by the process of the 
political transformations in Turkey, and they are all subject to power struggles and 




While observing these developments, my argument is that the prevalent conceptual 
debates in Turkey regarding Kurdish cinema, Turkish cinema and Türkiye sineması 
in fact echo, reproduce and influence pressing political issues regarding national 
identity in contemporary Turkey. We see that, especially from 2009 onwards, 
political debates over the definition of national identity in Turkey started to be 
regenerated in the national cinema debate, in a quite direct manner. This is a 
remarkable observation with reference to the overall quest to explore the interplay 
between ‘film and politics’ in this thesis because my argument is that Kurdish films 
triggered large-scale public debates in Turkey not only on the basis of their topicality 
or their subject matter which neatly overlapped with controversial issues occupying 
the political agenda; in fact, prior to how they represented the Kurdish issue it was 
their emergence under the label of ‘Kurdish cinema’ that became subject to debate. 
And diverse reactions towards the concept of Kurdish cinema, favouring or 
disfavouring it, mirrored the reactions towards the policy change over the Kurdish 
conflict. In short, my main argument regarding the first axis of the thesis is that in a 
country where Kurdish identity was denied for decades, the emergence of a notion 
called ‘Kurdish film’ was itself something that not only bespoke a political 
transformation, but also became a means of debating this transformation. 
 
The second axis of the thesis adopts a different contextual approach to address 
another dimension of the study of Kurdish films in Turkey. By conducting a context-
specific analysis of the prominent themes, representations, discourses and political 
propositions that are apparent in Kurdish films, I intend to discuss the political 
character of the films under study. I suggest that one of the necessary pillars of 
exploring the interplay between ‘film and politics’ is the interpretation of Kurdish 
films as ‘political films’. The directors of these films repeatedly highlight at every 
opportunity that while tackling politically significant issues in Turkey they believe in 
the potential of cinema to influence the public perception of the Kurdish conflict and 
to contribute to the peace-building process, and they express their desire to take an 
active part in contemporary political debates on the Kurdish issue via their films. The 
second axis of this thesis asks how filmmakers perform this political motivation in 
their films and examines how the aspiration to contribute to social peace in Turkey 
shapes Kurdish films. What kind of issues do Kurdish filmmakers speak of when 
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they gain access to the mechanisms of cinematic representation for the first time? 
Which hitherto unspoken issues are given primacy with the goal of joining the public 
debates on the Kurdish conflict that started at the same time these films started to 
emerge? In what ways do they “draw upon, incorporate, recontextualize and engage 
in dialogue with other texts” (Fairclough 2003: 17) while joining the intertextual 
struggles between multiple interpretations of the Kurdish issue? These are the kind of 
questions that shape the second axis of this thesis and my goal here is to analyse the 
textually evident political aspirations of these films with a particular focus on the 
complex intertextual dialogues between film and politics in a specific historical 
context. However, while focusing on the film texts in the second axis of my research, 
my aim is not to provide an in-depth analysis of the textual strategies of these films. 
In fact, I must underline that I deliberately refrain from performing a ‘creative formal 
analysis’ such as one that would discover hidden meanings in these texts, meanings 
that would be discernible only to professional film theoreticians, or suggesting 
alternative readings of these texts through close formal analysis. What I aim to 
accomplish in this chapter is to take up some politically significant meanings in 
Kurdish films that are explicit and observable to the general public in Turkey, the 
audience they address, as they have been central to the public debates these films 
have triggered. Following that, I interpret them with reference to the specificities of 
the political context in contemporary Turkey in which they circulate. This is thus the 
extent to which I engage with film texts in this context-based research. 
 
One of my key propositions is that we can talk about convergences between ‘past 
and present’, ‘reality and representation’, and ‘personal and social’ in the case of 
Kurdish films in Turkey, which all originate from the politics of the Kurdish conflict. 
And I suggest that we can examine the political character of these films by focusing 
on these convergences. Kurdish films are not only utilised as but also widely 
regarded as one of the most significant means of making Kurdish memories visible 
and accessible to the general public in Turkey for the first time. Following the 
decades-long ban on publicly discussing the Kurdish issue, these films set out to 
reveal some unspoken historical issues and events regarding the Kurdish conflict and 
they deploy Kurdish memories against the dominant historicisation of the Kurdish 
issue. In doing so, the majority of these films do not focus on the past but on the 
remembrance of the past; they unravel the past through (real or fictional) characters 
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that remember the past in present-day Turkey and in this way they suggest 
inextricable ties between past and the present. Thus, it is not what happened in the 
past so much as the present effects of the past that is of primary interest to Kurdish 
filmmakers.  
 
Primarily addressing Turkish audiences, Kurdish films communicate the Kurdish 
experience of the conflict and Kurdish suffering under state oppression in the past to 
those who had no access to the Kurdish perspective for decades in an attempt to 
influence the dominant thrust of Turkish public opinion about the conflict. As they 
acquire the means to break the silence, filmmakers first expose the price of the 
preceding silence by belatedly reporting on the oppressive mechanisms of silencing 
unleashed against the Kurdish people in the past. By screening state atrocities, 
filmmakers aim to contribute to social confrontations with a dark history and they 
utilise the medium of film as a mechanism of reconciliation and social justice 
without waiting for the official mechanisms to be established.  
 
Another commonly used strategy in peace-building via film is the revising of 
dominant image of the Kurds and the Kurdish region in Turkish public memory. 
While providing the first visuals from the region that are not war footage 
disseminated by the Turkish military and introducing the Kurdish region to the wider 
public in Turkey, Kurdish films undermine and revise the prevailing negative image 
of the region in Turkish public memory which was disseminated through official 
discourses for many decades. They also aim at relieving the Kurds of the image of 
‘pre-modern, primitive, uncivilised Turks’ and from the dehumanised image of 
‘bloody terrorists’. They flesh out and (re)introduce the Kurds via fictional and non-
fictional characters and they give Kurdish people the opportunity to communicate 
their experiences and memories to Turkish audiences through the mediation of film.  
 
In order to display the prevalence of the consequences of the dark history of the 
conflict in Kurdish society, Kurdish films tend to strongly link the personal to the 
social. As filmmakers often complain about the absence, or paucity, or inaccessibility 
of relevant historical archives regarding the Kurdish conflict, they are left with what 
they can access: personal memories available to them through spoken words or 
private collections such as photographs, family albums, letters, personal diaries, and 
 
sound recordings. While turning private archives into social archives, personal 
memories into public memories, Kurdish films utilise the representative power of 
personal stories to attest to the wide-scale social effects of the conflict in Kurdish 
society. 
 
Quite aware of the intense power struggles in the days of political transformation 
between opposing interpretations of the past in Turkey, Kurdish filmmakers seek out 
ways to claim that their narration of the past is ‘the true version’ among others. What 
is the most suitable way of telling some ‘uncomfortable truths’ (O'Regan 1996) to 
Turkish society about its past? How to undermine the political conventions that have 
been cutting off any attempts by the Kurds to express themselves, labelling them as 
‘terrorist propaganda’? How to render the average Turkish audience open to listening 
to the Kurdish issue from the Kurdish perspective? These are the kind of questions 
that seem to be significantly conditioning Kurdish films. Thus, I argue that, if 
speaking out about long-silenced issues, and thus building a communicative sphere 
for social confrontation, is the main motivation behind the emergence of Kurdish 
films, the challenge of accomplishing this motivation within the current political 
atmosphere is the main parameter defining the structure of these films.  
 
I suggest that the predominance of documentary in Kurdish filmmaking can be seen 
as one of the reflections of the challenge of convincingly representing truths that 
conflict with truths that have been largely accepted in Turkish society for decades. In 
this sense, we can say that Kurdish filmmaking relies on the traditional perception 
that considers documentary film as more entitled to ‘represent the reality’, or to be 
more competent in ‘unravelling the truth’ than fiction film. On the other hand, 
however, what I observe and find more significant is aremarkable convergence 
between fiction and non-fiction in the case of Kurdish films in terms of their 
relationship with the notion of reality. In Kurdish filmmaking there is always a true 
story at the initial point, which then becomes a fiction or non-fiction film. The quest 
to represent reality in a way that maximises the reality effect finds its response in 
both forms. And my argument is that in both fiction and non-fiction filmmaking, 
directors who address the history of the Kurdish issue are in search of the most 
effective ways of communicating to their audience that ‘what they are watching is 
not just a film’. In order to render the average Turkish audience more approachable, 
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and in order to break down ideological barriers, fiction films also endeavour to find 
ways of firmly knitting the representations with reality, anchoring their films to life. 
Thus I argue that, the drive to ‘reveal the truth’ and the claim of ‘truth-telling’ is 
observable not only in documentaries but in Kurdish fiction films as well. 
 
While investigating the centrality of the notions of ‘memory’ and ‘truth’ in Kurdish 
films, I attach significance to the fact that the films addressed in this thesis render 
hitherto silenced Kurdish memories publicly visible and publicly available; they 
function as one of the major mediums of publicising the Kurdish interpretation of the 
truth regarding the history of the Kurdish conflict for the first time in Turkey. This 
emphasis is particularly significant for the general concerns of this thesis regarding 
the issue of ‘film and politics’. Thus the third axis of this thesis focuses attention on 
how the Kurdish perspective on memory and truth represented in Kurdish films 
communicate to the society once they are public and asks what happens to the 
meanings discussed above, once the films are out of the hands of their creators, once 
they start their social circulation and get into intertextual dialogues with other texts 
regarding the Kurdish issue. In an attempt to respond to this inquiry, the final stage 
of my general exploration of the interplay between Kurdish films and the Kurdish 
conflict is based on another convergence, in this case the one between ‘text and 
context’ which I argue is again a consequence of the over-determination of politics 
concerning Kurdish films in Turkey in a period of political transformation.  
 
As Toby Miller remarks, “texts accrete and attenuate meanings on their travels as 
they rub up against, trope, and are troped by other fictional and social texts” (2010: 
142). In other words, the meaning of a filmic text undergoes a constant 
transformation during its social circulation, as it encounters other social texts that 
operate around the same subject. As the themes of Kurdish films are the themes of 
current affairs in Turkey, the process Miller talks about is something more readily 
observable in the case of Kurdish films. With the intention of exploring the 
immediate intertextual dialogues between films and the present-day politics, I appeal 
to the framework  of ‘reception studies’ which directs attention to the historical, 
contextual, and intertextual forces that shape different interpretations of filmic 
meaning and which “provides a sense of what the historical prospects were for 
viewing at a given time by illuminating the meanings made available within that 
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moment” (Klinger 1997: 114). In Janet Staiger’s description, reception studies aims 
at analysing “the historical context of the event of interpretation” and “seeks to 
understand textual interpretations as they are produced historically” (1992: 9). I 
argue that when the subject of research is films that specifically bring forth issues 
that dominate the present-day agenda of the society – issues that are highly subject to 
public controversy – as in the case of this research, then we can say that, directing 
our attention from text to context is necessary, even compulsory. 
 
As previously remarked, from 2009 onwards Kurdish films started to be widely 
publicised and discussed in Turkey with reference to the political debates on the 
Kurdish issue in general and the new Kurdish policy in particular. At a time when 
Turkey witnessed radical shifts in the politics of the Kurdish issue, films that focused 
on the very issues that were at the heart of this political transformation came forward. 
Consequently, in this period, the film theatres in Turkey screening Kurdish films 
became an arena for debating the Kurdish issue, while the films turned into 
‘discussion material’ for the general public to express their political opinions on the 
current political transformation and ventilate their disturbances, anxieties, angers and 
fears in an era of political turbulence. The potential political power of cinema was 
acknowledged and utilised by political parties active in the period who utilised films 
to publicly comment on recent developments regarding the Kurdish conflict. As a 
consequence, in this period, movie-going started to function as a political act, film 
comments as political commentary and film recommendations as coded political 
messages to the public. Furthermore, some Kurdish films struck up a direct dialogue 
with the parliamentary debates of the day on the Kurdish issue and filmmakers 
became public political figures who were regarded as ‘experts’ on the issues they 
addressed in their films and on the Kurdish issue in general.  
 
Observing this picture in detail, in this thesis I argue that Kurdish films became 
mediators for debating the Kurdish conflict in the days of political turbulence; they 
participated in the ongoing struggle in Turkey over the future of the Kurdish conflict 
not only as a subject speaking out, but also an object spoken about; not only did they 
interrogate the Kurdish issue, but they also became an instrument for the public to 
interrogate the issue. Examining the salient dynamics within the highly politicised 
film culture in Turkey in a period of political transformation, I propose that the 
 
stories Kurdish films tell, the political messages they convey, and the suggestions 
they make regarding peace-building transcended the finished films and extended 
outwards via the debates they triggered. My argument is that, although the actual 
audiences were limited in scope, owing to the extraordinary public interest they 
attracted and the wide public debates they triggered, the reach and sphere of 
influence of Kurdish films, always extended far beyond the actual audiences at the 
screenings. 
 
Based on these three main axes, this research seeks to make a contribution to several 
areas. First of all, it contributes to the field of Kurdish cinema studies, which only 
very recently started flourishing and calls for new scholarly research concentrating 
on diverse aspects of Kurdish films from different perspectives. The study of Kurdish 
films in Turkey also partly offers a contribution to the study of ‘cinema in Turkey’, 
since these newly emergent Kurdish films are one of the most dynamic components 
of contemporary cinema in Turkey. Although a conceptual solution has been 
developed that includes Kurdish films in the cinema of the country, the question of 
how to theorise and study Türkiye sineması and how to tackle the complicated 
questions thatKurdish films have brought along into the film culture in Turkey is an 
issue that needs to be addressed by new academic research. So far, Savaş Arslan’s 
recent book entitled Cinema in Turkey: A New Critical History (2011) is the only 
scholarly attempt to respond to this need. This thesis also makes a contribution to the 
general study of ‘film and politics’ and more specifically ‘socio-political conflicts 
and film’. By developing a contextual film analysis approach based on three different 
axes which can then be used to help us understand the interplay between film and 
politics in the case of Kurdish films in Turkey, I propose a certain perspective that 
could be adopted in different studies tackling different cinemas, especially those that 
also examine how films that directly address contemporary social tensions and 
political cleavages in a certain society enter into dialogue with those areas of socio-
political conflict in their immediate context. Lastly, this thesis also seeks to 
contribute to the field of national cinema studies by treating the case of Kurdish films 
in Turkey as a new example which demonstrates that analysing films with regards to 
nationhood does not have to feed into myths of national unity or ignore the 
diversities and conflicts within the nation. On the contrary, those dynamics of 
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political conflict are culturally specific to certain socio-historical contexts and that is 
why the national context still matters for film analysis.  
 
After explaining the main axes of my thesis, I should clarify a few other points 
regarding the methodology of this research. The primary interests explained above 
that have shaped the structure of this thesis have also guided my responses to some 
basic methodological questions. In selecting the films to be discussed, no subjective 
criteria have been assigned on the basis of the ‘aesthetic value’ or ‘political value’ of 
the films, nor has a specific genre been selected as the focus of research. Since this 
thesis primarily focuses on the interactions between ‘film and politics’ and ‘cinema 
and society’ in the case of Kurdish films in Turkey in a period of political 
transformation, the selected films are those that have been publicly visible in the 
given period and that have been widely debated and contextualised with reference to 
the contemporary political debates in Turkey on the Kurdish conflict. Rather than 
aiming to give a comprehensive overview of all Kurdish films made in the period of 
time taken up in this study, I focused on those films which were most widely 
discussed in the media and in the public sphere in general; as such, those films best 
demonstrate the intense interplay between film and politics in the case of Kurdish 
films in Turkey. Again, as a natural consequence of the main questions and 
approaches followed in the research, I did not conduct my own interviews with 
filmmakers. Instead, I took directors’ statements about their films to be one of the 
many contextualising forces impacting the meanings of the finished films, and 
therefore, while closely following the interpretation of Kurdish films by various 
actors within public film debates, I also followed the statements of the filmmakers 
that have been publicly articulated. Instead of conducting my own interviews with 
the goal of revealing something unknown about these films, in this thesis I refer to 
press releases, interviews and award ceremony speeches, in order to examine the 
ways filmmakers interpret and contextualise their own films in public and for the 
public and to discuss how their statements engage in dialogue with other dominant 








In Chapter 2, I revisit the national cinema debate. Rather than being a literature 
review that scrutinises all of the prominent theories and significant debates in the 
literature, this chapter focuses on certain issues and questions regarding national 
cinema that are related to this research. Here, I must underline that I do not allot one 
whole chapter to the national cinema debate because I favour this concept for 
defining and categorising Kurdish cinema. One of the main objectives of this chapter 
is to emphasise and discuss the continuing significance of examining the 
relationships between cinema and the national today. While thoroughly discussing 
the growing suspicion towards national cinema studies, I engage with the literature in 
terms of subnational and transnational issues. In this chapter I also discuss and 
rework Paul Willemen’s theorisation of ‘cultural specificity’ which I take up as a 
useful concept for understanding the sophisticated interplay between films and the 
socio-cultural domain of the nation. This is followed by a conceptual debate on 
national cinema and a discussion on the issue of categorising films in general. One of 
the main arguments here is that we cannot discount the fact that despite all the 
theoretical debates undermining the concept of national cinema, it continues to be in 
circulation as one of the main film categories in cultural use. And I emphasise the 
necessity of acknowledging this fact and incorporating the analysis of various 
discourses surrounding the national cinema of a country within the study of ‘cinema 
and the nation’ in the context of that country.  
 
In Chapter 3, I explain the socio-political context of Turkey in the 2000s before 
moving on to my analysis of Kurdish cinema in Turkey in the following chapters. A 
thorough description of the main characteristics of politics in Turkey in the 2000s 
and a portrayal of the major political actors and dominant ideologies as well as some 
key events of the period is essential to this thesis as it focuses attention to the 
interpenetrations between Kurdish films and politics in a period of political 
transformation in Turkey and discusses films with close reference to the socio-
political context. After drawing an overall picture of the political structure in Turkey 
since the founding of the Turkish Republic and discussing the characteristics of the 
traditional state ideology in Turkey, I examine the political character of the pro-
Islamic party AKP which instigated a dramatic socio-political transformation in 
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recent times. I investigate how the 2000s witnessed “the structural disintegration of 
dominant power relations and paradigms in Turkey” (Cizre 2008: 4) as a result of the 
reorganisation of key state institutions; the revision of some fundamental principles 
of traditional state ideology; the displacement of long-standing official policies 
towards some key national issues; the attempt to redefine national identity; and the 
re-narration of some significant aspects of the national past. In the second section of 
the chapter I focus on the Kurdish conflict in Turkey which was at the heart of this 
dramatic transformation. After explaining the history of the Kurdish issue in Turkey, 
this chapter focuses on the new Kurdish policy introduced by the AKP government 
and discusses the shifting dynamics of the conflict in detail.  
 
In Chapter 4, I first of all trace the socio-political and artistic historical developments 
that led to the rise of Kurdish cinema worldwide. I then I focus on the question of 
how to tackle the national within Kurdish cinema by returning to some of the key 
arguments in Chapter 2. In the second section of the chapter, I concentrate on 
Kurdish cinema in Turkey. I start by depicting and interpreting the void of 
representation in the cinema of Turkey before the advent of Kurdish films. After 
briefly addressing the few attempts that were made to break the on-screen silence 
concerning the Kurdish conflict, I focus on recent years which witnessed a boom of 
Kurdish films in Turkey with the emergence of films that for the first time directly 
and explicitly addressed the Kurdish issue from the Kurdish perspective. One of the 
main focuses of this chapter is a close observation of the conceptual debates in 
Turkey regarding Kurdish cinema, as well as Turkish Cinema and Türkiye Sineması, 
and in this chapter I draw attention to the parallels between these cinematic debates 
and the political debates regarding national identity in Turkey.  
 
In Chapter 5, the focus of my thesis shifts from ‘Kurdish cinema’ to ‘Kurdish films’ 
with the aim of exploring the political character of the Kurdish films under study. 
Here, I deploy a context-specific political analysis of Kurdish films and discuss the 
prominent themes, representations, discourses, and political propositions that are 
apparent in these films with close reference to the socio-historical context. I suggest 
that, before moving onto the next chapter, where I explore the reception and the 
political contextualisation of the meanings of Kurdish films, it is necessary to first 
understand the political character of these films. We need to first observe and 
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contextualise the explicit meanings Kurdish films convey to their audience, in order 
to then interrogate what happens to those meanings once these films are out of the 
hands of their creators and they start to circulate in an overly politicised society. This 
chapter mainly focuses on the convergences between ‘past and present’, ‘reality and 
representation’, and ‘personal and social’ in Kurdish films in Turkey. I first address 
the act of screening memories of state oppression via film, as all Kurdish films of the 
period, without exception, focus on various aspects of state brutality and narrate 
Kurdish suffering in the past. I then discuss how Kurdish films embark upon 
revisions of the dominant image of the Kurds and the Kurdish region in Turkish 
public memory as a strategy of peace-building via film. My analysis of the filmic 
representations of Kurds and the Kurdish region is followed by an exploration of the 
convergence between individual memories and social history in Kurdish films. Here 
I interrogate how Kurdish films link the personal strongly to the social as a political 
commentary and position individual Kurdish experiences within the broader picture 
of the Kurdish conflict. Another issue discussed in this chapter is the issue of 
representing reality in Kurdish filmmaking. The main argument which I pursue in 
this section is that the challenge of communicating on the Kurdish issue against the 
background of decades-old dominant narratives is something that conditions Kurdish 
films. I suggest that while bringing the dark history of the Kurdish issue to the 
screen, these films make a certain ‘claim of truth-telling’ which I argue is not only 
evident in documentaries but is equally predominant in Kurdish fiction films as well.  
 
Chapter 6 suggests that the politics of Kurdish films, the interplay between film and 
politics, is evident and significant beyond the fact that Kurdish films are literally 
‘political films’. This is where I add the convergence between ‘text and context’ into 
my analysis of the political meaning of Kurdish films. I argue that we can talk about 
‘the politicisation of film culture’ in Turkey in the early 2000s, which is a result of 
the historical conjunction of two dynamics that took place in Turkey in this period: 
the political transformation addressed in Chapter 3 and the revival of cinema 
discussed in Chapter 4. And, one of the most significant aspects of the political 
transformation in question was the policy shift in the state’s attitude towards the 
Kurdish conflict, while one of the most dynamic components of the new cinema in 
Turkey was the emergence of Kurdish films. I argue that this historical conjunction 
rendered Kurdish films a prominent means of debating the Kurdish conflict in 
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Turkey. This chapter is mainly concerned with observing the prominent discourses 
on Kurdish films that widely circulated in Turkey in the immediate context of their 
release and analysing the predominant contextualisations of these films in relation to 
the politics of the Kurdish issue. Therefore, I explore how various actors including 
politicians, filmmakers, festival organisers, audiences and the media deployed 
Kurdish films in this period to comment on the Kurdish conflict from varying 
political perspectives and positions of interest. After focusing on specific examples 
that demonstrate the intense interpenetration between Kurdish films and politics, I 
finalise this chapter by analysing the reception of Breath, a film that directly focuses 
on the Kurdish conflict but not from the Kurdish perspective, as public debates about 




CHAPTER 2:  





In the early years of film studies, national cinema as a category has been widely 
deployed without much critical reflection on it and the concept of national cinema 
has been functioning as one of the main organizing and descriptive concepts for film 
analysis. From the 1980s on, however, the assumption of commonality among the 
films of a nation has been superseded by a suspicion towards it. Thus, film scholars 
have for some decades been questioning the validity of the national cinema concept, 
criticising former definitions, seeking new approaches, suggesting various alternative 
categories that undermine the significance of the national in film analysis.  
 
Within the growing suspicion towards national cinema, two directions can be marked 
as the main axes of the argument. One of them is concerned with the subnational 
level, arguing that the national cinema approach assimilates the differences within 
the films of a nation. On the other hand, the second vein in the criticism of national 
cinema is more concerned with the transnational level, concentrating on the 
permeability of national borders while problematising the national cinema concept 
for seemingly limiting itself inside national borders at the very moment they seem to 
be becoming erased. From a wider perspective, these critical arguments are related to 
the complexity of the political questions surrounding the notions of nation and 
nationalism. What is to be done with the concept of national cinema has ultimately 
been a political decision. Put basically, the nation-state is a scale of political power; 
and for all anti-nationalist political movements, how to break the dominance of the 
power that operates at the national scale has always been a question of political 
strategy. In this context, two main conflicting routes emerge at the primary stage of 
deciding either to assign the national as the scale of struggle or to suggest a struggle 
that operates below or above the national scale; the first one underlines the 
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continuing significance of the national, whereas the latter one focuses on the 
possibilities of rendering it insignificant. The opposing approaches in film studies 
are, in a sense, the translation of this political argument into the theory of national 
cinema. Following this point, we can say that all critical studies undermining 
national cinema are principally characterised by an anti-nationalist consciousness. 
However, although sharing this consciousness with similar ideological concerns, 
some scholars emphasise the continuing significance of the national and find it 
problematic to abandon the idea of national cinema altogether.  
 
One of the main objectives of this chapter is to emphasise the continuing significance 
of examining the relationships between cinema and the national today. I argue that 
we need to make a distinction between ‘national cinema’ studies and the study of 
‘cinema and the national’ because the tendency to discredit the concept of national 
cinema involves a confusion between the two and more often than not results in 
declaring the invalidity or insignificance of studying films with regards to 
nationhood at all. However, even in a ‘globalised world’ the nation-state still flags a 
domain of power, and as all power relationships embody cleavages, conflicts, and 
struggles, the national borders of a country continue to designate a territory of socio-
political conflicts – conflicts that are historically specific to that national context. 
Thus, I argue that the study of ‘cinema and the national’ should focus on the 
interactions between films and the national dynamics of diversity and conflict. On 
the other hand, national borders also continue to demarcate a certain ‘cultural 
specificity’. Regarding Paul Willemen’s (2006) conceptualisation of ‘cultural 
specificity’ as a favourable concept for understanding the sophisticated interplay 
between films and the socio-cultural domain of the nation, I endeavour to rework this 
concept in this chapter. I suggest that the cultural specificity of the nation is one of 
the contextual powers that significantly influence the meaning of filmic texts, as we 
can talk about the superimposition of the cultural codes used in processes of 
encoding and decoding film meaning and the socio-historically familiar cultural 
codes within a certain national context.  
 
In this chapter I also make a conceptual argument and discuss the issue of 
categorising and labelling films in general. I stress that, despite the prevalent 
academic tendency of discrediting national cinema, the concept continues to be in 
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cultural circulation outside of film theory and the nationality of a film continues to be 
one of the main references contextually framing films. For this reason, I emphasise 
that studies regarding ‘cinema and the nation’ must observe the diverse definitions, 
interpretations, cultural usages and political contextualisations of a national cinema 
as a concept within a certain socio-historically specific context and also involve 
various discourses that construct it as an ‘object of knowledge’ (O’Regan 1996). 
 
I acknowledge that the literature is quite broad and multifaceted, as national cinema 
studies take on various aspects covering not only film production, but also many 
other areas of research, from the idea of a national audience to the policy making of 
the nation-state. My aim here is not to cover all these areas, but to discuss some key 
arguments that have played a significant role in shaping the dominant conceptions of 
national cinema in the last decades and also to specifically address certain aspects of 
the national debate that are particularly relevant to my analysis of Kurdish films in 
Turkey. Overall, it seems timely to sort through the criticisms regarding the concept 
of national cinema and reflect on the strengths and weakness of some of the 
prevailing arguments. This also involves reassessing the significance of examining 
the relationships between cinema and the national today, which is a key aspect of my 
research on Kurdish films in Turkey. 
 
 
The Nation and the Transnational 
 
Broadly speaking, we can say that transnational cinema studies basically concentrate 
on the permeability of the national borders and problematise the national cinema 
approach from this perspective. It is not appropriate though to mark one dominant 
approach, since numerous concepts deployed for the study of cinematic border-
crossings indicate the variety of diverse approaches. Categories such as global 
cinema, international cinema, multicultural cinema, intercultural cinema, diasporic 
cinema, exilic cinema, world cinema, and European cinema can all be seen within 
the scope of transcending the national borders in film studies, yet each of these 
concepts represents a different approach to its subject. Here I am using the concept of 
transnational cinema as a general inclusive title, because in recent years, it has been 
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becoming an established concept used for subsuming diverse studies addressing 
different aspects of the cinematic border-crossings. However, although it has been 
increasingly deployed in film studies, the definition of transnational cinema is still a 
vague and contradictory issue. As Leon Hunt and Leung Wing-Fai remark, “The 
word ‘transnational’ is used more often than it is defined, and definitions remain 
abstract by nature” (2008: 2). Similarly, Mette Hjort states that “the discourse of 
cinematic transnationalism has been characterized less by competing theories and 
approaches than by a tendency to use the term “transnational” as a largely self-
evident qualifier requiring only minimal conceptual clarification” (2010: 13). With 
reference to this ambiguity, Will Higbee and Song Hwee Lim question the necessity 
of the term transnational, and ask whether it risks “becoming a replacement for 
existing terms such as ‘world cinema’ as a means of merely describing non-
Anglophone films” (2010: 17).  
 
Ezra and Rowden remark that “cinema has from its inception been transnational, 
circulating more or less freely across borders and utilizing international personnel” 
(2006: 2). Similarly, O’Regan suggests that “what distinguishes the cinema from a 
good proportion of broadcasting and book publishing is that it is from inception 
international” (1996: 262).  What is new is, Ezra and Rowden explain, “the 
conditions of financing, production, distribution and reception of cinema today” 
(2006:1). Despite the emphases of transnationality as an inherent characteristic of the 
cinema, obviously, the historicity of the interest in the transnational phenomena is 
rooted in the emergence of the notion of globalisation. As Hunt and Wing-Fai 
remark, leaving aside the contradictions over definition, transnational studies 
generally presents itself with reference to the cultural and economic flows of 
globalisation, the erosion of the traditional nation-state in a globalised world, and the 
idea of a ‘borderless world’ evoked by these socio-historical processes (2008: 3). 
 
Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson’s argument of the globalisation’s effect on the 
formation of cultural identities is important for understanding the criticisms towards 
national cinema from the transnational perspective: 
 
Something like a transnational public sphere has certainly rendered any 
strictly bounded sense of community or locality obsolete. At the same time, 
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it has enabled the creation of forms of solidarity and identity that do not rest 
on an appropriation of space where contiguity and face-to-face contact are 
paramount. (1992: 9) 
 
 
Related to this point, Andrew Higson (2000) criticises the national cinema approach 
asserting that it tends to assume that national identities are fixed in place within 
borders, which are, again, assumed to be effective in shaping these identities. He 
argues that “In fact of course, borders are always leaky and there is a considerable 
degree of movement across them (even in the most authoritarian states). It is in this 
migration, this border crossing, that the transnational emerges” (2000: 61). Higbee 
and Hwee Lim find Higson’s approach problematic on the basis that while seeing the 
national model as ‘limiting’, he draws a national/transnational binary opposition and 
positions the transnational as a subtler means of understanding cinema’s relationship 
to the cultural and economic formations (2010: 9). Regarding the national and the 
transnational as binary notions is the most debatable approach in the transnational 
cinema writing. For example, Sheldon Hsiao-peng Lu’s suggestion is a very 
straightforward expression of this perspective, suggesting that “The study of national 
cinemas must then transform into transnational film studies” (1997: 25).  
 
As Michael Billig simply puts it, “the nation is always a nation in a world of nations. 
‘Internationalism’ is not the polar opposite of ‘nationalism’, as if it constitutes a rival 
ideological consciousness” (2002: 61). In Toby Miller’s words, “We live in an 
international age that by its very formulation decrees that we are also in a national 
one” (1999: 94). And globalisation does not invalidate this principle, inasmuch as the 
world remains to be divided into nation-states. Ezra and Rowden read nationalism as 
“a canny dialogical partner” of transnationalism “whose voice often seems to be 
growing stronger at the very moment that its substance is fading away” (2006: 4). 
This approach represents the wishful thinking that is common in the transnational 
cinema writing, in that it interprets even the continuing power of nationalism as 
evidence to its disappearance. However, as Craig Calhoun underlines, “globalization 
has not put an end to nationalism – not to nationalist conflicts nor to the role of 
nationalist categories in organizing ordinary people’s sense of belonging in the 
world” (2007: 171). We can say that what globalisation has done is introducing new 
power dynamics into the multifaceted relationships between the national and the 
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international; adding new dimensions to our understanding of ‘the nation in a world 
of nations’. As O’Regan’s suggests, these new dynamics “are not eroding the nation 
state so much as inaugurating another turn in the national coordination of a nation’s 
internal and external relations” (1996: 122).  
 
From this perspective, it is not reasonable to turn away from the consideration of the 
national context in film studies, and put forward the concept of transnational cinema 
as a substitution for national cinema, with the proclamation of national cinema as 
either an inadequate, outdated, or politically problematic approach. Instead, the 
transnational enquiries in film studies must be considered as part of the research of 
‘cinema and the national’, focusing on the transnational aspects of the issue with a 
relational approach to the interplay between the subnational, national and 
transnational. As O’Regan suggests, “Like the national cinema itself, national cinema 
writing needs to combine the local and the international” (1996: 3).  
 
In their comprehensive article working through the concepts of transnational cinema, 
Higbee and Hwee Lim argue that it is naive not to see that the transnational model 
also brings with it “boundaries, hegemonies, ideologies, limitations and 
marginalizations of its own kind, or replicate those of the national model” (2010: 10). 
In order to inform these aspects, they designate their paradigm as ‘critical 
transnationalism’ which underlines the necessity of scrutinising the issues regarding 
the national and the transnational with the emphasis of the dialogic character of their 
relationships.  
 
[W]hat we will term a ‘critical transnationalism’ might help us interpret 
more productively the interface between global and local, national and 
transnational, as well as moving away from a binary approach to 
national/transnational and from a Eurocentric tendency of how such films 
might be read. (2010: 10) 
 
While formulating a dialogic relationship between the national and the transnational, 
it is crucial to note that this dialogue does not only consist of contradiction, but it 
also involves coordination and cooperation. And considering that these relationships 
are subject to the manipulation of the power relationships which can, for example, 
render a contradiction into conciliation, this dialogic relationship manifests itself as a 
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rather complex issue. Moreover, although in theoretical debates it sounds like there 
are two actors in question, of course, in reality their reference scope comprises 
multiple nations, which renders the contradiction/cooperation dynamics unstable and 
relative.  
 
Focusing on the increase in the international co-productions in filmmaking, exploring 
the effects of the growing international film funding bodies, researching the 
transnationalisation of the film exhibition and distribution channels, analysing the 
aesthetic or thematic commonalities between the cinemas of the 
intercultural/multicultural/diasporic/ exilic filmmakers, are all significant enquiries 
considering different aspects of the transnationalism in the cinema. However, in 
order to avoid simplistic and hasty conclusions in transnational film studies, the 
political implications of these studies must be taken into central consideration, for the 
overall outcome of these transnational processes is rather complex, as exemplified by 
Higbee and Hwee Lim’s remark that “in fact the national continues to exert the force 
of its presence even within transnational film-making practices” (2010: 10). When 
the transnational aspects of the cinema are isolated from their relational interplay 
with the national, it is not possible to interpret the occasions where the transnational 
dynamics serve to the nationalist ideologies and practices, for example. Or, it is 
possible to ignore the complicated processes like the one John Hill addresses: “While 
British cinema may depend upon international finance and audiences for its viability 
this may actually strengthen its ability to probe national questions” (2006: 110). 
  
 
The Nation and the Subnational 
 
In the national cinema literature, the arguments concerned with the subnational 
issues are mainly structured around the critique of essentialism. The essentialism 
debate in national cinema theory interrogates the affinity of ‘national cinema’ with 
the myths of national unity imposed by the practices of the nation-state and the 
discourses of nationalism. The main concern of this argument is that ‘national 
cinema’ echoes the exercise of nation-states and the discourse of nationalisms in the 
way it manipulates differences into the common denominator of the nation. This 
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argument in film studies follows a paradigm shift in national studies with the impact 
of the prominent works by Ernst Gellner (1983), Eric Hobsbawm (1990), Benedict 
Anderson (1991) and Michael Billig (2002). Breaking the essentialist view that 
naturalises the notion of the nation, this new vein in sociological studies understands 
the nation as a modern creation constructed by nationalism for the ideological needs 
of the modern nation-state, and focuses on the socio-historical mechanisms of nation-
building and nation-maintenance. Hence echoing these sociological debates, film 
scholars have started to track the essentialist reverberations in film studies, and delve 
into the ideological issues that the national cinema concept brings along.  
 
Thomas Elsaesser states that in the early years of film studies, it used to be assumed 
that “the films produced in a particular country “reflect” something essential about 
this country as a “nation”” (2005: 60). He regards Siegfried Kracauer’s study of the 
cinema of the Weimar Republic From Caligari to Hitler(1947) as the founding text 
of essentialist national cinema theory, and argues that following Kracauer, during the 
1950s and 1960s, national cinema has been connoted as “a nation’s unconscious 
deep-structure, the reading of which gave insights about secret fantasies, political 
pressure points, collective wishes and anxieties” (Elsaesser 2005: 64). Elsaesser 
remarks that this approach was dangerous not only because it was essentialist, but 
also because it “risked being tautological, insofar as only those films tended to be 
selected as typical of a national cinema which confirmed the pre-established profile” 
(ibid: 64). This issue is one of the bases of Andrew Higson’s argument, while 
concerning “the limiting imagination of national cinema” (2000). According to him, 
the foundational problem about national cinema is that it bears the assumption that 
national identities are fixed in a unified community. The result of this assumption, 
for Higson, is “the tendency to focus only on those films that narrate the nation as 
just this finite, limited space, inhabited by a tightly coherent and unified community, 
closed off to other identities besides national identity” (2000: 60). Consequently, he 
emphasises the potential inherent in the national cinema concept to function in a way 
parallel to the operation of the nationalist project, in that it closes off the acceptance 
of the diversities within the nation.  
 
While undermining former paradigms, the issue of how to approach ‘national 
cinema’ without falling into the trap of essentialism has been central to the recent 
	

debates on ‘national cinema’. Thus, with the impact of growing sociological research 
on the ideological practices of nation-states to construct, maintain and naturalise the 
nation as a unity, film studies has become more inclined to investigate the ways in 
which national cinemas contribute to the construction of the nation. Susan Hayward 
(2000) is amongst the scholars who suggest a constructivist approach, following the 
inspiration of Gellner’s theory of the nation as an invention of nationalism. Hayward 
argues that nations “disguise themselves as abstract historicised subject-objects” 
(2000: 87) and the applications of national cinema always carry the risk of being in 
line with the masquerading practices of the nation. In this respect, she argues for a 
national cinema approach that would resist the assimilationist discourse of 
nationalism and underlines the significance of analysing national cinemas via the 
question of how they contribute to the construction of nations.  
 
The study of film as a means of social communication has been one of the main 
theoretical approaches in the constructivist view of ‘national cinema’. Philip 
Schlesinger asserts that “questions about ‘national cinema’ may usefully be 
resituated as part of a line of sociological inquiry that centres on the prior matter of 
how the nation may be conceived as a communicative space” (2000: 17). One of the 
earlier studies of this vein by Karl W. Deutsch (1966), which is also the base of 
Schlesinger’s approach, addresses the central role of communication in the 
construction of national identities. According to Deutsch, “Peoples are held together 
“from within” by this communicative efficiency, the complementarity of the 
communicative facilities acquired by their members” (1966: 98).  Deutsch does not 
discuss the role of the media as exclusively as Gellner, or Anderson; he emphasises 
all kinds of socially standardized system of symbols as a part of this social 
communication including the memories, habits, and traditions of a culture. Also, he 
does not particularly mention the nation-state; instead, he refers to the nation as 
‘people’. Schlesinger interprets this point by analysing that Deutsch prefers using the 
notion of ‘people’, because his theory entertains the idea of ‘the nation without a 
state’ without explicitly naming it (2000: 17).   
 
Gellner, on the other hand, regards culture as “the distinctive style of conduct and 
communication of a given community” (1983: 92). His approach is more concerned 
with understanding the nation-building mechanisms of the nation-state; therefore he 
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discusses the role of communication from this perspective and examines the modern 
institutional forms of communication. He argues that the modern media, as the 
nation-wide communication medium, serves the nation-state’s need of binding the 
people together through the very essential structural characteristics of it:  
 
[T]he media themselves, the pervasiveness and importance of abstract, 
centralised, standardised, one to many communication, which itself 
automatically engendered the core idea of nationalism, quite irrespective of 
what in particular is being put into the specific messages transmitted. The 
most important and persistent message is generated by the medium itself, by 
the role which such media have acquired in modern life. (ibid: 127) 
 
Anderson’s theory of ‘imagined communities’ (1991) suggests a similar, but more 
exclusive argument on this issue. Given that Anderson’s concept has been of 
particular interest to national cinema studies, and that the debates around his theory 
touch various significant issues of the national cinema theory, I would like to focus 
on Anderson in more detail. Clearly, one of the reasons Anderson’s concept has been 
consistently appropriated in film studies is the fact that it evokes the imagination 
process inherent in the cinematic mechanism itself. However, how to interpret this 
imagination has been a rather confused and contentious issue. In fact, we can say 
that, the debates on the “imagined communities” theory bear the traces of the 
confusions surrounding the conceptualisation of ‘national cinema’, in general. For 
example, Chris Berry considers Anderson’s theory as the promoter of the 
“conceptual shift that works to erase the naturalized realm of the essential” (1998: 
143), whereas Wimal Dissanayake criticises Anderson’s formulation as it pays scant 
attention to the internal divisions and local resistances the nation contains (1998: 
529). However, even though it has stimulated conflicting interpretations, as Michael 
Walsh observes, “of all the theorists of nationalism in the fields of history and 
political science, Anderson has been the only writer consistently appropriated by 
those working on issues of the national in film studies” (1996: 6). Like Dissanayake, 
Elsaesser also is sceptical about this widely-used appropriation, firstly because he 
questions the significance of the media in shaping national identities. According to 
him, Anderson’s theory has been serving as a rescue for national cinema theories 
through creative misapplications of it. Thus, he asserts that “media studies needed 
Anderson’s arguments more than his arguments needed media studies” (Elsaesser 





If we return to the original theory, for Benedict Anderson, the collective 
consumption of the media is of central importance in the nation-building process. 
The nation is an ‘imagined political community’, because “the members of even the 
smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even 
hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion” 
(Anderson 1991: 6), and according to Anderson, the print media has a central role in 
the creation of this image. Thus, he regards the novel and the newspaper as “two 
forms of imagining” that have a significant role in the birth of the nation as an 
imagined community (ibid: 24). The crucial point regarding the newspaper is that it 
is not the content of the newspaper Anderson places emphasis on; it is the way it is 
consumed largely and the way this consumption creates the feeling of being part of 
the community. While talking about “the almost precisely simultaneous consumption 
(‘imagining’) of the newspaper-as fiction” (ibid: 35), he uses the term ‘consumption’ 
as synonymous with ‘imagining’. This supports the idea that for Anderson, it is the 
time and space consciousness within the national space that generates the ‘imagined 
community’, simply through the act of reading the newspaper at a certain time, in a 
bordered society, simultaneously with the other members of that community. In this 
regard, the newspaper provides a form of imagining before the effect of its content, 
just with the very mechanism of large-scale consumption in a demarcated time and 
space.  
 
This description of the newspaper’s role in the self-imagining process of the national 
community seems to be more analogous to television studies than film studies. This 
is one of the main arguments of Elsaesser; he asserts that for television, there is a 
‘national audience’ and we can speak of a ‘national television’, “but precisely to the 
degree that one is talking about a ‘national cinema’, one is not talking about 
audiences, but filmmakers” (2005: 38). This emphasis is important in that it reminds 
us of the centrality of the audience and consumption to Anderson’s theory. Following 
this argument, Elsaesser’s conclusion is that “the idea of a national self-image 
specific to the cinema and yet with distinct contours in each national media culture is 
therefore – for better or worse – different from Anderson’s imagined communities” 




Although not having a similar mode of consumption with the newspaper, the role of 
the cinema as a form of imagining can be seen more akin to that of the novel. With 
reference to Anderson, Ella Shohat and Robert Stamdraw a continuity between the 
societal function of the novel and the film, as two forms of fiction. Their proposition 
is that the fiction film has “inherited the social role of the nineteenth-century realist 
novel in relation to national imaginaries” (1994: 102). They make particular mention 
of the fiction film because their application of Anderson’s theory to the cinema is 
mainly based on the nation’s need to be narrated: “The cinema, as the world’s 
storyteller par excellence, was ideally suited to relay the projected narratives of 
nations and empires. National self-consciousness, generally seen as a precondition 
for nationhood – that is, the shared belief of disparate individuals that they share 
common origins, status, location, and aspirations – became broadly linked to 
cinematic fictions” (ibid: 101). 
 
This definition of a cinema with regards to nationhood needs some consideration 
from different perspectives. When the concept of imagined community is interpreted 
mainly in terms of the role of story-telling in the formation of communities, it seems 
reasonable to adapt the concept to other community formations as well, given that 
self-narration is fundamental for any community. Hence, Anderson’s theory has been 
widely decontextualized in this sense from its national context and expanded to 
explore other community units. Arjun Appadurai, for instance, remarks that the role 
of the print media addressed by Anderson can be applied to the forms of electronic 
media, and he posits the idea that these new forms of communication can have 
similar or even more powerful effects with the print media, because they do not 
operate only at the level of the nation-state (2000: 8). He discusses the role of the 
electronic media in binding people across borders through transnational 
conversations, and remarks that through the instrument of technological 
developments, a similar link to Anderson’s description can be found between the 
work of the imagination and the emergence of a post-national political world (ibid: 
21-22). Considering the international circulation of films and the increasing role of 
the new electronic media in this circulation, we can say that, unlike the national 
newspaper and national television, the cinema can be regarded as an effective 
channel for imagining communities not only within the nation-state, but also beyond 




Even when we put aside the issue of internationalisation, it is questionable that the 
national audience of cinema is wide enough for the application of Anderson’s theory 
in the sense that Shohat and Stam suggest. Considering cinema as a popular media 
form, Shohat and Stam assert that films have the effect of an “institutional ritual of 
gathering a community” which is “in a sense the symbolic gathering of the nation”, 
and for them, “Anderson’s sense of the nation as ‘horizontal comradeship’ evokes 
the movie audience as a provisional ‘nation’ forged by spectatorship” (1994: 103). 
However, as Hill discusses, it is problematic to assume that national audience is 
homogenous to the nation, given that “even at its peak, the cinema audience was 
never fully representative of the nation” (2006: 105). As Toby Miller suggests, “it is 
hardly an empirical audience arrayed in front of the screen as before the flag at a 
citizenship ceremony” (1999: 94). In this respect, the function of the cinema as a 
story-telling medium cannot be discussed with the presumption of a large national 
audience. For this reason, the societal role of the cinema must be considered as a less 
direct and less instant one, when compared to the newspaper and television. In the 
following parts, I will try to reflect on the issue of ‘cinema and the society’ in 
general, and ‘cinema and the nation’ in particular, from this perspective, and explain 
this assertion in depth.  
 
In conclusion, the reviewed vein of sociological approaches needs an extensive re-
interpretation within the frame of the cinema. The fact that the medium of cinema is 
not as centralised and standardised as Gellner discusses for the media in general is 
significant, because it suggests the potential of cinema to enable the re-imaginations 
of the nation. The faithful applications of Anderson’s theory always carry the risk of 
focusing on the ways films contribute to the binding of the nation, while ignoring the 
cinematic re-imaginations that unbind it. On the other hand, the overall problem 
about the constructivist approach in film studies, and thus the applications of the 
‘imagined community’ concept, is that while arguing against the essentialist 
formulations, they generally portray a national cinema that is subservient to the 
nationalist ideology. However, the study of ‘cinema and the nation’ with respect to 
the notion of communication needs to be reconsidered in a way that is capable of 
informing the power struggles within this dialogue. And for this, as much as 
analysing the power of the dominant agents (in the form of a nation-state or any other 
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forms implying a dominant political actor), it is also important to inform the more 
complex mechanisms of the politics of the nation, for understanding the dynamics of 
diversity and conflict in the national cinema.  
 
 
The Issue of Cultural Specificity 
 
John Hill particularly favours Paul Willemen’s conceptualisation of ‘national 
specificity’ while arguing for the capacity of ‘national cinema’ to encompass 
different ways of addressing the complexity of the nation and to inform the 
diversities of the nation: 
 
The national cinema which genuinely addresses national specificity will 
actually be at odds with the ‘homogenising project’ of nationalism insofar as 
this entails a critical engagement with ‘the complex, multidimensional and 
multidirectional tensions that characterise and shape a social formation’s 
cultural configurations’. (Hill 2006: 110) 
 
As James Chapman mentions, the concept of national cinema inevitably centres 
around the question of what is specific to that cinema with the questions such as 
“What is uniquely ‘British’ about British cinema, or what is specifically ‘German’ 
about German cinema?” (2003: 47). In this sense, it can be argued that the idea of 
specificity is already inherent in the concept. And, for Elsaesser (2005) for instance, 
it is the very idea of the specificity of a nation, and a national cinema, that feeds into 
an essentialist understanding of nation. Therefore, we need to examine Willemen’s 
conceptualisation of specificity more closely to consider how it might be suggesting 
something more than the innate idea of specificity in the national cinema concept.   
 
Willemen basically introduces a national cinema approach that would avoid the 
confusion between the discourses of nationalism and the issue of national specificity. 
He highlights the distinction between “the national identity and the specificity of a 
cultural formation”, and gives the example of black British films as “part of a British 
specificity, but not of a British nationalism” (Willemen 2006: 33). Willemen’s study 
is a significant input into the national cinema theory, as it is one of the first 
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theoretical resistances against the rush to abandon ‘national cinema’ and to discredit 
the significance of the national in film theory. And I particularly find his argument 
valuable for studying the complex issues of ‘nationhood’ that Kurdish films in 
Turkey brings about, however, although agreeing with his general approach, I think 
Willemen’s theory needs to be reworked.  
 
One of the problems about Willemen’s argument is that the source of cultural 
specificity and the way it comes to existence within the socio-historical sphere of the 
nation is not clearly defined. In one part, he identifies the source of the specificity 
primarily in terms of the practices of the nation-state:  
 
[I]n film studies, the issue of specificity is primarily a national one: the 
boundaries of cultural specificity in cinema are established by governmental 
actions implemented through institutions such as the legal framework of 
censorship, industrial and financial measures on the economic level, the 
gearing of training institutions towards employment in national media 
structures, systems of licensing governed by aspects of corporate law, and 
so on for the purposes of film culture.(Willemen 2006: 33) 
 
Here, he points at the direct governmental actions on the cinema for supporting or 
suppressing films as the main determining aspect of the cultural specificity. 
However, the dominance of the nation-state varies in each national cinema case. 
Moreover, this approach is not capable of informing the ways in which cultural 
specificity is at work in the cases of cinemas regarding non-state nations, which is a 
significant aspect for my research. Considering the potency level of the nation-state’s 
power on the cinema and examining the specific ways in which each nation regulates 
the cinema is an important aspect of the study of national cinemas, but not the 
cultural specificities of national cinemas. The concept of cultural specificity must be 
rather formulated in a way that would correspond to the intricacy of the notion of 
‘culture’ it implies. As Edensor suggests, it is not only the state’s legislative 
framework that shapes the national identity and national culture: 
 
[I]n addition to this legal, bureaucratic framework there are familiar places 
and generic landscapes; there are a multitude of shared conventions, habits 
and enactions; there are a plethora of familiar commonly used objects in 
households, communal spaces and in the world of commodities which 
constitute material commonplaces amongst national subjects; and there are 
shared narratives and representations which circulate throughout quotidian 
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life, in the media, in convivial talk and in politics. These numerous cultural 
forms and practices provide an epistemological and ontological basis which 
foregrounds the nation as a hegemonic, common-sense entity. (2002: 4) 
 
From this point of view, I will regard cultural specificity as a favourable concept to 
understand the sophisticated interplay between films and the socio-cultural domain 
of the nation. Later in his article, Willemen discusses the notion of cultural 
specificity from a closer perspective to this approach. Within the context of my 
discussion, the most notable part in Willemen’s article is the piece where he talks 
about the universalising ethnocentricity at work in film studies. He criticises this 
approach because it ignores “the specific knowledges that may be at work in a text, 
such as shorthand references to particular, historically accrued modes of making 
sense (often referred to as cultural traditions)” (Willemen 2006: 35). This point is 
significant for my application of the idea of cultural specificity as a national issue 
and I would like to reinterpret Willemen’s theory starting from here. Tom O’Regan 
understands the concept of cultural specificity with a similar approach to this 
emphasis, attaching importance to the common cultural archives accumulated 
throughout the history of a nation; “each national cinema stresses its social texts, 
drawing as it does on its public record and the cultural archives particular to it. These 
common archives of information, story and archetype are shared by film-maker and 
local audience alike” (1996: 173).  
 
Above I had stated that the social role of the cinema must be considered as a less 
direct and less instant one. In order to develop this assertion it is significant to study 
the ways in which films operate in relation to the ‘historically accrued modes of 
making sense’ within the cultural memory of a nation. This approach might also 
suggest some solutions to the above discussed problems about the research of the 
social function of the cinema with reference to the nation as a communicative space.  
In this regard, Peter Sahlins’s criticism of Anderson’s theory is important; Sahlins 
remarks that “approaches like Anderson’s still fail to focus on the specific ways in 
which individuals and communities construct symbolically, in their own 
communities, the means of linking themselves to the wider worlds of the nation” 
(1998: 32). Stuart Hall’s definition of the nation is akin to that of Anderson, but more 
adequate to respond to Sahlins’s criticism as he identifies the nation as a “symbolic 
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community” and focuses on the “systems of cultural representations” of the nation 
(Hall 1992: 293).  
 
Interpreting the idea of cultural specificity in accordance with Hall’s definition of the 
nation means placing emphasis on the narrational conventions established within a 
culture, as much as the narratives of a culture. Robert Wuthnow (1992) stresses the 
importance of analyzing a culture through the examination of the symbol production, 
symbol manipulation, and symbolic practices within that culture. He remarks that we 
cannot understand a culture through simply thematising the contents of its narratives, 
but we need to examine “the complex relationships between form and content within 
symbolic codes themselves and the ways in which these codes relate to symbolic 
dimensions of the broader social environment” (Wuthnow 1992: 13). Jay Lemke’s 
(1995) study based on the concept of ‘textual politics’ elaborately addresses these 
symbolic dimensions for explaining the political aspects of the cultural texts 
circulating in a community:  
 
Sign systems are semiotic resource systems; they enable us to make 
meaningful actions (including utterances) by deploying these resources in 
recognizable, mostly habitual (and marginally creative) ways. The habitual 
ways in which we deploy them are identifiable as semiotic formations: the 
regular and repeatable, recognizably meaningful, culturally and historically 
specific patterns of co-deployment of semiotic resources in a community. 
(1995: 85) 
 
Following this point we can regard nation as a cultural domain where the 
recognizably meaningful semiotic codes operate within the same resource system 
shared by its members. Norman Fairclough refers to the formation of a common 
cultural archive with the concept of ‘members’ resources’, “which people have in 
their heads and draw upon when they produce or interpret texts - including their 
knowledge of language, representations of the natural and social worlds they inhabit, 
values, beliefs, assumptions, and so on” (Fairclough 1996: 24).  
 
Here, it is important to note that the notion of a shared ‘resource system’ does not 
refer to an ideological agreement or a political consensus, and it does not exclude the 
societal conflicts and power struggles. On the contrary, I suggest that the recognition 
of the same codes within the same system is the necessary ground for the practice of 
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re-framing, re-coding, and subverting these codes. Thus in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, 
this point will be significant for my analysis of representations of the Kurdish issue 
in cinema as well as the public reception of these representations in Turkey in the 
2000s. The transformation of the cultural codes with the impact of societal struggles, 
or the deployment of the cultural codes for re-coding them as a political textual 
strategy, can only happen on the ground of a shared ‘meaning system’, that provides 
the contextuality within which individual images, symbols and texts make sense in a 
particular way: “Meaning consists in relations and systems of relations of relations. 
These relations are basically contextualizing relations; they tell us what the contexts 
are in relation to which an act or event has its meanings in our community” (Lemke 
1995: 142).   
 
Studying the cultural specificity of national cinemas within the context I suggest 
means examining the filmic text within the web of its intertextual relationships with 
other cultural texts that contribute to the shared ‘meaning system’. Drawing upon 
Mikhail Bakhtin’s theorisation of intertextuality, Ron Scollon remarks that “all 
communication is positioned within multiple, overlapping, and even conflicting 
discourses”, and “all communications (particular utterances) borrow from other 
discourses and texts and are, in turn, used in later discourses”(2001: 8). Here, I attach 
importance to the question Fairclough raises asking how exactly texts draw upon, 
incorporate, recontextualize and engage in dialogue with other texts (2003: 17). 
Fairclough emphasises the aspect of intertextuality that focuses on the relationship 
between texts, on the one hand, and the ideological structures and societal struggles, 
on the other. In this regard, while deploying the concept of intertextuality, I do not 
only refer to the contact between film texts. Because as O’Regan remarks, “the 
intertextuality of film-making is not only an accomplishment turning on relations 
with other films but also on relations with other social and textual entities outside 
film” (1996: 173). Also, my interest is not only of the intertextual relationships 
surrounding films at the thematic level, which is easier to observe and analyse, but 
also the intertextuality enabled through the shared symbolic meaning systems.  
 
From this perspective, cultural specificity can also be interpreted within the context 
of ‘collective memory’. Maurice Halbwachs (1992), a student of Durkheim and 
Bergson, introduced the concept of ‘collective memory’ which posited the view that 
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all memory is a social phenomenon. He was the first to theorise individual memory 
as a phenomenon structured by a communal sense of the past constructed by social 
groups. He argues that what we remember, as well as why and how we remember it, 
is strongly informed by collectively inscribed versions of the past. Halbwach’s 
concept of collective memory has been widely used in studies regarding the 
communal sense of belonging and the formation of social identities shaped by the 
feeling of being a part of ‘a communal past’ and the idea that there is “some 
connection between what happened in general and how they were involved as 
individuals” (Dijck 2004: 267). It is through collective memory that individuals’ 
sense of time extends beyond their lifespans and their identities span the history of 
the social group, thus embodying the narration of events that happened long before 
the individual existed. It is mainly this point that makes the notion of collective 
memory particularly significant in the analysis of the formation and maintenance of 
nationhood. In line with sociological enquiries that de-mythicise the nation, 
Halbwach’s theory of collective memory has been widely applied in analyses of the 
construction of the idea of ‘national unity’ and ‘national identities’ through the 
narration of a mythical past of the nation, inscribing a nation’s past into the collective 
memory of its members. For example, Susan Hayward points out that “Nationalism’s 
investment in history to create its nation and its identity means that the modern 
nation is built on shared memories of some past or pasts that can mobilise and unite 
its members” (2000: 83). 
 
Collective memory is a valuable concept in understanding how nationalism 
constructs a national past, and through the institutional mechanisms of the state, it 
ensures that the members of the nation not only share knowledge about this narrated 
past, but also share a common interpretation of and shared feelings regarding the 
nation’s past. However, national formation is never a conflict-free process, and 
constructed collective memory is always fraught with contested narratives and 
discordant feelings about significant events in a given national history. As Sune 
Haugbolle argues, “Despite its significance, state-centred nationalism only accounts 
for the production, not the reception and ensuing negotiation, of national memory”. 




Despite nationalist imagination’s predilection for immutable history, the 
negotiation of national memory continues to evolve in ways that incorporate 
recent events and give new meaning to old myths, and indeed undermine 
those myths. In the evolving histories of states, revolution, war and national 
liberation generate new foci for nationalist imagination. (2010: 8) 
 
Thus, as the history of the nation evolves, the collective memory of the nation also 
evolves with the driving force of diverse agents recalling historical events that were 
excluded from the narration of the national past, re-interpreting well-known events, 
undermining national myths, and fracturing the monolithic picture of collective 
memory. The original conception of collective memory does not imply absolute 
agreement among the members of a group, and as Halbwachs argues, collective 
memory is not conflict-free terrain. The question is whether we can talk about a 
collective memory if there is always contestation about political interpretations of the 
past, or if narrations of the past are not monolithic but a conflictingly polyphonic. 
The answer should be yes, based on an understanding of collective memory that 
emphasises sharing and not necessarily agreeing. As Jose van Dijck states, 
individuals “may ‘share’ a memory even if their accounts are antithetical” (2004: 
267). Or, in Hobsbawm’s words, “To be a member of any human community is to 
situate oneself with regard to one’s (its) past, if only by rejecting it”(1972: 3). This 
idea of a collective memory does not exclude on the contrary necessarily include the 
socio-political disagreements over the communal past. This approach will be central 
to my analysis of representations of the past in Kurdish films and the receptions of 
these representations in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, where I will reinterpret Willemen’s 
notion of “cultural specificity” from the perspective of collective memory 
specifically in the national context of Turkey.  
 
Jill A. Edy remarks that “the idea that multiple and competing versions of the past 
might somehow be pulled together and represented as the collective memory—the 
story that everyone knows—is generally absent from the literature on collective 
memory” (2006: 3). This point links back to my argument on the issue of ‘cultural 
specificity’ and my reinterpretation of it with reference to Lemke’s idea of a common 
‘resource system’ in a society, as well as Fairclough’s theory on ‘members’ 




consensus but refer to the significance of the recognition of the same codes by 
members of a society in the same system. 
 
Within the domain of a shared system of meaning, or a shared memory, an object 
seen in the background of a frame, or the accent of a character, a landscape, or any 
detail in a filmic text for that matter, can “become identifiable symbolic cultural 
elements. And the process of representation adds a further density to the ways in 
which these are apprehended, producing more points of association through which 
they accrue meaning” (Edensor 2002: 140). In this way, recognised cultural codes 
appeal to members’ resources or shared memories via the superimposition of the 
film’s symbolic system with the socio-historically familiar symbols of the culture of 
the nation. In this sense, we can say that the cultural specificity of the nation is one of 
the contextual powers that significantly influence the meaning of filmic texts. In this 
point of view, cultural specificity in national cinema implies a common ‘resource 
system’ with the usage of the same cultural codes in processes of encoding and 
decoding.  
 
Thus, the cultural specificity of a nation provides a meaning layer in the filmic texts, 
which is specific to the members who recognise the connotative meanings embedded 
in the symbolic system of films, and which is lost in translation outside the domain 
of that cultural specificity. Here, I am not referring to the idea of an ‘original 
meaning’ of a filmic text which can be misinterpreted outside its own cultural roots, 
and I am not interested in the argument of the productive (or unproductive) 
‘misreadings’ in the frame of this study. But I am simply referring to the shifting 
meaning structures in different contexts, which means placing emphasis on the 
specific meanings of films which can only occur in the national cultural domain, with 
an interest of the way these specific meanings shape the cultural meaning and the 
societal function of films within the politics of the nation. And this argument will be 
highly significant in Chapter 6, where I analyse the public reception of Kurdish films 
in Turkey in the 2000s and interpret diverse interpretations, contextualisations and 
manipulations of film meaning and interrogate the intertextual dialogues of film texts 





The Validity of National Cinema as a Concept 
 
From this point, I would like to return to the beginning and reflect on the 
functionality of national cinema as a concept. I have been building my argument 
mainly through responding to the literature of the ‘essentialist versus constructivism’ 
debate. However, in the progress of national cinema theory, the essentialism debate 
has gone beyond the criticism of early film studies and resulted in a scepticism about 
the concept of national cinema at large with a suspicion towards the possibility of 
national cinema studies escaping any forms of essentialism. In this direction, the 
constructivist approach has also become subject to criticism. According to this, the 
argument is no longer about deciding on the most appropriate approach to national 
cinema, but rather questioning the validity of the concept altogether. In this vein, 
Thomas Elsaesser states that, from a historical perspective, the classic analyses of 
national cinemas were on the whole essentialist, including the ones applying a 
constructivist approach, because “they looked to the cinema, its narratives, 
iconography or recurring motifs with the expectation that they could reveal 
something unique or specific about a country’s values and beliefs” (2005: 64). From 
this point of view, given that national cinema concept inevitably implies the notion 
of national specificity, any study researching films in terms of national specificity 
becomes questionable, regardless of the paradigm they suggest. This is the 
suggestion of Elsaesser while asserting that “national cinema has become a floating 
designation, neither essentialist nor constructivist, but more like something that 
hovers uncertainly over a film’s “identity” (ibid: 76). Then, we must ask, is ‘national 
cinema’ nothing more than a blank signifier if it refers to a non-existent, but imposed 
national specificity?  
 
At this point we need to make a distinction between the study of ‘national cinema’ 
and the study of ‘cinema and the national’ in order to minimise the confusing aspects 
of the debate, because in some cases the criticisms originally directed to certain ways 
of approaching national cinema also sound like alluding to the invalidity of studying 
films with regards to nationhood at all. To clear up this vagueness, we can draw a 
distinction between pronouncing the insignificance of the national context in film 
studies altogether, and accepting the continuing significance of the national while 
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finding the concept of national cinema problematic. I believe that so far it must be 
clear that my approach in this study emphasises the significance of the national in the 
cinema, and finds it crucial to stress the materiality of the concepts of nation and 
nationalism within the context of their socio-historical background, and recognise the 
need to understand “how they are produced and reproduced, how they work and how 
they can be changed” (Calhoun 2007: 9).  
 
When we affirm the significance of the national for film analysis from this point of 
view, it then becomes a question of the appropriateness of ‘national cinema’ as a 
concept for the examination of this significance. Following the anti-essentialist 
critical vein in national cinema theory, Chris Berry and Mary Farquhar also remark 
that the national in films can no longer be studied adequately using “the old national 
cinemas approach, which took the national for granted as something known” (2006: 
2). However, they also argue against the rush to abandon the national altogether, and 
suggest “a reconfiguration of the academic discourse known as “national cinemas” as 
an analytic framework within which to examine cinema and the national” (ibid: 8). 
According to them, the old national cinema model which assumed that “nation-states 
were stable and coherent and that films expressed singular national identity” (ibid: 
195) needs to be abandoned, but the study of ‘cinema and the national’ is still 
significant as “a framework within which to consider a range of questions and issues 
about the national” (ibid: 2).  
 
Like Berry and Farquhar, John Hill (2006) also emphasises the ongoing significance 
of the national, but, unlike them, he does not find it necessary to change the 
discourse to discredit the national cinema concept. He argues against the 
formulations of ‘national cinema’ which regard the concept as if it is by definition 
linked to the myths of national unity. While discussing the British cinema, Hill 
argues that “this formulation of a national cinema underestimates the possibilities for 
a national cinema to reimagine the nation, or rather nations within Britain. And also 
to address the specificities of a national culture in a way which does not presume a 
homogenous or ‘pure’ national identity” (2006: 110). When we consider that national 
cinema theory has already been accommodating a wide variety of research 
addressing the political complexities of the notion of nation, Hill’s argument 
becomes more sensible. At this point it is worth remarking that the proportion of 
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critical studies in the national cinema literature has now become much larger than the 
old national cinema approaches they argue against. In fact, the awareness of the 
ideological ballast ‘national cinema’ carries has become so well established in the 
film theory that any new researcher in the area now gets acquainted with the 
literature through the criticisms of the old national cinema view, before a first-hand 
encounter with the subject of criticism. In this sense, studies regarding ‘cinema and 
the national’ might benefit from not structuring the argument against an insubstantial 
opponent any more.  
 
‘National cinema’ as a concept does not have to ignore the multidimensional 
conflicts within the nation, and stressing the significance of the national does not 
have to lead to studies that focus only on the films that narrate the nation as a unified 
community, as Higson (2000) suggests. On the contrary, the cinema of a nation can 
be conceived as one of the observational fields for exploring the cleavages of the 
nation. If homogeneity is an imposition of the governing power of the nation-state, in 
imposing homogeneity, it always has to expose heterogeneity. The exercise of power 
for this imposition works by repressing and oppressing the dissonant voices that 
break the forced monotone harmony. However, no oppression is entirely successful, 
no repression can completely erase the repressed, and the marginalised persists in the 
margins of the society. In this regard, within the cinema of a nation, we can explore 
not only how the myth of unity is imposed, but also how it cannot entirely be 
imposed; we can analyse how the imposition of homogeneity works, but also how it 
does not and cannot work. We can always hear the repressed, oppressed, 
marginalised, expelled voices from within the fissures of the enforced monophony, 
and cinema is one of the cultural territories of societal fissures. In this respect, it is 
would be reasonable to suggest the value of retaining the national cinema as a 
concept for the very reasons that Berry and Ferquhar suggest avoiding it; it could be 
argued that it is significant to keep the concept in use while studying diversities and 
conflicts in order to emphasise that that is exactly what a national cinema is, or what 
it could be; a territory of diversities and cleavages bearing the traces of the societal 
conflicts the nation embodies. National cinema as a concept implies homogeneity, 
whereas the films that embody it suggest heterogeneity; this tension is the essential 




On the other hand, as the subject of this research exemplifies, some cases particularly 
expose this definitional tension, and thus overflow this tension. It is common in the 
national cinema writing to simply list diverse types of conflicts consecutively while 
talking about the inner divisions of the nation. An example can be seen in Elsaesser’s 
argument: “A nation, especially when used in a context that suggests cultural 
identity, must repress differences of class, gender, race, religion, and history in order 
to assert its coherence, and is thus another name for internal colonization” (2005: 
36). However, it is important to study these diverse dynamics of conflicts separately, 
with a close examination of the specific tension forms in their relationships with the 
nation. In the case of Kurdish films in Turkey, for instance, the division of ethnicity 
as an inner conflict functions in a way that essentially fractures Turkish cinema. 
Different from the class, gender, or race differences, ethnic differences carry the 
potential of questioning national cinema from the very basis of it, and thus reaching 
to a point where it cannot be regarded as an element in the definitional heterogeneity 
of the nation. In other words, two separate claims of national homogeneity cannot 
live under the same roof of heterogeneity inherent in the national cinema concept. 
“What happens then?” is generally one of the main questions I will address in detail 
in Chapter 4. But in order to find the theoretical frame for addressing this question, 
here, I find it useful to reflect on the way film categories operate, in general.  
 
 
The Issue of Categorising Films 
 
While reflecting on national cinema as a category, first of all, it is worth 
remembering that conceptualising and categorising processes are the main principles 
of human thinking; basic thinking tools of our minds for making sense of (or 
representing) the world. And all categories created by the human mind ignore 
differences within the category, whether it be colours, or tables, or films which are 
being culturally organised. Converging divergent elements is what categorising most 
simply is, and categorising is always attributing coherence. In this respect, there is a 
confusing aspect to the criticisms of ‘national cinema’ in terms of the essentialism 




While discussing the possibility/impossibility of ‘national cinema’ to inform the 
contradictory voices within the nation, it is important to note that the problems 
relating to the conceptualisation of ‘national cinema’ are not unique to but common 
to all film categories. For example women’s cinema, Middle Eastern Cinema, French 
New Wave cinema, New Hollywood cinema, transnational cinema, or queer cinema 
are all selective, homogenising concepts, closed to differences within the group. And 
they all have the tendency to focus only on those films that enable the relevant 
category, just as Higson (2000) suggests national cinema does. Again, each of these 
categories select some films amenable to its process of grouping, each “attributes a 
weight” to “large blocks of textuality”, as Philip Rosen argues with respect to 
national cinema (2006: 17). Thus, the criticism of national cinema cannot be simply 
conducted on the basis that, while labelling films with regards to the nation, it 
ignores differences. Any selective grouping requires determining the primary/central 
point according to which all other elements would be secondary/contingent. Ignoring 
differences is culturally inevitable, and methodologically legitimate.  
 
Another problem about the criticism of national cinema as a category can be 
identified in relation to the socio-cultural historicity of film categories. While 
underlining the fact that the same principles are at work for all film categories, it is 
also important to differentiate film categories in terms of the social dynamics that 
have given birth to them. For example, some film categories come into existence 
directly through the agency of their producers. Third Cinema, or Dogma Cinema, for 
example, are based on manifestos, thus for the study of these categories, this 
declaration of commonality, or the claim for being regarded as a coherent unity, 
would inevitably be a key reference to the analysis. Here, the category is not an 
attribution of film theory, but the presentation of filmmakers. This is an example of 
the cases where the category is a found-category for the theoretician. Whether a 
category is established within the discipline of film theory for methodological use, or 
has its roots outside the realm of theory, is always a significant differentiation for the 
analysis of that category. For example, ‘accented cinema’ is a concept introduced by 
Hamid Naficy (2001) that suggests categorising some certain films under this 
concept; it is a theoretical/methodological category invented for the needs of the 
analysis of some aspects of a certain group of films. So, in some cases, it is the film 
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theoretician who suggests contextualising a group of films under a theoretically 
defined category, which previously does not have a life outside of theory. Other film 
categories, however, are not solely subject to the acknowledgement of the discipline 
of film theory. 
 
Returning to our original argument, although film theory has had a major role in the 
establishment of national cinema as a category, it is an example of a film category 
that is not introduced and maintained by the discipline of film theory per se. The 
differentiation drawn between film categories with reference to their relationship to 
theory is crucial to our argument, because national cinema debates mostly address 
national cinema as if it is just a theoretical category. Hence there is a tendency to 
question the legitimacy of national cinema in a way as if the history of national 
cinema approach starts with the analysis of them, and would end with the decision of 
abandoning the concept. However, despite all the theoretical enquiries of the last 
three decades, national cinema as a category continues to be in circulation; French 
cinema, Russian Cinema, Japanese cinema, may all be found in a festival catalogue, 
on a DVD cover, or in a film review, and thus the nationality of a film continues to 
be one of the main references contextually framing films. Even when we have a look 
at the list of the festivals happening in London, we see that the majority of the 
numerous festivals in London are nationally labelled ones: Korean, Greek, Iranian, 
Romanian, Turkish, Portuguese, Russian film festivals, just to name a few. This 
picture exposes a gap between theory and the culture it engages in, that needs to be 
reflected upon.  
 
This discussion brings us to the need of understanding ‘national cinema’ as 
something more than a theoretical tool, but as a long-established cultural entity. Like 
all cultural entities it embodies contradictory views concerning its definition insofar 
as it bears the history of social dynamics and power relationships. Tom O’Regan’s 
study of Australian cinema is one of the seminal works regarding my argument, since 
it emphasises that “for a national cinema to function it must become ‘an object of 
knowledge’. It must be put into discourse: narrated, discursively represented by 
tropes, words, phrases, archives, verbal associations, texts” (1996: 25), and thus he 
involves the cultural construction of Australian cinema in his study, exploring the 
ways Australian cinema becomes an object of knowledge. He remarks that from 
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audiences to film critics, from filmmakers to governments, “diverse agents take up 
film stories using them for their own purposes” (ibid: 15). He emphasizes that 
national cinema is discursively produced and regards it as “a domain in which 
different knowledges are produced and brought into relation” (ibid: 25), and, stresses 
that his task is not one of deciding the right way of defining the Australian cinema, 
but of “showing how each element explains and discloses something about it” (ibid: 
4). I believe that this approach, which suggests that we take into consideration the 
diverse definitions, interpretations, cultural usages, political contextualisations and 
power struggles regarding the national cinema of a country, must be one of the main 





The national cinema debate is significant for this thesis as one of my main aims in 
the following chapters is to interrogate the political dynamics of the nation in the 
realm of cinema and address the complex relationships between film and politics in 
the national context through the case of Kurdish films in Turkey. While arguing for 
the continuing significance of the national context for film studies, this chapter 
engaged with the literature on national cinema in terms of subnational and 
transnational issues. These arguments are particularly important for the rest of this 
thesis because the recent emergence of Kurdish films in Turkey is a dynamic which 
has put pressure on Turkish national identity and Turkish cinema from within (at the 
subnational level, by questioning the very definition of Turkishness and hence the 
notion of Turkish cinema) and from outside (at the transnational level, by being a 
part of Kurdish cinema as a transnational cinema). 
 
In this chapter I suggested that rather than constructing ‘transnational cinema’ as a 
substitution for ‘national cinema’, we need to formulate a dialogic relationship 
between the national and the transnational which not only consists of contradictions 
but also involves coordination. On the other hand, I tackled the debate over 
essentialism in the literature on national cinema at length as part of my exploration of 
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subnational issues. I suggested that analysing films with regards to nationhood does 
not have to presuppose an essentialist view, feed into myths of national unity, or 
ignore the diversities and conflicts within the nation. On the contrary, the cinema of a 
nation is a territory of diversities and cleavages that bears the traces of the societal 
conflicts that the nation embodies. Hence I remarked that national cinema as a 
concept implies homogeneity, whereas the films of a nation expose heterogeneity, 
and concentrating on this tension is essential to the study of cinema and the national. 
An emphasis on the interactions between films and national dynamics of diversity 
and conflict is central to the study of Kurdish films in Turkey, as these films direct 
their cameras to the national past, display the price that the Kurdish people have paid 
as the result of state ideologies which imposed the idea of an ethnically homogenous 
nation, and bring forward issues regarding the bitter conflict that emerged in the 
national context.  
 
In discussing British cinema, John Hill (1992) argues that the existence of Black 
cinema, or Scottish cinema, makes it impossible to define a homogenous national 
cinema and suggests that it would be preferable to refer to ‘national cinemas’ instead 
of a single ‘national cinema’. How does this discussion relate to the example of 
Kurdish cinema in Turkey? Is the antagonism between the nationalist practices of the 
Turkish nation-state and Kurdish nation-building practices reciprocated in the 
controversial relationship between Turkish cinema and Kurdish cinema? How do 
these two concepts, referring to two diverse national identities, yet existing within 
the same nation-state borders influence the definition of each other? In the following 
chapters, I will address these questions by investigating the conceptual debates on 
Kurdish cinema and Turkish cinema in Turkey in the 2000s. That investigation will 
link back to one of the focuses in this chapter on the issue of categorising films in 
general and the question of how to tackle national cinema as a concept. Tom 
O’Regan’s general perspective on national cinema and his suggestion that we 
examine national cinema as an ‘object of knowledge’ will be central in the following 
chapters in which I identify Turkey as the national scale where the antagonism 
between Turkish nationalist discourses and practices and Kurdish nation-building 
discourses and practices are reciprocated in the constructions and interpretations of 
‘Turkish cinema’ and ‘Kurdish cinema’ during a time of political turbulence. In this 
way, my lengthy conceptual argument in this chapter will be crucial for my analysis 
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of the notions of ‘Kurdish cinema’ and ‘Turkish cinema’; and rather than merely 
‘defining’ them, I will investigate the construction, contextualisation, and political 
manipulation of these concepts in Turkey in the 2000s.  
 
Another key debate in this chapter was on Willemen’s conceptualisation of ‘cultural 
specificity’. I suggested that this concept can be reworked to allow for an 
examination of the filmic text within the web of its intertextual relationships with 
other cultural texts in a specific socio-historical context; for analysing how films 
operate in relation to the ‘historically accrued modes of making sense’ within a 
nation. I argued that within the domain of a shared system of meaning, recognised 
cultural codes appeal to ‘members’ resources’(Fairclough 1996: 24) via the 
superimposition of the film’s symbolic system with the socio-historically familiar 
symbols of the culture of the nation. Building upon this point, I suggested that the 
cultural specificity of the nation is one of the contextual powers that has a major 
influence on the meaning of filmic texts. In this point of view, cultural specificity in 
national cinema implies a common ‘resource system’ (Lemke 1995) through the 
usage of the same cultural codes in processes of encoding and decoding. This was 
one of the key arguments of this chapter, which also influences the overall 
perspective of this thesis in the examination of the predominant meanings that are 





CHAPTER 3:  






‘New Turkey’ is a widely and increasingly deployed concept in academic studies as 
well as political analyses that focus on the recent historical period in Turkey. Turkey 
has been under a significant socio-political transformation since the early 2000s; a 
transformation instigated and led by the AKP (Justice and Democracy Party) which 
has been in government since 2002. In fact, ‘new Turkey’ is a concept which was 
initially introduced by the AKP itself. Routinely declaring “its commitment to the 
idea of transformation” (Duran 2008: 80), AKP discourses constructed two diverse 
images of Turkey, drawing a sharp line between what they called the ‘old Turkey’ 
and the “new Turkey”. ‘Old Turkey’ was a reference to the Turkey under the rule of 
the Kemalist elites – that is from the foundation of the Republic in 1923 up until the 
2000s – , whereas ‘new Turkey’ signalled, and in fact proclaimed, the beginning of a 
brand new phase in Turkey in the AKP era. Although the continuities and 
discontinuities between Kemalism – the traditional official ideology of the Turkish 
state named after Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the Turkish Republic – and 
the AKP’s ideology has been subject to debate, it is undeniable that the AKP 
government “signifies the beginning of a new phase of interaction between 
secularism and Islam, state and society, and politics and society” (Çınar 2008: 111).  
 
Turkey in the 2000s witnessed “the structural disintegration of dominant power 
relations and paradigms in Turkey” (Cizre 2008a: 4) as a result of the reorganisation 
of key state institutions; the revision of some fundamental principles of traditional 
state ideology; the displacement of long-standing official policies towards some key 
national issues; the attempt to redefine national identity; and the re-narration of some 
significant aspects of the national past. In this sense, the political transformation 
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Turkey witnessed in the 2000s was a transformation concerning the very definition 
of the nation, national identity and national history. And the consequence of this was 
an unprecedented power struggle over who controlled the definition and narration of 
the nation in Turkey, which initiated heated public debates nationwide on various 
key national issues, not only between political actors and public figures, but also 
amongst the confused ordinary citizens witnessing this transformation.  
 
As the long-standing Kurdish conflict in Turkey was one of the main issues which 
necessitated such a dramatic shift in the foundational state ideologies and policies 
and which was one of the key areas of transformation, examining the political 
dynamics of this transformation is vital for the study of Kurdish films in Turkey. 
Mapping out the historical and socio-political context by focusing on the key events 
and prominent political debates within this period is quite necessary for and closely 
related to my analysis of Kurdish films in Turkey in the following chapters. For this 
research, which aspires to develop a contextual film analysis approach, this chapter is 
essential beyond simply giving a general idea about the socio-historical background 
of the films under investigation. While analysing the reverberations of the emergence 
of the concept of ‘Kurdish cinema’ in Turkey in Chapter 4, conducting a context-
specific formal and thematic analysis of individual Kurdish films in Chapter 5, and 
investigating the public reception and political impact of these Kurdish films in the 
2000s Turkey in Chapter 6, it will be necessary to remember the key arguments 
addressed in this chapter regarding the general characteristics of this era in Turkey as 
well as some specific historical developments of the period under consideration.  
 
 
The Emergence of the AKP as a New Political Actor in Turkey 
 
 “Islamist movements are almost exclusively seen as anti-modern, anti-democratic 
and mostly violent political movements based primarily on the portrayal of Islam as 
an essentially dysfunctional religion for both modernity and democracy” (Çınar and 
Duran 2008: 17). This understanding of Islam as a religion incompatible with 
modern Western values had been fully appropriated by the founding elite of the 
Turkish Republic in their imagining of Turkey as a Muslim yet strictly secular 
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country highly committed to the project of Westernisation. “The authoritarian 
nationalist military officers, bureaucrats, academics, journalists and intellectuals who 
formed the nucleus of the Kemalist elite were profoundly affected by European 
thought” (Zeydanlıoğlu 2008: 161), and, the national goal of the Kemalist leadership 
was the ‘achievement of contemporary civilization’, a formula that equated 
modernization with Westernization. Within this perspective, Islam was considered to 
represent “a set of traditions, values, legal rules, and norms which were intrinsically 
non-Western in character and hence an inherent obstacle to be overcome” (Gülalp 
2003: 388). And this approach has been one of the fundamental components of state 
ideology for decades since the foundation of the republic.  
 
On the other hand, however, despite this secularist conception of Islam as an obstacle 
and threat to the republic, Kemalist policies towards Islam cannot be conceived of 
simply and merely in terms of exclusion and oppression. As Sakallıoglu remarks, 
since its inception, “the Turkish state adopted a double discourse: on the one hand 
establishing a rigid segregation between Islam and the political realm: on the other, 
accommodating and incorporating Islamic politics into the system in various ways” 
(Sakallıoğlu 1996: 231). This “double discourse” is evident in the very definition of 
Turkish national identity by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk which involves, and does not 
exclude, religion as one of the unifying factors cementing the Turkish Republic as a 
new nation-state.  
 
Atatürk’s own notion of secularism (laiklik) imagined a religiously 
homogeneous, rather than pluralist, nation. [...] Even though Atatürk’s goal 
was to eliminate the public role of religion, his anti-clerical yet homogenizing 
policies amounted to forcing the entire Muslim-born population to conform to 
Sunni Muslim orthodoxy in religious practices and education. In Perry 
Anderson’s (2008) words, “Turkish secularism has always depended on what 
it repressed,” that is to say, religious identity (Bakıner 2013: 701).  
 
Sultan Tepe also argues against the common misconception of the relationship 
between Kemalism and Islam simply as a power struggle between two antagonistic 
forces, and she writes: 
 
Since the foundation of the Turkish Republic, Islam has performed a dual and 
contradictory role. The state elite have often relied on Islam as a common 
identity marker of the peoples who constitute the Turkish nation. It has also 
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perceived Islam as a threat, because of its inherent capacity to challenge state 
power by offering an alternative source of legitimacy (2006: 110).  
 
This argument is significant for the following sections in this chapter for 
understanding the characteristics of politics in Turkey in the 2000s, following the rise 
of the AKP. Because the misrepresentation of the historical relationship between the 
Kemalists and the Islamic movement as mere antagonism has been one of the key 
discourses of the AKP, and, in its struggle for gaining legitimacy and popularity, the 
AKP government has benefited from presenting itself as the ultimate rival and the 
victim of the Kemalist regime. Hence, in the 2000s, it has become common in the 
wider public’s perception to dismiss the fact that, for the Turkish state, political 
Islam has not been an ultimate enemy that has to be entirely erased from the social 
structure, but a dangerous, yet functional, social dynamic that needs to be kept alive, 
but under control, as an instrument appropriated in the processes of the construction 
and maintenance of the nation. 
 
Historical developments from 1980 to the present depict the paradoxical nature of the 
Kemalist attitude towards Islam and also demonstrate the active role of the Kemalist 
elites in the growing power of the pro-Islamic movement in Turkey. The military 
coup experienced in 1980 marks one of the most dramatic turning points in Turkish 
history. The September 12 military coup, which introduced a sudden, dramatic and 
forced transformation in Turkey in every socio-political aspect, was a milestone also 
in terms of the place and the role of political Islam on the Turkish political stage. 
Before 1980, Turkey had already experienced two successive military interventions, 
in 1960 and in 1971. Since the foundation of the republic, the military has been the 
backbone of the Kemalist state and the TSK (Turkish Army Forces) has always 
considered itself to be the true owner of the Kemalist state. As Sakallıoğlu expresses 
it, “the ultimate justification for the military's political predominance rests on its 
‘guardianship of the national interest’, of which maintaining national unity is 
considered to be the most important component” (1997: 154). Thus, the three 
successive military interventions experienced at ten-year intervals demonstrate the 
TSK’s “capacity to militarize political issues that it categorizes as ‘regime issues’” 




The 1980 military coup was a counter-revolutionary act carried out by the Kemalist 
establishment against the socialist revolutionary movement in Turkey, which had 
increasingly gained strength during the 1960s and the 1970s. During these years, 
communism was regarded by the Turkish state as the biggest threat to the regime 
and, of course, the existence of the Soviet Union just on the other side of the Black 
Sea was something that amplified this fear of communism. In 1980, the TSK played 
its ‘guardian role’ to protect the Kemalist regime and staged a coup against the 
‘threat of communism’. As Feroz Ahmad remarks, “the principal concern of the junta 
was the political and institutional restructuring of the country and they set about the 
task with great abandon. They were determined to de-politicise the urban youth who 
had come to play such an important role since the 1960s. That required crushing 
every manifestation of dissent from the left” (1993: 184). The initial steps of the 
junta involved the physical destruction of all democratic and socialist groups by 
brutal military force. Thus, the September 12 coup was one of the bloodiest coup 
experiences in world history. 
 
A total of 650,000 people were detained and most suspects were either beaten 
or tortured. Over 500 people died while under detention as a result of torture; 
85,000 people were placed on trial mainly in relation to thought crimes by 
association; 1,683,000 people were officially listed in police files as suspects; 
348,000 Turks and Kurds were banned from travelling abroad; 15,509 people 
were fired from their jobs for political reasons; 114,000 books were seized 
and burned; 937 films were banned; 2,729 writers, translators, journalists and 
actors were put on trial for expressing their opinions. (Zeydanlıoğlu 2009: 79) 
 
 
On the other hand, the military coup was not just a reactionary and short-sighted 
move with the sole purpose of demolishing the socialist movement; it was the first 
stage of a major plan for socio-political transformation envisioned by the Kemalist 
establishment. Amongst the large-scale and multifaceted transformations 
experienced in Turkey with the 1980 coup, one that is significant for our discussion 
is the shifting official policy towards Islam and Islamic movements in the post-coup 
era. Following the physical destruction of the socialist movement, some long-term 
policies were adopted to prevent the emergence of a similar ‘threat of communism’ 
in the future. One of these policies against the left was “to engineer a new form of 
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depoliticized Turkish-Islamic culture” (Yavuz 2003: 73) by encouraging religious 
dynamics in society and smoothing the way for Islamic movements.   
 
The generals who came to power on September 12, 1980, instead of showing 
secular disregard for Islam, took several steps to strengthen it. [...] The 
leaders of the military coup, ironically, depended on Islamic institutions and 
symbols for legitimization; fusing Islamic ideas with national goals, they 
hoped to create a more homogeneous and less political Islamic community. 
[...] Moreover, the leadership of the 1980 coup considered Islam a pacifying 
and submissive ideology preferable to the threat of communism. (Yavuz 
1997: 67) 
 
Following the military takeover, Turkey returned to parliamentary democracy in 
1983 with the AP (Motherland Party) government headed by Turgut Özal. In line 
with the global wave of neo-liberalism in the 1980s, the AP government introduced a 
Thatcher-style economic programme for the implementation of neo-liberalism in 
Turkey. Thus, in harmony with the policy of utilising Islam as a means of moving 
towards a depoliticised society, shifting economic policies in the post-coup era 
provided favourable ground for the pro-Islamic movement to flourish financially. Of 
course, obtaining economic power meant having access to the “opportunity spaces” 
(Yavuz 2003) for gaining cultural and political power as well. For example, “the 
expansion of higher education, print media, and mass communication played a 
critical role in the public emergence of an Islamic identity in the late 1980s” (Yavuz 
1997: 69). In the post-coup era, pro-Islamic circles established their own 
intellectuals, businessmen, scholars, and artists (Yavuz 2003: ix), overall “increasing 
their participation in the social, economic and political spheres from which they had 
been significantly blocked for many decades” (Yılmaz 2009: 114). On the other 
hand, the state provided the most fundamental “opportunity space” for Islamic 
movements to flourish by Islamicizing the whole educational system. In the post-
coup era, “the state introduced compulsory religious instruction into primary and 
secondary schools” (Sakallıoğlu 1996: 246), and, “more Imam Hatips high schools 
(in which religious education is taught along with modern courses), Qur'anic 
teaching seminaries, and new Islamic private colleges and high schools” were 




At this point, it is important to underline that the Kemalist strategy of utilising Islam 
in engineering a more conservative, religious and depoliticised society does not mean 
that the Kemalist establishment entirely discarded their secularist ideals and 
sensitivities. Thus, the RP (Welfare Party) incident in the early post-coup days 
illustrates the continuing secularist concerns of the Kemalist bloc in that period even 
while paving the way for Islamic dynamics. The pro-Islamist RP, headed by 
Necmettin Erbakan and established shortly after the military coup, was disallowed by 
the generals from entering the 1983 elections. As this example demonstrates, for the 
Kemalists, it was a process where two conflicting policies went hand in hand; that is, 
supporting Islam while at the same time trying to keep it under state control. 
However, the 1990s proved the risky nature of such an ambivalent policy towards 
Islam for the traditional Kemalist power base and the decade witnessed 
developments as a result of which political Islam, along with the Kurdish movement, 
came to be identified by the Turkish military as one of the two biggest internal 
threats.  
 
In 1996, Erbakan and the RP took to the stage again to be one of the leading actors of 
another historical moment in the relationship between Kemalism and the Islamic 
movement. Economic growth and the cultural flourishing of Islam in the post-coup 
era had its reflection in the parliamentary politics of the 1990s. The RP, which was 
banned from the 1983 elections, thenceforth gained popularity as the political face of 
the Islamic movement, and in 1996, formed a coalition government with the centre-
right DYP (True Path Party). And Erbakan, the leader of the RP, became the prime 
minister. This was a significant moment in the Turkish parliamentary system as “for 
the first time, the Turkish republic had a prime minister whose political philosophy 
was based on Islam” (Yavuz 1997: 63). Hence, this development triggered the 
secularist reflexes of the TSK. The military “took the accession of the RP into 
government as confirmation of its belief that Islamist reactionism, irtica in Turkish, 
had become a substantial threat to the secular character of the republic” (Sakallıoğlu 
and Çınar 2003: 309). Consequently, the coalition government did not last long and 
collapsed in 1997 as a result of a military intervention which is referred to as the 
‘February 28 process’, or ‘the postmodern coup’. It is commonly named as a 
‘postmodern coup’, because unlike the previous military coups in the history of the 
republic, this time the TSK did not directly take power. Instead, “the military-
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dominated National Security Council (NSC) issued a list of measures to the coalition 
government led by the Islamist Welfare Party (RP) to eliminate the ‘creeping 
Islamization,’ and the tension finally led to the resignation of the government, 
closure of the party by the Constitutional Court and the banning of its key 
policymakers from active politics” (Cizre 2008a: 4). Sakallıoğlu and Çınar see the 
February 28 process as a breaking point in terms of the relationship between the state 
establishment and political Islam after the 1980 military coup:  
 
Contrary to the ‘‘neorepublican’’ policies that prevailed after the post-1980 
military rule when elements of Islam were incorporated into public discourse 
to provide a moral basis, ideological unity, and some certainty in the face of 
global capitalism, the February 28 process seeks to usher back the republic’s 
radical secularism. That represents a complete reversal from the republican 
pattern of state-Islam relations that, in the past, allowed for negotiation, 
compromise, and reconciliation between Turkey’s political Islamists and the 
establishment. (2003: 312) 
 
It was the February 28 process which led to the emergence of the AKP as a new 
political actor in Turkey. After the coalition government collapsed as a result of the 
February 28 process and the RP was banned from politics by the Constitutional Court 
in 1998, the pro-Islamic political movement split into two diverse groups. The 
‘reformists’, spearheaded by Tayyip Erdoğan, separated from Erbakan and his 
followers, who came to be known as ‘traditionalists’ after this separation. And the 
‘reformist’ faction established the AKP in 2001 with a significantly new vision, 
differentiating itself from the political perspective and the image of the traditional 
pro-Islamic movement. The redefinition of the pro-Islamic vision came to fruition for 
the AKP shortly after its establishment. The AKP came to power with the 2002 
elections, winning 34 percent of the vote, which, according to Gereth Jenkins, 
represented “the greatest challenge to the traditional concept of Turkish secularism 
since the foundation of the Republic” (2006: 185). The AKP also won two 
consecutive general elections in 2007 and 2011, increasing its share of the vote in 
each election.  
 
The ideological character of the AKP has been subject to much confusion and has 
triggered debates in Turkey since the day it came to power. Since its establishment, 
the AKP has sedulously distanced itself from its pro-Islamic roots and presented 
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itself as a more inclusive ‘conservative democrat’ party. This self-definition of the 
AKP not only attracted the support of centre-right voters, but more importantly, it 
served a more pressing need for the AKP. Underlining its distinction from the 
traditional pro-Islamic movement was mainly a survival strategy for the AKP. 
Having learnt a lesson from the February 28 experience, the AKP realised that the 
success of a pro-Islamic party in Turkey can be “a self-defeating success” (Dağı 
2006: 90). Therefore, especially in its early years, the AKP has been very careful in 
its actions and its discourses to avoid suffering the same fate as its predecessors: 
“The JDP’s [AKP] power-sharing strategy with the establishment is centred on a 
moderate non-polarizing discourse avoiding ostentatious and exaggerated signs of 
religiosity and raising issues about Islamic identity in the language of individual 
freedoms”. (Çınar 2008: 120). 
 
One of the key aspects of the AKP’s self-presentation and its performance in 
government, which generated confused perceptions of the party by the public and 
also helped the AKP avoid probable adverse reactions of the Kemalist establishment, 
was the adaptation of democracy and human rights discourse into the party’s policies 
and discourses. İhsan Dağı argues that, in order to secure its position in the 
government against the Kemalist threat, the AKP developed “a three-layered 
strategy: first, adopt a language of human rights and democracy as a discursive 
shield; second, mobilize popular support as a form of democratic legitimacy; and 
third, build a liberal-democratic coalition with modern-secular sectors that recognize 
the JDP [AKP] as a legitimate political actor” (2006: 88-89). 
 
The adoption of the perspective of democracy and human rights by the AKP into its 
discourses and policies was also in line with the requirements of the European Union 
for Turkey’s accession process. As Dağı states, “the Islamists began to realize that 
Western demands for democratization and human rights in Turkey overlapped with 
their own search for protection against the Kemalist establishment, especially the 
military and the judiciary” (2006: 143). Improving the image of Turkey in the West, 
accelerating the EU process, and thus gaining the support of the West functioned in 
favour of the AKP in domestic politics in many ways. Above all, progress in the EU 
accession process had a paradigm-shifting effect on the established ideological 
structure in Turkish politics, and empowered the AKP in its ideological struggle vis-
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à-vis the Kemalist bloc. As Ahmet İnsel discusses, it was “a paradoxical period in 
which statist-Westernizing elites are forced to swerve into anti-Western positions” 
(İnsel 2003: 306), and the Kemalist ideal of Westernisation is represented and 
executed by a pro-Islamic actor. Hence, the Kemalist establishment, which 
traditionally defined itself with regard to its dedication to the objectives of 
modernisation and westernisation, and regarded Islam as an obstacle, even a threat, 
in this process, found itself representing the ‘conservative’ camp against a 
‘progressive’ pro-Islamic party who presented a reform agenda in line with the EU 
requirements. Overall, the self-promoted image of the AKP as a party dedicated to 
human rights and democracy allowed itto disempower the Kemalist elite within a 
legitimate scenario, presenting its steps towards shifting the balance of power in its 
favour as a fight for democracy. In this way, the AKP was able to construct its 
democratic image basically as a counter-image of Kemalism, gaining strength from 
the anti-democratic and authoritarian character of the Kemalist establishment.  
 
 
Shifting Balance of Power between the Old and the New Power Elites in Turkey 
 
The most strategic action of the AKP against the Kemalist establishment was also the 
most legitimate one, as it targeted the military tutelage in Turkey. A civil government 
finally calling a halt to military oppression in politics was in tune with the AKP’s 
discourse of democracy and also with EU requirements. As Cizre states, “EU entry 
requirements have provided one external impetus for the JDP [AKP] government 
attempts to reshape military-civilian relations” (2008b: 134).  The first step towards 
disempowering the military was to reduce “the legal-institutional sphere of the 
military’s influence” (Çınar 2011: 112). The harmonisation package passed by 
parliament in 2003 introduced reforms “limiting the jurisdiction of military courts 
over civilians, [...] repealing the executive powers of the general secretary of the 
NSC [National Security Council], [...] and opening the way for appointment of a 
civilian secretariat general for the NSC” (Dağı 2006: 99). In 2004, as a part of 
another package of amendments, “the State Security Courts were abolished” and “the 
military representative on the higher education board was removed” (ibid: 100). All 




in the history of Turkey that a political actor dared to question the role of the military 
in politics, attempted to redefine its role and limit its authority. These steps, 
consequently, put the TSK in a paradoxical situation. Despite considering and 
projecting itself as the true representative of the republic and the guardian of the 
Kemalist objectives such as Westernisation, the TSK had to reject the democratic 
requirements of the EU, and find itself in opposition to the West, if it were to 
counteract the AKP’s reforms restructuring civil-military relationships.  
 
However, despite finding itself in such an ontological dilemma, the Kemalist centre 
still felt the urge to take action against the AKP. From the Kemalist-secularist 
perspective, the AKP’s disclaiming of its pro-Islamic legacy has never been 
convincing. Considering themselves to be the true representatives of the republic 
above all political parties, and also the citizens who might be deceived by those 
political parties, they believed that the AKP’s “claim of change is the manifestation 
of an insincere, masked position”, and “removing this mask must be the first priority 
of both state and society” (Yıldız 2008: 49). Thus, the Kemalist camp always found 
ways of expressing their distrust of the AKP, projecting their concerns, and warning 
the government at its every significant step. Eventually, in 2007, the tension came to 
a point where the Kemalists decided that it was time to take further action against the 
AKP government beyond expressing concerns and giving warnings. When Abdullah 
Gül, a prominent figure in the history of the pro-Islamic political movement and one 
of the founders of the AKP, was nominated for the presidential elections, an 
ultimatum-like statement was released on the website of the General Staff, which 
came to be known as the ‘e-memorandum’. Following this, a series of street protests, 
called ‘republic protests’ (cumhuriyet mitingleri), were organised in the three 
principal cities with the participation of large crowds showing their support for the 
TSK’s ultimatum and chanting the slogan “Turkey is secular, it will remain secular”. 
Thus, the tension between the Kemalist state actors and the AKP hit the streets for 
the first time with pro-Kemalist citizens directly getting involved in the conflict and 
taking sides with the Kemalist-secularist bloc. On the other hand, the e-memorandum 
drew strong reactions from other circles that had been supporting the AKP in its 




Later, in 2008, several months after the AKP’s re-election in 2007, a court case was 
opened by the State Prosecutor to close down the AKP on the grounds that the party 
had become “a focal point for anti-secularist activities” (Hurriyet Daily News, 14 
March 2008). Although the court ultimately decided not to close down the party, the 
case functioned as a powerful symbolic act and as an ultimatum by the establishment 
against the AKP. However, these counteractions against the government by the 
Kemalist-secularists, especially the e-memorandum and the attempt to ban the AKP, 
had a reverse effect on the balance of power and functioned to the benefit of the 
AKP, because “in the public eye the AKP was seen as the victim in the face of the 
uncompromising attitude of the secularists” (Yılmaz 2009: 121). It would be easier to 
understand this public response when we consider the fact that diverse political 
groups in Turkey have traditionally identified and positioned themselves in 
opposition to the Kemalist ideology, conflicting with the traditional Kemalist state 
actors, and suffering politically from military tutelage. In this sense, it can be said 
that Islamists, Kurds, socialists and liberal-democrats in Turkey have historically 
clashed with a ‘common enemy’ – albeit on different grounds. Therefore, it was a 
rather tough ideological task for many political players to decide upon their position 
vis-à-vis the conflict between the AKP government and the Kemalist establishment. 
Thus, a large section of the political factions listed above supported the AKP for the 
sake of democracy against the Kemalist camp, particularly the TSK. And, the 
counteractions of the Kemalist establishment paradoxically helped the AKP to 
mobilise the support of a wider spectrum of society to establish its legitimacy.  
 
Following the incidents of the e-memorandum and the closure case, the AKP carried 
its struggle to limit Kemalist power a step further and escalated the conflict by 
launching a more open, harsher and forceful operation against them. Having started 
to reshape the political structure by means of democratic reform packages, in its 
second term in government, the AKP continued this transformation with more 
confident steps and bolder strategies. In 2008, the Ergenekon operations started; 
retired and active-duty military members, mostly high-ranking officers, including 
former Chief of Military Staff İlker Başbuğ, alongside some other public figures such 
as journalists and lawyers, were arrested for getting involved in a plot to overthrow 
the AKP government. In the court file, Ergenekon was defined as an ‘armed terrorist 
organisation’, and the military officers were charged with participation in ‘terrorist 
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activities’. The trials continued for years with new waves of prosecutions and with an 
indictment thousands of pages long. The controversial Ergenekon trial was 
undoubtedly a major blow against the most powerful players in the Kemalist bloc. 
First of all, it tied the TSK’s hands as the Ergenekon trial represented the authority to 
arrest any military personnel, even with some vague accusations and without much 
evidence. On the other hand, the Ergenekon trial not only undermined the 
institutional power of the military, but also tarnished its image and discredited it, and 
thus ideologically and psychologically disempowered it. Consequently, “the balance 
of forces in Turkish civil-military relations has been gradually transformed in favour 
of the civilian government” (Akça and Paker 2013: 77). 
 
Another significant step by the AKP for reshaping the power structure in Turkish 
politics was constitutional reform. While the limitation of the military’s institutional 
power fundamentally changed the power dynamics in Turkey, constitutional reform 
targeted another key institutional power base of the Kemalist establishment. As Cizre 
explains, “as the possibility of the military bureaucracy’s intervention in the political 
system lessens because of the EU reform process and the emergence of an 
atmosphere of openness in society, Turkey’s judiciary has begun to take the role of 
“system guardianship””(2011: 58). Therefore, the AKP’s objective of transforming 
the political structure and eliminating all potential oppositional voices this time 
focused on the judiciary. In 2010, Turkey went to the polls to vote for the 
controversial referendum on constitutional amendments as proposed by the 
government and “designed to reshape the structure of higher administrative courts 
and reduce the role of the military in Turkish politics” (Cizre 2011: 57). 
 
As Baç and Keyman put it, “The referendum passed with 58 percent of approval, but 
it left behind considerable bitterness as opponents complained that the AKP was 
seeking not so much to consolidate democracy as to cement its own hold on 
power”(2012: 86). As the AKP continued to seize more power in all fundamental 
institutions of the state apparatus, and as the balance of power shifted in favour of the 
AKP, Turkey witnessed the gradual transition of the AKP into an anti-democratic 
authoritarian power. While the AKP managed to impress a significant segment of 
society in Turkey with its claim of dedication to human rights and democracy and 
built the image of a ‘democratizing Turkey’ in the international arena in its first term, 
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in the process of the long years of the AKP government, critical voices towards the 
AKP’s performance started to increase, both at home and abroad. For instance, Ziya 
Öniş talks about “the marked decline in democratization impulse and the emergence 
of creeping authoritarianism” (2013: 104) in the later phase of the AKP era and 
points at “a kind of “civilian tutelage” that seems to have replaced the “military 
tutelage” of the previous era” (ibid: 107). Cuma Çiçek argues that “its election for 
the second time in 2007, its considerable majority in the national assembly and the 
international support behind it facilitate the AKP’s dominant, exclusive and coercive 
ruling style” which “provoked civil tyranny discussions in Turkey” (2011: 23).  
 
The new phase of the AKP era eventually upset not only pro-Kemalists and 
secularists who were never convinced by the party’s promises in the first place, but a 
much wider segment of the society, including left-wing liberal-democrats who had 
supported the government in its early years, and in fact helped the AKP in 
convincing both the national and international public of its democratic impetus. One 
reflection of the AKP’s changing attitude was the bold steps taken towards “moving 
Turkish society in a more conservative direction, with religion having an 
increasingly important role in public space” which limited “the space for the more 
Western-oriented, secular segments of Turkish society” (Öniş 2013: 108). The 
AKP’s increasingly authoritarian tendencies were also reflected in terms of “controls 
over the press and freedom of expression, the lack of tolerance for opposition, and 
the notorious malfunctioning of the judicial system” (ibid: 107). Akser and Hawks 
remark that “Turkish media is under siege today by the ruling government of the 
AKP. The level of political pressure and legal restraints on news-reporting are visible 
in an unprecedented scale” (Akser and Hawks 2012: 302). In a 2012 article, Berna 
Turam draws the following picture of Turkey with regard to the anti-democratic 
attitudes of the government: 
 
About seventy journalists and an increasing number of academics are now in 
jail or some other form of detention as they prepare to face charges of illegal 
political activity or ties with terrorist groups. In nearly every case, the actual 
“offense” is that of having expressed a political opinion offensive to someone 
in power. The Council of Europe recently expressed its concern that more 
than a thousand cases currently before the European Court of Human Rights 
have to do with freedom of expression issues in Turkey. [...] The government 
has also been active in the field of Internet censorship, denying access to 
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YouTube videos and occasionally closing down satirical or otherwise critical 
websites. (2012: 112) 
 
The accumulation of disturbance experienced by diverse segments of society due to 
this deteriorating anti-democratic situation eventually manifested itself in a massive 
uprising in Turkey in 2013. Starting as a small protest to resist the demolition of Gezi 
Park in central İstanbul according to the plan of the government to build a big 
shopping mall in the area, events unexpectedly spawned a widespread nation-wide 
uprising against the AKP government. Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan projected the 
Gezi protests that continued for months all over the country merely as a Kemalist 
movement, reacting to the fact that they had lost their privileges in the AKP era. He 
claimed that the Gezi uprising was a “coup attempt” against the government, 
referring to the protestors as “coup-seekers” as well as “scum”, “marginals” or 
“drunkards”. Whilst the demonstrations continued, he threatened the protestors with 
unleashing his supporters, claiming that he could “hardly hold back 50% of the 
people in their homes” (Milliyet, 3 June 2013). Eventually all protests in different 
cities were violently suppressed by the police, as a result of which eleven people died 
and hundreds of people were seriously injured. In response to the protestors’ demand 
for “the prosecution of those responsible for the violence against demonstrators”, 
Erdoğan blatantly stated that he had personally given the order to the police (Radikal, 
24 June 2013). 
 
Heated debates on various questions raised by the Gezi Uprising and its 
reverberations continue in Turkey in 2014, as the research for this thesis is being 
conducted, and the academic literature on this socio-political event is still quite 
limited for the present. However, it no doubt marks a milestone with regard to the 
political transformation Turkey has been witnessing in the AKP era, as depicted in 
this chapter. The outburst of a nation-wide uprising stands as a bold manifestation of 
the disillusionment of the masses with the AKP’s human rights and democracy 
discourse. Furthermore, it can be said that the government’s response to the Gezi 






The History of the Kurdish Conflict in Turkey 
 
In building a nation-state on a multi-religious and multi-ethnic territory, the founding 
elite of the Turkish Republic adopted a “nationalism-from-above” strategy: “In this 
construct, the state could demarcate the boundaries of the nation and determine the 
margins beyond which the necessary unity of the collective body would be 
threatened” (Keyder 1997: 42). For the construction of a homogeneous nation-state, 
Turkish identity was designated as the source of ethnic unity, which meant all the 
non-Turkish residues of the Ottoman Empire within the boundaries of the nation-
state were to be eliminated or suppressed. Welat Zeydanlıoğlu gives a brief account 
of the initial steps taken by the new state in this direction: “significant 
homogenisation was achieved by the extermination of most Armenians between 
1915-1916 and the move of approximately 1.2 million Greek Orthodox Christians to 
Greece and 500,000 Muslims emigrating from Greece to Turkey as part of a 
population exchange between the two countries” (Zeydanlıoğlu 2008: 162). 
Alongside these bold and grisly nation-building practices, targeting non-Muslims and 
forcibly reshaping the profile of the population, the construction of a homogeneous 
Turkish nation also required “the dilution of the largest culturally and linguistically 
distinct non-Turkish people: the Kurds” (ibid: 161). In order to accomplish this, “all 
those who were now citizens of the Turkish Republic, including Kurds, were invited 
to become Turks. Accordingly, a comprehensive policy of compulsory assimilation 
began to be implemented” (Yeğen 2011a: 230). 
 
Kurds were no longer members of a “sibling nation”, but “Mountain Turks”, 
who had “forgotten” their Turkishness or were in “denial” of their Turkish 
origins and who needed to be told the “truth.” [...] The Kurdish language, 
traditional dress, folklore and any expression of Kurdish culture were banned 
and reconstructed as “Turkish”. [...] All references to a territory called 
“Kurdistan”, which had been widely acknowledged during the Ottoman era, 
were removed from maps and official documents, and Turkish names 




These denial and assimilation policies promptly triggered unrest amongst the 
Kurdish population and the early years of the Turkish Republic witnessed Kurdish 
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revolts against the new state. However, the founding elite identified these revolts as a 
manifestation of resentment towards the modernisation project:  
 
Believing to be representing the present, Turkish nationalism considered the 
Kurdish unrest of the time as the resistance of premodern social structures 
and adherences. Tribes and banditry were the leading components of such 
structures. As the Kurds ‘did not exist’ any more, those who resisted the new 
regime could not be the Kurds with an ethno-political cause, but only the 
tribes and bandits threatened by the dissemination of modern state power into 
the region. (Yeğen 2007: 129) 
 
This interpretation of the first Kurdish revolts in the new-born Turkish Republic 
captures one of the permanent key discourses embraced by the Turkish state in 
dealing with all future Kurdish revolts at different junctures of its history. It not only 
concealed and denied the actual socio-political origins of Kurdish unrest, but also 
planted the seeds of the stereotypical Kurdish image prevailing in the west of the 
country since then: “a persistent image of the Kurds as culturally backward, socially 
tribal, religiously fanatic, economically lagging and an internal threat to the territorial 
integrity of Turkey” (Zeydanlıoğlu 2008: 163), and as such, against everything the 
Kemalist modernisation project represented.  
 
The rigid denial of Kurdish reality and the Kemalist policies implemented to oppress 
the Kurds and suppress all cultural elements of Kurdishness conversely gave strength 
and continuity to Kurdish dissent and politicised Kurdish identity. Consequently, the 
Kurdish issue remained unresolved and Kurdish rebellions kept surfacing at different 
times from the 1920s onwards, taking different political and ideological forms at 
different junctures according to the shifting socio-political contexts of the times 
when it re-emerged.  
 
In the 1960s and 1970s, Kurdish resistance was influenced by and became a part of 
the growing left-wing socialist movement in Turkey. And, later in the 1980s, Kurdish 
socialists suffered greatly from the military junta’s atrocities, together with other 
segments of the left-wing revolutionary movement of the period. As Zeydanlıoğlu 
remarks, “the systematic repression and assimilation of the Kurds reached its peak 
with the 1980 coup, which specifically singled out the Kurdish region as a particular 
threat to national unity” (Zeydanlıoğlu 2008: 166). Following the military coup, the 
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Kurdish language, Kurdish folk songs, Kurdish names on birth certificates as well as 
Kurdish place names were all prohibited under new laws (MacDowall 2007). Also, 
“in 1987 a governor-general was appointed over the eight Kurdish provinces in 
which a state of emergency was declared” (ibid: 427), and that provided legitimate 
grounds for state brutality in the region right up to 2002.  
 
The experience of Diyarbakır Military Prison best illustrates the extent of the 
oppression Kurds experienced during the junta years. Kurdish left-wing activists who 
were imprisoned after the coup faced incredible methods of systematic torture in this 
military prison in the 1980s. After giving an account of the horrifying acts of torture 
performed by the military, Zeydanlıoğlu states that “the prison seemed to have 
functioned as a laboratory for humiliation, punishment and ‘rehabilitation’ of 
Kurdish prisoners through torture as Turkification” (2009: 85). And he underlines 
that these military practices, that attempted not only to terrorise but also to Turkify 
Kurdish political prisoners, “played a crucial role in the crystallisation of nationalist 
secessionist ideas and the radicalisation of a generation of Kurds, large numbers of 
which went on to join the ranks of the militant Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK)” 
(Zeydanlıoğlu 2009: 81). In fact, it is widely agreed that the 1980 military coup in 
general has played a significant role in the emergence of the biggest and the longest-
running Kurdish insurgency in Turkey, gaining determination and strength from the 
fierce oppression and physical destruction a large number of Kurds experienced 
during the junta years. 
 
In 1984, the PKK, a Kurdish guerrilla movement inspired by Marxism-Leninism and 
led by Abdullah Öcalan, launched an armed national liberation struggle by attacking 
Turkish army forces in the Kurdish region. The Turkish state’s response to the PKK 
exacerbated the conflict with the perception that military intervention accompanied 
by further oppressive measures in the region was the most appropriate and expedient 
solution to the conflict. The policy of denial towards the Kurdish issue remained 
intact after the emergence of the PKK; state discourse represented the PKK as a 
terrorist organisation invented and manipulated by foreign enemies of the Turkish 
state, and thus obscured the socio-historical origins of the PKK and the armed 
conflict. The consequence was a decades-long war leaving behind approximately 
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forty thousand dead alongside the multi-faceted long-term social impacts of a 
decades-long internal war.  
 
While the armed conflict between the Turkish army and the PKK reached at its peak 
in the early 1990s, state forces started to carry out illegal counter-guerrilla activities 
in the Kurdish region. Paramilitary forces were mobilised to deal with the Kurdish 
movement, such as JITEM(Gendarmerie Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism), the 
existence of which was denied by the state until the 2000s. Moreover, in order to 
restrain the growing mass support for the Kurdish movement, the ‘war on terrorism’ 
was extended from the PKK guerrillas over to civilian Kurds. Within the scope of 
this strategy, a large number of civilian Kurds suffered from village evacuations for 
allegedly assisting the PKK militants. The extreme brutality deployed during the 
evacuations included “deliberately degrading behaviour, arbitrary arrest, violence, 
torture, extra-judicial killings, sexual violence or threats of violence and the wanton 
destruction (or plunder) of moveable property, livestock and food stocks” 
(MacDowall 2007: 440). Village evacuations were amongst the most traumatic 
Kurdish experiences in the history of the conflict with long-term broad social 
consequences. 
 
On the other hand, the strategy of extending the ‘war on terror’ to Kurdish civilians 
was not limited to Kurdish peasants. Kurdish intellectuals, journalists, human rights 
activists and politicians also became the target of state brutality. First of all, the 
activities of these groups were strategically delegitimized by official discourse; 
“human rights activists were “denounced as defenders of “internal enemies” of the 
State [...], violations of human rights were justified in the name of “national defence” 
and the very notion of human rights – like the concept of democracy itself – became 
something suspicious” (Bozarslan 2001: 50). Thus, the efforts of the Kurdish 
intellectuals, journalists and activists to expose state crimes and to claim basic human 
rights in the region were answered in the same oppressive manner by the state. A 
large number of these people ‘disappeared’ during the 1990s, and most of the cases 
remain as ‘unidentified murders’ up to today. The figures reflecting the overall 
results of these state atrocities in the 1990s were extreme; “more than 2,000 people, 
mostly intellectuals, were killed by ‘unidentified’ persons; some 1,779 villages and 
hamlets, and 6,153 settlements were partly or completely destroyed, along with 
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several towns (Şırnak, Kulp, and Lice, for instance); and almost three million people 
were forced to leave their homes” (ibid: 45).  
 
Not surprisingly, this picture led to further growing Kurdish unrest and more popular 
support for the PKK – which had in such an atmosphere of oppression turned into “a 
defender of Kurdish dignity” (Bozarslan 2001: 46-47) in the eyes of a large number 
of Kurdish people. “By the early 1990s, the armed struggle of the PKK was echoed 
by an eager discontent of the Kurdish masses” (Yeğen 2007: 135-136)and “the PKK 
offensive was eclipsed by the burgeoning civil resistance to the security forces” 
(MacDowall 2007: 429). Public funerals for fallen PKK fighters, street protests 
against state policies, and celebrations on symbolic days for Kurdish identity started 
to be organised. All these public gatherings were dense with slogans and symbols 
showing support for the PKK and loyalty to PKK leader Öcalan. Although the state 
forces did not tolerate these events and more often than not dispersed these mass 
demonstrations by using brutal force1, Kurdish civil resistance continued to grow 
despite the heavy price being paid. Thus, with its capacity for mobilising mass 
support, in the 1990s the PKK turned into something beyond a guerrilla movement; 
the armed wing of a mass grassroots movement, the political representative of 
Kurdish people and their interests.   
 
 
The Kurdish Conflict and Social Polarisation in Turkey 
 
While the situation explained above was the Kurdish experience of the war, in the 
west of the country, all people heard about what was going on in the Kurdish region 
was the official narrative of ‘bloody separatist terrorists’ provoked and financed by 
external forces. Especially during the 1990s, the terrorism discourse used to occupy 
the headlines of the Turkish media every day. Zeydanlıoğlu emphasises the 
mainstream Turkish media’s role in shaping the perception of the Kurds and the 
Kurdish conflict in the Turkish public by “inflaming fears and stigmatising the 
                                                 
1For example, about 100 Kurdish civilians were killed by state forces in 1992 during the Newroz 
celebrations in three Kurdish towns (The Newroz day originally marks the beginning of the spring in 
the Kurdish culture, yet the celebrations has been politicised over the last decades, turning into a 




Kurds” (2008: 167). Also underlining the fact that the Turkish media have been 
utilised for propagating the official narrative of the conflict to the west of the 
country, Wall and Sezgin write, “Kurds are kept silent in media coverage (discussion 
is ‘about’ them not ‘with’ them), are mostly associated with terrorism (the PKK), and 
are portrayed as divisive and as putting forth unreasonable demands” (2005: 795).  
 
Overall, rigid state control over the narration of the war, refusing to let real 
information flow to the west of the country and deploying a discourse on terrorism in 
narrating the conflict, created a wide gap between the experience and the knowledge 
of the Kurds and the Turks on the war2. The result was two segregated perceptions of 
the conflict in the same country. In her study of socio-political polarisation in 
Turkey, Ayşe Betül Çelik remarks that “long-lived violent conflicts leave a legacy of 
mistrust between the citizens” and notes that “whereas most Kurds feel a lack of 
justice, humiliation, and silencing, many Turks feel afraid (that “their land” will be 
taken away), angry (that “terrorism” took away their sons), and proud (to be a “Turk” 
for centuries)” (2012: 256). Consequently, as Zeynep Gambetti stresses, the war 
created two “antagonistic publics” in Turkey and “by the early 1990s, it was barely 
impossible to speak from a “middle ground.””(2008: 96).  
 
The wave of internal migration from the Kurdish region to the other parts of the 
country did not help to narrow this gap, either. On the contrary, it can be said that 
Turks and Kurds became politically more distant as they grew physically closer. As a 
consequence of the overall underdevelopment of the Kurdish region in comparison 
with the rest of the country, Kurdish migrants came to the big western cities with 
various disadvantages that rendered the integration process even harder for them. 
Çelik emphasises that “low levels of education” and the “language barrier” were 
some of the main disadvantages experienced by the Kurdish migrants in the 
west(2005a: 141). Apart from creating difficulties for the Kurdish migrants in their 
integration process, this profile was also something that reinforced and stiffened the 
long-established Kemalist image of culturally backward pre-modern Kurds as an 
object of disdain and hatred, and thus justified the exclusion and discrimination of 
                                                 
2
 There are several surveys and studies that reveal the profound contrast between the Turkish and 
Kurdish perceptions of the conflict. For example, see the findings of the national surveys by SETA 
(2009) and KONDA (2011). Also see (Kılıç, 1992);(Haşimi, 2009); (Çelebi, et al., 2014); (Saraçoğlu, 
2010); (Dixon andErgin, 2010). 
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the Kurdish migrants in the western cities. Çelik stresses that Kurdish migrants in the 
west have faced social exclusion, racism and discrimination and experienced 
“blocked access to many social and economic opportunities in the city primarily due 
to their Kurdish identity” (ibid: 152). 
 
Zeydanlıoğlu discusses the impact of Kurdish migration to Turkish cities with regard 
to the spread of the consequences of the Kurdish conflict across the whole country: 
“The “Kurdish question” has now become a “Turkish question”, in the sense that the 
conflict and its impact is also increasingly present in the daily lives of urban Turks 
who might otherwise have been fairly immune to the conflict” (Zeydanlıoğlu 2008: 
167). However, he acknowledges that this has had a rather negative impact on inter-
ethnic relationships in Turkey. While Kurdish migration enabled the first face-to-face 
encounters between the Kurdish and Turkish people on a large social scale, the 
outcome of these encounters was far from bringing the two communities closer. On 
the contrary, encounters between Turkish city-dwellers and poor Kurdish migrants 
living in the Kurdish ghettos of these cities have been not only limited but also 
marked by “inter-ethnic tensions” (Çelik 2005a: 141).  
 
The tension between Kurdish migrants and the locals in the western cities increased 
so intensely in the 1990s that, in 1996, a human rights association, Mazlum-Der, 
warned a parliamentary commission in the following words: “In cities like Adana, 
Mersin and Antalya, Turkish and Kurdish districts are emerging. Turks cannot enter 
the Kurdish district and vice versa. One should realise that with a little provocation 
this will lead to very serious social clashes” (MacDowall 2007: 449). Yet despite 
warnings, no measures were taken to prevent such incidents and thus the tension 
between Turkish and Kurdish people turned into clashes (mostly in the form of 
lynching attempts against Kurds) on numerous occasions from the early 1990s. And 
the picture got worse after the capture of Öcalan: 
 
After the arrest of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan in 1999 a new tendency 
emerged. Anti-Kurdish resentment became widespread, and signs of 
polarization started to be observed. [...] A discourse that defined not only the 
PKK but also the “Kurds” (taken as a homogeneous subjectivity) as the 
enemy became prevalent. This banal nationalist discourse, which defines the 
Kurds as barbarians while criminalizing them not only politically but also 
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socially and ethically, signifies the dangerous replacement of assimilationist 
optimism with a violent non-assimilationism. (Bora 2011: 58) 
 
Mesut Yeğen also makes a similar observation and talks about a shift in mainstream 
Turkish nationalism’s understanding of the Kurds and the Kurdish issue in the 2000s. 
He states that “the confidence of Turkish nationalism as to the Kurds’ potential of 
becoming Turkish is not as firm as it used to be” (Yeğen 2011a: 240). He takes the 
term “pseudo-citizens” used with reference to Kurds by the Turkish General Staff in 
2005 as a “notorious sign” confirming his observation (ibid: 241). That year, big 
Newroz demonstrations were organised in several cities with broad participation of 
Kurdish crowds carrying posters of Öcalan and Kurdish flags, which was enough to 
agitate Turkish nationalist sentiments but, in addition, the Turkish flag was taken 
down by some protesters in one of these demonstrations, which of course intensified 
nationalist reactions. It was about pictures of these demonstrations that the term 
“pseudo-citizens” was used by the TSK. Yeğen takes this term and theorises it to 
describe the new official approach towards the Kurds. He suggests that the way the 
Kurdish issue developed since the emergence of the PKK created disappointment in 
the Turkish state and, by the 2000s, the Kemalist establishment was “on the verge of 
revising its image of Kurds” (2011a: 241). For Yeğen, the “pseudo-citizens” 
statement signalled the “erosion in the long-standing image of Kurds as Turks-to-be” 
(ibid: 245).  
 
 
The Pressing Necessity of a Political Solution to the Kurdish Conflict 
 
While historical developments after 1984 slowly led to an understanding of the 
Kurds as “unassimilable” (Yeğen 2011a: 244) and eventually stirred up direct 
hostility towards Kurdish citizens on the one hand, the same picture engendered a 
growing realisation in some quarters that the traditional Kurdish policy was 
unsustainable and an alternative approach was needed. The capture of PKK leader 
Öcalan was one of the significant historical developments whose consequences 
reinforced this realisation. Despite the Turkish state’s hope that Öcalan’s capture 
would be the beginning of the end of the PKK and the Kurdish conflict, the course of 
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events refuted this prediction. After a period of confusion and hanging in the balance, 
the PKK bounced back and declared the permanence of the leadership of Öcalan 
despite his imprisonment in isolation on İmralı Island, and started to attract new 
militants. Popular support for the PKK and Öcalan also continued, and even gained 
momentum in the 2000s.  
 
While these developments disproved the state’s high expectations arising from 
Öcalan’s capture, on the other hand, this process ultimately led to a transformation in 
the Kurdish movement, which eventually cornered the Turkish state not in military 
terms but in the field of ideological and political struggle. In the 2000s, the Kurdish 
movement underwent a significant transformation in its organisational structure, 
political perspective and strategies. The PKK, which had originally emerged as a 
national liberation movement inspired by socialism, adopted a democratic discourse 
in the 2000s and modified its demands from a democratic perspective, articulating a 
will to live together within a democratised Turkey and making it clear that their 
struggle would no longer be for an independent Kurdish nation-state, as long as 
Kurdish identity and the democratic rights of the Kurds as a community were 
recognised. Subsequently, the Kurdish movement started to advance their activities 
in the legal, democratic sphere by creating new organisations and instruments 
concentrating on the democratic struggle.  
 
The pro-Kurdish political parties have been articulating Kurdish identity and 
national demands within the discourse of democracy and human rights, and 
as a way to end the conflict put forward proposals to reform the existing 
political framework to recognise the Kurdish identity and difference in 
Turkey. They have been consistently emphasizing the need to build an open, 
participatory and plural democratic society that respects human and cultural 
rights, and the accommodation of Kurdish rights and demands. Initially, the 
pro-Kurdish parties campaigned more specifically on political reconciliation 
and the political solution of the conflict. Highlighting the exclusionary, 
authoritarian, homogenising and anti-democratic character of the republican 
order in Turkey, the pro-Kurdish democratic discourse proposes peaceful 
political change and seeks to weaken the antagonisms created by this 
conflict.(Güneş 2014: 268) 
 
This transformation of the Kurdish movement raised the possibility, and in fact the 
necessity, of a political solution to the Kurdish conflict, as it was something that 
rendered the traditional Kemalist idea of a militarist solution untenable. On the other 
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hand, the new political perspective of the Kurdish movement created new political 
channels with the potential to communicate with western Turkey. As Güneş remarks, 
in this period, the Kurdish movement developed “links with other groups in Turkey 
who also advocate democratisation, such as trade unions, socialist groups and other 
minorities”(2014: 261) and, “increasingly over the years we have seen the emergence 
of civil society activism in Turkey around the peaceful resolution of the Kurdish 
question” (ibid: 267). All these activities showed the Turkish state a way out of the 
deadlock and in fact compelled change in the classic state attitude.  
 
Another significant historical development that influenced the direction of the 
Kurdish conflict in Turkey towards the option of a political solution was the 
foundation of the Kurdish Regional Government in the neighbouring country of Iraq. 
Çiçek gives an overall explanation as to how the changing political status of the 
Kurds in the wider region pressurized the Turkish state into a policy shift: 
 
The founding of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq after 
2003 has made it much more difficult to stick to traditional security policies 
that have denied Kurds and their ethnic identity. [...] The Kurds whose 
distinct identity has been denied throughout the Republican history and 
defined as the “mountain Turks” had a federal state just on the other side of 
the border named “Kurdistan Region.” Furthermore, the new era after 2003 in 
Iraq, has led the Kurds to become more visible in the international political 
arena, on the one hand; the KRG has been recognized by international 
political actors including the US and EU member-states, on the other hand. 
Consequently, the denial of Kurdish identity and the refusal of the Kurdish 
claims have become much more difficult and unacceptable in the 
international political arena after 2003 for Turkey (Çiçek 2011: 19).   
 
In conclusion, the sum of all the historical developments explained above rendered 
the official denial policy of the Turkish Republic dysfunctional and highlighted the 
urgency of a new Kurdish policy responsive to the peace-seeking approach of the 
Kurdish movement. However, apart from some hesitant statements and weak 
attempts by some political players in the past, it was not until the AKP government 
that the necessity of a new Kurdish policy was officially recognised and explicitly 
articulated by any state actor in Turkey. In fact, as I will discuss in the following 
section, the Kemalist establishment by the 2000s was still persistent in maintaining 
its traditional approach to the Kurdish issue at any cost and was tenaciously 
upholding its past attitudes, regarding any compromise as tantamount to self-
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contradiction. Therefore, while on the on the one hand underlining that it is the 
historical evolution of the dynamics of the Kurdish conflict that underlined the 
urgency of a reformist Kurdish policy in Turkey, on the other hand we must 
recognise the significance of the rise of the AKP on the political scene with an anti-
Kemalist ideological background that allows it to recognise and not deny the 




The Revision of State Nationalism in the 2000s: The Kurdish Conflict and the 
AKP 
 
As emphasised at the beginning of this chapter, the subject of dispute between the 
AKP and the Kemalists not only concerned religion; it has been much broader, with 
significant discrepancies in their approach to some key national issues. The political 
transformation Turkey witnessed in the 2000s was a transformation concerning the 
very definition of the nation, national identity and national history. It is certainly a 
risky political move for any governing power in a nation-state to unsettle such 
fundamental national matters that are more than likely to stir up some sensitive and 
highly charged socio-political issues. Thus no political actor would go to this trouble 
had not some issues forced such a transformation. What encouraged the AKP to 
initiate such a bold revisionist project was mainly the Kurdish conflict. One of the 
main promises of the AKP since its foundation was to develop an alternative policy 
towards the Kurdish conflict and to put an end to the decades-long war in Turkey. 
The AKP promised to replace the previous policy of denial and oppression towards 
the Kurdish issue, which approached the conflict as an issue of terrorism, with a 
reformist policy, which would regard the conflict as an issue of democracy.  
 
Beyond just recognising the urgency of a new Kurdish policy, the AKP in fact saw 
the potential of the Kurdish conflict as a ground for manoeuvre in its struggle against 
the Kemalist power elites as well. First of all, approaching the Kurdish conflict from 
the perspective of human rights and democracy was in line with the self-portrayal of 
the AKP as a democratising force in Turkey, breaking the anti-democratic state 
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tradition of Kemalist power. In this respect, developing a reformist Kurdish policy 
was in keeping with the strategy of incapacitating the Kemalist bloc, especially the 
military, which owed much of its hegemonic power in Turkish politics to the 
continuation of the war in the Kurdish region of the country. On the other hand, a 
more reformist Kurdish policy was also in line with requirements for EU accession. 
This meant that, once again, the AKP was able to corner the pro-Kemalists on the 
ground of their westernisation ideal, this time through the Kurdish issue.  
 
In essence, the AKP’s discourse on the Kurdish issue was mainly based on blaming 
the Kemalist understanding of nationalism and presenting itself as a natural ally for 
the Kurdish people “insofar as Kurds and Islamists have both been defined as the 
Other of the Republican hegemony of Turkish secularism” (Casier et al. 2011: 124). 
While envisioning an alternative Turkey with a redefined sense of nationhood, the 
main element for national unity proposed by the AKP was a shared Islamic heritage. 
In this regard, the AKP “used the Kurdish issue as a weapon against secularism in 
Turkey, identifying secularism as a cause of division between Turks and Kurds” and 
offering “its own solution – “Islam as cement” – to end the societal polarization of 
Turkey” (Yavuz and Özcan 2006: 103). As the AKP government raked up the 
Kurdish issue, it triggered the two greatest Kemalist fears at once: the Kurdish issue 
and political Islam. And, ultimately, the resolution of the Kurdish conflict became 
one of the main areas of dispute between the AKP and the Kemalist actors, revealing 
the distinctions between the two, intensifying their contradictions and escalating the 
conflict. In this regard, it can be said that the power struggle over the direction of the 
Kurdish issue turned into a battleground for hegemony between the two camps.  
 
As mentioned above, the most radical attempt by the AKP in this context, which 
violated the red lines of the Kemalist state tradition and increased tension, was 
publicly questioning the very basic Kemalist definition of Turkish national identity 
which was previously – since the foundation of the republic – imposed by state 
ideology as non-negotiable. In need of a new definition of national identity in Turkey 
which does not deny and exclude the Kurds but recognises and includes them, the 
AKP sought new formulations of national identity “without making any reference to 
ethnic roots of a certain kind and hence strengthening societal bonds” (Yıldız 2008: 
55). In 2005, Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan gave a speech in Diyarbakır, 
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addressing the Kurdish issue as an issue of democracy and acknowledging the 
existence of the Turkish state’s wrongdoings in the history of the Kurdish conflict. It 
was in this speech that he propounded the term “supra-national identity” for the first 
time: “No matter which ethnicity or religion any citizen of this country belongs to, 
we should all unite to live as brothers under the supra-national identity of citizenship 
of Turkey” (Sabah, 23 November 2005). This speech was widely recognised as a 
historic moment in the history of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey. In other speeches 
Erdoğan also deployed the notion of Türkiyelilik (an ethnically neutral concept 
meaning ‘being from Turkey’ and representing a civic understanding of the nation) 
in an attempt to reformulate citizenship in Turkey in a way that acknowledges the 
multi-ethnicity of Turkish society.  
 
The new terminology adopted by the government in defining national identity was 
extremely disturbing to the Kemalist bloc and they responded promptly. The military 
addressed the issue at The National Security Council meeting and responded to 
Tayyip Erdoğan’s latest speeches by stating that “the debates on primary and sub-
identities would erode national identity, and micro-nationalism would endanger 
Turkey’s unitary structure, harming its integrity and unity” (Yavuz and Özcan 2006: 
112). On the other side, the questioning of the Kemalist understanding of nationalism 
by the AKP inspired hope amongst the Kurds and other anti-Kemalist parties. In fact, 
the Prime Minister’s above-mentioned speeches were even applauded as a 
manifestation of the AKP’s “anti-nationalist” democratic attitude in some left-wing 
liberal democrat circles. In reality, the aim of the AKP was of course not to abolish 
nationalism from official ideology altogether, but to displace the Kemalist 
conception of nationalism with a revised interpretation, one that is more suitable for 
the alternative national project envisioned by the AKP. Umut Özkırımlı underlines 
that the AKP’s discourse is “not situated beyond or outside the nationalist 
parameters” and that “they aspire to an alternative Turkey, not for an “un-national” 
or “supranational” order” (2011: 97). Özkırımlı appeals to the following quote from 
Prasenjit Duara to explain the political scene in Turkey, comprising multiple 
interpretations of nationalism interacting with each other in various ways: “In place 
of the harmonized, monologic voice of the Nation, we find a polyphony of voices, 
overlapping and criss-crossing; contradictory and ambiguous: opposing, affirming 
and negotiating their views of the nation” (cited in, Özkırımlı 2011: 84). With a 
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similar approach to that of Duara’s, Tanıl Bora stresses that “one must consider 
Turkish nationalism not as a homogeneous discourse but as a series of discourses 
with a vast lexis” (Bora 2011: 62), and he talks about a “struggle for hegemony 
among nationalisms” (ibid: 79). He positions the Islamist movement’s understanding 
of nationalism within this picture and remarks that “after the 1980s Turkish modern 
Islamist intellectuals developed a radical criticism of the nation-state and of 
nationalism”, where “the Muslim community (ummet) stands above the nation”, yet 
he also highlights “the strong nationalist implications in the discourse of the Islamist 
movement in Turkey” (ibid: 77). Following these arguments, we can conclude that 
the AKP, as a new political actor, introduced a new interpretation of nationalism in 
Turkey and opted into the “struggle for hegemony among nationalisms” in the 2000s.  
 
While talking about a ‘struggle’, though, it is important to specify that whilst 
clashing with the pro-Kemalists over the conception of nationalism, the AKP 
government never completely discarded Kemalism itself in dealing with the Kurdish 
conflict and the key national issues connected with this conflict. In this regard, the 
nature of the relationship between Kemalism and the AKP has always confirmed 
Özkırımlı’s emphasis that “at times the two nationalisms reach a modus vivendi and 
coexist peacefully; at other times they clash” (2011: 97). Thus, as I will discuss 
further in the following sections of this chapter, the AKP has never been consistent in 
its aspiration to deconstruct the Kemalist conception of nationalism, inasmuch as it 
continued to rely on traditional state nationalism, promoting it at certain junctures 
when it was more beneficial for their specific needs in dealing with the ever-
changing parameters of the Kurdish issue.  
 
 
Kurdish Opening and the Peace Process 
 
From 2002 to 2009, the AKP’s aspiration to develop an alternative approach to the 
Kurdish conflict expressed itself mainly in the discursive realm, and despite hope-
inspiring discourses, not so much in concrete steps towards a peaceful resolution to 
the conflict. At a time when pointed remarks on the government’s performance vis-à-
vis the Kurdish issue started to increase, in 2009 the AKP took a step forward by 
	

officially launching the ‘Kurdish Opening’ (alternatively translated into English as 
the ‘Kurdish Initiative’). The Kurdish Opening was not a comprehensive reform 
package, and it was not a clear road map for the political solution of the conflict 
either. Yet it was still a historic step basically as a manifestation of the official 
recognition of the Kurdish conflict as an issue of democracy, the official 
acknowledgement of the invalidity of the prevailing state policy towards the conflict, 
and the official declaration of the government’s will to develop a democratic solution 
to the long-standing conflict.  
 
Following the launch of the Kurdish Opening a few reforms were introduced, such as 
“allowing the teaching of Kurdish language as an elective course in schools and 
teaching different languages and dialects in private institutions”, “allowing the 
formation of Kurdish institutes and/or Kurdish Literature departments in 
universities” and “renaming the places of former ‘locally-named’ places” (Çelik 
2012: 253). Also, TRT-6, a state-owned channel broadcasting in Kurdish was 
launched within the scope of the Kurdish Opening. However, these steps were far 
from meeting the demands of the Kurdish community and the Kurdish Opening was 
not found satisfying within Kurdish circles, who had been expecting the government 
to take some concrete steps since 2002 and who had developed high expectations 
based on the government’s promising public statements. Conversely, the government 
had gone too far, according to one dominant Turkish view, concerned about the 
‘Kurdish separatist threat’. Hence, from the day it was launched, the Kurdish 
Opening became subject to harsh criticisms from diverse political positions for 
varying reasons. Heated debates on the Kurdish Opening, and the Kurdish issue at 
large, occupied parliamentary discussions, as well as media coverage and daily 
conversations amongst citizens. Those were quite extraordinary days in Turkey, 
witnessing an overwhelming nation-wide debate on a subject which had been strictly 
banned from public discussion in the past.  
 
From the Kurdish perspective, the Kurdish Opening was widely criticised for not 
only being limited in its scope but also for being quite vague, “leading to discussions 
over whether there actually was a clear package or plan” (Casier et al. 2011: 122). In 
fact, even the name of the project was ambiguous. It was initially announced as the 




issue, but soon afterwards, the government started to refer to the project as the 
“Democratic Initiative”, and finally as the “National Union and Brotherhood 
Project”. Whether this rapid name-changing in a short span of time was a result of 
confusion, hesitation, or pragmatist manoeuvre, the inconstancy in the naming 
process of the project symbolised the ambiguous character of the entire attitude of 
the government in dealing with the Kurdish issue.  
 
One of the further problems with the Kurdish Opening, and more generally the 
Kurdish policy of the AKP, was the exclusion of the Kurdish political representatives 
from the process and the oppressive strategies deployed to eliminate them. 
 
Although enlarging the political arena is among the primary steps to resolve 
the Kurdish issue and to disarm the PKK, the AKP has narrowed the political 
arena for pro-Kurdish politics during the democratic initiative [Kurdish 
Opening] process. While both Kurdish and Turkish societies have expected 
that the PKK’s militants would return during the democratic initiative, and 
the Kurdish issue would freely be discussed in the political arena, the 
Constitutional Court has closed the DTP [the pro-Kurdish Democratic 
Society Party] and has introduced a political ban for 37 party members 
including co-presidents of the DTP who have been accepted as the most 
moderate names in the party. Moreover, nearly 1,500 Kurdish politicians 
alleged members of the KCK, the urban branch of the PKK, and nearly 2,000 
children for throwing stones at police force have been arrested. (Çiçek 2011: 
16) 
 
With these developments, it quickly became clear that the Kurdish Opening project 
had never intended to recognise the political representatives of the Kurdish people 
and conduct a peace process by officially coming to the table with them. Quite the 
contrary, it was evident that one of the main objectives of the new Kurdish policy 
was to discredit and eliminate the Kurdish movement, as the core of the AKP’s plan 
was “to integrate Kurds through depoliticising the Kurdish identity” (Güneş 2014: 
253). As Çınar expresses it, “the AKP was intent on emerging as the true 
representative of the Kurdish people in Turkey, and thereby substantiate its claim to 
be the one and only democratic and democratizing force” (2011:120). The 
government had its own understanding of a ‘political solution’ to the Kurdish 
conflict and was resolved to keep the process within the limits of its own agenda, and 
the Kurdish movement constituted a major obstacle to the government’s intention to 
proceed with the process on its own terms. The arrest of thousands of respected 
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Kurdish politicians and activists under the KCK operations, including elected 
members of parliament, resulted in disillusionment with the government and its 
Kurdish Opening project amongst the Kurds, as Casier et al. observed: “Supporters 
of the Kurdish movement share a deepening sense of hostility towards the ruling 
party and have come to denounce the Kurdish opening as a Kurd-less opening or an 
opening without Kurds. Less radical voices merely state their loss of enthusiasm, 
disappointment, and lack of hope for anything to transpire from the government’s 
initiative at this point”. (2011: 28) 
 
One significant incident that damaged the trust between the government and the 
Kurds in the early days of the peace process was the Habur incident. Imprisoned 
PKK leader Öcalan had completed a road map in 2009, in essence proposing “a 
democratization and decentralization of the Turkish state into what he has termed at 
various times a democratic republic, a democratic confederalism, a democratic 
nation, or a democratic homeland” (Gunter 2013: 89), and explicating the necessary 
concrete steps to be taken by both sides within a time schedule towards peace. The 
Kurdish movement as a whole kept pressing the government for a response to 
Öcalan’s road map, officially recognising him as the representative of the movement, 
and getting into direct dialogue with him for the peaceful solution of the conflict. 
While the government on the one hand maintained the discourse on terrorism, 
repeatedly declaring to the public that “no matter what they would not come to the 
same table with terrorists”3, on the other hand the MIT (Turkish National Intelligence 
Organisation) had confidential meetings with Öcalan and the most significant 
outcome of these meetings was the initiation of a publicly undisclosed plan towards 
the disarmament and retreat of the PKK (Çandar 2012). In agreement with the MIT, 
several months after the launch of the Kurdish Opening, Öcalan declared that 
delegations of Kurdish militants would return to Turkey as ‘peace groups’. The 
arrival of the first ‘peace group’ from the Habur border gate in October 2009 was a 
historic moment in Turkey, broadcast live, followed and discussed nationwide. The 
                                                 
3
 Tayyip Erdoğan kept the old discourse on terrorism alive and deployed it on numerous occasions. 
For instance, shortly after his hope-inspiring Diyarbakır speech in 2005, he refused to meet with 
Ahmet Türk, the co-chairman of the pro-Kurdish party DTP, “on the grounds that the DTP does not 
recognize the PKK as a terrorist organization and condemn it” (Çınar 2008: 124). Another occasion 
where the AKP conflicted with its democratic discourse on the Kurdish issue was an extreme 
example; Tayyip Erdoğan attacked the MHP, the ultra-nationalist oppositional party who was in the 




group was welcomed by hundreds of thousands of Kurdish people celebrating the 
beginning of the ceasefire and peace process. Their arrival was pictured in the 
Hurriyet newspaper as follows: 
 
Dressed in combat vests, pants and with sashes around their waists, the group 
smiled and made victory signs while crossing the border. The group likewise 
received an enthusiastic welcome from the thousands of jubilant Kurdish 
demonstrators waiting outside the border gate chanting, “Welcome peace 
ambassadors!” The group also carried a letter listing a series of requests 
addressed to Turkish officials. They were released after more than 24 hours 
of questioning, drawing reaction from Turkish nationalists, the court of public 
opinion, and the families of soldiers who lost their lives fighting the PKK in 
the country’s Southeast. (Hurriyet Daily News, 21 October 2009) 
 
 
The picture of some PKK members in their guerrilla uniform being welcomed by a 
huge joyous Kurdish crowd was interpreted as the PKK’s ‘victory parade’ by a 
significant part of the Turkish public and it stirred up nationalist hatred towards the 
PKK and the Kurds in general. The disturbance was expressed in some angry 
nationalist protests which were immediately organised in several cities. Moreover, 
the two main opposition parties, the pro-Kemalist CHP (Republican People’s Party) 
and the ultra-nationalist MHP (Nationalist Movement Party), both accused the 
government of treason. The government promptly responded to these negative 
reactions by suspending the project and shifting the discourse; “the government’s 
narrative of unity was quickly replaced with one portraying the firmly ‘reliable’ 
government and the ‘unreliable’ Kurdish side” (Nykanen 2013: 89). Seven members 
of the ‘peace group’ were in the end sentenced to 77.5 years of imprisonment in total 
with accusations of being members of and making propaganda for a terrorist 
organization. (Bianet, 25 April 2012). Furthermore, it was shortly after the Habur 
incident that the pro-Kurdish party DTP was banned. The furious reactions from the 
Turkish nationalists were disconcerting for the Kurds who gathered that day to 
celebrate peace, and the government’s immediate step back was a disappointment for 
the Kurdish movement. Consequently, the Habur incident proved to be a clear 
indicator of the striking discrepancy between the conceptions of the ‘peace process’ 




Whilst the Kurdish Opening from the very beginning triggered unrest in the majority 
of the Turkish public on the one hand and disappointment amongst Kurdish citizens 
on the other hand, time also showed that the government’s strategy to eliminate the 
Kurdish movement was far from yielding the intended results. A new pro-Kurdish 
party, BDP (Peace and Democracy Party), was formed straightaway following the 
closure of the DTP. And the Kurdish politicians benefited from the break from the 
traditional denial policy and effectively used the new opportunity to publicly address 
the Kurdish issue. The BDP’s parliamentary performance gave more visibility to the 
Kurdish perspective and Kurdish interests amongst the Turkish public and also more 
legitimacy to Kurdish representatives. The Kurdish party became a powerful voice in 
the ongoing public debate on the Kurdish issue and “pushed the boundaries of the 
democratization process” (Kurban, 2013a).  
 
As the AKP government’s plan to discredit and liquidate the Kurdish political 
movement collapsed, the peace process continued with an intense power struggle 
between the two political actors. In 2012, the AKP government’s effort to keep 
Öcalan in absolute isolation, preventing him from seeing anyone, including his 
lawyers, drew a reaction from the Kurdish public. Eventually, hundreds of Kurdish 
prisoners started a hunger strike, demanding an end to Öcalan’s solitary confinement, 
and the larger Kurdish community supported the strike with street protests. The 
hunger strike continued for sixty-eight days and ended only when Öcalan called for 
an end to the strike via a message carried by his brother. After this incidence, seeking 
ways of rebuilding hope and trust amongst Kurds and restoring the process, Prime 
Minister Erdoğan for the first time disclosed to the public that the MIT had been in 
dialogue with Öcalan. The government also permitted delegations of BDP deputies 
to visit Öcalan. Thus, as Villellas notes, “for the first time the Turkish Government 
has publicly recognised Abdullah Öcalan as its interlocutor in peace talks and as a 
central figure for millions of Kurds in Turkey” (Villellas 2013: 21). 
 
In 2013, Öcalan sent a public message to the Kurdish people, which was read out at 
the Newroz celebrations in Diyarbakır. In this message, Öcalan called on the PKK to 
initiate a ceasefire and to withdraw from Turkey, and he suggested that the Kurdish 
movement needed to enhance their legal political practices on democratic grounds. 
Following this historic message, the PKK started the process of withdrawing its 
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guerrilla forces from Turkey. However, the process did not continue with full 
harmony between the government and the Kurdish movement; it was laden with 
disagreements and tensions due to disparate views and expectations of the 
fundamentals of the process and its ultimate destination.  
 
For the government, the ultimate aim is the cessation of armed conflict, and 
the PKK’s withdrawal beyond Turkey’s borders and laying down arms. For 
the Kurdish political movement, the goal is to find a democratic solution to 
the Kurdish question based on structural constitutional and legislative reforms 
to grant the Kurds political status and equal rights. The leaked minutes of the 
meeting between Öcalan and the BDP delegation on 23 February 2013 make 
clear that Öcalan has no intention to immediately and unconditionally call on 
its troops to lay down their arms. Rather, he envisions a long term process 
where the two parties will gradually take coordinated and consecutive steps 
towards an eventual peace settlement. (Kurban, 2013a) 
 
Hence within only a few months of Öcalan’s historic Newroz message, the mood of 
optimism once again collapsed. The PKK suspended the withdrawal process, 
claiming that the government had not been taking the necessary steps agreed under 
the peace process. With these developments putting a strain on the government, the 
2013 ‘democratisation package’ was announced. The reforms included allowing 
politicians to use “any language other than Turkish”, allowing education in 
“languages other than Turkish” at non-state schools, “decriminalizing the use of 
Kurdish letters not found in the Turkish alphabet” and “permission for villages to use 
their original Kurdish names” (Zaman, 30 September 2013). Also, as a part of this 
‘democratisation package’, the AKP removed the ‘student oath’ which had been 
compulsory for primary school students to memorise and read out loud in unison at 
the beginning of each school day since 1932. It was a nationalist oath that started 
with the lines “I’m Turkish, I’m righteous, I’m hardworking” and ended with the 
famous phrase of Atatürk; “How happy is the one who says I am a Turk”. This 
phrase used to be one of the key slogans of Kemalist nationalism that could be found 
written in various public spaces everywhere in the country, even on the mountains in 
the Kurdish region written in huge letters.  With the ‘democratisation package’, the 
AKP also removed one of these signs in Diyarbakır which had been set up on a city 
street after the 1980 military coup. Thus, removing this sign that represented the 
official oppression policies towards the Kurds and was a constant reminder of the 
Turkish military coup that had tortured, imprisoned and killed a great number of 
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Kurds, from a city recognised as the capital city by the Kurds had great symbolic 
value. 
 
Yet, once again, the government’s attempt was found weak from the Kurdish 
perspective. Gülten Kışanak, the co-chair of the BDP, for instance, said “the package 
does not address the need for democratization, broader freedoms and rights, solutions 
to problems and an acceptance of citizens as they are”, and she also added that “the 
package was drafted to meet the needs of the AKP, not the people” (Today’s Zaman, 
30 September 2013). Dilek Kurban interprets these negative reactions with regards to 
the timing of the package: “Had Erdoğan made this announcement after the opening 
of the EU accession talks in 2005 or as part of his government programme after his 
re-election in 2007, or even in the context of the ‘Kurdish opening’ in 2009, many 
more people than just core constituents, party members and supporters in the pro-
government media would have wholeheartedly welcomed the measures” (Kurban 
2013b). Thus she emphasises that the scope of the package fell behind its times, 
behind the specific necessities of the current circumstances of the process and the 
present expectations of the Kurds.  
 
Nevertheless, despite all the negative developments, fundamental disagreements and 
conflicts, the ‘peace process’ has continued to date, albeit with ups and downs, and 
with the Kurdish movement’s frequent criticisms and warnings to the government, 
even threats to back out of the process. In general, the Kurdish movement as a whole 
retained its determination to seek peace. In fact, abstaining from “damaging the 
peace process” (now a famous phrase) became the core principle determining the 
Kurdish movement’s position towards any current political issue, at times to the cost 
of receiving harsh criticisms from some left-wing anti-government parties that had 
been the main if not the only ally of the Kurdish struggle in the past.  
 
On the other hand, the AKP has never been able to fully control the direction and 
outcomes of the public debate on the Kurdish issue, despite the advantageous 
position it holds as the government party. As Casier et al. suggest, “even as it 
attempted to initiate this break with traditional statist ideology— and in the midst of 
apparent competition, rather than cooperation with the Kurdish movement—the AKP 
was unable to control the official narrative” (2011: 108). First of all, as discussed 
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above, the process beginning with the Kurdish Opening had given more visibility and 
legitimacy to the Kurdish movement and had transformed the Kurdish political 
movement “from an outcast to the facilitator of peace” (Kurban, 2013a). While the 
Kurdish movement turned into a publicly visible political actor, challenging the 
government and disallowing it to freely create its own narrative of the issue, on the 
other hand, pro-Kemalist political players have also remained capable of challenging 
the government in terms of its Kurdish policy, and Kemalism as an ideology has 
continued to influence a large section of the Turkish population, although the 
Kemalists dramatically lost power during the AKP era. So, considering this picture, 
with multiple political actors each with their own capacity to influence and 
manipulate public opinion on the Kurdish issue in different segments of society, the 
AKP government’s aspiration to solve the issue in its own terms proved to be 
difficult to fulfil. Thus, the destination of the Kurdish conflict became a subject of 
political struggle as never before; the past of the conflict turned into a contested 
open-ended narrative to be rewritten, whereas the future of the conflict became an 




Public Consequences of the New Kurdish Policy 
 
As all the above discussed developments make clear, the AKP government’s Kurdish 
policy is far from being a democracy-seeking policy; it is yet another authoritarian 
and anti-democratic policy, but with a significantly different approach from its 
predecessors’; a new policy that can be called a “patronising embrace” towards the 
Kurds, as Kerem Öktem (2008) aptly puts it. However, the AKP government’s 
attempt to shift traditional state policy towards the Kurdish issue indisputably 
represents a milestone in the history of the conflict, mainly because it dramatically 
shifted the dynamics of the conflict regardless of the government’s intentions. Most 
importantly, in order to change the course of the conflict in their preferred direction, 
the government had to expand the areas of freedom in certain respects. And to be 
able to obtain the Turkish public’s support in this bold policy shift, they had to 
reshape the dominant public perception of the Kurdish conflict, which necessitated 
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an open and extensive public debate on the issue. This was in a sense the most 
significant aspect of the official launch of the Kurdish Opening; lifting the strict ban 
over speaking about the Kurdish issue, breaking the enforced silence, and 
encouraging an unprecedented broad public debate on the issue.  
 
As Cemalettin Haşimi writes; “The continuous increase in the discussions on the 
Kurdish issue and the greater importance attributed to the problem verify that the 
initiative [Kurdish Opening] acted as an opening of Pandora’s box. Marking a 
rupture moment, the very act of announcement began to re-write and re-encounter 
the whole memory of the problem in the public perception”. (2009: 23). The public 
debate generated by the Kurdish Opening consequently gave voice to some long 
silenced realities of the conflict and gave public visibility to the previously 
suppressed historical context of the conflict. The oppressively controlled 
monophonic official narration of the Kurdish conflict by the Kemalist state was 
publicly questioned for the first time or, we can say, this traditional narration of the 
conflict became just one of many narrations amongst the polyphony of voices 
narrating the conflict from various perspectives and struggling with each other to be 
the dominant narrative in the new era.  
 
Generally, the explosion of a wide public debate on a formerly suppressed issue of 
socio-political conflict in a society can be regarded as a positive phenomenon in 
itself. However, the new era in the Kurdish conflict in Turkey depicted in this 
chapter brings not only positive potential for a peaceful solution to the conflict, but 
also potential risks of actually intensifying the conflict. In evaluating the AKP’s 
Kurdish policy in terms of the political tensions in society, Somer and Liaras share 
the following observations: 
 
Turks’ predominant image of their society no longer resembles a 
homogeneous melting pot. [...] It is unclear how much it translates into 
recognition of difference, respect for the other and acceptance of particular 
rights, rather than fear of difference, the vilification of the other and 
sociopolitical polarization. There are signs of both. Liberal views of pluralism 
and coexistence, diversity-skeptical views nurtured by intolerance and 
prevalent interpretations of history, and anti-Kurdish values fed by the PKK 





Çelik argues that “the social polarization dimension of the conflict is the most 
neglected side of the issue” (2012: 256) and draws attention to the long-settled 
“spillover effects” of the war in the big cities reflected in turn in societal polarisation. 
Approaching the Kurdish Opening from this perspective, she writes, “many fear that 
if this chance of resolving the conflict is missed, social polarization of Kurds and 
Turks might result” (ibid: 255).  
 
In 2013, the government set up a controversial ‘committee of Wise People’ that was 
composed of intellectuals, artists, academicians and other public figures with the aim 
of influencing public opinion about the Kurdish conflict and winning the hearts and 
minds of the people as regards the new Kurdish policy. The committee members 
were assigned to seven regions of the country and they were expected to organise 
meetings in various cities to explain the peace process to the public. However, as was 
previously explained, that year the relationship between the Kurdish movement and 
the government suffered severe setbacks following a failed attempt to get the PKK to 
withdraw. At the same time, the Gezi protests in the summer of 2013 had 
dramatically changed the political dynamics in the country and tarnished the 
government’s image. In this political atmosphere, the committee of Wise People 
could not operate. With the government’s loss of credibility, some members left the 
committee and in a short period of time the committee became inactive and the Wise 
People project came to a halt without being officially cancelled or a government 
statement.  
 
We can say that, one of the main problems that gives rise to the risk of further 
political polarisation in Turkey is the uncertainties, inconsistencies and 
contradictions in the AKP government’s new Kurdish policy, which has been 
“causing insecurity among ethnic Turks and Kurds alike” (Yavuz and Özcan 2006: 
115). A governing power radically shuffling the dynamics of such a severe and long-
standing social conflict in a deeply polarised society without a clear plan no doubt 
creates a risky political atmosphere with the potential of triggering some long-
accumulated political tensions in that society. For example, the expanding liberty to 
publicly address the Kurdish issue more openly is no doubt a positive development 
towards a more democratic society. On the other hand though, we can say that a 




Kurdish perspective would also allow opposing perspectives and anti-Kurdish 
sentiments to be fired as well. The former policy of denial, while strictly ordering 
silence on the Kurdish issue, in fact silenced all possible commentaries on the issue 
from any political position, including discourses of enmity and racism against the 
Kurds. Put simply, it had been impossible to hate Kurds by name, when naming 
Kurds as such was forbidden. In short, a political atmosphere that enables Kurds to 
speak out inevitably enables other views to speak as well. And, following Haşimi’s 
metaphor quoted above, we can say that once Pandora’s Box is opened, what comes 
out are all sorts of opinions, beliefs, and sentiments from different and clashing 





In conclusion, we can say that even though the AKP’s Kurdish policy has been 
highly controversial and has largely failed to meet Kurdish demands, it nevertheless 
dramatically changed the course of the conflict. As a result of the ceasefire and 
ongoing peace talks, the conflict between the Turkish state and the Kurdish political 
movement has been transformed into an intense political struggle rather than armed 
conflict. On the other hand, breaking the traditional state policy of denial made it 
possible for the Kurdish identity and Kurdish political perspective to be visible and 
accessible to Turkish society for the first time. While the past and the future of the 
conflict became subject to open power struggles between multiple actors as never 
before, the Kurdish voice became one of the dominant voices within the heated 
public debate on the Kurdish issue.  
 
In the following chapters, I will focus on Kurdish films in Turkey that were made 
and released in this period of political transformation. It was the shift in official 
Kurdish policy which enabled and even encouraged the emergence of the first 
Kurdish films in Turkey which explicitly tackle the Kurdish issue after decades of 
silence on the screen. The socio-political context discussed in this chapter is highly 
significant in terms of one of the key questions that shapes this entire study: the 





transformation. As discussed above, the new political dynamics of the Kurdish 
conflict bear the potential to lead Turkey towards a peaceful resolution of the conflict 
or towards a deepening of the conflict. And one of the fundamental characteristics of 
Kurdish films of the period is their aspiration to play a positive role in this process 
towards building social peace in Turkey.  
 
The kinds of filmic strategies Kurdish films deploy to accomplish this political goal 
and whether or not these strategies are likely to have an influence on political 
opinions dominant in the conflict-driven society of Turkey are issues I will address in 
the following chapters. As I will argue in detail, the complicated political dynamics 
explained in this chapter have had a strong influence on the salient themes and 
formal patters in Kurdish filmmaking. Furthermore, since these films circulated in a 
period of dramatic political transformation when intense public debates on the 
Kurdish issue were high on the public agenda, their public reception was always 










In this chapter I will interrogate how the national cinema debates addressed in 
Chapter 2 apply to the operation and cultural reception of the concept of national 
cinema, specifically in Turkey in the 2000s, at a time when the country experienced a 
significant political transformation regarding the very definition of national identity, 
as explained in Chapter 3. The recent emergence of Kurdish cinema in Turkey offers 
a substantial case study laden with significant questions regarding the multiple and 
evolving constructions and perceptions of national cinema under the influence of 
national politics.  With a particular interest in understanding the political dynamics of 
the nation in the realm of cinema, in this chapter, I will concentrate on Turkey to 
interrogate how the rise of Kurdish films and the birth of the concept of Kurdish 
cinema generate (and reveal) various questions regarding the relationships between 
cinema and the nation.  
 
As I pointed out in Chapter 2, it is common in the literature on national cinema to 
just consecutively list diverse types of conflicts (based on class, gender, race, 
ethnicity, and religion) while directing attention to the inner divisions of the nation 
with the aim of undermining essentialist understandings of the notion of national 
cinema. On this point, I argued that each of these socio-political conflict dynamics in 
fact generate unique forms of tension in their relationships with the nation. Different 
from class or gender differences, for example, ethnic differences carry the potential 
of questioning the very basis of national cinema. And in the case of ‘Kurdish cinema’ 
in Turkey, the division of ethnicity as an internal conflict functions in a way that 
essentially fractures ‘Turkish cinema’. One of the key frames of this chapter is that 
here I identify Turkey as a national scale where the antagonism between Turkish 




practices are reciprocated in the constructions and interpretations of ‘Turkish 
cinema’ and ‘Kurdish cinema’ at a time of political turbulence. 
 
In order to address these issues, I will first trace the socio-political and artistic 
historical developments that led to the boom of Kurdish films in Turkey in the 2000s 
by examining the double alignment of these films. I will first focus on the global 
emergence of Kurdish cinema in the 2000s, as Kurdish films in Turkey are a part of 
and in touch with the rise of Kurdish cinema as a transnational phenomenon. On the 
other hand, the birth of Kurdish films in Turkey also needs to be specifically 
addressed in the context of Turkey, and therefore I will position these films within 
the specific socio-political context of the Kurdish issue in Turkey and also analyse 
them as part of the general revival of cinema in Turkey in the 2000s. While Kurdish 
cinema as a whole raises various complicated questions, these questions take 
different forms and new meanings within the culturally specific context of Turkey in 
the 2000s. Kurdish films made in Turkey on the one hand share ambiguities and 
complexities with Kurdish films from elsewhere, but on the other hand, questions 
regarding their position, identification and definition have a different dimension, 
which is a product of the specificities of the history of the Kurdish issue in Turkey in 
general and the political developments in the 2000s in particular.  
 
While investigating the complicated questions regarding the definition of Kurdish 
cinema in Turkey, I will also focus on how Kurdish cinema carries these questions 
over to the concept of Turkish cinema, how defining Kurdish cinema inevitably 
means re-defining Turkish cinema, and, how these conceptual questions take shape 
under  the over-determining impact of the politics of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey. 
In Chapter 2, I took on Tom O’Regan’s suggestion that we analyse the national 
cinema of a country as ‘an object of knowledge’ and pay special attention to the 
diverse discursive constructions of it by diverse agents. In his study on Australian 
cinema, O’Regan draws attention to the contextualising power of “the multitude of 
actors within the national cinema itself – filmmakers, government officials, film 
festival coordinators, multinational distributors, private investors, cultural critics and 
audiences, [and] publishers”  (1996: 31-32). In line with O’Regan’s approach, rather 
than proposing my own definition of Kurdish cinema, I will closely investigate the 




social actors with the aim of defining, interpreting, contextualising, constructing and 
manipulating the concepts of ‘Kurdish cinema’, as well as ‘Turkish cinema’. This 
issue is significant for the following two chapters, in which I focus on individual 
films and question the potential political impact of Kurdish films in Turkey. 
Arguments regarding what Kurdish cinema is and what it should be have an 
influence on the thematic and formal choices in Kurdish filmmaking that I analyse in 
Chapter 5. On the other hand, the emergence of the concept of Kurdish cinema has 
had an impact on the public reception of individual Kurdish films in Turkey that is in 
the focus of Chapter 6.  
 
In that chapter, I will interrogate how Kurdish films from 2009 onwards became one 
of the chief means of debating the Kurdish issue in Turkey. But first, my point here 
is that Kurdish films triggered wide public debates not only on the basis of their 
topicality or their subject matter which neatly overlapped the controversial issues 
occupying the political agenda; in fact, prior to how they represented the Kurdish 
issue it was their emergence under the label of ‘Kurdish cinema’ that became subject 
to debate. In a country where even the very existence of Kurds has been denied and 
the word ‘Kurd’ was banned for decades, the emergence of a notion called ‘Kurdish 
film’ was itself something that bespoke a political transformation, and that became a 
means of debating this transformation. 
 
 
The Birth of Kurdish Cinema 
 
The meeting of the Kurds with the medium of cinema was a notably retarded one, 
due to the social, political and economic circumstances they have historically 
experienced. Kurdish filmmakers took to the stage and the concept of Kurdish 
cinema came into existence at a time when the world was celebrating the centenary 
of the birth of cinema. It was the 2000s when films made by Kurdish filmmakers 
narrating the Kurdish issue from the Kurdish perspective first came out. In terms of 
the socio-political context that led to the recent emergence of Kurdish films, we can 
point to the historical developments in the Kurdish region from the 1990s onwards, 




issue, as explained in the previous chapter. On the other hand, Kurdish political 
struggle against oppression and assimilation, which had grown stronger in previous 
decades and which reinforced the sense of community amongst Kurds, politicised 
Kurdish identity and cultivated a Kurdish political awakening, is no doubt  one of the 
most prominent factors behind the emergence of Kurdish films. Kurdish political 
struggle not only politically influenced Kurdish films but also played a more 
practical role in developing Kurdish filmmaking. Certain mediums and institutions 
established by the Kurdish movement – such as Kurdish newspapers, TV stations, 
and art and culture institutions – provided the ground for a young generation of 
Kurds to gain certain skills adaptable to filmmaking.  
 
In 2000, Bahman Ghobadi, a Kurdish filmmaker from Iran, won the Golden Camera 
Award at the Cannes Film Festival with A Time for Drunken Horses, a film that is 
woven with certain elements distinctly identifiable as ‘Kurdish’, such as its language, 
theme and geography. Making a name for himself with his success at Cannes, 
Ghobadi gave voice to the Kurdish identity not only through his film; he also 
publicly inscribed Kurdish identity into his identity as a filmmaker by defining 
himself as “a Kurdish filmmaker making films for the Kurds” and stating that he is 
“fighting for Kurdish rights through his cinema” and “using his films to show the 
suffering of the Kurdish people” (Ghobadi 2007). Thus, he was the first filmmaker to 
vocalize the notion of Kurdish filmmaking on the platforms of international film 
culture. Hence, Ghobadi’s international recognition under the label of a ‘Kurdish 
filmmaker’ has been a milestone for Kurdish filmmaking, in that it inspired and 
motivated new Kurdish filmmakers and moreover, helped the notion of Kurdish 
cinema to be heard and recognised widely. After all, all cinemas need their auteurs, 
and Ghobadi in this sense has an iconic significance in the history of Kurdish cinema 
as the first Kurdish auteur to gain international recognition.  
 
In fact it wasGhobadi’s success that even helped some Kurdish activists to crystallise 
the idea of organising Kurdish film festivals. In explaining how they arrived at the 
idea of establishing the London Kurdish Film Festival (LKFF), the first ever Kurdish 
film festival in the world, Mustafa Gündoğdu, the founder and director of the LKFF, 
says, “That year, Bahman Ghobadi had won an award at the Cannes Film Festival. 




The idea of a Kurdish film festival came out” (Koçer 2014: 477). The LKFF later 
turned into the institutional representative and the world centre of Kurdish cinema, 
where over time film archives (as well as knowledge about Kurdish films) 
accumulated and were concentrated. It became the leading institution of Kurdish 
cinema in its early years, taking an active role in almost all activities and events 
regarding Kurdish films, and deploying its resources to assist the flourishing of the 
web of cultural activities and institutions surrounding Kurdish films.   
 
Following the LKFF in 2001, and in fact with the guidance of the LKFF, a large 
number of Kurdish film festivals started to spring up in other places. The wide 
dispersion of the rapidly growing Kurdish film festivals in various cities – from Paris 
to New York, even to Carrick-on-Shannon in Ireland – reflected the historical 
dispersal of the Kurds all around the world. Within a few years, the idea of Kurdish 
film festivals spread into the Kurdish mainland as well, with the organisation of local 
Kurdish film festivals. On the other hand, following in Ghobadi’s footsteps, various 
Kurdish filmmakers continued to gain visibility through prominent international film 
festivals. And, other than these individual screenings, in 2010, the Pusan Film 
Festival in South Korea for instance showcased a special programme featuring 
Kurdish films.  
 
From 2009 onwards, all prominent domestic film festivals in Turkey included a 
selection of Kurdish films in their programme. The first book on Kurdish cinema was 
published in İstanbul in 2009. And the same year, a conference was organised in 
Diyarbakır (the biggest Kurdish city in Turkey and the unofficial capital of 
Kurdistan), which brought together a group of Kurdish filmmakers from different 
parts of the world, Mustafa Gündoğdu from the LKFF, a representative from the 
Ministry of Culture of Iraqi Kurdistan, and a couple of scholars researching Kurdish 
films, to theoretically address the definition of Kurdish cinema as well as to discuss 
the problems and needs of Kurdish filmmaking. Through all these historical 
developments and organised efforts, Kurdish films gained visibility and recognition 
in the main countries hosting a Kurdish population, as well as on international 





Kurdish Activism and the Political Construction of Kurdish Cinema 
 
While ‘Kurdish cinema’ started to appear increasingly in festival programmes, film 
criticism, academic studies, as well as within political debates on the Kurdish issue, 
there have always been a cluster of questions shadowing the concept of Kurdish 
cinema. Any argument concerning Kurdish films first of all starts from the very 
question as to whether there is such a distinct and coherent group of films to be 
recognised and named as ‘Kurdish cinema’. And, if so, what makes a film Kurdish? 
Is it the ethnicity of the director, the theme, the language, a specific aesthetic style, or 
a political stance that allows one to recognise it as a Kurdish film? Can we talk about 
a national cinema, or should we talk about an ethnic cinema, or a minority cinema? 
These are questions that tag along with Kurdish films everywhere they travel. And, 
no doubt, all these questions actually reverberate and reproduce some other 
questions, in a quite direct manner; questions regarding the political status of the 
Kurdish people.  
 
Kurdish films correlate with the Kurdish people who, with an estimated population 
of over 30 million, are widely recognised as one of the largest non-state nations. 
They have been physically divided into four main parts across Turkey, Iran, Iraq and 
Syria since the establishment of these states at the end of World War I. Moreover, as 
a result of the oppressive nation-state policies and the ongoing political conflicts in 
the Kurdish region, Kurdish people have become dispersed not only among these 
four countries, but all around the world, to constitute a widely dispersed large 
diasporic/exilic community. And, as Hassanpour states, “the Kurdish nation, with its 
distinctive society and culture, has had to confront in all of the ‘host’ states 
centralizing, ethnically–based nationalist regimes – Turkish, Arab and Persian – with 
little or no tolerance for expressions of national autonomy within their borders” 
(1994: 3). Nevertheless, Kurdish political struggles based on the claim to be 
recognised as a nation have always been on the agenda; this claim has been regarded 






In this picture of fragmentation, each Kurdish political movement in history has 
concentrated its efforts mainly on one part of Kurdistan. However, “the dynamics of 
assimilation, repression and Kurdish resistance in each country have affected the 
direction and outcome of the Kurdish struggles in the neighbouring countries” 
(Hassanpour 1994: 3). So, on the one hand Kurdish societies are internally complex 
and fractured, but on the other hand, despite this situation, Kurdish people have 
preserved the shared elements of Kurdishness and constructed a national 
consciousness which has strengthened in relation to the oppression to which they 
have been subject. Hence, the discourses of fragmented political struggles have 
always referred to a Kurdish nationality which goes beyond the national scale of the 
struggle, embracing Kurds under the imagined national unity of all Kurds. 
 
This complex picture regarding the definition of Kurdishness cannot be worked out 
on the basis of lists of similarities and differences among the dispersed Kurdish 
communities. For any community claiming a distinctive collective identity, the role 
of agency has to be taken into consideration. As Stuart Hall remarks, national 
identity is “cross-cut by deep internal divisions and differences, and ‘unified’ only 
though the exercise of different forms of cultural power” (1992: 297). Employing a 
similar approach, Fredrik Barth regards “the maintenance of a boundary” as the key 
element for understanding ethnic units: “the critical focus of investigation from this 
point of view becomes the ethnic boundary that defines the group, not the cultural 
stuff that it encloses” (1969: 10). Although ethnic categories construct their 
distinctiveness on the basis of their cultural differences, for Barth, there is no simple 
one-to-one relationship between ethnic units and cultural similarities and differences:  
 
The cultural features that signal the boundary may change, and the cultural 
characteristics of the members may likewise be transformed, indeed even the 
organizational form of the group may change – yet the fact of continuing 
dichotomization between members and outsiders allows us to specify the 
nature of continuity, and investigate the changing cultural form and content” 
(ibid:14).  
 
In this regard, even if the culture of an ethnic group shows internal differences, this 
does not affect the unity of the group as long as it maintains the boundary 
distinguishing that ethnicity from the others. Tim Edensor, while analysing national 




essence, and states that identities are constructed through an ‘internal-external 
dialectic” (2002: 24). As such, he introduces a similar approach to that of Barth, 
remarking that the process of identification of national identity is the drawing of 
boundaries between ‘self’ and ‘other’. On the ground of these arguments, we can say 
that Kurds have established the channels of politicising their ethnicity and preserving 
a sense of national identity, despite their history of fragmentation. In this sense, 
Ernest Gellner’s argument that “two people could be considered from the same 
nation if and only if they recognize each other as from the same nation” (1983: 7) 
can be considered as the most powerful aspect of Kurdish national identity.  
 
We can say that, in parallel with this briefly explained socio-political context, 
Kurdish cinema functions as a new emergent means of politicising ethnicity and as a 
new medium for Kurds to ‘recognise’ each other as members of the same nation. In 
the process of the politicisation of ethnicity, having an independent cinema functions 
in the same way, for instance, as having a distinct language does, and thus Kurdish 
cinema becomes one of the representatives of a distinctive Kurdish national culture. 
And, in this sense, Kurdish cinema functions as an instrumental cultural tool to 
counter and to break the historical denial of Kurdish identity.  
 
At this point, it is crucial to draw attention to the relationship between Kurdish 
cinema and Kurdish political struggle. As a highly politicised community, long 
before the emergence of Kurdish films, Kurdish people have established various 
institutional channels in different places that contribute to the binding together of the 
community, the preservation of Kurdish culture, and the maintenance of a sense of 
unity. This politically organised character of the Kurdish community manifests itself 
in the institutional practices contributing to the construction of Kurdish cinema. For 
example, we can say that the role played by the widespread Kurdish film festivals in 
the rise of Kurdish cinema went far beyond simply providing a venue for showcasing 
Kurdish films, as they actually set the necessary stage for the growth of Kurdish 
films and played a crucial role in the construction, contextualisation and 
institutionalisation of the concept of Kurdish cinema. Hence, in an interview, 
Gündoğdu clearly states that the initial idea of founding a Kurdish film festival was a 
politically motivated idea, rather than being influenced by artistic ambitions. He 





systematically attempted to eradicate Kurdish heritage from the cultural landscape”. 
(Koçer 2014: 478). He further points to the role of Kurdish film festivals in the 
building and maintenance of Kurdish collective identity: 
 
Cinema has a peculiar capacity to bring the Kurdish nation together; when a 
Kurd from Iraq sits in a European movie theatre next to a Kurd from Turkey 
and watches a film narrating a Kurdish funeral or wedding in Iran, that 
experience becomes effective in healing the ruptures of time and history in 
cultural knowledge, historical memory, and identity. (ibid: 478) 
 
The audience reaction to the trailer for the 7th London Kurdish Film Festival in 
November 2011 demonstrates the success of the festival in delivering the role 
Gündoğdu describes. That year, the trailer for the festival was an animation in which 
a hand draws the map of the officially non-existent Kurdistan. When the map of the 
region is finished, the hand first names the neighbour countries, and finally writes 
‘Kurdistan’ in the middle of its map. On the opening night, when the trailer for the 
festival was screened for the first time, there was huge applause in the theatre at the 
moment ‘Kurdistan’ was written. This applause gives expression to the mechanism 
of relating Kurdish films to the Kurdish political struggle and demonstrates how the 
LKFF functions as a meeting point for cinema and politics; and how the festival 
itself – just as much as the films it showcases – contributes to the Kurdish sense of 
belonging and becomes a venue for the celebration of national identity. Thus, it 
implies that Kurdish cinema becomes a part of Kurdish nation-building not only 
through filmic texts, but also through the contextualisation of the films with 
reference to a collective Kurdish political identity.  
 
Not only Kurdish film festivals, but also other cultural activities related to Kurdish 
cinema exhibit a certain political will towards assisting the birth and growth of 
Kurdish cinema. For instance, the editor of the first book on Kurdish cinema was 
Mizgin Müjde Arslan, a Kurdish activist and filmmaker. In the introduction to the 
book, Arslan presents the book as a concrete response to the ongoing argument about 
whether or not there is a Kurdish cinema (2009a: xiii). And it is indeed true that the 
mere existence of a book on Kurdish cinema is something that functions as a reply to 
queries concerning the existence of Kurdish cinema, regardless of what is actually 






current argument is the fact that this book project has been conducted with the 
conscious intention of proving and declaring the existence of Kurdish cinema.  
 
More generally speaking, what is striking about all the early cultural practices around 
Kurdish films is their sense of urgency in responding to an only just burgeoning 
dynamic. The first film events, festivals, books and conferences on Kurdish cinema 
did something beyond just recognising and showcasing an already ripened cinematic 
dynamic; they gave impetus to the growth of an as yet rudimentary dynamic at the 
time these activities were conducted. In a way, we can say that the construction and 
institutionalisation of Kurdish cinema preceded the growth of Kurdish films, and, it 
was a certain political will that accelerated the rise of Kurdish cinema and amplified 
its visibility. We can for instance read the criticism of Zeynel Doğan, a Kurdish 
filmmaker from Turkey, from this point of view: 
 
Our problem is that we set off with the aim of making Kurdish cinema. That 
is a wrong point to start from. We organise conferences, we write, we discuss, 
but there is not much production when it actually comes to filmmaking. I 
don’t mean to belittle what is being done, but I am just arguing that it is not 
enough” (Doğan 2012a)  
 
Collective Kurdish efforts to support Kurdish films also worked towards writing the 
history of, or writing a history for, Kurdish cinema. Every cultural entity seeks its 
own history; this is true for individuals, for nations, and for cinemas as well. And the 
process of ‘seeking one’s own history’ is never motiveless; behind the necessity of 
having a history, of having roots in the past, there is always a motivating dynamic in 
the present day. In this regard, the recent emergence of Kurdish films is the dynamic 
that necessitated the need to write the history of Kurdish cinema, to seek its ancestors 
and to mark its inception. All the aforementioned cultural activities regarding 
Kurdish films played a crucial role in historicising current Kurdish films. The case of 
Zarê (1926, Amo Bek-Nazaryan), which is now recognised as the first ever Kurdish 
film, best demonstrates the history-writing process of Kurdish cinema. Suncem 
Koçer’s research shows how Zarê was discovered and “nationalised” by the LKFF: 
 
When Gündoğdu and his colleagues planned the London Kurdish Film 
Festival in 2001, they sought, in addition to erasing borders that fragment a 





production and by reclaiming films that “belonged to Kurds.” [...] They 
conducted research on films about and/or by Kurds with the aim of 
reclaiming them as part of a Kurdish cultural legacy. After encountering a 
reference to Zarê in an online article, Gündoğdu contacted Armenian officials 
to inquire about the film. In 2006, after tedious bureaucratic maneuvering 
with the Armenian government, he finally managed to salvage a print of the 
film from the Armenian national archives. At a well-publicized screening at 
the fourth London Kurdish Film Festival, viewers saw what was billed as the 
first film ever produced about the Kurds. Retrieving Zarê from Armenian 
national archives, according to Gündoğdu, proved that the London Kurdish 
Film Festival had achieved its founding mission: to make Kurds visible 
within the pages of history. (2014: 478) 
 
Yet the Kurdishness of Zarê is a controversial issue as it is an Armenian production 
directed by an Armenian filmmaker, but it tells the story of a Kurdish village in 
Armenia. Thus Koçer for instance argues that Zarê contradicts “the critical norms of 
Kurdish cinema that have been established in debates among Kurdish filmmakers 
and film critics” (ibid: 479). However, given the LKFF’s dominance in the 
establishment of Kurdish cinema, it is not surprising that Zarê quickly came to be 
widely recognised as the earliest example of Kurdish cinema. Later in 2011, with the 
initiation of Gündoğdu, Zarê was screened in Turkey, as a special event hosted by 
the Kurdish municipality in Diyarbakır and also in İstanbul at the If Istanbul Film 
Festival. Both screenings were accompanied by a live music performance by Tara 
Jaff, a Kurdish harpist from Iraq, and, the screening of Zarê in Turkey was publicised 
as a historical moment with discourses celebrating the first Kurdish film returning its 
homeland to meet its people for the first time after many decades. Thus, as this 
specific example demonstrates, politically motivated cultural activities played a 
fundamental role in discovering/constructing the history of Kurdish cinema.  
 
 
Kurdish Cinema and the National 
 
One of the prevailing approaches deployed in defining Kurdish cinema is to regard it 
as the ‘national cinema’ of a ‘nation without a state’, and to analyse Kurdish films 
from all around the world with respect to their commonalities in line with the 
conventional framework of national cinema. And the context summarised above in 





of Kurdish films. However, I believe that this approach would not only be 
insufficient in coping with the multifaceted character of Kurdish cinema, but it will 
also mean ignoring, or repressing, its potential for suggesting new approaches with 
regards to the theory of ‘cinema and the nation’.  
 
The difficulty in fitting Kurdish cinema into a self-evident recognised theoretical 
frame is not something we can overcome by making a note of its ‘uniqueness’. The 
fact that it does not properly fit the theory tells us something not only about Kurdish 
cinema, but also about the theories it invokes. In order to decide how to tackle the 
national within Kurdish cinema, we need not only to review and utilise theories of 
national cinema, but also to utilise the complexity of Kurdish cinema to reinvestigate 
the already complex issues of national cinema theory. In this regard, I see Kurdish 
cinema as an opportunity to rethink possible ways of approaching ‘national cinema’ 
as a realm of socio-political conflict. 
 
The concept of ‘Kurdish cinema’ evokes the theoretical debates addressed in the 
second chapter within a highly complicated case. To begin with, we can say that the 
widely criticised presumption of commonality amongst the films of a nation is 
replaced by a suspicion towards commonality in the case of Kurdish films. In other 
words, for Kurdish films the issue of commonality turns into a ‘claim’ that needs to 
be justified or proved. And the ambiguity in labelling Kurdish films implies the fact 
that power struggles over the status of Kurds still persist. In this frame, how to 
approach the concept of Kurdish cinema becomes a matter of political stance; insofar 
as recognising Kurdish cinema warrants recognising the Kurds, defining Kurdish 
cinema means defining the Kurds. And the struggle over the definition of Kurdish 
films bears the weight of the history of the Kurdish issue.  
 
Although it is a complicated case, the complexities of Kurdish cinema always 
revolve around questions regarding nationhood. In this respect, it is true that the 
ground for the debate on Kurdish films is essentially characterised by the notion of 
nation; the national informs all the questions surrounding Kurdish films. However, 
this emphasis is not the same as simply stating that Kurdish cinema is a national 
cinema. We can rather say that Kurdish cinema in itself carries the tension of the 





same tension to other related national cinemas, because the possibility of Kurdish 
cinema as a ‘national cinema’ seems to imply the impossibility of ‘Iranian cinema’, 
or ‘Turkish cinema’, for example. In this sense, defining Kurdish cinema is 
inevitably re-defining the cinemas of other nations that are interrelated with the 
Kurds. 
 
When talking about Kurdish films, we refer to films from the main host countries, 
and also, for example, a film by a Kurdish filmmaker from Iraq living in Norway, or 
a film by a Kurdish filmmaker from Turkey living in Germany. The issues regarding 
nation within Kurdish cinema always concerns at least two national formations. In 
terms of production, distribution and consumption processes, all Kurdish films are in 
dialogue with more than one nation; the films of Bahman Ghobadi, for example, are 
a part of both ‘Kurdish cinema’ and ‘Iranian cinema’ at the same time, or the films of 
Kazım Öz are in contact with both ‘Kurdish cinema’ and ‘Turkish cinema’. The 
picture can become even more complex in the case of diasporic filmmakers. For 
instance, until recently, Yüksel Yavuz was considered as a ‘Turkish-German 
filmmaker’, but since the emergence of the concept of ‘Kurdish cinema’, he is 
regarded as a diasporic Kurdish filmmaker; in this respect we can say that his films 
concern three different nations and three national cinemas. In this context, Kurdish 
films cannot solely be conceived of as the national cinema of Kurds, since they carry 
the marks of different nations. The way they address multiple nations highlights the 
fault lines in the notion of the nation; how the formation of a nation is related to 
another’s; how the history constructed by a nation steals some elements from 
another’s. Kurdish films, conceived of as a meeting point for interconnecting 
national issues regarding diverse nations, expose the aspect of nation as a 
construction within the tensions created by the power struggles from above and 
below the nation.  
 
Questions surrounding the concept of Kurdish cinema also link back to the 
transnational cinema debates addressed in the Chapter 2. On the textual level, we can 
speak of an intertextual and transnational dialogue between Kurdish films emerging 
from different parts of the world. The fact that Kurdish filmmakers, who have been 
dispersed around the globe have the characters that they depict, produce films that 





most powerful traits that binds Kurdish films together. For example, if the Kurdish 
guerrilla in Photograph (2001, Kazım Öz) had not died, he would maybe have 
become the ex-guerrilla in Yüksel Yavuz’s film A Little Bit of Freedom (2003), 
working in a kebap shop in Germany. Or, we can think that the arm of Saddam’s 
statue that repeatedly appears in Kilometer Zero (2005, Hineer Saleem) is the arm 
that is given to the little boy Satellite in Turtles Can Fly (2004, Bahman Ghobadi) 
upon Saddam’s fall. Here we have a group of films that talk to each other, that 
continue each other’s stories, that take the floor from one another, that transfer 
characters from one to another. For this fragmented nation narrative provides an 
important means to keep interconnected memories in cultural circulation. The 
fragmented memories re-join through the path of this communication, a path which is 
composed of stories. By narrating the stories of Kurdishness, the practice of story-
telling reveals the common experiences, common feelings and common desires of 
Kurdish people dispersed all over the world and thus draws a map of Kurdistan 
which extends the borders of the actual Kurdistan to wherever Kurds are. The 
practice of narrating Kurdishness in cinema reveals the commonalities of the 
physically divided but historically connected stories of the Kurdish people. And 
through the intertextual, transnational dialogue between Kurdish films, each film 
adds one piece to the jigsaw of the history of the Kurdish issue, which is scattered all 
around the world. Thus, these films draw a ‘narrative map’ through the stories 
dispersed all around the world map; from Turkey to Iran, Iraq, Germany, Norway, 
and Paris. This is a map that binds ‘being Kurdish’ on a transnational scale, a 
Kurdish map that is formed through stories. In this regard, we can say that we are 
talking about films that go beyond national, geographical boundaries; that get into a 
transnational dialogue which contributes to the sense of national belonging. On the 
other hand, the transnational within Kurdish cinema is not only a matter of textuality. 
As discussed earlier, the institutional practices that work towards building a Kurdish 
film culture also operate transnationally, however, they mobilise their institutional 
means towards reinforcing the sense of national unity amongst Kurds.  
 
We can say that Kurdish cinema is a case that confirms the argument for the 
necessity of a formulation of transnationalism with the emphasis on its complex 
dialogue with the national. The fact that as a result of the history of political 





Syria, but all around the world, makes the existence of Kurdish films from very 
different geographies possible. Thus, due to the socio-historical background of the 
Kurdish issue, Kurdish cinema is from its inception a transnational cinema. On the 
other hand, however, despite fragmentation, Kurdish people have historically 
constructed and maintained a national consciousness, which is evident in the textual 
and contextual formation of Kurdish cinema. So, with reference to this socio-
historical background, Kurdish cinema can be considered as a cinema that reflects 
and reproduces a national consciousness in a transnational space.  
 
In fact, based on all the arguments introduced so far, it would be theoretically 
justifiable to regard Kurdish cinema as a subnational cinema, national cinema, or a 
transnational cinema. However, rather than fixing it in one of these categories, we 
can see Kurdish cinema as an example that demonstrates the importance of 
understanding the relationships between the national, subnational and transnational 
from a relational perspective. Kurdish films, as a meeting point for interconnecting 
national issues regarding diverse nations, expose the aspect of nation as a 
construction within the tensions created by power struggles from above and below 
the nation.  
 
By this point, it must be clear that my aim here is not to favour one of the potential 
definitions of Kurdish cinema, or to suggest a new definition. Instead, I find it crucial 
to emphasise that Kurdish films have emerged from a political context which renders 
the definition of Kurdish cinema as open as the status of the Kurdish people. Kurdish 
cinema makes it impossible to fix a definition of it; it rather necessitates involving 
the study of the structuring pressures on its definition.  
 
In Chapter 2, I argued for the necessity of recognising ‘national cinema’ as 
something more than a theoretical tool, as a long-established cultural entity. This 
perspective helps us understand the functioning of Kurdish cinema as a concept. All 
the questions raised by Kurdish cinema actually function towards putting the concept 
into discourse and thus contribute to the construction of Kurdish cinema. In this 
sense, although always bringing up more questions than answers, we can say that 
Kurdish cinema has been constructed as ‘an object of knowledge’ through these 





there a Kurdish cinema?”, we can say that Kurdish cinema has come into existence 
through, and within this question. To put it in another way, Kurdish cinema has come 
into existence since the question of its existence entered circulation. For cultural 
entities come into existence not necessarily through fixed definitions and agreements 
on how to identify them, but also through the questions, ambiguities, debates and 
power struggles around them.  
 
In this context, Tom O’Regan’s emphasis that national cinema is a discursively 
produced concept, “a domain in which different knowledges are produced and 
brought into relation” (1996: 25), is particularly useful and necessary in the study of 
Kurdish films, because the question of “What is Kurdish cinema?” is under constant 
transformation in relation to the ever-shifting political dynamics of the Kurdish issue, 
and thus, we can say that studying Kurdish cinema involves studying this 
transformation. And within this transformation, what is particularly salient is 
observing how Kurdish cinema concurrently makes different, even conflicting, 
answers to the same questions possible and legitimate. Kurdish cinema embodies 
contradictory views concerning its definition insofar as it bears the history of social 
dynamics and power relationships, and it is crucial to observe the social circulation 
of the concept from this perspective.  
 
On a final note; while tackling the concept of Kurdish cinema as ‘an object of 
knowledge’, as a discursive subject that has a life outside of theory, we must also 
take into account the effect of the contextualising power of the Kurdish political 
struggle on Kurdish cinema. When we consider the previously discussed fact that 
certain agents operate towards contextualising and institutionalising Kurdish cinema 
as such, the question, for example, of whether Kurdish films constitute a common 
and distinctive unity is no longer a question that could be addressed simply and only 
through theoretical analysis. In other words, as there are certain cultural powers at 
work that contextualise these films and unite them under the label of Kurdish 
cinema, this question is no longer merely a matter of theoretical judgement. For 
example, one dominant argument repeatedly vocalised by Kurdish agents is that 
Kurdish films must feature the Kurdish language and that should be the main 
defining element of Kurdish cinema. This proposition was one of the most dominant 





LKFF deploys its institutional power in this context, too, in the slogan of the 8th 
LKFF; “Cinema is beautiful in Kurdish”. It is in this sense important to observe that 
the commonality debate is shaped not only through the interrogation of what the 
characteristics of Kurdish films are, but also through the propositions as to what they 
should be.   
 
All these complex arguments regarding the definition of Kurdish cinema with regard 
to nationhood are highly relevant for the rest of this chapter in which I focus on the 
public reverberations of the emergence of Kurdish films and the concept of Kurdish 
cinema specifically in Turkey. Inasmuch as Kurdish films in Turkey constitute a 
segment of transnational Kurdish cinema, the first Kurdish films that became visible 
in the public sphere in the 2000s introduced all these questions and issues to the film 
culture in Turkey. As I emphasised earlier, however, these general questions took on 
different forms and meanings as they were translated into the particular context of 
Kurdish films in Turkey during an era of political transformation. In the following 
sections, I will interrogate this particular situation, and in order to do that, I will first 
briefly trace the historical trajectory of representations of the Kurdish issue in cinema 
in Turkey.   
 
 
The Void of Representation in Turkey Preceding Kurdish Films 
 
Traditional denial policy in Turkey strictly banning any public representation of 
Kurdish identity and the Kurdish conflict impinged on the cinema, leaving behind a 
void of representation in the film history of the country. Cinema in Turkey 
experienced its heyday during the era of Yeşilçam cinema (named after Yeşilçam 
Street in İstanbul) which continued from the 1950s to the early 1990s. 
Characteristically, Yeşilçam was never a cinema that directly touched upon political 
issues of any kind in the first place. Yeşilçam rather steered clear of the social 
realities and political conflicts of its time and produced popular entertainment films, 
predominantly in the genres of melodrama and comedy. The political-ideological 
formation of Yeşilçam was overall in line with the dominant ideological frame of the 





official state policy of national identity based on homogeneity” (Colin 2008: 15), 
and, “failed to reflect the country’s ethnic and regional diversity” (Arslan 2011: 85). 
It is in this sense no surprise that the Kurdish issue was kept off the screen by 
Yeşilçam cinema. Thus, up until the mid-1990s, when a ‘new cinema’ in Turkey 
began to flourish after the break-up of Yeşilçam, the socio-political realities of the 
Kurdish issue remained unrepresented on screen.  
 
On the other hand, Kurds were misrepresented rather than being unrepresented in 
Turkish cinema, as they recurrently appeared in popular Yeşilçam films, not with 
their authentic identity, but through a tacitly implied Kurdish image; a cinematic 
construction of Kurdishness.  
 
The Kurdish issue and the war in the south-east have been thorny subjects for 
Turkish cinema, which until the 1990s, showed the Kurds as Turks. The 
Kurds were the poor illiterate easterners from the mountains. They were 
identified by their black shalvar (loose pants), their poverty and their lack of 
proper discourse in the official language. [...] Commercial cinema used the 
Kurdish characters and the geography of their homeland without giving a 
name or language, but rather with an orientalising gaze. (Colin 2008: 91) 
 
 
This cinematic representation of the Kurds was of course not an invention of the 
Turkish film industry, but a cinematic reproduction of the stereotypical Kurdish 
image which was long established in the dominant Turkish nationalist discourse, as 
discussed in Chapter 3. Avoiding any actual socio-political references to the Kurdish 
issue, and abstaining from even mentioning the word ‘Kurd’, popular Turkish cinema 
built the implicit image of ‘Kurds as Easterners’ on screen – ‘Easterner’ being the 
dominant discursive substitute for ‘Kurdish’ with derogatory resonances deployed in 
the official and daily language in the west of the country. It is with reference to this 
representation of Kurds in cinema that prominent Kurdish filmmaker Kazım Öz 
argues that “Turkish cinema has been doing to the Kurds what Hollywood has done 
to the American Indians” (Colin 2008: 94).  Though, before Kazım Öz and his 
contemporaries gained agency over the representation of Kurdish culture and 
identity, during long decades when the Kurds were completely deprived of the means 




distorted and implicit representation of Kurdishness, portraying Kurds as 
underdeveloped Turks.  
 
The lack of dissonant voices in cinema representing the Kurdish perspective is only 
one dimension of the absence of the Kurdish issue in Turkish cinema. What is 
perhaps more remarkable is that, not only the Kurdish perspective, but also Turkish 
nationalist views of the issue have been completely kept off-screen. This means, we 
cannot find any examples of nationalist, militarist, anti-Kurdish takes on the Kurdish 
issue either in the history of cinema in Turkey. In this sense, it is striking that cinema 
has not been utilised by the Kemalist power elite in shaping the ideological 
construction of the Kurdish issue, especially considering the significance of 
manipulating public opinion for the nation-state to win the hearts and minds of a 
mass public on the so-called ‘war against terrorism’.  
 
In analysing the lack of representations of Turkish soldiers and their experiences of 
the Kurdish conflict in fiction genres, Sevilay Çelenk writes; “At a time when 
thousands of soldiers were killed, there has been no ‘martyr’s mother’ character 
appearing in any domestic TV series, even as a supporting character. No fiction 
character has a colleague, or neighbour, who has lost his/her spouse, children, or 
siblings in the Southeast” (2010: 94-95). Her interpretation is that, for the Turkish 
state, fiction genres in particular carried the potential risk of a “meaning excess”, 
which means that, compared to documentaries or newscasts, fiction narratives held a 
higher ‘risk’ of conveying some unintended meanings to the public on such a 
politically sensitive issue. And, the Kurdish policy of the Turkish state would not 
tolerate any risk of a “meaning excess” on this issue. What Çelenk argues 
specifically in terms of the absolute absence of Turkish soldiers’ experience of war in 
fiction genres could be extended to the interpretation of the lack of representation of 
Kurdish issue from the dominant Turkish nationalist perspective in cinema. This 
point directly links back to one of my arguments in Chapter 3, where I suggested that 
the traditional denial policy in fact silenced all possible commentaries on the issue 
from any political position, including discourses of enmity and racism against the 
Kurds, and, with reference to the new era of politics in Turkey in the 2000s, 
highlighted that a political atmosphere that enables Kurds to speak out inevitably 





films with Turkish nationalist tendencies – such as Nefes: Vatan Sağolsun/Breath: 
Long Live the Homeland (2009, Levent Semercioğlu) or Dağ/Mountain (2012, Alper 
Çağlar) – were made after and only after the emergence of films that treated the issue 
from the Kurdish point of view.  
 
It is also significant to note here that Çelenk, for instance, develops the argument 
cited above through her analysis of a 2009 film, Breath; the first film in Turkey to 
address the Kurdish conflict with the war genre. Generally, it was only after the 
release of Breath that the lack of films on the internal war in Turkey became a 
widely addressed issue, with intrigued comments of a sudden realisation of the 
preceding void.  In this sense, the emergence of Breath generated public awareness 
of the previous lack of films dealing with the war in Turkey. This is significant as an 
example that shows that for silence to become ‘visible’ there needs to be a sound 
breaking it. And this applies to the more general issue of the representation of the 
Kurds and the Kurdish issue in cinema in Turkey. It was only after the emergence of 
Kurdish films that academic and non-academic cinema writing started to tackle the 
preceding silence on the Kurdish issue in cinema4. Hence, this example represents 
one of those cases where a void gains visibility and public recognition only at the 
moment when it is filled.  
 
For this research, the decades-long silence of Turkish cinema on the Kurdish conflict 
is not an issue that needed to be addressed only for drawing a historical picture of 
cinematic representations of the Kurdish issue. This matter has further significance in 
relation to different facets of my research, as the void of representation in question is 
something that informs Kurdish films of the 2000s. Because of the void preceding 
them, the analysis of the first Kurdish films in Turkey must first of all begin with the 
analysis of ‘what the existence of these films says’, before ‘what these films say’. For 
being the first sound following a long silence, prior to the meanings embedded in 
film texts, the mere existence of Kurdish films actually conveys certain meanings. 
For example, when we think of the first films to feature the Kurdish language, we 
need to acknowledge that these films signal the fact that “it is now possible to speak 
                                                 
4For example, Müslüm Yücel’s book entitled Türk Sinemasında Kürtler (Kurds in Turkish Cinema) is 
the first research on the misrepresentation of the Kurds in Turkish cinema; yet the book was published 




in Kurdish and make films in the Kurdish language”, and that is the very first 
meaning they convey even before communicating their internal meaning to their 
viewer. In this sense, the element of the Kurdish language in these films operates 
towards expressing something beyond what is said in that language, merely by its 
presence. Thus, more generally, we can say that the preceding void in the history of 
cinema has a certain impact on the communication between Kurdish films and 
society in 2000s Turkey as I will thoroughly discuss in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.  
 
 
Yılmaz Güney: Tacit Representations of Kurdishness on Screen 
 
Until the late 1990s, the only exception to break the onscreen silence on the Kurdish 
issue was the legendary filmmaker Yılmaz Güney, one of the biggest stars of all 
times in Turkey, a Kurdish and socialist actor-turned-director. Güney became a 
legend not only through his films, but also for his personal life story. He spent a large 
part of his short life in prison; he was sent to prison in 1961 for publishing a short 
story that was deemed communist propaganda, in 1972 for sheltering some wanted 
socialist-revolutionaries, and finally in 1976 for shooting a judge dead, for which he 
was sentenced to nineteen years in prison. Despite his short career interrupted by 
these events, Güney appeared in a great number of films as an actor, taking on roles 
in around twenty films per year during the golden years of the film industry. He 
started to direct his own films in the mid-1960s. After making a great many violent, 
blood and guts genre commercial films in tandem with his acting career, he 
established his social-realist aesthetics in Seyyit Han/The Bride of the Earth (1968), 
and especially in Umut/Hope (1971), which is widely recognised as the breakthrough 
in Güney’s career as a filmmaker.  
 
The first attempt by Güney to allude to Kurdishness in his films was in Bride of the 
Earth, merely through giving Kurdish names to his characters, yet this was sufficient 
reason for the authorities to censor the film. In Sürü/The Herd (1979), he depicted 
characters struggling with the feudal and patriarchal structure of their society whose 
Kurdishness was again an implicit message hidden in their names. Güney continued 




was written by him while in prison, shot by Şerif Gören under his supervision, and 
edited in Paris after he escaped from prison in 1981. The film is set in the post-
military coup days and depicts the militarist state’s oppression through the journey of 
a group of prisoners who are permitted to visit their hometowns for a short duration. 
The Way was the first film in Turkey to feature Kurdish culture, use Kurdish folk 
songs, and depict Kurdish characters truly with their own identity. Moreover, as Fuat 
Şengül points out, it was also the first film to introduce “‘Kurdistan’ as a new 
cinematic space” (2013: 243). The Way was politically progressive, not only because 
it depicted Kurdistan in a realistic manner, but also as it literally named it; during the 
bus journey of the prisoners towards the east of the country, at the moment while 
they pass by the city of Urfa, an inter-title appears on screen as a substitution for a 
roadside sign, marking the landscape as ‘Kurdistan’.  
 
In his last interview, conducted by Chris Kutschera in Paris just before his death, 
Güney talks about how the constraints of the oppressive attitude of the state affected 
his filmmaking:  
 
During my whole life as a creator, I have had to use indirect means to express 
my thoughts, and I must frankly admit that to date my works have not totally 
expressed what I wanted, either in their style or in their spirit. The dominant 
element in these works is that they are a compromise. The Herd, in fact, is the 
history of the Kurdish people, but I could not even use the Kurdish language 
in this film; if we had used the Kurdish language, all those who took part in 
this film would have been sent to jail. In the case of The Way, the focus was 
to be on Diyarbakir, Urfa and Siirt. I tried to create a Kurdish atmosphere by 
the use of music. But although the film was dubbed in Europe, I did not 
succeed in making it all in Kurdish. (Güney 1983) 
 
Still, his masterpiece and the film that stands out in his filmography for touching 
most boldly upon the Kurdish issue was The Way. And it was of course considered 
extremely dangerous by the Turkish state, and thus the film was banned in Turkey 
for seventeen years, until the late 1990s. After escaping from prison and fleeing 
abroad, Güney was awarded the Palme d'Or Grand Prize at Cannes Film Festival in 
1982 for The Way. He attended the award ceremony at Cannes, and disappeared 
again. His Turkish citizenship was revoked in 1983, and the following year he died 
of cancer in Paris at the age of forty-seven. Yet, Yılmaz Güney with his films and his 




perhaps the single most influential figure in Kurdish cinema and it is no 
understatement to note that his films have left a powerful and indelible mark on 
Kurdish consciousness” (Gündoğdu 2010).  
 
 
First Attempts of Turkish Filmmakers to Break the Silence on the Kurdish 
Conflict 
 
The silence on the Kurdish issue in Turkish cinema continued during and after the 
exceptional example of Yılmaz Güney. Only after many years, in 1996, Yavuz 
Turgul made a weak attempt at representing Kurdishness on screen with 
Eşkıya/Bandit; a box office hit with over 2 million viewers and one of the precursors 
of the revival of cinema in Turkey. The film features characters with Kurdish names 
and “the bandit wears a black shalvar and supports the poshu (the traditional scarf 
that also connotes liberation of the Kurds from the oppression of the Turkish state), 
but his identity is irrelevant to the narrative” (Colin 2008: 93). The same year Reis 
Çelik made Işıklar Sönmesin/Let There Be Light (1996), which focused more directly 
on the Kurdish conflict via the metaphorical story of a PKK guerrilla and a Turkish 
soldier marooned in the mountains after the avalanche fall that kills all the other 
members of both groups during a shootout. Yet despite being a bold attempt in terms 
of its subject matter, the political stance of the film and its representation of both the 
Turkish soldiers and the Kurdish guerrillas was criticised by Turks and Kurds alike 
(Colin 2008).  
 
Güneşe Yolculuk/Journey to the Sun (1999, Yeşim Ustaoğlu) is a landmark in Turkey 
in terms of the representation of the Kurdish issue on screen, for the complexity of its 
narrative, providing a multi-layered depiction of the Kurdish issue, for its positioning 
of Kurdish characters within a socio-political context, for its sympathetic treatment 
of the Kurdish experience, and for its counter-official stance and peace-seeking 
approach to the conflict. Director Ustaoğlu defines the film as “the product of ten 
years of feeling guilt for living in this society and keeping silent” (Colin 2008: 97). 
The film is set in İstanbul and tells the story of three people: working-class Mehmet, 




his dark skin, his working class girlfriend Arzu, and Berzan, a Kurdish guy who has 
fled from his hometown in the Kurdish region to Istanbul and who is actively 
involved in the Kurdish political movement. When Berzan gets murdered by the 
Turkish police during a demonstration, his friend Mehmet embarks upon a ‘journey 
to the sun’, towards the Kurdish region, to take his friend’s coffin to his Kurdish 
village, yet only to find out that there is no village left. Journey to the Sun is an 
outstanding film in the history of cinema in Turkey not only for its political treatment 
of the issue of discrimination against the Kurds, but also because it was the first film 
to feature the Kurdish language.  
 
Ustaoğlu’s film was released in 1999, just after the PKK leader Öcalan was captured, 
and, no distributor was found who was willing to distribute this film during a time 
when the Turkish nationalist upsurge was so strong. Ustaoğlu comments that “a film 
which dealt with the issue of ignorance was completely ignored” (Ustaoğlu 2014), as 
the media, national film festivals, and the industry all blocked out the film, as she 
recalls. The film was even removed from the programmes of festivals abroad through 
the coercion of the Turkish state. However, in time Journey to the Sun turned into a 
cult movie in Turkey. It played a key role in breaking the silence, encouraging a new 
generation of filmmakers to address the Kurdish issue, and even inspired the 
emergence of Kurdish filmmaking in Turkey.  
 
Another prominent film is Büyük Adam Küçük Aşk/Hejar (2001, Handan İpekçi), 
made by another left-wing female Turkish filmmaker two years after Journey to the 
Sun. The main characters of the film are a retired judge who evidently represents the 
Kemalist power elite and a little Kurdish girl, Hejar, who sneaks into the judge’s 
house when the police raid the neighbour’s apartment opposite in search of some 
members of a revolutionary organisation. As all the people in the house get killed 
during the raid, the judge is left with this Kurdish girl who does not speak any 
Turkish. The film draws an allegorical picture of the policy of denial towards 
Kurdish identity through the difficult relationship between a hard-line Kemalist and 
an innocent yet stubborn Kurdish kid and the language barrier between them. In one 
scene, the judge takes Hejar out shopping, and when an acquaintance tries, without 
success, to make conversation with the little girl, the judge breaks in saying “She 




not Turkish?”. The judge’s contemplative silence hints at the conflicts embedded in 
the Kemalist understanding of the Kurds as Turks. Hejar is a story about “the Turks 
who cannot speak Turkish”, “the Turks who don’t look like Turks”, and “the real 
Turks” who do not know what to do with them. And, like Journey to the Sun, Hejar 
stands out as a notable example where a Turkish filmmaker sympathetic to the 
Kurdish perspective tackles the issue by undermining the dominant Turkish 
interpretation of the Kurdish conflict. Even though Hejar was initially funded by the 
Turkish Ministry of Culture, it was then banned by the Ministry “for violating the 
principle of the indivisible integrity of the state” by “highlighting Kurdish 
nationalism and portraying Turkish police in a derogatory manner”, and director 
İpekçi was brought to trial for “insulting the police” (Colin 2008: 101-102). 
 
Uğur Yücel’s Yazı Tura/Toss Up (2004) is also noteworthy as an example of 
attempts by left-wing liberal Turkish filmmakers to address the Kurdish issue on 
screen, before the emergence of Kurdish filmmakers. It tells the story of two young 
Turkish men returning home after completing their obligatory military service in 
Southeast Turkey, the Kurdish region, one of them with a missing leg and the other 
one with hearing loss due to the war. Deploying a narrative similar to that of the 
generic anti-war narratives of the Vietnam films of Hollywood, Toss Up takes a 
critical stance towards the war not by focusing on the Kurdish experience, but on the 
post-war traumas of the Turkish soldiers who have taken an active role in the war, in 
the front line of the Turkish military. Yet although this narrative approach to war has 
been widely criticised in the case of the Vietnam films, it was a significant first 
attempt in the case of Turkey, given that the war experiences of the private soldiers 
remained an unspoken issue in Turkey up until recent times. The only way Turkish 
soldiers appeared in the media was in the news as ‘martyrs’. In this sense, Turkish 
soldiers have been un-represented and over-represented at the same time; the over-
representation of the image of martyrs' coffins silenced the ones who were still alive 
and had stories to share with the public. For instance, when Nadire Mater’s (2005) 
collection of interviews with forty-two ex-soldiers, who had done their military 
service in southeast Turkey between 1994 and 1998, were compiled in a book in 
1999, Mater was charged with ‘insulting and belittling the military’ and the book was 
banned. As this famous incident also shows, it was not only Kurdish people whose 




‘encountered’ the Kurds in the ‘state of emergency region’ within a war scenario. 
And, in this regard, Toss Up was a significant first attempt as it addressed a taboo 
subject in Turkey.  
 
Overall, it is striking that before the emergence of Kurdish films, we find only a 
handful of films that have directly addressed the Kurdish issue, attempted to break 
the ban over speaking on the Kurdish issue in cinema and narrated stories that 
contrast with the dominant narration of the Kurdish issue. Though, few as they are, 
the films addressed here stand as influential examples making way for future 
filmmakers to treat the Kurdish issue in cinema.  
 
 
The Emergence of Kurdish Films in Turkey in the late 1990s 
 
Although Kurdish films gained recognition and public visibility in Turkey mainly 
from 2009 onwards, that is, after the launch of the Kurdish Initiative, Kurdish 
filmmaking in Turkey actually dates back to the mid-1990s. The initial development 
of Kurdish filmmaking in Turkey had strong ties with the Kurdish movement. 
Kurdish political struggle against oppression and assimilation, which grew stronger 
in the 1990s and reinforced the sense of community amongst the Kurdish people in 
Turkey, politicised Kurdish identity, cultivated Kurdish political awakening, and is 
no doubt one of the most prominent factors behind the emergence of Kurdish films. 
Kurdish director Mizgin Müjde Arslan emphasises this link in stating that the 
emergence of Kurdish films in the 1990s was “contingent on the Kurdish political 
movement” (Koçer 2014: 482). Another prominent Kurdish filmmaker Kazım Öz 
explains his understanding of the relationship between the Kurdish movement and 
Kurdish arts in general as follows: 
 
All Kurdish cultural and artistic activities in Turkey have risen on the 
foundation laid by the Kurdish movement. In this sense the Kurdish 
experience is different than others. For example, Kurdish literature did not 
inspire the Kurdish movement. On the contrary, the Kurdish movement set 
the ground for Kurdish literature. [...] Therefore, Kurdish cultural and artistic 
activities thrived in the period when the Kurdish political movement thrived. 




this stage, when the very basic problems of the Kurdish people, even the 
language issue, remain unsolved, the artists and intellectuals naturally have to 
act in unison with the Kurdish movement”. (Öz 2011) 
 
The role of the Kurdish movement in the development of Kurdish filmmaking was 
not limited to its political influence; the movement in fact played a more direct and 
active role in the process. The first Kurdish films in Turkey were products of the 
political vision of the Kurdish movement to maintain, foster and institutionalise 
Kurdish culture. As discussed in the previous chapter, in the 1990s, the PKK’s 
political influence had created a Kurdish mass movement in Turkey and the Kurdish 
political struggle had expanded into the legal-democratic sphere through various 
institutions and organisations, most of them directly linked to the Kurdish political 
movement via organic relationships, and some indirectly via political proximity and 
a bond of communion. The Mesopotamia Culture Center (MKM) was amongst these 
institutions; a centre established in 1992 with the aspiration of maintaining Kurdish 
culture and cultivating Kurdish cultural and artistic practices. In 1995, a cinema unit 
(Mesopotamia Cinema Collective) was formed as a branch under the MKM. 
Politically active young Kurds with an interest in filmmaking gathered in this cinema 
unit at the İstanbul branch of the MKM and they participated in workshops offered 
by some left-wing filmmakers. Initially, Mesopotamia Cinema Collective produced a 
number of short films as part of the training. Also, a group of attendees at this 
cinema unit formed part of the film crew of Journey to the Sun, which gave them the 
opportunity of gaining professional experience. Some of the most well-known 
filmmakers of the 2000s who focused on the Kurdish issue in their films emerged out 
of the Mesopotamia Cinema Collective, such as Kazım Öz, Hüseyin Karabey, Özkan 
Küçük, and Özcan Alper. Mustafa Gündoğdu, who later founded the first Kurdish 
film festival in London and became a prominent figure in the rise of the Kurdish 
cinema, was also a member of this cinema unit. 
 
Mustafa Gündoğdu remarks that the idea behind the Mesopotamia Cinema Collective 
was “to train people interested in cinema to become a new generation of Kurdish 
filmmakers and to make films about the Kurds and their struggle for recognition and 
equal rights” (Gündoğdu 2010: 20). Kazım Öz explains that the main aim of this 
cinema unit was “supporting the formation of a Kurdish cinema by training its 




Collective also clearly indicate, there was a certain political will behind the 
emergence of Kurdish films in Turkey, rather than artistic motivations. In this sense, 
we must underline the fact that the Kurdish filmmaking experience in Turkey 
initially emerged as an appendage of the Kurdish political struggle and as an 
implementation of the political vision of the Kurdish movement to create the cultural 
tools for favouring Kurdish culture, strengthening Kurdish identity, propagating 
Kurdish political interests, and legitimising the Kurdish struggle.  
 
The first film by the Mesopotamia Cinema Collective to be released was a short film 
called Ax/The Land (1999, Kazım Öz) which tells the story of an old man who has 
persisted in staying in his village after the village had been evacuated by the Turkish 
military and who lives all alone with the memories of his village before it was 
destroyed. The journey of The Landitself in fact summarises the difficult conditions 
in which the Mesopotamia Cinema Collective produced and distributed their films. 
Director Öz (2008) relates that they originally wanted to shoot the film in a village in 
Dersim, in the Kurdish region, though it was not easy because of the ongoing war 
and strict military controls. The crew first attempted to enter the village by attending 
a funeral, but Turkish soldiers showed up at the funeral, checking everyone’s identity 
cards, and bombarding the film crew with questions. After this experience they 
realised the impossibility of filming in the Kurdish region and found a Turkish 
village in central Anatolia. However, they never told the villagers the actual subject 
matter of the film. When the film was completed, it was selected for the Short Film 
Competition of the Milano Film Festival. Not having the financial resources, they 
sent a 16 mm copy of the film with a woman from the Mesopotamia Centre circle, 
who was to travel to Milano. “Next day it was in the news: A PKK courier captured 
at the airport with a mysterious 16mm film” (Öz 2008), Öz recalls, and notes that the 
woman carrying the film was arrested on suspicion of supporting the PKK.  When 
they eventually managed to send The Land to the festival, it won the Best Short Film 
Award. However, the film was rejected by the Ankara Film Festival in Turkey. One 
of the members of that year’s selection committee, Mahmut Tali Öngören, later 
published an article in Milliyet Sanat magazine disclosing that in 1999 the festival 
had complied with the state directive dictating that the festival was not to showcase 




banned by the Ministry of Culture and director Kazım Öz was put on trial for his 
film.  
 
Starting from The Land, all films produced by Mesopotamia Cinema have been 
subject to diverse facets of censorship. Therefore, these first Kurdish films never had 
the opportunity of obtaining a wide audience in Turkey. However, they became 
widely known and gained acclaim amongst the Kurdish political community. Kazım 
Öz became a leading figure, inspiring future Kurdish filmmakers as a new Kurdish 
auteur winning prestigious awards at various international film festivals. And, we 
can say that these first Kurdish films did break the ban over speaking on the Kurdish 
issue even though they were banned. The Kurdish voice was now out there on 
screen, although still within banned films, which nevertheless speak from the 
Kurdish perspective and boldly articulate Kurdish political interests in cinema for the 
first time.  
 
 
Kurdish Filmmaking and the Revival of Cinema in Turkey in the 2000s 
 
The actual rise of Kurdish films in Turkey, their dramatic emergence in public 
sphere, and their encounter with large audiences nationwide took place in the 2000s. 
The international growth of Kurdish filmmaking and the recognition of the notion of 
Kurdish cinema worldwide no doubt had a certain influence on the emergence of 
Kurdish films in Turkey. Kurdish films emerging from Turkey are interrelated with 
the birth of the transnational Kurdish cinema phenomenon in the sense that they 
benefited from the same developments that generated the rise of Kurdish films 
worldwide. Various statements by Kurdish filmmakers from Turkey demonstrate 
their excitement about the birth of the concept of Kurdish cinema, their close interest 
in Kurdish directors from other countries, their admiration for the international 
successes of Bahman Ghobadi, as well as the encouraging impact of the growing 
Kurdish film festivals in various cities in the world on their own filmmaking 
experience. In this sense, Kurdish films from Turkey are a part of, and in touch with, 






On the other hand, however, the rise of Kurdish films in Turkey is also an outcome 
of the general revival of cinema in Turkey in the 2000s. After the decline of 
Yeşilçam in the 1980s and its break-up in the 1990s, the film industry in Turkey 
experienced some years of stagnation. Yet, from the mid-1990s onwards, cinema in 
Turkey “began to reconfigure both its financial and narrative strategies in an effort to 
revive and reinvent itself after the collapse of Yesilçam” (Köstepen 2009a: 6). And 
in the 2000s cinema in Turkey started to flourish with the growth of both commercial 
films and also politically and artistically ambitious independent films. A new 
generation of filmmakers took to the stage in these years and their films attracted 
interest in Turkey and also gained international acclaim through international film 
festivals, which gave rise to the phenomenon of ‘New Turkish Cinema’. Growing 
opportunities for film funding (mainly funds granted by the Turkish Ministry of 
Culture and Eurimages funds) played a significant role in the revival of cinema in 
Turkey as they enabled a space for independent filmmaking. As Enis Köstepen 
remarks, the diversity of the emergent independent films in Turkey “signifies the 
growth of a space for filmmaking in Turkey independent from commercial 
pressures” (Köstepen 2009b: 6). And Kurdish films in Turkey came out in this new 
era of filmmaking in Turkey; they benefited from the overall revival of the film 
industry, the new opportunities for film funding, the space for independent 
filmmaking, the growing audience interest in domestic films, as well as the 
considerable media interest in newly emergent domestic films.  
 
One of the notable phenomena in this new era of filmmaking in Turkey was the 
“steady increase in the number of films touching on political issues” (Göl 2007: 27). 
And that involves both “individual efforts by independent directors focusing on 
Turkey’s unresolved issues, and mainstream political films” (ibid: 23).  As Gökçe 
and Onaran suggest, in recent years, with the emergence of a new generation of 
filmmakers in Turkey, “perhaps the most significant cinematic voices came to be 
heard, responding to the manifold character of contemporary politics and social 
traumas that had previously remained untreated in artistic production” (Gökçe and 
Onaran 2007: 30). Asuman Suner (2010) dedicates one chapter of her book on “new 
Turkish cinema” to the study of this salient tendency. In analysing a group of recent 
films in Turkey which she labels as “new political films”, she writes, “new political 




attention on how the lives of ordinary people have been destroyed by the turbulent 
political climate of Turkey during the recent past” (Suner 2010: 53). On the other 
hand, Enis Köstepen addresses this new dynamic with regards to audience interest 
and argues that “the choice of political subject matter has also enabled these directors 
and films to address a larger audience within Turkey” (2009b: 8). Pointing at the box 
office success of some of the contemporary political films in Turkey, he concludes 
that “a successful match between thoughtful film language and relevant political 
issues can attract a larger domestic audience than previously was expected from 
independent films” (ibid: 9). Looking at this picture, we can regard Kurdish films as 
part of the apparent tendency in contemporary filmmaking in Turkey to tackle some 
significant political issues and address some uncomfortable political events of recent 
history.  
 
In sum, Kurdish films in Turkey benefited from the diverse yet contemporaneous 
dynamics of both the growth of Kurdish cinema worldwide and the revival of cinema 
in Turkey in the 2000s. Hence we can say that the concurrence of these two 
developments goes to explain how Kurdish films from Turkey quickly came to be the 
most competent and productive component of Kurdish cinema worldwide. Though 
due to this double alignment that has been at work since their inception, the 
definition of Kurdish films in Turkey always oscillates between the two axes under 
the influence of everyday politics and this oscillation is one of the main issues that 
will be interrogated in the following sections.  
 
 
The Public Exposure of Kurdish Films after the ‘Kurdish Opening’ 
 
Apart from the national and transnational cinematic dynamics addressed above, it 
was also the political transformation in Turkey which played a crucial role in the rise 
of Kurdish films specifically in Turkey. The launch of the Kurdish Opening in 2009 
in particular marks the beginning of a new era for Kurdish films in Turkey. From 
2009 onwards Turkey witnessed what we can certainly call a boom of Kurdish films, 




extraordinary public interest they received, to their sudden and dramatic rise in the 
public sphere.  
 
After 2009, all prominent national film festivals of Turkey started to feature a 
number of Kurdish films in their programmes each year. Within a few years, Kurdish 
film festivals also started to be launched (e.g. Amed Film Festival in Diyarbakır, 
Yılmaz Güney Film Festival in Batman, and Lake Van Film Festival in Van), 
alongside many small-scale local film events focusing on Kurdish films organised in 
various Kurdish cities, mostly with the support of Kurdish municipalities. The 
previously mentioned book on Kurdish cinema (Arslan, 2009) was published in 2009 
and the first ever conference on Kurdish Cinema was organised in Diyarbakır, again 
in 2009. Kurdish films began to be highlighted, discussed and recommended widely 
in mainstream newspapers and on TV channels, the screenings of Kurdish films at 
national film festivals and the audience reactions they received became a fixed 
element in the media coverage of those annual festivals, film magazines gave wide 
coverage to Kurdish films and even published special issues dedicated to the Kurdish 
cinema debate. Shortly after the launch of the Kurdish Opening, in 2010, If Istanbul 
Film Festival showcased a special programme of Kurdish films with the help of 
Mustafa Gündoğdu from the LKFF and called the programme ‘The Opening’. They 
also hosted a panel with the participation of some Kurdish filmmakers and Mustafa 
Gündoğdu discussing Kurdish cinema and the Kurdish Opening. The following year 
If Istanbul continued to feature Kurdish films, this time under a bolder title: ‘The 
Ones in the Mountains’. Thus as all these developments manifest, following the 
launch of the Kurdish Opening, Kurdish films suddenly turned into a significant 
cinematic (and political) phenomenon in Turkey.  
 
The first and most observable impact on Kurdish films of the political transformation 
discussed in Chapter 3 was that the shift in official policy to some extent freed 
Kurdish filmmaking from the constraints of censorship and oppression. The new 
political climate in Turkey enabled the production and exhibition of films that 
directly engaged with the Kurdish conflict from the Kurdish point of view and that 
explicitly featured Kurdish identity and culture as well as the Kurdish language. 
Shortly after its launch, director Mizgin Müjde Arslan interpreted the significance of 





I believe this process will have a positive impact. [...] Already Kurdish 
cinema has been featured at three big festivals of the country. When I made 
my first short film three years ago, it did not have any dialogues, because I 
wasn’t sure about what language to use. My following films were in Kurdish, 
but then the question was how and where to show them. Now Kurdish 
language films have the opportunities of exhibition, and this will encourage 
more Kurdish language films. (Arslan 2009c) 
 
The statements of Sedat Yılmaz on the other hand demonstrate how the launch of the 
Kurdish Opening shifted the conditions of Kurdish filmmaking in a flash. Yılmaz is 
the director of Press (2010), a feature film that deals with the subject of state control 
over the Kurdish press. The story centres on a group of Kurdish journalists who are 
constantly  exposed to  threats, raids, assaults and even assassinations, because they 
work for Özgür Gündem, the daily Kurdish newspaper of the 1990s that reported the 
state atrocities and human right abuses in the Kurdish region. Yılmaz remarks that 
they had actually completed the production of Press in 2008, but it was not released 
until 2010 due to the political atmosphere, and, he also says; 
 
When we were working on the project, we did not even consider applying to 
the Ministry of Culture for funding. We would not have any chance to get any 
funding anyway. Besides, it would be like grassing on ourselves for making 
such a film. [...] Whereas, whilst applying to the ministry for getting licence 
for the Altın Portakal Film Festival screening of Press in 2010, this time we 
had no worries. The film was the same, but Turkey was different. (Yılmaz 
2011a) 
 
Yet the significance of the political transformation was not limited to the loosening 
of the censorship regarding representations on screen of Kurdish identity, Kurdish 
language and Kurdish political interests. The ‘New Turkey’ not only enabled 
Kurdish films to be made, but it spotlighted them. From 2009 onwards Kurdish films 
started to be widely publicised with reference to the political debates on the new 
Kurdish policy. Exactly in the days when the launch of the Kurdish Opening had 
spawned an intense public debate and the Kurdish issue occupied the whole 
country’s political agenda, Kurdish films took the stage and received profound media 
interest, to the point that they turned into a big and widely debated artistic and 
political phenomenon, making their mark on film culture in Turkey. They were 




film’ was deployed as a discursive instrument for its potential of contributing to the 
acclimatisation of the society to the shifts in official Kurdish policy. Hence, for the 
first time in the history, the political dynamics of the Kurdish conflict smoothed the 
way for the development of Kurdish films, instead of blocking their way.  
 
In 2009, Antalya Golden Orange Film Festival, the oldest and one of the most 
significant film festivals in Turkey, included two Kurdish films in the National 
Competition for the first time; the documentary film İki Dil Bir Bavul/On the Way to 
School (2009, Özgür Doğan and Orhan Eskiköy) and Min Dit/The Children of 
Diyarbakır (2009, Miraz Bezar), a Kurdish language feature film. The media showed 
huge interest in the selection of these two films in the national competition of Altın 
Portakal. They reported this occurrence by contextualising it with reference to the 
Kurdish Opening with headlines such as ‘Kurdish Opening in Cinema’, ‘The Altın 
Portakal ‘Opening’’, ‘The ‘Opening’ on Silver Screen’, etc. And, within this 
discourse, The Children of Diyarbakır was publicised everywhere as “the first ever 
Kurdish language film”. Yet this was not entirely true; preceding The Children of 
Diyarbakır, there had been documentary films and short films made in Turkey in the 
Kurdish language (e.g. the films produced by the Mesopotamia Cinema Collective), 
and, there were also fiction films that partly featured the Kurdish language (e.g. The 
Journey to the Sun, or Photograph), though those films never had the chance to 
enjoy any media attention and they had been blocked out if not directly censored. As 
in the case of the presentation of The Children of Diyarbakır as the first ever Kurdish 
language film, the general media coverage of the new Kurdish films completely 
dismissed the former examples and treated the Kurdish films of 2009 as if they had 
come out of nowhere and thus historically decontextualised them. After all, the 
Kurdish Opening process needed its ‘firsts’. Hence, whilst some Kurdish circles and 
institutions narrated the history of Kurdish films from their own perspective, another 
history of Kurdish films started to be written for the Turkish public in the early days 








A Conceptual Shift: From ‘Turkish Cinema’ to ‘Türkiye Sineması’ 
 
Some films called ‘Kurdish films’ taking part in the national competition of a 
Turkish film festival stimulated questions as to what ‘national cinema’ meant (and 
what it should mean) in the case of Turkey. The recognition of The Children of 
Diyarbakır and On the Way to School as ‘national films’, despite their identification 
as Kurdish films and despite for example needing Turkish subtitles to be screened at 
a national film festival in Turkey, was something that confused the definition of 
Turkish national cinema. Public reverberations of Kurdish films gaining visibility in 
Turkey explicitly demonstrate how Kurdish films put pressure on the notion of 
Turkish cinema in terms of the possibility/impossibility of national cinema. In this 
regard, the concept of ‘Kurdish cinema’ emerged in Turkey not only as a question, 
but also as a questioner, inasmuch as its existence complicated and disconcerted the 
notion of ‘Turkish cinema’ and the question of how to define Kurdish cinema 
inevitably put forth the necessity of redefining Turkish cinema.  
 
Kurdish films challenged ‘Turkish cinema’ not only in the present day, but 
historically as well, as the case of Yılmaz Güney best demonstrates. As discussed 
earlier, one fundamental pillar of Kurdish collective efforts towards the construction 
of Kurdish cinema has been writing the history of Kurdish cinema. And, within this 
history-writing, Yılmaz Güney has been re-discovered and reclaimed as a Kurdish 
filmmaker. This claim has been built not only within and through writings on 
Kurdish cinema either; for example, Kurdish film festivals in Turkey have been 
giving special awards in memory of Yılmaz Güney and Kurdish filmmakers have 
been repeatedly referring to him as their biggest source of inspiration and dedicating 
their awards to him. What brings Yilmaz Güney’s Kurdish identity as a filmmaker 
and the traces of Kurdishness in his films to the public’s attention today is the fact 
that Kurdish films of the present seek their own history; they aspire to find their 
ancestors, their auteurs in the past. Yet the struggle of Kurdish cinema to find and 






Yılmaz Güney used to be known as aprominent ‘Turkish filmmaker’ up until the 
recent emergence of Kurdish films in Turkey. Even in academic studies, which 
actually acknowledged his Kurdish identity, Güney was regarded without hesitation 
as a ‘Turkish filmmaker’. For example, Hamid Naficy refers to him as a “Turkish 
exile director”, despite in the same breath analysing his “desire for an independent 
Kurdish homeland yet to come” in the textual strategies of The Way (Naficy 2001: 
184). Another example can be found in Asuman Suner’s book where she writes, “The 
Way is most arguably the most internationally acclaimed Turkish film ever made to 
date” (Suner 2010: 5). Yet it would be now impossible to imagine any scholarly 
writing on Yılmaz Güney that would name him as a ‘Turkish filmmaker’ with no 
note of hesitation, with no acknowledgement of the debates regarding his identity, 
dismissing Kurdish efforts to reclaim him as a ‘Kurdish filmmaker’. Thus, as the 
example of the reinterpretation of Güney’s persona as a filmmaker, and re-
identification of his cinema show, the struggle of Kurdish cinema to define itself 
creates a rupture in Turkish cinema history.   
 
Following debates triggered by Kurdish films regarding the present and the past, the 
concept of ‘Turkish cinema’ eventually came to be reconsidered. The tendency of 
questioning the legitimacy of the designation of Turkish cinema is evident in the 
discourses of film criticism and academic film studies, where we can observe efforts 
to seek, deploy and theorise alternative concepts to avoid and replace the concept of 
Turkish cinema. Although concepts like ‘domestic cinema’, or ‘local cinema’ also 
appeared in cinema writing from 2009 onwards, the prevailing alternative concept 
has been Türkiye Sineması (Cinema in/of Turkey), and, within a few years this 
concept came to be the established substitution for ‘Turkish cinema’. As explained in 
the previous chapter, Türkiyelilik is a notion thatrepresents a civic understanding of 
national identity in Turkey and that was deployed by Tayyip Erdoğan in an attempt 
to find a new formulation of nationality that would not exclude Kurdish identity. 
Thus, Türkiye Sineması is a direct adaptation of this civic definition of national 
identity into the identification of films; a new concept coined for referring to films 
from Turkey without making any reference to Turkish ethnicity; a discursive solution 
against the oppressive and exclusive connotations signalled in the concept of Turkish 




over the definition of national identity in Turkey started to be regenerated in the 
national cinema debate, in a quite direct manner.  
 
The monthly cinema magazine Altyazı prepared a series of books and booklets for 
different film events and festivals abroad that featured film selections from Turkey 
and articles in these publications provide some of the few in-depth studies of 
contemporary filmmaking in Turkey. Yet the conceptual shift observed in the titles 
of these books with similar contents edited by the same magazine within the time 
span of only a few years reflects the conceptual ambiguities cinema writing 
experienced in those years. The first of these books, which was published in 2007, 
was entitled ‘Turkish Cinema Now’ (Gökçe 2007) and the next one was published in 
2009 with the title of ‘Young Turkish Cinema’ (Aytaç and Onaran 2009a). Whereas 
the next one that came out in the second half of 2009 was called ‘New Cinema from 
Turkey’ (Aytaç and Onaran 2009b), and the following book prepared for the Cannes 
Film Festival was entitled ‘Cinema Turkey: New Times, New Tendencies’ (Yücel 
and Onaran 2011). The editors explain the choice of title in the following words: 
 
We preferred to call this book ‘Cinema Turkey’ rather than ‘Turkish 
Cinema’, since the 2000s have become the first period in the country’s 
history during which filmmaking became relatively democratic and much 
more representative than ever before. This title signals many things at once: 
the wave of independent films made with low budgets and digital cameras; 
the rise of new filmmakers based in cities other than İstanbul [...] and their 
productions that spread filmmaking practices to a wider geography; the 
increase in the visibility of films made by minorities reflecting their specific 
issues through their own voice and perspective, especially the emergence of 
Kurdish directors who just recently gained the relative freedom to shoot films 
in their own language; and last but not least, the new wave of documentary 
filmmaking, which directly and more or less spontaneously points to 
sociopolitical issues of the times, with cameras scanning a much wider scene 
(politically and geographically) than ever before. (2011: 4) 
 
We can observe the same conceptual shift in the academic literature as well. Once 
regarded as a legitimate concept used without much hesitation, ‘Turkish cinema’ has 
recently started to be problematized and undermined in scholarly writing. For 
example, Asuman Suner’s book entitled New Turkish Cinema (2010) was published 
in what can be considered as the transition years of the conceptual shift in question. 




concept of Turkish cinema and despite focusing on some Kurdish issue themed films 
under the title of “new political films”, she does not feel the need to mention the 
concept of ‘Kurdish film’ in this book. Yet, in the conclusion of the chapter on “new 
political films”, she acknowledges the problems inherent in the concept of ‘Turkish 
cinema’ in a brief note: 
 
These films certainly pose unsettling questions about national belonging and 
identity. In fact, they challenge the very notion of ‘Turkish cinema’ as a 
classifactory designation because of the emphasis on ‘Turkishness’ it entails. 
‘The cinema of Turkey’, I believe, is a more fitting designation for these 
films, since it places the emphasis not so much on ‘Turkishness’ as ethnic 
identity, but on Turkey as a geographical entity and a locus of divergent 
ethnic, religious, and, cultural identities. (Suner 2010: 74-75) 
 
On the other hand, Savaş Arslan’s book published a few years after Suner’s, puts the 
problematisation of the concept of Turkish cinema at the heart of his study and 
suggests replacing it with concepts like “cinema of Turkey’, or, ‘cinema in Turkey’ 
which gives his book its title. He draws attention to the necessity of a conceptual 
shift in the following words: 
 
In view of this plurality and multiplicity, it is no longer appropriate to 
conceive of contemporary cinema in Turkey as the new Turkish cinema. 
Instead, a more apt term would be the new cinema of Turkey. [...]Following 
the rapid transformation of society since the 1990s, the new cinema of Turkey 
is heterogeneous, reflecting a multitude of voices and viewpoints. Unlike 
Yeşilçam, the new cinema of Turkey is no longer limited by a narrowly 
defined notion of ‘Turkishness’. (Arslan 2011: 95) 
 
These debates also led to a change in the title of the only local annual film studies 
conference in Turkey. Organised since 1998, this conference for many years used to 
be called ‘New Directions in Turkish Cinema Studies’. However, after some 
arguments that took place during the panels from 2010 onwards, the title of the 
conference was eventually changed in 2013 by replacing the word ‘Turkish’ with 
‘Turkey’.  
 
The use of the newly coined concept of Türkiye Sineması was not limited to 
academic and intellectual circles either; it circulated widely and was debated in the 




debates. In 2014, Nuri Bilge Ceylan won the Golden Palm at the Cannes Film 
Festival for his film Kış Uykusu/Winter Sleep. At the ceremony he dedicated the 
award to “the young people in Turkey and those who lost their lives in the last year”, 
alluding to the Gezi protests. This speech provoked quite an unpredictable debate in 
Turkey. Ceylan had delivered his speech in English and the phrase of “young people 
in Turkey” he used in his speech was widely translated into Turkish as ‘Türk 
gençleri’, meaning ‘Turkish youth’. The arguments about what he actually said and 
how exactly it translates into Turkish turned into a debate on ‘Turkishness’ and on 
the hesitation over using the designation ‘Turkish’. What added another layer to 
these arguments was that Ceylan had symbolically clenched his fist whilst receiving 
the award, just as the Kurdish filmmaker Yılmaz Güney had famously done in 
receiving the Golden Palm for The Way back in 1982. The news that Ceylan had 
received the Golden Palm was reported on the web page of Altyazı magazine where 
Ceylan was mentioned as Türkiyeli yönetmen, meaning director from/of Turkey, 
which is a concept that has been used in line with Türkiye Sineması, as a replacement 
for Türk yönetmen (Turkish director). The web page received numerous heated 
reader comments arguing with each other and reflecting the confusions regarding 
concepts of Turk/Turkish, Turkish Cinema/Cinema of Turkey, sub-identity/supra-
identity, nationality/ethnicity, with reference to both Güney and Ceylan. Thus, 
Ceylan’s Winter Sleep unpredictably turned into something that revealed the political 
confusions, disturbances and conflicts that have been dominating the recent public 
agenda in Turkey, despite having no relevance to these issues in the film text.   
 
In 2014, the Altın Portakal Film Festival witnessed a shocking debate on this 
conceptual shift. At the award ceremony Ertem Göreç, one of the prominent directors 
of Yeşilçam cinema, made a speech and said “Nowadays they call Turkish cinema 
Türkiye Sineması.  If someone’s name is Ahmet, can you call him Mehmet?” and 
shockingly he continued with foul language addressing the ones using Türkiye 
Sineması. Yet, following this speech, a Kurdish film, Annemin Şarkısı/Song of My 
Mother (2014, Erol Mintaş) received awards in four categories, including the Best 
Debut award. While receiving the awards, Kurdish filmmaker Erol Mintaş responded 
to Göreç: “Yes, we say Türkiye Sineması, because we imagine a new Turkey in the 
2000s. And, we will hereafter persistently continue to use the term Türkiye 






Although Türkiye sineması has started to be widely deployed in academic writing 
and favoured as a substitution for Turkish cinema, from a theoretical point of view, it 
is also laden with ambiguities, and it fails to escape the questions discrediting any 
conceptualisation alluding to a national cinema. Thus, film scholar Canan Balan, for 
instance, assesses the expedience of Türkiye sineması with reference to the familiar 
arguments addressed in Chapter 2 undermining the validity of national cinema, and 
she concludes that Türkiye sineması offers no potential to overcome the problems 
inherent in Turkish cinema (Balan 2011). 
 
Like Erol Mintaş, Kurdish filmmakers in general embraced the term Türkiye 
Sineması, the majority expressing their preference for this term over Turkish cinema. 
However, this categorisation has never been totally free of confusions and 
controversies either. For example, when asked about how he feels about the use of 
Türkiye Sineması, Kazım Öz first says, “It is a more democratic term at least in 
comparison to Turkish cinema”, but then he continues; “Though I still question 
whether it is just another term that still refers to the nation-state” (Öz 2011b). 
Overall, favouring Türkiye Sineması is in line with the recently modified political 
vision of the Kurdish political movement which no longer aspires to independence 
but articulates a will for living together within a democratised Turkey where Kurdish 
identity and the democratic rights of the Kurds as a community are recognised. 
However, as explained in the previous chapter, the peace process has never been free 
of doubts, frustrations, conflicts and showdowns. And, the ever-changing political 
dynamics of the peace process, the ups and downs of the process, and the fluctuation 
of Kurdish people between hope and grievance are reflected in the issue of the 
designation of Kurdish films. Thus, while the concept of Türkiye Sineması is 
generally favoured by Kurdish filmmakers, at times when conflicts prevail over faith 
in peace, dissonant voices are heard approaching this term with suspicion.  
 
On the other hand, while the concept of Turkish cinema lost its legitimacy for a large 
section of film-related circles, it did not simply fall into disuse. Now, Turkish 
Cinema, Kurdish cinema and Türkiye Sineması are all used in Turkey, by different 
agents, in certain contexts, at different times. They all continue to circulate despite 




transformations in Turkey, and they are all subject to power struggles and political 
debates. And diverse reactions towards these concepts, favouring or disfavouring 
them, mirror the reactions towards the policy change over the Kurdish conflict. 
 
 
The Politics of the Definition of Kurdish Films in Turkey 
 
While the defining characteristics of Kurdish cinema in general have always been 
full of ambiguities, the debates on the identification of Kurdish films in Turkey in 
particular involved some political criteria, specifically as a result of the political 
context of 2000s Turkey. The controversial case of Güneşi Gördüm/I Saw the Sun 
(2009, Mahsun Kırmızıgül) is a noteworthy example that demonstrates the politics of 
the definition of Kurdish films.  
 
Kırmızıgül is originally a famous Arabesque singer who recently launched out on a 
career in filmmaking. His second film I Saw the Sun actually comprises certain 
Kurdish elements; the ethnicity of the director is Kurdish, the subject matter is the 
Kurdish conflict, the focus is on the suffering of the Kurdish people, the film location 
is in the Kurdish region, and although the language of the film is Turkish, the 
Kurdish language is featured in certain scenes with symbolic significance. However, 
despite ticking many boxes in terms of the range of criteria suggested in identifying 
Kurdish films, there has been a wide debate arguing against the identification of I 
Saw the Sun as a Kurdish film.  
 
The first Kurdish cinema book included an article on I Saw the Sun, where Arslan 
criticised the representation of the state atrocities in the film. She claimed that the 
unrealistic scene where the Turkish soldiers politely request the Kurdish peasants to 
evacuate their village is sufficient to judge the political stance of the film (Arslan 
2009b: 312). She further argued that Kırmızıgül relies on the few Kurdish words that 
he drops in to impress the Kurdish audience, but, she writes, “Those times are over 
when Kurds would start crying when they hear just one word of Kurdish. Kurds are 
now making films in Kurdish. There are Kurdish film festivals organised all around 




writes; “The Turkish soldier’s lines shouting “Stop firing! They are peasants!” when 
he realises that the group of people tracked by the military helicopter are actually 
smuggling villagers might have pleased the high state officers, but it is a tragicomic 
scene for the people of the region who know the truth and who have witnessed 
thousands of JITEM murders” (Koala n.d.). Emphasising similar points, Çetin 
Baskın (2009) concludes that I Saw the Sun is based on a hollow discourse of 
brotherhood. Hence, a film that represents the Kurdish conflict from the Kurdish 
perspective, with a sympathetic treatment of the Kurdish experience and a peace-
seeking approach, was widely denounced on the basis of its political approach 
towards the issue.  
 
Discourses favouring the idea of ‘Kurdishness as a political identity’ instead of 
‘Kurdishness as an ethnic identity’ with regards to the definition and evaluation of 
films operated the other way round as well. For example Sedat Yılmaz, the director 
of Press is actually not Kurdish, and neither is Özcan Alper, the director of Gelecek 
Uzun Sürer/Future Lasts Forever (2011). Yet these films are nevertheless regarded 
as Kurdish films on the basis of their political alignment.  Consequently, as the case 
of I Saw the Sun demonstrates, each potential criterion to define Kurdish films 
carries with it deep complications, and the paramount significance of the political 





Insofar as the concept of Kurdish cinema correlates with the Kurdish people whose 
political status has been and is still subject to power struggles, the definition of 
Kurdish cinema has never been a mere theoretical issue. Thus in this chapter I 
examined the over-determination of politics in the identification, definition, 
construction and contextualisation of Kurdish cinema. As the politics of the Kurdish 
conflict is still under constant transformation, the debates regarding Kurdish cinema 
inevitably carry (and will continue to carry) the marks of the significant political 
developments that have occurred within this transformation. And since the 




status of the Kurds in today’s world, a change in this political status could easily alter 
the identification and definition of ‘Kurdish cinema’. Put simply, for instance if 
political developments happen to lead to the establishment of an independent 
Kurdistan in the future, then all current Kurdish films will undoubtedly be 
(re)historicized as the first examples of ‘Kurdish national cinema’ and the 
groundings of all the arguments discussed above would fundamentally change. 
However, in this chapter I have focused on analysing the current complexities, 
ambiguities and instabilities of Kurdish cinema with a particular focus on the socio-
political reverberations of these questions specifically in the 2000s Turkey.  
 
The emergence of Kurdish films puts pressure on the concept of Turkish national 
identity and Turkish cinema, on the one hand, from the subnational level, by 
questioning the very definition of Turkishness, while on the other hand from the 
transnational level, by being a part of transnational Kurdish cinema. Kurdish films in 
Turkey can be considered within the scope of Türkiye sineması, but at the same time 
they are connected with Kurdish films produced outside Turkey and thus they are a 
part of this distinct Kurdish cinema that transcends national borders. What makes 
Kurdish films from Turkey closer to one of these two concurrent dynamics is a 
matter of politics. When the Kurdish issue in Turkey moves forward to a solution for 
‘living together in peace’, this encourages the dynamics of Kurdish films to be a part 
of the film culture in Turkey. In contrast, when the conflict runs deeper to the point 
of a deadlock, their potential for aligning with Kurdish films produced outside 
Turkey gains dominance. Hence, each act within the dynamism of the political 
context exerts force on Kurdish films, pulling and pushing them from one side to 
another.  
 
Kurdish films in Turkey embody diverse dynamics and incorporate various forms of 
potential within them. As I investigated in this chapter, different political factors and 
various social actors encourage some of these dynamics, while repressing others. 
And because they emerged at a time of political turbulence in Turkey, it is 
particularly crucial to examine the socio-political dynamics and discourses that are 
shaping and reshaping the questions and answers about Kurdish films, in parallel 
with everyday politics regarding the Kurdish issue in Turkey. Observing the impact 




because the complex debates regarding the concepts of Kurdish cinema, Turkish 
cinema and Türkiye sineması in fact mirror, reproduce and influence pressing 
political issues regarding national identity in Turkey. Thus, we can say that the 
conceptual arguments generated by Kurdish films had already driven forward intense 
direct dialogues between politics and cinema in Turkey in the 2000s before public 





CHAPTER 5:  





In this chapter, the focus of the attention of my research shifts from ‘Kurdish cinema’ 
to ‘Kurdish films’. One dimension of exploring the interplay between ‘film and 
politics’ is the interpretation of Kurdish films as ‘political films’. Kurdish films are 
‘political films’ in the sense that they tackle politically significant issues in 
contemporary Turkey with the goal of taking an active part in political debates on the 
Kurdish issue, influencing the direction of the Kurdish conflict, and contributing to 
the peace-building process. Before moving onto the next chapter, where I discuss the 
public reception and the political contextualisation of the meanings of Kurdish films, 
and where I explore the social circulation and the political influence of these films, it 
is necessary to first understand the political character of these films. We need to first 
observe and contextualise the explicit meanings Kurdish films convey to their 
audience, in order to then interrogate what happens to those meanings once these 
films are out of the hands of their creators and they start to circulate in an overly 
politicised society. 
 
What kind of issues do Kurdish films speak of when they gain access to the 
mechanisms of cinematic representation for the first time? What are the apparent 
political propositions of these films? Through their films, how do the filmmakers 
aspire to contribute to the peace-building process? Which hitherto unspoken 
historical issues are given primacy with the goal of joining the public debates on the 
Kurdish issue that started at the same time these films started to emerge? In 
responding to these questions, in this chapter I will focus on the salient themes, 
discourses, representations, and political propositions we find in Kurdish films. 
However, in doing so, I will refrain from performing a ‘creative formal analysis’, 




only to professional film theoreticians, or suggesting alternative readings of these 
texts through close formal analysis. What I aim to accomplish in this chapter is to 
take some politically significant meanings in Kurdish films that are explicit and 
observable to the general public in Turkey, to the audience they address, and that 
have been central to the public debates these films triggered, and to interpret them 
with reference to the specificities of the political context in contemporary Turkey 
where they circulate. Or in other words, to analyse the textually evident political 
aspirations of these films with a particular interest in the complex intertextual 
dialogues between film and politics in a specific historical context. 
 
One of the key observations that shapes this chapter is that in the case of Kurdish 
films in Turkey we can talk about convergences between ‘past and present’, ‘reality 
and representation’, and ‘personal and social’, and we can examine the political 
character of these films by focusing on these convergences. Following the decades-
long ban over publicly addressing the Kurdish issue and narrating stories regarding a 
long-standing and harsh political conflict, Kurdish films embark upon ‘revealing the 
historical truths regarding the Kurdish conflict’ and suggest inextricable ties between 
the personal and social experiences in the history of the conflict.  
 
Kurdish films emerged in a period of political transformation in which power 
struggles in the present to shape the future of the country centred upon the past, and 
national history has become an open narrative that is subject to political debates and 
contestations as never before. It was a dramatic shift, given that Turkish society used 
to be “frequently accused of being amnesiac” (Özyürek 2007: 3), or “used to suffer 
from a purposeful amnesia” (Kechriotis 2011: 101), or was even “considered an 
archetype of social amnesia” (Bakıner 2013: 697). Yet, the political transformation in 
the AKP era dramatically broke the traditional culture of ‘amnesia’ in Turkey and led 
to an “explosion of memory” (Bakıner 2013). As Schwartz et al. point out, “no 
society would go to the trouble to reconstruct its past had not some significant 
problem disrupted its normal pattern of living”; thus, it is the “periods of rapid 
change” when “new pasts are most likely to emerge” (1986: 150). Sune Haugbolle 
states that national memory is informed by “the disparities, catastrophes and traumas 
that cannot be captured by triumphant history and must, accordingly, be disseminated 




violent conflict, various master narratives are formed through which the past of 
different groups is understood, reinterpreted and incorporated into national history” 
(ibid: 27).  
 
We can say that periods of discontinuities, ruptures, crises or transformations are 
generally times when the contestations over the national past most potently come to 
the surface. In Turkey, it was the AKP’s project of eliminating old state actors and 
fundamentally restructuring the socio-political structure in Turkey which opened up 
to critique the pages of official national history that were written and strictly 
monitored by Kemalist elites. And, the Kurdish conflict was one of the most 
significant and controversial issues that urged a reinterpretation of the national past, 
and that dominated the memory wars in Turkey in the 2000s. Emerging in this period 
of political transformation, Kurdish films function as an unofficial channel for re-
writing the history of the Kurds and the Kurdish issue in Turkey; they deploy 
Kurdish memories against the dominant historicisation of the Kurdish issue. 
Following the decades-old order of silence on the Kurdish issue, they dispute the 
official history by embarking upon telling the untold, showing the invisible, 
representing the unrepresented and documenting the suppressed through Kurdish 
memories that become public for the first time through film. Thus they build 
narratives that highlight the contrast and the tension between the Turkish state’s 
history and the Kurdish people’s memories. And, while narrating stories from an 
unspoken past in the days of memory wars in Turkey, these films build a certain 
claim of truth-telling; they seek ways to convince the audience that their version of 
the history of the Kurdish issue is the ‘true version’ among various other opposing 
narratives and conflicting interpretations. And in doing so, they enter into the realm 
of ‘politics of memory’ and ‘politics of truth’.   
 
What is particularly important for this research in this context is that the Kurdish 
films addressed in this study function as one of the major mediums of publicising 
Kurdish memories for the first time in Turkey; they render hitherto silenced Kurdish 
memories publicly visible and publicly accessible. Through Kurdish films, the 
Kurdish version of history in Turkey, and the Kurdish version of the truth regarding 
the conflict, become visible and available to the general public and compete with 




toMichael Schudson’s notion of “available past” in this context; he writes, “Given 
that people choose from available past and that the available past is limited, are 
individuals free to choose as they wish? Far from it. There are a variety of ways in 
which the freedom to choose is constrained” (2011: 288). I would like to extend 
Schudson’s phrase here and talk about ‘publicly available pasts’. And, I deploy the 
concept of ‘public memory’ in this regard, for emphasising the importance of the 
public availability of diverse narrations of the past in investigating the relationship of 
a society with its history. My conception of public memory involves a reminder of 
the fact that power struggles over history take place in public, to influence the public 
opinion on the past, and it is a struggle between publicly available pasts only.  
 
The significance of the controversial new Kurdish policy developed by the AKP in 
this context is that the new policy enabled the Kurdish perspective to become public, 
to communicate to the general public in Turkey. Although the “the disarticulation of 
Kemalist hegemony under the AKP government has merely made it possible for 
another state-centric (and highly coercive) memory framework to fill the gap, rather 
than having led to the affirmation of plurality in how citizens can remember the past” 
(Bakıner 2013:700), this new period has nevertheless brought about a dramatic 
change that engendered much public interest in the national past and it has witnessed 
power struggles among the multiple narrations of the history of the Kurdish issue 
from diverse perspectives representing conflicting political interests, including the 
Kurdish perspective. And the public availability of the Kurdish perspective means 
that the general public in Turkey now for the first time has access to the Kurdish 
version of the past. Contesting with both the old and the new official interpretations 
of the past, the Kurdish perspective is now one of the many voices that publicly 
narrate the history of the conflict and that compete with each other in the public 
sphere to influence public opinion. And Kurdish films are not only utilised as but 
also widely regarded as one of the most significant means of making Kurdish 







The ‘Burden of Representation’: Screening Memories of State Oppression 
 
As Forest et al. suggest, “Discussions about ‘crimes’ and responsibility are central to 
the politics of public memory, because national histories are (re)narrated through 
such debates” (2004: 358). One of the most commonly treated issues in Kurdish 
films is the state atrocities that have been committed against the Kurds in Turkey. 
Emerging in the days of ‘peace talks’, Kurdish films aim at expanding the 
understanding of peace from ceasefire and disarmament to social peace and 
reconciliation, and the filmmakers persistently emphasise the necessity of 
confrontation with state violence in the past for building peace in the present.  
 
Some of the most prominent examples of screening memories of atrocity were made 
in the form of what we can call oral history films, or “testimonial cinema” (Chanan 
1990: 40) which leave the floor to the memories of the victims and witnesses of state 
brutality. Although the question of the reliability of oral testimonies has been subject 
to much theoretical debate5, “inevitably the proposal for a history from below led to a 
great deal of oral history” (Lynd 1993:1). On the other hand, as Lundy and 
McGovern highlight, “testimonial truth claims are also an important recognition that 
marginalized historical experiences, particularly in sites of conflict, often leave few 
other evidential traces than a witness’s words” (2006: 84). Kurdish oral history films 
in this regard mainly originate from the lack of historical archives on the issues they 
bring to the screen. We can say that oral history is deployed in these films as one of 
the only possible ways of rendering the history of state atrocities in Turkey publicly 
available. And, although this type of documentary is widely disregarded as just 
‘talking heads’, Kurdish testimonial documentaries have been highly successful in 
Turkey, maybe not commercially but politically. 
 
Çayan Demirel’s 38 (2006) was among the vanguard of Kurdish oral history films 
and it triggered an immense debate in the early days of the Kurdish Opening, as I 
will discuss in the following chapter. In this documentary film, Demirel addresses 
the Dersim massacre in 1938 where tens of thousands of Kurds were killed by the 
state forces of the young Turkish Republic. In his interviews, Demirel, who is also 
                                                 
5
 For a comprehensive review of the main debates and prevalent paradigms in the field of oral history 





originally from Dersim, remarks that the research for this documentary project took 
three years, as it had been extremely difficult to access the relevant archival 
documents, because the evidence of the event had either been destroyed or hidden 
away from public access. Through mainly witness accounts supported by some 
archive documents, photographs, and scholarly opinions, the film represents the 
Dersim massacre as a consequence of the project of the Turkification of the Kurds in 
the early republican era. The documentary starts with a self-reflexive moment that 
reveals the continuing fear of the victims whilst publicly speaking out about their 
Dersim 38 experience, even after many decades. An old man who was a child in 
1938 says, “I will tell you about it. Though turn that camera off”. Then he starts 
recalling the past, but after a minute he repeats, this time angrily, “The red light is 
on! I told you to turn it off!” While Demirel has kept this moment in order to express 
how difficult it is for the victims and witnesses to recall and publicly speak out about 
this traumatic memory and thus how challenging it was for him to make this 
documentary, he explains that he eventually managed to get through the fear by 
agreeing to the relatives of the witnesses conducting the interviews for him.  
 
Another documentary film that again addresses the Dersim massacre is İkiTutam 
Saç: Dersim’in Kayıp Kızları/Two Locks of Hair: The Missing Girls of Dersim 
(2010, Nezahat Gündoğan), which reveals one of the darkest secrets of the history of 
the conflict by bringing to light the case of the young Kurdish girls whose parents 
were killed in 1938 and who were taken away from their remaining relatives to be 
forcibly adopted by high-ranking Turkish military officers and were raised as 
‘Turks’. Although the exact number of these adopted girls is yet unknown, it is 
estimated to be hundreds. Hence, following the film, Nezahat and Kazım Gündoğan 
published a book (2012) where they put together interviews with one hundred and 
fifty Kurdish women who were adopted in 1938. In her interviews, director 
Gündoğan has remarked that while working on this film they worked confidentially 
and they did not even ask for financial support from any organizations because they 
were worried that if they did, they would face restraints in the making of this film. 
Gündoğan deploys a traditional documentary language in the film with voice-over 
narration recounting the historical events, supported by interviews with a number of 
victims, as well as newspapers, photographs and archival video footage, but she puts 




period of research, Gündoğan made contact with two sisters who were adopted 
separately back in 1938, taken to different cities and had never seen each other since. 
The documentary brings the two sisters, now in their eighties, together while filming 
this process and capturing their emotional meeting after so many decades. In a sense, 
all the other materials used in the film in fact function towards historically 
contextualising and verifying this individual story. 
 
Another significant oral history documentary of the period that touches upon one of 
the greatest state atrocities committed against the Kurds was also made by Çayan 
Demirel. In 5 No’lu Cezaevi/Prison No.5 (2009), Demirel brings forward the 
memories of the systematic torture inflicted on Kurdish political prisoners in 
Diyarbakır Prison, which was built after the 1980 military coup. In the film he 
interviews the survivors of the prison, many of whom are prominent Kurdish 
intellectuals and politicians in present-day Turkey. Listening to their accounts 
throughout this feature-length documentary borders on being an unbearable 
experience for the audience, as the witnesses recall memories such as Turkish 
soldiers forcing them to eat rats or their own excrement, raping them with batons, 
forcing them to memorise Turkish national marches and beating them when they fail 
to remember them perfectly, and so on. In their analysis of Prison No.5,Spence and 
Avcı write; “The memories expressed in Prison No.5 are valuable not only because 
they break the conspiracy of whispers and innuendo to tell us of events, but also 
because they tell us what those events mean to the people who recount them. As 
people look back on their lives, their memories are vital sources of their feelings, 
beliefs, and values” (2013: 301). The act of speaking out is in its purest and strongest 
form in this film, as the victims publicly articulate their experiences of one of the 
most brutal state atrocities for the first time and with no interruption of manipulative 
film techniques, just staring into the eyes of the audience and unearthing their 
traumatic memories. 
 
While these oral history films have been particularly successful in opening up certain 
state atrocities to public debate, in fact all Kurdish films of the period, without 
exception, focus on various aspects of state oppression and narrate Kurdish suffering 
in the past, including fiction films. Even an overall look at the subject matter of 




state atrocities in these films. For instance, in Min Dit/The Children of Diyarbakır 
(2009), Miraz Bezar narrates the paramilitary activities in the Kurdish region in the 
1990s via the story of two siblings whose parents are killed by JITEM in front of 
their eyes. Press (2010, Sedat Yılmaz) focuses on illegal state activities targeting the 
Kurdish press in the 1990s. Babamın Sesi/Voice of My Father (2012, Zeynel Doğan 
and Orhan Eskiköy) brings forward the state-orchestrated Alevi massacres in Maraş 
in 1978, told through the story of a family that has survived the massacre but still 
bears its scars. Fırtına/The Storm (2008, Kazım Öz) portrays the Kurdish student 
movement in the 1990s, where the anti-democratic and violent attitude of the state 
forces towards the legal activities of Kurdish youth is central to the narrative. Kayıp 
Özgürlük/Lost Freedom (2011, Umur Hozatlı) is yet another film that focuses on 
JITEM within a dark and claustrophobic torture narrative with dramatic real-time 
torture scenes. In Gelecek Uzun Sürer/Future Lasts Forever (2011), Özcan Alper 
uses formal interviews with the victims and eyewitnesses of state atrocities carried 
out in the 1990s – from village evacuations to unidentified murders –within a 
fictional narrative in which the interviews are motivated as the result of research 
conducted by fictional characters. In short, when we simply list the topics of Kurdish 
films, they all seem to emerge from an urge to speak out about all the unspoken 
traumatic experiences of Kurdish people, because, as all of the filmmakers highlight 
at every opportunity, they believe that narrating these true stories has the potential to 
contribute to social peace. As they acquire the means to break the silence, these 
filmmakers first expose the price of the preceding silence by belatedly reporting on 
the oppressive mechanisms of silencing unleashed against the Kurdish people in the 
past.  
 
While screening memories of state oppression, Kurdish films on the one hand 
address the government, compelling it to acknowledge the past wrongdoings of the 
state, to identify and punish the alleged offenders, and to take action towards 
building institutional mechanisms of confrontation and reconciliation. Directors 
utilise their films in their advocacy for building Truth and Reconciliation 
Commissions on the issues they bring to the screen, usually referring to examples 
established in other countries dealing with a past laden with state atrocities, such as 
South Africa, Argentina or Chile. On the other hand, they address Turkish society at 




to the Kurdish perspective for decades, in an attempt to influence the dominant thrust 
of Turkish public opinion on the Kurdish conflict. As I will discuss in detail in the 
following chapter, these films have been highly successful in achieving their 
objective of bringing these dark past events onto the public agenda and pushing the 
limits of the current government’s understanding of peace. We can say that in effect, 
by screening state atrocities, Kurdish films actually took on the task and utilised the 
medium of film as a mechanism of reconciliation and social justice, without waiting 
for the official mechanisms to be established. 
 
What inspires Kurdish filmmaking is the amplitude of the untold traumatic stories of 
the Kurdish people waiting to be told. However, this amplitude does not always 
make the filmmakers’ work easier. While representing Kurdish memories of state 
brutality, Kurdish films do not simply exercise an act of coming to terms with a 
traumatic past or healing the wounds of the past as a therapeutic attempt. They are 
not bringing forth the memories of a conflict that is already past, but the past of a still 
ongoing conflict; a past that has never become distanced from the present. They are 
active and political films in this sense, which speak out about the past with a high 
awareness of the current political use value of memories. There is a sense of urgency 
in the making of Kurdish films; a hurry to make use of the abolition of the ban on 
speaking on the Kurdish issue, to immediately join the ongoing political arguments 
about the past through the language of film, to have an impact on the direction of the 
power struggles over history, to add certain past events into the publicly available 
pasts, and to bring forth certain past issues that remain obscure even in the days of 
“explosion of memory”, due to the selective remembering performed by the AKP 
government. The pressurising sense of urgency in choosing the most significant 
issues and dark events from history with the highest political use value in the present, 
and immediately bringing them forth in film whilst the power struggles over the 
interpretation of the past are at their most heated, is articulated by many filmmakers. 
For example, Özcan Alper says “I had to make this film now. If I had made this film 
ten years later, maybe it would have been a better film. I would have been a more 
experienced filmmaker by then. [...] But, I am glad I made it now, this film had to be 





We can say that Kurdish filmmakers suffer from a certain ‘burden of representation’; 
in a similar way Kobena Mercer (1990) famously argues the first black artists in 
Britain have experienced. In discussing the reception of The Other Story exhibition 
that put together works of black artists in post-war Britain, Mercer writes; “The 
Other Story had to carry an impossible burden of representation in the sense that a 
single exhibition had to ‘stand for’ the totality of everything that could fall within the 
category of black art” (1990: 62). And he suggests that the works of black artists bear 
“the weight of the double meaning of the concept of representation”, as they are 
“expected to speak for the black communities as if she or he were its political 
‘representative’” (ibid: 65). 
 
If, after many years of struggle, you arrive at the threshold of enunciation and 
are ‘given’ the right-to-speak and a limited space in which to tell your story, 
is it not the case that there will be an overwhelming pressure to try and tell 
the whole story all at once? If there is only one opportunity to make your 
voice heard, is it not the case that there will be an intolerable imperative to try 
and say everything there is to be said, all in one mouthful? (ibid: 62) 
 
 
Director Özcan Alper for instance talks about the impact of this kind of a ‘burden of 
representation’ on Kurdish filmmaking:  
 
In our films, there is always the risk of trying to tell everything. There are 
only three or four examples preceding us, like Yeşim Ustaoğlu’s Journey to 
the Sun, but many dimensions of the issue remains untouched. As a 
filmmaker, you cannot ignore this fact. For example, because The Children of 
Diyarbakır already treated the issue of unidentified murders, I didn’t feel the 
need to give the background information on this issue in my film. If there 
were other films that touched upon different aspects of the issue, then I could 
easily focus on one single aspect in my film. When you think, “the audience 
knows too little, but other films did focus on this issue”, it relieves your mind. 
(Alper 2011a)  
 
Director Miraz Bezar says, “Because the Kurdish language and Kurdish culture were 
oppressed for such a very long time, we now want to take ten steps at once” (Bezar 
2010a).As these statements also point out, the ‘burden of representation’ that marks 
Kurdish films in Turkey is very much related to the void of representation in the past 
and dramatic political transformation in the present. Suddenly gaining access to the 




accumulated throughout the history of denial, and having the opportunity of utilising 
the medium of film towards communicating these issues to the general public in 
Turkey, filmmakers are left with the burden of deciding on the past issues with the 
highest representative power and with the biggest potential to influence the direction 
of the Kurdish issue in the present.   
 
 
Revising the Image of the Kurdish Region in Public Memory 
 
While bringing forth the history of the Kurdish issue in an attempt to contribute to 
the peace process, Kurdish films aim at revising the dominant image of the Kurds 
and the Kurdish region in Turkish public memory. One of the consequences of the 
official policy of denial and the severe armed conflict that continued in the region 
from 1984 onwards is the unfamiliarity of the Kurds and the Kurdish region for the 
majority of Turkish society living in western Turkey. The Kurdish conflict in a sense 
precluded state nationalism to involve the Kurdish region as part of the national 
discourse praising the national territory. The Turkish state declared sovereignty in 
the region via Turkish flags, Atatürk statues, and massive “How happy is the one 
who says I am a Turk” writings on buildings and on mountains, yet it failed to 
annexe and incorporate the region into the national imagination of the homeland. As 
addressed in Chapter 3, the region was first the territory of pre-modernity, 
underdevelopment, backwardness and primitiveness in the dominant national 
discourse, representing huge opposition to the Kemalist ideal of a westernised 
Turkey. Then, after the emergence of the PKK and the beginning of the armed 
conflict, the prevailing image of the Kurdish region became even darker, as it came 
to represent the dangerous geography of war and the territory of terrorism for the rest 
of the country. As a result, people from the west stayed away from the Kurdish 
region; only military personnel and teachers went to the region to do their ‘obligatory 
service’ in the ‘state of emergency’ region for a few years, and they were paid extra 
salary for serving there. TV programmes travelling around the country inch by inch 
introducing the geography and the culture of the homeland to the national audience, 
or TV food shows exploring the richness of diverse culinary traditions in different 




the region started to be broken down for the first time in the 2000s. And in the early 
days of the Kurdish Opening, the Turkish media started to ‘advertise’ Kurdish 
geography, presenting for instance the ‘unexpected’, beautiful landscape of Dersim 
with astonishment as an unknown tourist attraction for the Turkish people.  
 
While attempting to narrow down the angle between Kurdish and Turkish memories 
of the conflict, Kurdish films make familiar the unfamiliar through their 
representation of the Kurdish region. When the first Kurdish films emerged, they 
provided the first visuals from the region that were not war footage disseminated by 
the Turkish military and they introduced the Kurdish region to the wider public in 
Turkey for the first time. Or, they re-introduced it with an alternative image; the 
image of a different Kurdish geography built through and within Kurdish memories 
to replace the prevailing negative public image disseminated through official 
discourse. The beautiful mountainous Kurdish rural landscape and Kurdish cities 
were featured for the first time in these films. Hence, using the Kurdish region as 
their setting has been one of the salient characteristics of Kurdish films, which gives 
them a distinct look and in fact the feeling of ‘foreign films’ for the audience in 
western Turkey. The unfamiliarity of Kurdish geography and culture, its virginity in 
the realm of visual representation, give these films a certain spectacular and 
ethnographical value, which has been particularly highlighted in most Kurdish films. 
 
Kurdish films depict the Kurdish region as it lives in the Kurdish imagination and 
Kurdish memories. In this representation, the natural Kurdish landscape, the 
countryside and the villages, are particularly foregrounded and spectacularised, as 
these geographical images have a symbolic value in the Kurdish imagination of 
Kurdistan. As Maria T. O’Shea remarks, “Kurds have a strong attachment to both 
their real place of origin and also often to their concept of all of Kurdistan. For Kurds 
this attachment is most usually expressed through love of Kurdistan’s natural 
features and landscape” (2004: 5). The mountain image particularly is so prominent 
in Kurdish films that it is regarded as one of the defining characteristics of Kurdish 
films in general (Arslan 2009a; Kennedy 2009, Kılıç 2009b). David McDowall 
remarks that for many Kurds, “the idea of Kurdistan is characterized by an almost 
mystical view of ‘the mountain’, an imaginary as well as a real place” (McDowall, 




not surprising that the mountains have become the prominent symbol of the 
homeland in Kurdish culture. However, the mountain is not merely a natural feature 
of the region; it is the actual location of the Kurdish liberation struggle. As O’Shea 
states, in Kurdish culture we find the theme of “mountains as allies” in the armed 
struggle (2004, s. 140). Hence, the mountain image is not just a symbol of the 
homeland, but of the fight for the homeland. In this regard, the mountain is not a 
postcard image of the homeland in Kurdish films, or an idyll, but a political symbol 
dense with the history of the Kurdish conflict. It is so highly symbolic that it names 
the geography in Yüksel Yavuz’s film, for example. Close-up Kurdistan opens with 
a full-frame image of a statuesque mountain accompanied by a sorrowful Kurdish 
folk song in the background, and, the title of the film, ‘Close-up Kurdistan’, falls on 
to this image; the worded naming of the land overlaps with the visual naming.  
 
The symbolic power of the natural Kurdish landscape to represent the imagined 
homeland is widely deployed in Kurdish films. The spectacular and idyllic 
representation of the beautiful Kurdish landscape opposes the dominant imagination 
of the region in western Turkey as an arid, ugly and dark zone of terrorism. Some 
Kurdish documentaries particularly focus on life in the rural areas of the Kurdish 
region, aiming to capture Kurdish culture and geography in its most intact form, such 
as Dûr/The Distance (2005, Kazım Öz), Son Mevsim: Şavaklar/The Last Season: 
Shawaks (2009, Kazım Öz), Bertij (2010, Caner Canerik), and Fecira (2013, Piran 
Baydemir). Shawaks tells the story of the Shawaks, a nomadic Kurdish tribe living in 
the Dersim area. The film follows the four seasons of Shawaks who live in the 
village in winter, breeding their livestock, and move to the high pastures in the 
mountains with their lambs and live in tents throughout spring and summer. While 
communicating to the audience without narration and mainly through poetic images, 
the film performs an anthropological approach to the life and culture of the Shawaks, 
whose name was unheard of even in Turkey up until this documentary. Despite their 
many hardships, the film idealises their pre-modern life style, because it is in director 
Öz’s words, “autonomous, independent from the dominant economic system, and 
nature-compatible” (Öz 2010). An interesting point about this film is that Öz remarks 
that one of the challenges in structuring his documentary was to manage to keep 
direct political references off-screen. He draws attention to the fact that it used to be 




is located near one of the main war zones in the Kurdish region. He says, “The armed 
conflict was in fact still quite severe even when we were there. It was risky, our lives 
were in danger. There were times when we got caught in the crossfire. Therefore, it 
was very difficult to shoot this film without making the war its subject” (Öz 2010). 
Yet he still keeps the war off-screen, because for him, the political value of the film 
lies in the representation of the pre-modern life of the Shawaks, as he equates 
modernisation with assimilation. In this sense, according to him, representing the 
beauty of the Kurdish natural landscape and the indigenous culture of the Shawaks is 
a strong political comment in itself.  
 
Not only the natural landscape, but also Kurdish cities were represented visually for 
the first time in Kurdish films. The Children of Diyarbakır, which was acclaimed as 
the first ever Kurdish-language film in Turkey, was also the first film to use 
Diyarbakır, the capital city of the Kurdish region, as its setting.  In fact, director 
Miraz Bezar states that the initial idea that excited him was as simple as “making a 
film that is set in Diyarbakır”; he then goes to Diyarbakır to find a story and works 
on the script whilst staying there. In general, as much as the stories they narrate, 
taking the audience to the unknown Kurdish region through film is one of the initial 
motivations of many Kurdish films. The excitement of starring Diyarbakır for the 
first time is evident in the The Children of Diyarbakır. The film tells the story of two 
young siblings who are left to their own means after their parents are killed by 
JITEM before their very eyes. Because the kids start living in the streets, the majority 
of the film consists of outdoor scenes. This makes it possible for Miraz Bezar to 
make the most of being the first to introduce Diyarbakır in cinema, as the city 
literally becomes home to the two young orphans. Consequently, the city becomes 
one of the main subjects treated in the film along with the story of the siblings.  
 
Future Lasts Forever is another film that gives a central role to Diyarbakır in its 
narrative. It is a film widely regarded as a ‘Kurdish film’ despite not being made by a 
‘Kurdish filmmaker’, for it adopts the Kurdish perspective in representing the history 
of the Kurdish issue. And aptly, in Future Lasts Forever the audience meet the 
Kurdish region through the eyes of a visitor, an ‘outsider’. The main character is 
Sumru, a doctoral student from western Turkey, who visits Diyarbakır to collect folk 




site of memory in the film, a cradle of unpleasant memories, opening up its past to its 
visitor with memories springing out from everywhere and everyone Sumru touches. 
The film primarily addresses the Turkish audience, and the obscurity of the Kurdish 
region for the majority of the Turkish audience is what influences its narrative 
structure. In an interview, Özcan Alper points out that the Kurdish region has been 
an obscure territory not only for the average Turk, but even for left-wing/socialist 
people who have actually been sympathetic to or who support the Kurdish political 
struggle, like himself and like his character Sumru. He says, “How well do we 
actually know the region? People from the Turkish left, do they ever visit 
Diyarbakır? Who showed the courage to go to Hakkari, or to Van? Nobody. There 
has always been a distance, maybe an unavoidable one” (Alper 2011a). While 
attempting to obliterate this distance in and through his film, he gives his audience a 
main character to identify with, a character as unfamiliar with the Kurdish region as 
the Turkish audience.  
 
Director Alper remarks that he has been rigorous in terms of how he represents 
Diyarbakır: “One of the issues I have refrained from was representing Diyarbakır 
simply as a poor and downtrodden place. There is actually a cultural renaissance 
there. [...] A renaissance that has been built through a thirty years long political 
struggle” (Alper 2011a) he says. Future Lasts Forever draws an authentic and 
detailed picture of citylife in Diyarbakır, featuring its streets, historical buildings, 
cafés, museums, art and cultural centres, and thus utilises the power of representing 
the unrepresented, treating Diyarbakır as a treasure untouched in cinema. Before 
setting out to accomplish this, at the beginning, the film first comments on the 
prevailing image of the Kurdish region in the west of the country that it aims to 
dispel. When Sumru first arrives in Diyarbakır for her doctoral research, we see her 
walking in the streets while talking to her mother on the phone. We hear her trying to 
soothe her concerned mother, saying “Don’t worry about me, mom. In fact İstanbul 
is more dangerous than here. Forget about what they say on TV. It is not like bombs 
exploding everywhere, you know?” With these words, the film begins by addressing 
the fear of its audience that originates from the dominant representation of the region 
and inviting them to overcome that fear, and then lets them see the region with their 






Some films literally take the audience on a journey through Kurdistan in their 
attempts to make the unfamiliar region familiar. In these examples, the journey 
narrative allows the filmmakers to map out the Kurdish region for their audience. 
While characters travel around to unravel certain aspects of the history of the 
Kurdish issue, they explore and unravel Kurdish geography, too, before the eyes of 
the audience. In this sense, journey-narrative functions as an appropriate means of 
introducing the region with its geography and culture to the wider Turkish public.  
 
 Ben Uçtum Sen Kaldın/I Flew You Stayed (2011, Mizgin Arslan), is a first-person 
documentary film in which director Arslan tracks down traces of her departed father, 
who joined the Kurdish guerrilla movement when she was a baby. When she was 
studying at university, she received the news that her father had ‘fallen a martyr’. 
When Arslan coincidentally meets someone in Armenia who used to know her father 
and listens to stories about this father she never met, she decides to take a journey to 
find out more about him. She says, “On my journey, I wanted to take a camera with 
me only because I did not want to feel alone. A camera gives you strength. Initially, I 
was not even sure whether this journey would turn out to be a film or not” (Arslan 
2012a). I Flew You Stayed is not a fully pre-planned documentary journey; each 
person Arslan comes across and each new piece of information she gathers open up 
the next step and give direction to Arslan’s journey. While traveling around to meet 
people who used to know her father, from family members to PKK militants, Arslan 
builds up a journey narrative in which the Kurdish region is foregrounded as a land 
in which her father’s traces are engrained. And, while the director explores the traces 
of her father, she explores the Kurdish geography as well, presenting it to the eyes of 
the audience.  
 
My Marlon and Brando (2008, Hüseyin Karabey) is a striking example of a Kurdish 
film that deploys journey-narrative. Ayça, an amateur Turkish actor from İstanbul, 
meets Hama Ali, a Kurdish actor from Iraq, on a film set; they fall in love and keep 
in touch after returning to their lives. During the days of the Iraq war, Ayça decides 
to travel to Iraq to meet Hama Ali. Departing from a loosely sketched script based on 
this plot, the film shapes the finer details of this fictional story through and within an 
improvised actual journey in which Ayça travels through actual settings in the 




they come across during the filming process. Thus, representing the Kurdish region 
in an authentic manner and breaking through the obscurity of the Kurdish region is 
observed in its most spectacular form in this film. 
 
Yakın Plan Kürtler/Close-up Kurdistan6 (2007, Yüksel Yavuz) is another film that 
deploys the journey narrative. It is a documentary film made by a Kurdish director 
from Turkey who is based in Germany, and the film attempts to provide a macro-
level historical study of the Kurdish issue via film. Starting with his own parents, 
Yavuz meets up with a large number of people to discuss the history of the Kurdish 
issue during a journey around Kurdistan. Like I Flew You Stayed and My Marlon and 
Brando, the documentary film Close-Up Kurdistan visualises the journey narrative 
with tracking shots taken from moving vehicles and interspersed throughout the film, 
featuring the Kurdish region as a land that is explored through a journey. In an 
interview, Yavuz explains how these tracking shots serve to affix the Kurdish 
geography to his personal memories and the memories of other people in the 
documentary, as well as to the social history this geography has witnessed: 
 
There are many tracking shots in the movie. Thus the film shows us the cities 
and the landscape, but even more complex circumstances are illustrated by it, 
too. For me the film was a personal journey into the recent past of the 
Turkish-Kurdish conflict. By using many tracking shots I show the cities and 
the landscapes I usually pass when I visit my parents. They show the variety 
and beauty, but also the decay of this land. And when Dr. Ismail Besikci talks 
about his numerous stays in prisons in different cities, he sure has passed 
many of the streets the film passes.  While we traverse the Kurdish mountains 
we also pass places which have been scenes of heavy fights during the war 
between the Turkish army and the Kurdish guerrilla. This is the area where 
the German ex-guerrilla stayed during his time in Kurdistan. The Kurdish 
woman from the refugee camp Maxmur in Iraq also comes from this area. 
There are destroyed and abandoned villages everywhere, places which must 
have been a ‘paradise on earth’ for many before. (Yavuz 2009)  
 
Martin Lefebvre (2006) distinguishes two diverse functions of landscape in film; 
‘landscape-as-setting’ and ‘autonomous landscape’. The former is “the place where 
something happens, where something takes place and unfolds” (Lefebvre 2006: 24). 
                                                 
Although Close-up Kurdistan was made in 2007, it was shown in Turkey for the first time in 2009, 
after the Kurdish Opening, as part of the ‘Opening Films’ programme of the If İstanbul Film Festival. 
Though, because the festival hesitated to showcase a film that features the word ‘Kurdistan’ in its title, 




Whereas, “autonomous landscape” directs “the spectator’s attention toward the 
exterior space rather than toward the action taking place within it”; the audience 
experience the film “in the spectacular mode”, and, their attention is directed “toward 
space in such a way as to free it from its subservience to narrative” (ibid: 33). 
Lefebvre applies to Seymour Chatman’s study on Michelangelo Antonioni where he 
writes;  
 
The film says not that “this is such-and-such a place, in which event X 
occurs” but rather that “this place is important quite independently of the 
immediate exigencies of plot, and you will sense (if not understand) its odd 
valueif you scrutinize it carefully. This is why I give you time to do so.” [...] 
Not that the simple space as stasis is turned into an event or action. It is rather 
that the camera’s lingering makes the place pregnant with significance”. 
(Chatman 1985: 125-126) 
 
Applying this distinction to the analysis of Kurdish films in Turkey, we can say that 
the whole Kurdish region, with its natural landscapes as well as cities, is represented 
as an ‘autonomous landscape’ in these films. The lingering of the camera on the 
natural landscape or on a long shot of the city, without any narrative motivation, is 
something we find in all the films mentioned above. In all these films, we have 
breaks from the flowing story while the camera fixes its focus on Kurdish geography; 
we are given the time to reflect on the story events while resting our gaze on this 
obscure land; the internalisation of the story takes place in these pictorial portraits of 
the region. These portraits are ‘significant in themselves’, not because they host 
narrative events, but because they invite the audience to experience these visuals ‘in 
the spectacular mode’. And the autonomous power of the Kurdish region derives 
from the obscurity of the region for the presumed Turkish audience. 
 
 
(Re)introducing the Kurdish People via Film 
 
While embarking upon the project of familiarising their audience with the Kurdish 
region, Kurdish films also (re)introduce the Kurdish people to their audience. This is 
a crucial dimension of contributing to the process of peace-building via film, 




narration of the Kurdish conflict, the official interpretation of the conflict has been 
the dominant narrative shared for decades by the vast majority of Turkish society. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, the result was two fundamentally opposing perceptions of the 
conflict and an immense gap between the dominant Kurdish and Turkish 
perspectives; between their knowledges, experiences, opinions, beliefs and emotions 
on the Kurdish issue. And, in an atmosphere marked by political polarisation and 
social segregation, the channels and opportunities for Turks and Kurds to listen to 
each other have been limited, if there have been any at all. Hence, commenting on 
his choice to combine actual testimonies of state atrocities with a fictional story in 
Future Lasts Forever, director Özcan Alper says: “The witnesses in my film never 
directly met the audience before, not even briefly. They never expressed themselves 
in their own language to the audience. They never met my mother, or the mother of a 
Turkish soldier from Trabzon or Istanbul. I wanted to make this film in such a way 
that it would be more than a film: a memory or testimony that conveys the weight of 
the past” (Alper 2011b). 
 
While (re)introducing the Kurds, Kurdish films aim at relieving the Kurds of the 
image of ‘pre-modern, primitive, uncivilised Turks’ and from the dehumanised 
image of bloody terrorists. They humanise and flesh out the Kurds against a 
background of Kurdishness as a negative discursive object. At the beginning of 
Kazım Öz’s documentary film The Distance,which is thefirst feature-length Kurdish 
film in Turkey, the camera focuses at length on the faces of a number of elderly 
Kurdish peasants one by one, in close-up. Each of them just stands in front of the 
camera with their faces bearing the traces of intense life experience, remaining 
completely silent whilst looking directly into the camera, that is, into the eyes of the 
audience. Thus the documentary film gives the audience the time to examine these 
faces at length, but whilst they are looking back at the audience, too. In this way, the 
film begins with this striking scene of ‘first on-screen encounter with the Kurds’ 
before entering into their lives and speaking with them. This unconventional 
technique was later deployed in exactly the same way in two more Kurdish films as 
well; in Kirasê mirinê: Hewîtî / A Fatal Dress: Polygamy (2009, Müjde Arslan) and 
in Close Up Kurdistan, which also leave their audience alone with the Kurdish 





In fleshing out the Kurds via film, Kurdish films highlight elements of the highly 
distinctive Kurdish culture. Kurdish folk songs, elegies, local stories, ceremonies, 
dances, dresses, embroideries, tattoos are everywhere in these films. All these 
cultural elements stand in Kurdish films as a testament to the failure of the 
assimilation project and strongly undermine the discourses of the policy of denial. 
Featuring the hitherto denied, banned and criminalised Kurdish language is one of 
the most significant aspects of introducing Kurdish culture via film. All Kurdish 
filmmakers attach high importance to representing the Kurdish language 
authentically; depending on where their stories are set, they make an effort to portray 
the nuances of spoken language in different parts of the Kurdish region. And some 
films focus directly on the assimilation of the Kurdish language and display its 
impact on the lives of ordinary Kurdish individuals. For example, Türkçe 
Pekiyi/Turkish A+ (2012, Murat Bayramoğlu) is a documentary film which narrates 
the alienation between different generations of a family due to the language barrier 
between them caused by assimilationist state policies. The film features a young 
Kurdish woman who has grown up in western Turkey and who can no longer speak 
any Kurdish and documents her visit to her village where she cannot even 
communicate with the older generation, including her grandmother, without the help 
of an interpreter. Anadilim Nerede?/Where is My Mother Tongue? (2012, Veli 
Kahraman),on the other hand, is a fiction film based on a true story, starring the 
director’s parents playing themselves. The father, who is old and ill, decides that he 
has to pass on his knowledge of the Kurdish language to his children before he dies, 
so he starts keeping records of the Kurdish language.  
 
The documentary film İki Dil Bir Bavul/On the Way to School (2009, Özgür Doğan 
and Orhan Eskiköy) follows the story of Emre, a newly graduated Turkish teacher 
from western Turkey, who is appointed to teach in a small Kurdish village. Yet, 
Emre cannot speak any Kurdish and his little students cannot speak any Turkish. 
Because his training has in no way prepared him for such a situation, he is left to his 
own devices in attempting to solve this problem. And thus Emre decides that the first 
thing to do, before engaging with the standard curriculum, is to teach his students 
Turkish. Just like their teacher, these students also struggle; on top of the new 
uniforms, the space, the social codes and the rules at school that might already make 




example, when one little girl needs to go to the restroom, she not only discovers that 
she must ask for permission, but also that she must learn how to do so in Turkish. 
The documentary is full of tragicomic moments that build sympathy for these kids, 
like the scene which shows the whole class shouting “watermelon” in Turkish with 
one voice when being showed the picture of a bird, to the teacher’s annoyance. As I 
will discuss in the following chapter, On the Way to School was one of the most 
acclaimed Kurdish films of the period and it received positive acclaim from a broad 
swathe of Turkish audiences. Starring Kurdish kids while (re)introducing Kurds to 
the general Turkish public and depicting the suffering Kurdish kids endured as the 
result of policies of assimilation has been an effective strategy in the attempt to break 
down the dominant image of Kurds in western Turkey.  
 
Alongside cultural identity, there is another fundamental element of Kurdishness: 
political identity. And this is the most challenging issue for Kurdish films to touch 
upon whilst appealing to the identification mechanisms of cinema to overcome 
political polarisation in Turkey. Three films that came out in the same year, Voice of 
My Father, I Flew You Stayed, and Future Lasts Forever all have an absent character 
who is at the centre of the story; they are absent because they joined the PKK, the 
Kurdish guerrilla movement. They are missing from the lives of the on-screen 
characters, thus missing from the screen. However, they are the focus of the narrative 
in their absence, in fact, due to their absence. They are in a sense hidden main 
characters.  
 
As mentioned earlier, I Flew You Stayed is a first-person documentary film in which 
director Arslan tracks down traces of her departed father, who joined the Kurdish 
guerrilla movement when she was a baby, and whom she has never met. Following 
the traces of her father on a long journey and speaking to many people who used to 
know him, she tries to piece together everything said about her father so she can 
build up an image of him. I Flew You Stayed was a ground-breaking film in Turkey 
as it portrays a so-called ‘terrorist’ via his daughter’s search and the memories of 
many others who miss and mourn him, such as his sister who became mentally ill 
when she heard that her brother had ‘fallen a martyr’ and has been sick in bed ever 
since then. Or, Arslan’s mother who, for the first time, tells her daughter about how 




home after being arrested and beaten unconscious. He was tortured and his toe nails 
were torn out, and she says it was the following day when he left to join the guerrilla 
movement. 
 
Articulating the whereabouts of these missing characters means entering a hazardous 
zone for these films, with the potential of jeopardising their fragile communication 
with the Turkish audience, due to the extreme contrast between the dominant 
Kurdish perception of the PKK militants as freedom fighters and the dominant 
Turkish perception of them as violent terrorists.  Future Lasts Forever takes its time, 
or gives the audience time, for the unfolding of information about the missing 
character, Mehmet. The story about Mehmet slowly unfolds through brief flashbacks, 
prompted by Sumru’s memories and dreams when she is in Diyarbakır for her 
research on ethnomusicology, and they are intercut with the present time of the plot. 
We understand that Mehmet and Sumru used to be lovers, yet the flashbacks do not 
let the audience piece the story of Mehmet together until near the end of the film. 
Eventually the film reveals the fact that Sumru had met Mehmet during their 
university years in İstanbul, and together they had been part of the political youth 
movement, but one day Mehmet had disappeared to join the PKK, leaving a letter 
behind for Sumru. The film completely reveals this story only after the socio-
historical context that gave rise to the Kurdish guerrilla movement is portrayed in 
depth through Sumru’s interviews with the real victims of state atrocities and through 
the archives she researches that reveal the history of the Kurdish conflict. Only then 
are the whereabouts of Mehmet explicitly articulated to the audience. And from that 
point on the film continues with the exploration of Mehmet’s story through Suna’s 
journey to a remote village in Hakkari where Mehmet is buried.   
 
Voice of My Father is a fiction film based on the true story of co-director Zeynel 
Doğan’s family, where Doğan, his mother, and his wife play themselves. The main 
character is Base, Doğan’s mother; a taciturn old Kurdish woman who always wears 
black and who lives alone in the family home in the desolate hills of their village 
burdened by all the weight of past. This is an Alevi-Kurdish family that survived the 
Maraş Massacre in 1978. The father works abroad in Saudi Arabia as a construction 
worker to earn money for the family and at the end of the film dies in a work 




had joined the guerrillas some time ago. Just as in Future Lasts Forever,the reason 
for Hasan’s absence remains unexplained throughout Voice of My Father. It is 
articulated for the first time towards the very end of the film, in one of the audiotapes 
from the past that Base has recorded for her husband as an audio-letter: “Hasan 
decided to join the guerrillas, he left saying not to expect him back. You’ll get angry 
now and blame me. But it is not my fault”. Until this audiotape, throughout the film, 
the mountain-image stands literally as a visual answer to the core question that is 
unanswered in the narrative: “Where is Hasan?”. “He is in the mountains”, is the 
answer, as in the famous euphemism for joining the PKK used by the Kurds. In 
answering the key question of the plot, the mountain-image concurrently represents 
Hasan and the Kurdish movement.  
 
Zeynel Doğan says, “One of the main things we wanted to articulate in the film was 
that those people who are called ‘terrorists’ went to the mountains from households 
around us. How could Base call his son in the mountains a ‘terrorist’? Or, her 
neighbours? What made Hasan go to the mountains are structural problems” (Doğan 
2012b). In their interviews, co-directors Doğan and Eskiköy also repeatedly note that 
they consider Voice of My Father to be a sequel to their first film On the Way to 
School which follows the story of Kurdish kids at a primary school in a small 
Kurdish village.They say that while working on the scenerio they thought of Hasan 
in Voice of My Father as the future version of young Zülküf, the primary school 
student in On the Way to School who plays the lead role in tragicomic scenes in 
which he struggles to learn Turkish and who was the most beloved  character of the 
documentary film. They explain that they particularly wanted to highlight the fact 
that the people who go to the mountains are the innocent kids that the audience met 
and loved in their first film. Remarking that Voice of My Father was like a test to see 
if the audience could relate to this kind of a story, Eskiköy says, “People who 
watched On the Way to School kept talking about what a beautiful kid Zülküf was. 
However, Zülküf has some problems, so what are you going to about those? In fact, 
now I think that it was actually a mistake that we created that close proximity 
between Zülküf and the audience in On the Way to School. [...] With Voice of My 
Father, we are saying to the audience, “Come and see the issue from this distance. 
How does it look now?””(Eskiköy 2012a). As these statements also point out, while 




the political aspect of Kurdish identity, even though that is dangerous territory when 
the goal is to change the dominant image of Kurds in Turkish society.  
 
On a final note, we can say that the representation of the Kurdish guerrillas in these 
films not only attempts to break the image of ‘inhuman terrorists’ built up in the past 
decades, but also to comment on one of the key conflicts in the present-day ‘peace 
process’. Here, we need to remember one of the issues raised in Chapter 3. Since the 
beginning of the ‘peace process’, the government’s main strategy has been to 
depoliticise Kurdish identity and drawing a distinction between ‘Kurds to fight 
against’ and ‘Kurds to make peace with’. However, the project of weakening the 
popularity and the political influence of the Kurdish movement amongst the Kurds 
has failed, even backfired, many times throughout the process. So, considering the 
centrality of this issue in the present-day political atmosphere, it is not surprising that 
Kurdish films take up the challenge and seek appropriate strategies for portraying the 
political identity of the Kurds, by showing the strong ties between the Kurdish 
political movement and the Kurdish people, introducing Kurdish guerrillas as human 
beings, and pointing at the socio-historical context that gave rise to the emergence of 
the Kurdish armed struggle.   
 
 
Personal Memories and Social Histories 
 
Theories of ‘collective memory’ have always addressed the relationships between 
individual and collective remembering (and forgetting), starting from Halbwachs, 
who was the first to theorise the individual memory as a phenomenon structured by a 
communal sense of the past constructed by social groups. In pointing at the 
inextricable relationship of the individual memory to the collective memory, he 
wrote, “One may say that the individual remembers by placing himself in the 
perspective of the group, but one may also affirm that the memory of the group 
realizes and manifests itself in individual memories” (Halbwachs 1992: 40). 
However, the extent to which this integral connection is visible or obvious to the 
members of a society varies in the context of different historical periods of that 




broader social history in which those individuals are located can be more explicit, 
palpable and perceptible, or more obscure, vague and imperceptible in different 
historical contexts. It can be said that in general, periods of dramatic historical events 
tend to render the linkages between the personal and the social more perceptible for 
the witnesses of those periods.  
 
One of the salient features found in Kurdish films in Turkey is the convergence 
between the personal and the social; between individual memories of Kurdish people 
and the social history of the Kurdish issue. While making Kurdish memories public 
through the medium of film, Kurdish films tend to link the personal strongly to the 
social, to position individual Kurdish experiences within the broader picture of the 
Kurdish conflict. On the one hand, this intended convergence is a reflection of the 
political character of Kurdish films; it is a political strategy of drawing upon personal 
stories as explicit representatives of broad social issues. On the other hand, it can be 
said that these films in fact make visible the already existing convergence between 
the individual and the social in the Kurdish experience. There is one fact that Kurdish 
people, and those who have been to the Kurdish region, know very well: in that 
region, almost all individual stories bear the traces and the scars of the social history 
of the Kurdish issue. Director Miraz Bezar, who started out making The Children of 
Diyarbakır with the motivation of using Diyarbakır as the setting for the first time in 
a film produced in Turkey, says, “Every single person has a story in Diyarbakır. 
Whoever you speak with, they have a story to share with you” (Bezar 2010b). As 
director Özcan Alper puts it, “Whoever you get in touch with, whoever you come 
across in the street, it’s either his brother is in prison, or her father is missing, or 
another relative is murdered” (Alper 2011a). İlham Bakır, one of the organisers of 
the Amed Film Festival in Diyarbakır, says, “Kurdish cinema is lucky, because in the 
Kurdish region, wherever you direct the camera you would find a story for a film. 
[...] What has been experienced in the last thirty years in this region gives enough 
material to the filmmakers to last for fifty years in cinema” (Evrensel, 9 August 
2012). In a sense, what Kurdish films do is to try to capture this fact and make it 
visible; to bring the prevalence of painful individual Kurdish stories marked by the 
socio-political history of the Kurdish issue into view, which when repeated as a 







Bûka Baranê/The Children Chasing the Rainbow(2013, Dilek Gökçin) starts with a 
close-up of a photograph from 1989 taken in the primary school garden of a village 
in Yüksekova in Hakkari province, one of the war zones in the Kurdish region. We 
see the little students of the school posing for the camera together with their teacher 
and there is a rainbow in the bacground. İrfan Aktan’s voice over introduces this 
picture from the past, identifying himself and his friends in the picture. He explains 
that he is about to take a journey to the village for the wedding of one of his friends 
from the picture and that this will be the first reunion in twenty-three years of these 
primary school friends. The documentary film continues with the wedding and then 
Aktan’s interviews with his childhood friends, who are now in their early thirties, 
about their experiences from the year the photo was taken up to that day in 2013. 
Starting from how they struggled at school because they did not know any Turkish 
and how the teacher in the picture used to beat them, they all recount many stories 
they have experienced throughout the years since 1989: constant military raids into 
the village; the difficulties of living under military blockade; their family members 
being beaten, tortured or killed; their own experiences of torture and imprisonment; 
some of their friends from the picture joining the PKK; the evacuation of the village 
in the 1990s; the difficulties they experienced because of their Kurdish identity when 
they first went to western Turkey for their university education, etc. The outcome is a 
moving picture of recent Kurdish history that touches upon all the significant issues 
and events in the history of the conflict, told by first-hand accounts of ordinary 
Kurdish people. And the fact that a film is able to draw a large-scale historical 
picture of the conflict by starting off with a single photograph and merely taking up 
the memories of a group of friends is striking. Another documentary film, Gerçekleri 
Yazdım: Lice Defteri / I Totally Wrote the Truths: The Notebook of Lice (2012, Ersin 
Çelik) is based on the diaries of a villager from Lice, which have been kept regularly 
since 1945. The film follows up the events recounted in this diary by interviewing 
other people from the region and deploying archive footage. As Lice has been one of 
the Kurdish towns that has experienced the conflict most severely, the diary is 
brimming with accounts of village evacuations, tortures and slaughters targeting 
civilian Kurds. Thus, while the historical narrative in The Children Chasing the 




diaries of one ordinary Kurdish individual while mapping out the history of the 
Kurdish conflict. 
 
While applying the representative power of personal stories to attest to the wide-
scale social effects of the Kurdish conflict in Kurdish society, filmmakers usually 
direct their cameras to the nearest stories available and thus speak of the Kurdish 
issue through their own stories, or stories of their families, of villagers, and friends. 
While representing personal memories and social history as inseparably transient, 
Kurdish films frequently deploy the form of autobiographical narrative. Keeping in 
mind that all these filmmakers made their debuts in the 2000s, we can say that most 
of them started the cinematic narration of the Kurdish issue firstly from their own 
individual memories. As mentioned earlier, Voice of My Father is a fiction film 
based on the true story of co-director Zeynel Doğan’s family, where Doğan, his 
mother, and his wife play themselves. What inspired Doğan with the idea of making 
a film based on the true story of his family was an actual archive of audiotapes that 
for years were used as letters between the father who worked abroad and the rest of 
the family. Listening to all these audio-letters, director Doğan retrospectively 
realised the power of these sound recordings in representing not only his family’s 
history but also the history of the Kurdish issue in general. He says: 
 
We [Kurdish filmmakers] are good at telling stories we know well. You know 
all the details and the feelings engrained in that story very well. However, I 
have always been aware that this story had a representative power; that there 
are certain things that my and my family’s experiences represent. This story 
did not only belong to me, because I knew that there were many people in 
this country that would find themselves in this story. (Doğan 2012c)  
 
Doğan regards Voice of My Father as a personal journey that he had to take in order 
to confront his past: 
 
It is like killing two birds with one stone. You have these poisonous 
experiences about your past, about your relationship with your family, and 
you throw up that poison whilst making a film. I would have felt uneasy had I 
made a film about something else while I had this mother, this family at my 
elbow. I am at ease now; I can now look into other stories, as, I honoured my 
debt of gratitude in a sense and completed my confrontation with my dad and 





Stitching together personal and social memories, filming the journey of a 
confrontation with personal memories in an attempt to contribute to the social 
confrontation with a dark history is central, too, to Müjde Arslan’s documentary film, 
I Flew You Stayed which, as mentioned earlier, is a first-person documentary film in 
which director Arslan tracks down traces of her departed father whom she has never 
met as he joined the Kurdish guerrilla movement just after her birth. In her 
interviews, Arslan remarks that she has always been in need of a confrontation with 
her dad, that she wanted to understand why he had left her as a baby, to know what 
kind of a person he was, and to visit his grave. Throughout her filmed personal 
journey, she meets members of her family and other relatives to inquire about her 
father, asking questions that were suppressed amongst the family members for many 
years. She also meets new people, including people from the Kurdish movement who 
used to know her father. Eventually she goes to the Mahmur Camp in Iraq, which is 
officially a refugee camp hosting the Kurds who fled Turkey due to the war, though 
in Turkey it is known as a PKK camp, and the state identifies and presents it as such. 
There she meets an ex-PKK member who used to be a close friend of her father, and 
from him she hears the story of how her father died during a combat with Turkish 
soldiers. When Arslan wants him to take her to her father’s grave, he says they 
cannot take the responsibility, as that area is not safe. Yet there is a scene in Mahmur 
Camp which materialises Arslan’s father and his death, not through a grave, but by 
locating him amongst other Kurdish people who have lost their lives. In this scene 
Arslan visits the building of the ‘Martyrs’ Families Foundation’ in the camp, which 
has empty rooms with all the walls covered with countless small pictures of Kurdish 
people who lost their lives due to the war, hanging next to each other. A woman, who 
has lost her son whose body was never found, guides Arslan through the pictures. 
The camera travels across the countless small pictures whilst the woman recounts 
their stories. The scene strikingly highlights the convergence between the individual 
and social, by portraying Arslan’s father as just one of the thousands of Kurds – 
civilians as well as PKK militants – who have lost their lives in the conflict, and in 
this way, positioning Arslan’s personal story within the bigger picture of the Kurdish 
conflict consisting of uncountable pictures encapsulating many stories, like Arslan’s, 
like the story of this film. And the general tendency of the filmmakers to represent 
the Kurdish issue starting with their own stories in this example results in a 




the internal war in Turkey simply via a filmmaker’s personal search for her lost 
father.  
 
The documentary Close-up Kurdistan, which was discussed above, is the most epic 
historical documentary about the Kurdish issue made to date. The film attempts to 
provide an overview of the extremely complicated recent history of the Kurdish 
conflict in Turkey and it features interviews with a large number of people, including 
prominent Kurdish intellectuals and politicians, ordinary Kurdish citizens, ex-PKK 
guerrillas, and even an ex-Turkish soldier and an ex-JITEM member; that is one of 
the most notable achievements of the documentary as it is quite difficult to convince 
such people to publicly share their past experiences. Treating various aspects of the 
Kurdish issue and touching upon many significant historical events attesting to state 
atrocities in the Kurdish region, Yüksel Yavuz embarks upon drawing the big picture 
of the Kurdish issue in Turkey with thorough analyses and provides a macro-level 
historical study of the issue in film. Though, even in doing so, he too structures his 
documentary as a personal journey, in his own words, “a personal journey into the 
recent past of the Turkish-Kurdish conflict” (Yavuz 2009). He says, “I wanted to 
experience what has happened to the people who have been born and raised there 
like me, but who have continued to live there. I wanted to understand why a 
girlfriend of mine from my school days went to the mountains to become a guerrilla 
and never came back”. Hence, the narration of his documentary is designed in a way 
to highlight that understanding these personal stories is possible only through a 
knowledge of the Kurdish issue in general and only by positioning individuals within 
a broad historical frame.  
 
In the opening scene of Close-up Kurdistan, we see the director and his parents 
sitting in their village house, going through the family album and reminiscing about 
the old days, and about relatives and friends whilst looking at their photos. With each 
photo comes a story; of someone tortured by Turkish soldiers, someone who joined 
the PKK, someone who had to flee abroad, etc. The implication is that the 
consequences of the social history of the conflict are so prominent in the personal 
lives of Kurdish people that the stories hidden in the private family album of any 
Kurdish household when pieced together would create the larger picture of the 




formal interviews and archive footage commenting on the Kurdish issue in general, 
but it keeps coming back to the first scene, intercutting the narrative of the history of 
the Kurdish conflict with the stories of random Kurdish individuals in the family 
album.   
 
Private collections that materialise personal memories in the form of photographs, 
family albums, letters, diaries, sound recordings play a central role in Kurdish films. 
This is on the one hand related to the lack of public archives on the history of the 
Kurdish issue in Turkey. As filmmakers often complain about the absence, or 
paucity, or inaccessibility of relevant historical archives, they are left with what they 
can access: private collections of personal memories available to them. Yet, this 
disadvantage becomes an advantage. Publicising the actual collections of private 
memories via film and pointing the camera at the family albums, personal diaries, 
and private sound recordings in Kurdish households grants Kurdish films one of their 
most potent political meanings. Personal memories mediated and collected in various 
forms take on new meaning as they are re-mediated and re-produced through the 
medium of film. Once featured in film, these private archives turn into social 
archives; personal memories into public memories. We can in fact talk about an 
inter-conversion between the personal and the social in these films, where they 
transform from one to the other in a cycle. For example, in Voice of My Father, Base 
has preserved newspapers from the Maraş Massacre days and hidden them away in a 
chest. As someone who has experienced those dark days, she has added the public 
archives of social incidents into her private collection of memories. Yet, when she 
opens her chest for her son’s film, this public memory that was once transformed into 
private memory becomes public again. However, it is not simply a public memory 
any longer; it is ‘a public memory mediated through personal memories’; ‘social 
history mediated through the personal story’; social history that becomes flesh, that 
no longer refers to cold statistics but to living people. We can say that this is what 
Kurdish films in general do whilst utilising the power of individual stories to 







From Present to Past: What to Do With the Kurdish Memories? 
 
“Memory is, by definition, a term which directs our attention not to the past but to 
the past-present relation”, and, “it is because ‘the past’ has this living active 
existence in the present that it matters so much politically” (Popular Memory Group 
2011: 256-257). One of the fundamental principles of history as well as memory is 
that they are constructed in the present and their representation of the past is always 
marked by the present. Specifically, in cases where history becomes a terrain of 
political struggle, conflicting representations of past events by diverse groups are 
highly informed by present-day politics:  
 
[T]o contest the past is also, of course, to pose questions about the present, 
and what the past means in the present. Our understanding of the past has 
strategic, political, and ethical consequences. Contests over the meaning of 
the past are also contests over the meaning of the present and over ways of 
taking the past forward. Ideas of restitution and reparation, evoking both 
financial or political justice and more abstruse compensations such as 
recognition of wrongs done, or readiness to hear and acknowledge hidden 
stories, all draw on a sense that the present is obliged to accommodate the 
past in order to move on from it. (Hodgkin and Radstone 2003: 1) 
 
As for Kurdish films in Turkey, the specificities of the present-day political context 
of the Kurdish issue are highly significant in terms of their representation of the past. 
One specific point that is noteworthy in this context is that Kurdish films did not 
come out during the period when the political project of the Kurdish movement was 
national liberation and the armed struggle was regarded as the only way to 
materialise this goal. They came out during the days of peace talks, in a period when 
the Kurdish movement reformulated its ultimate goal and identified the solution to 
the Kurdish conflict as building peace and enhancing democracy in Turkey. This 
transformation was of course something that required certain modifications in the 
views, attitudes and feelings of the Kurdish people, the base of the movement. And 
the adaptation of the Kurds into the new era in the Kurdish conflict is strongly 
connected with the question of what to do with the past under the new political 
circumstances. Hence, Future Lasts Forever, for instance, raises this question 




seen what war is, what civil war is, I know that everybody, if one day it should end, 
ought to ask himself: “And what shall we make of the fallen? Why are they dead?””.  
 
In a sense, the ‘political use’ of traumatic Kurdish memories in the present day was 
clearer in the previous era, as memories of pain and suffering due to brutal state 
oppression were mobilised towards and gave power to the Kurdish political struggle 
for national liberation and independence. Yet the question of what to do with these 
memories, where to go with them, is more complicated in the new era of the Kurdish 
conflict. While talking about the necessity for social confrontation in Turkey, the 
first aspect that comes forward is the confrontation of the state, the guilty 
perpetrators, and Turkish society at large, with their roles in the crimes against the 
Kurdish people. Though for social peace, Kurdish people also need to undergo the 
process of confronting their memories and deciding what to do with them.  
 
The question of what to do with the painful memories of Kurdishness is evident in 
Kurdish films. First of all, it is significant to note in this regard that the majority of 
these films do not focus on the past but on the remembrance of the past; they unravel 
the past through (real or fictional) characters that remember the past in present-day 
Turkey. They focus on the ones who have lost their lives in the past, through the 
stories of the survivors who in the present remember those lost ones. It is not what 
happened in the past so much as the present effects of the past that is of primary 
interest to Kurdish filmmakers. In this regard, what Kurdish films do is not only to 
represent history, but to represent the remembrance of history. Thus, the question in 
this context is no longer what to do with the past, but what to do with the memories 
of the past.  
 
In Future Lasts Forever, Özcan Alper chooses to focus on fictional and non-fictional 
characters in the present who live with the weight of their memories of the 1990s, the 
years when the Kurdish conflict was at its peak, instead of writing a scenario that is 
directly set in those years. The film’s narrative is overloaded with memories of the 
past, while the present time is drawn almost as a sketch that is developed just enough 
to host memories and only so as to render the past ‘the remembered past’. The main 
characters, Sumru and Ahmet, who meet Kurdish people to hear and record their 




with their own memories, fail to be fully developed characters in the present. Rather, 
they appear as the bearers of the memories of absent people; they are the mediators 
between the past and the present as remembering agents. A similar yet more dramatic 
example is Voice of My Father, which, rather than directly telling the story of the 
Maraş Massacre in a story set in 1978, brings forward the story of a family in 
present-day Turkey who cannot get over their memories of the massacre. Directors 
Doğan and Eskiköy say: “We realised that when talking about the past massacres in 
this country, we always focus on people who were killed. Yet, we believe that we 
need to know what the survivors feel and what kind of a future they imagine for this 
country” (Radikal 30 October 2012). Voice of My Father’s story is set in a frozen 
present time. As with Future Lasts Forever, so little happens in the present time of 
the story in terms of action and dialogue that the present time almost does not exist in 
the film. The main character Base appears like a mythical character, walking around 
the hills in silence, with a mysterious look in her long black dresses, preoccupied 
with memories, and with no trace of live-ness or mundane-ness. We see some 
fragments from the daily life of Base and her son Mehmet throughout the film, but 
with almost nothing happening. The very few dialogues between the two that break 
the silent present are conversations about the past. The viewer does not get to know 
the characters through their present-time actions or dialogues, but only through their 
memories of the time past. The film avoids disrupting its focus on the past with the 
mundaneness of the present. The lack of natural dialogues and daily life experiences 
represents the present as an impossible time. The present is solely the container of 
past time; a non-experienced time-space invaded by the memories of experiences in 
the past.  
 
The stagnation of the present and the inertia of the characters in these films can be 
read with regards to the issue of integration. The integration of the hitherto excluded 
and oppressed Kurds into Turkey is in a sense their integration into the present. They 
need to come to terms with the past, they need to know what to do with their 
memories, in order to have an integrated life in the present of Turkey. “What to do 
with these memories?” is a question that is evident in Kurdish films and that puzzles 
their characters. In these films we hear Kurdish people repeatedly advising each 
other either to forget or not to forget; some reminding of the necessity of not 





I Flew You Stayed could have been a biopic that directly portrayed Mizgin Arslan’s 
father’s life, but instead Arslan chose to portray him by positioning herself in the 
centre of the narrative longing for her father in the present and by revealing the 
memories of the people who remember him today. One of the most striking scenes in 
I Flew You Stayed is when Arslan visits her grandparents in her journey following 
the traces of her father. Visiting them in their house in a Kurdish village, Arslan asks 
her grandparents about her father, requesting all sorts of details about him to build a 
memory of her father whom she has never met. Yet the grandparents are reluctant to 
share his memory with their granddaughter and they disapprove Arslan’s attempt to 
rake up the past. Though at one point, they show her a picture of her father hanging 
on their wall. It has been hung on the wall, yet covered with an old and shabby 
plastic shopping bag. The grandfather takes the picture off the wall and out of the 
bag, the camera zooms into the face of the missing father, the grandfather talks about 
his son looking at the picture, but then he suddenly stops and immediately hangs the 
picture back up, and covers it again with the plastic bag. This is a striking moment, 
revealing the issue of not knowing what to do with memories – Not not hanging his 
picture on the wall, putting it away and repressing that memory, but putting it up yet 
concealing it.   
 
In Voice of My Father, Mehmet (based on and played by the co-director Zeynel 
Doğan) is keen to reveal the family history and discuss the past with her mother 
Base. However, Base resists sharing her memories with her son, although she carries 
the weight of the memories and lives in the past herself. Similar to the grandparents 
in I Flew You Stayed, she has kept everything that makes memories tangible, but she 
has kept them away. Her wooden chest is a private archive of family history, full of 
audiotapes, letters, photographs and newspapers, which she does not want to open. 
When Mehmet asks about the audiotapes that for years were used as letters between 
the father and the rest of the family, she lies: “I threw them away. What use are 
they?” Mehmet replies, “Is it so bad for a person to know about his past?” When 
Mehmet finds old newspapers from the Maraş massacre days hidden in Base’s chest 
in the bedroom, he asks, “What are these? Why are you keeping them?” Base replies, 
“Leave them. Be glad you weren’t born then and didn’t see those days”. But then, as 




by the crowd with knives and meat cleavers, how women’s hands were cut off for 
their bracelets, and how they managed to escape from the massacre. She then says, 
“Your dad told me not to tell you. What would I have done if you had gone off like 
Hasan?” – referring to his older son who joined the PKK. This comment discloses 
the reason behind her resistance to sharing her memories with Mehmet. ‘The voice of 
the father’, on the other hand, openly advises, even dictates his family to forget, 
starting with their own language. In the audiotapes from the past, Base speaks in 
Kurdish, yet the father speaks in Turkish on the tapes he sends. The father repeatedly 
advises that kids should speak Turkish and stay away from trouble: “The kids need to 
fit in. Don’t let them stand out”, he says. On one of the tapes, it becomes clear why 
he keeps imposing forgetfulness on his kids: “Watch out for Hasan. Don’t let him be 
angered by things he remembers. Don’t let them feel hatred”. Yet despite ‘the voice 
of the father’, as we find out towards the end of the film, Hasan does join the PKK.  
 
In these examples we find the representation of a generation that is overly aware of 
the consequences of remembering memories of pain and suffering. In the years of 
war painful memories generated anger, anger generated war, and war generated more 
painful memories. Behind the emergence of the Kurdish armed struggle, and its 
growing power and popularity over years, was mainly the collective suffering of the 
Kurds under state oppression. Yet in the days of the ‘peace process’, the new 
generation go back to their family albums, open their mothers’ chests, ask questions 
about the past, and rummage through private collections. And they narrate the 
process and the outcome of their memory hunt in their films. They remember within 
and through their films not for finding motivations in the past for fighting a war in 
the present, but, as they articulate at every opportunity, for contributing to the peace 
yet to come by making Kurdish memories public.  
 
 
Claim of Truth-telling and Convergences between Fiction and Non-Fiction 
 
Tom O’Regan remarks that “film-making is implicated in processes of popular 
socialization and social problem solving (locating social problems, identifying their 





a nation can serve as “a forum for telling uncomfortable truths about its society” 
(ibid:10); “films investigate contemporary public issues [and] they register disturbing 
social and cultural truths, and foster alternative identities within the country” (ibid: 
19). There is no scarcity of ‘uncomfortable truths’ in the recent and distant history of 
Turkey for Kurdish films to tackle; if anything, there is an overabundance of them. 
And, as noted earlier, this abundance is one of the main motivations driving Kurdish 
filmmaking, yet it also places a ‘burden of representation’ on the filmmakers. 
However, ‘truth’ is a highly politicised concept; what is to be recognised as truth in a 
society is always subject to power struggles, as well as what is to be done with the 
knowledge of those truths. Especially when we are talking about issues such as the 
Kurdish conflict, the politicization of the notion of truth becomes more explicit, and 
the power struggles over truth becomes more observable. And, as the themes of 
Kurdish films are the themes of an ongoing political struggle, these films take shape 
under the impact of the political power struggles over what is to be recognised as 
truth in relation to the Kurdish conflict.  
 
Communicating on the Kurdish issue against the background of decades-old 
dominant narratives and to a wide spectrum of the Turkish audience is a difficult 
task, and this difficulty is something that conditions Kurdish films. While bringing 
the history of the Kurdish issue to the screen and telling some ‘uncomfortable truths’ 
to Turkish society about its past, Kurdish filmmakers search for ways of saying “This 
is really what happened in the past”. ‘Truth-telling’ is one of the main motivations 
behind the making of Kurdish films, and, the ‘claim of truth-telling’ is one of the 
main characteristics of these films.  
 
What could be the most effective way of telling a society some ‘uncomfortable 
truths’ about its past, when that society has been ideologically configured under the 
powerful impact of an official policy of denial that has been suppressing those 
truths?  How to undermine the political conventions that have been cutting off any 
attempts by the Kurds to express themselves, labelling them as ‘terrorist 
propaganda’? How to render the average Turkish audience open to listening to the 
Kurdish issue from the Kurdish perspective? These are the questions that seem to be 
significantly conditioning Kurdish films. If speaking out about long-silenced issues, 




motivation behind the emergence of Kurdish films, the challenge of accomplishing 
this motivation within the current political atmosphere is the main parameter defining 
the structure of these films.  
 
The predominance of documentary in Kurdish filmmaking can be seen as one of the 
reflections of the challenge of convincingly representing truths that conflict with 
truths that have been largely accepted in Turkish society for decades. Documentary 
films have played a significant part in the recent boom of Kurdish films in Turkey. 
Kurdish documentaries of the period are all low budget independent films mostly 
directed by inexperienced filmmakers, usually making use of filmmakers’ social 
networks as Kurds. Reflecting on the predominance of documentary genre in 
Kurdish filmmaking, we can point to the multiple reasons underlying this tendency. 
Firstly, the films in question are mostly the first films of Kurdish filmmakers, and, 
many beginners in filmmaking usually consider the documentary format ‘easier’ as it 
does not require the challenging steps involved in fiction filmmaking such as writing 
a fictional script, finding locations, directing actors, and so on. Moreover, 
documentary filmmaking is thought to be more accessible as it can be done 
independently and with a low budget, especially since the digitalisation of the 
medium. The documentary genre is also deployed by Kurdish filmmakers as a 
suitable medium for responding to the problem of the lack of historical archives on 
the Kurdish issue. As stated earlier, this problem is repeatedly underlined by many 
filmmakers. Özcan Alper even directly refers to this issue in Future Lasts Forever; 
his characters, who are carrying out research about the 1990s in the Kurdish region, 
routinely go to a place called the Musa Anter Audio-Visual Memory Centre (which 
does not exist in real life) and all the archival material Özcan Alper gathers for the 
film is presented as if it was collected under the roof of the centre. Alper says: 
 
While working on the film, I wanted to access sound recordings, newspaper 
archives, and photographs, but there are hardly any archives available. Then I 
started to talk with Kurdish people about this issue of a lack of archives.  The 
Musa Anter Audio-Visual Memory Centre that we see in the film is a 
reference to this issue and also actually an implied suggestion that such a 
centre should be created. And that is why I quoted John Berger in the film: 
“We need to keep records, because the perpetrators not only destroy the 
innocents, but also try to destroy our memory”. I can only hope that, 




of this centre can be used by yet-to-be-founded Truth Commissions in the 
future”. (Alper 2011b)  
 
In commenting on his choice to use the documentary format for 38 which is 
structured around interviews with witnesses of the Dersim massacre supported by 
historical documents and archive footage, Çayan Demirel also underlines that the 
lack of Kurdish historical archives is a major problem in the region, and he states that 
this is why he felt the urge to bring to light the existing evidence and testimonies 
regarding this horrifying state atrocity through a documentary. He says, “If someone 
else had previously done research and unearthed these archives, then I could have 
considered making a fiction film addressing these issues”(Demirel 2008). In sum, as 
these statements also show, Kurdish documentary filmmaking in general is very 
much dedicated to the project of bringing to light historical archives concerning the 
Kurdish issue. We can say that Kurdish filmmakers see their film projects as 
historical research projects unearthing lost, hidden, or inaccessible historical 
materials and they have started building an on-screen historical archive of the 
Kurdish issue in Turkey with their films.  
 
On the other hand, as noted above, the predominance of the documentary genre in 
Kurdish filmmaking can also be seen as a consequence of the difficulties Kurdish 
films face due to the over-politicization of the notion of truth in conflict-driven 
Turkey. For example, while commenting on why they preferred the documentary 
genre over fiction in On the Way to School, Orhan Eskiköy remarks that the audience 
would not have believed that kind of a story had they told it via a fiction film. He 
emphasises that using the documentary format was therefore particularly necessary 
in the narration of this story which touches upon a “sensitive issue”, because the 
documentary format does not leave space for doubtful questions regarding the 
validity of the film (Eskiköy 2009). In pointing to the common tendency of Kurdish 
filmmakers to favour documentary over fiction film, director Hüseyin Karabey says: 
 
We thought, if we show people these issues in an objective way, people 
cannot remain unresponsive. [...] This was why we became interested in 
cinema in the first place. When you can’t see yourself, the things around you, 
the things you have witnessed in cinema, you think, “We must be living in a 




we reckoned that the most objective way to do something about this was 
documentary (Karabey 2009)  
 
As these comments also indicate, in order to break down some deep-seated 
ideological prejudices, to overcome the problem of persuasion, the Kurdish issue is 
mostly told in the documentary format. In this sense, Kurdish filmmaking draws 
upon the traditional perception that considers documentary film as more entitled to 
‘represent the reality’, or to be more competent in ‘unravelling the truth’ than fiction 
film. We can say that what Spence and Avcı argues specifically for Çayan Demirel’s 
documentary film Prison No.5 (2009) in fact applies to the majority of the Kurdish 
documentaries of the period:  
 
Prison No. 5 [...] does not see the notion of historical knowledge as a 
problem. It confidently substitutes one history for another. It never challenges 
conventional historical understandings of evidence. Nor does it include the 
search for meaning as part of the story. Nor does it critically and 
selfconsciously incorporate into the story the difficulty of discovering and 
telling the whole truth – or even a small part of the truth – about an event. [...] 
History is knowable and eyewitness testimony is evidence that can bring the 
past to us. We might describe its use of testimony as a positivist faith in truth 
and historical knowledge, a discursive transparency that hides its own power 
behind a naive epistemology. (2013: 302) 
 
At this point we need to acknowledge that the rigidity of the traditional policy of 
denial and the rigorousness of the suppression of Kurdish voices in telling the history 
of the conflict have played a major role in this “positivist faith in truth and historical 
knowledge”. Because the Turkish society has been oblivious of many ‘historical 
facts’ as regards the Kurdish conflict up until the 2000s, ‘truth-telling’ in Kurdish 
films first and foremost means ‘revealing denied historical facts’. As the Turkish 
state for decades denied Kurdish identity, stringently controlled narrations of the 
conflict, and blocked the flow of information to the west of the country, primary 
questions regarding the history of the conflict, the first set of questions whose 
answers need consensus if the political polarisation in Turkey is to be healed are 
rather simple: “Is there such thing as a Kurdish language?”, “Did the state forces kill 
thousands of Kurdish civilians in Dersim in 1938?”, or “Was there a secret 
paramilitary organisation in the 1990s, established by the Turkish state and named 
JITEM, which tortured and killed tens of thousands Kurdish people?” There is a true 




as we will see in the following chapter, even ‘historical facts’ are still subject to 
debate, contestation, and denial in contemporary Turkey. More complicated 
questions regarding truth, questions about what to do with the dark historical facts 
and how to interpret them, how to deal with them, and how to accommodate them in 
present-day Turkey, are of primary concern; they are crucial to the peace-building 
process, but they can be fully addressed only when there is consensus on historical 
facts, on what actually happened in the past. In sum, it is necessary to acknowledge 
that it is in this political atmosphere that Kurdish films perform a belief in “an 
opposition between the subordinate truth versus the dominant lie” (Hodgkin and 
Radstone 2003: 5) and deploy an approach that is not so self-conscious or 
sophisticated in dealing with the issue of representing reality in documentary film.  
 
While the documentary genre has been widely deployed as a suitable medium for 
convincingly narrating historical facts regarding the Kurdish issue, on the other hand 
the drive to tell the truth and the claim of ‘truth-telling’ is in fact apparent not only in 
documentaries but in Kurdish fiction films as well.There is aremarkable convergence 
between fiction and non-fiction in the case of Kurdish films in Turkey, in terms of 
their relationship with the notion of reality. In the case of Kurdish films, the 
relationships between ‘reality and representation’, ‘film and life’, are so transitional 
that the distinctions between fiction and non-fiction also become transitional.  
 
First of all, we can say that, the pre-production stage of most Kurdish fiction films is 
no different from that of documentary films. Treating film projects as historical 
research projects is something we find in fiction filmmaking as well. For example, in 
his interviews Sedat Yılmaz remarks that while writing the script for Press they were 
working on the diaries of Bayram Balcı, a Kurdish journalist who used to work for 
the newspaper Özgür Gündem in the 1990s and who also took part in the making of 
Press as a consultant; moreover, they interviewed other people who worked for 
Özgür Gündem in those years in order to create a faithful representation of the events 
and create a feeling of authenticity in this fiction film. Miraz Bezar, the director of 
The Children of Diyarbakır, says: 
 
Because I haven’t experienced that period myself, I wanted to make this film 




journalist in the region back then. Together with her, we made an extensive 
research. We also went to the Human Rights Association in Diyarbakır and 
worked through the incidents in their files. We tried to deploy those incidents 
in our script. We were looking for a real example that would best represent 
the issue of unidentified murders”. (Bezar 2009)  
 
In short, most Kurdish filmmakers start off their projects with a thorough historical 
study as they create their fictional scripts. And, on the textual level, we observe that 
Kurdish fiction films also perform a certain claim of truth-telling; they are structured 
with a claim to be regarded as documentaries in terms of representing reality. There 
are various filmic ways of enunciating and prompting this claim. Here, we can 
briefly remember certain patterns we find in Kurdish films that are addressed earlier 
in this chapter. Kurdish fiction films use real locations, perform an authentic 
representation of Kurdish culture, employ non-professional actors, and generally 
fictionalise true stories. They widely deploy archival footage within fictional stories; 
photographs, videos, newspaper pages are interspersed within the fictional narratives 
as reminders of reality, contextualising the fictional narrative with reference to socio-
historical realities. And, all these elements function in the role of positioning the 
textual fiction within a contextual reality, reminding the viewer of the reality in 
relation to which the film claims to be based. 
 
In terms of incorporating the outcomes of their historical researches into fictional 
narratives, on the one hand we have films that literally blend fictional and non-
fictional elements and thus exemplify ‘hybrid genre’ films such as Voice of My 
Father, which, as discussed earlier, is based on the true stories of the co-director 
Zeynel Doğan and his family and which is structured around the actual archive of 
audio tapes recorded in the past as audio-letters between family members. Future 
Lasts Forever is another example of hybrid genre Kurdish films where the main 
character is Sumru, as mentioned earlier, a Turkish doctoral student who visits the 
Kurdish region for her research in ethnomusicology. Future Lasts Forever makes use 
of densely integrated audio-visual archival footage as well as interviews with actual 
eyewitnesses of state violence, but these materials are all motivated within the 
narrative as material found by Sumru throughout her academic research. Hence, the 
film conveys real accounts of memories of atrocity through the mediation of fictional 




documentary project behind the making of a fiction film. Before shooting the 
fictional parts of this film, director Özcan Alper has conducted a thorough historical 
research, accessed some significant archive footage from the 1990s and also recorded 
interviews with eyewitnesses of the village evacuations, tortures and unidentified 
murders, and he has later integrated this footage into the fictional story. In this sense 
it can be said that he has first made a documentary film based on testimonies and 
archival footage, one exactly like Çayan Demirel’s testimonial documentaries, for 
example, but then framed it within a fictional story.  
 
As mentioned earlier, in My Marlon and Brando, Ayça, an amateur Turkish actor, 
falls in love with a Kurdish actor from Iraq and she takes an adventurous journey to 
meet him during the days of the Iraq War. The story is the true story of Ayça 
Damgacı who co-wrote the script together with director Karabey and who plays 
herself in the film. The film mixes documentary footage with fiction in portraying 
Ayça’s journey through the Kurdish region, by making use of a great variety of 
actual people, actual events and actual settings that they come across throughout the 
journey they took for the filmmaking process. For example, when they come across 
an actual wedding on the way, they stop and Ayça joins the wedding crowd and 
performs the traditional Kurdish dances with them, and Karabey integrates this scene 
into the film. Or, when Ayça needs to take a taxi according to the script, for instance, 
they find a real Kurdish taxi driver and film the spontaneous conversations between 
Ayça and the driver. Director Karabey says:  
 
We didn’t want to lose the feeling of reality. For that reason, some of the 
actors in the film are acting themselves and others worked alongside people 
who participated in the real-life drama. Throughout the production, reality 
intercepted. When one of the drivers asked if he could stop at his parents’ 
grave in a destroyed Kurdish village, we ended up incorporating this in the 
film because his experiences were so reflective of those we were trying to 
represent in the story. (Karabey 2008)  
 
Hence, the convergence between fiction and non-fiction in My Marlon and Brando 
originates not only from the fact that the script is based on a true story, but also from 





Although there are examples that literally mix fiction and non-fiction, if we consider 
the centrality of the claim of truth-telling in all Kurdish fiction films, we can even 
conclude that theorising these films as ‘hybrid genre’ films is in fact insignificant. 
For instance, The Children of Diyarbakır is not a hybrid genre film but, as pointed 
out above, it is based on true stories and it makes extensive use of the documentary 
value of featuring Diyarbakır for the first time in cinema, so much so that we can say 
there is a fictional story in The Children of Diyarbakır that is set within a 
documentary film about Diyarbakır in the background. Thus, in general, one aspect 
of the convergence between fiction and non-fiction in Kurdish films is related to the 
previously discussed void of public representations of Kurds and the Kurdish region 
before the emergence of Kurdish films. Being the ‘firsts’ to introduce the Kurdish 
geography and culture to the wider public gives all Kurdish fictional films a certain 
‘documentary value’. We can also think about Sedat Yılmaz’s extensive efforts to 
faithfully represent every single detail in drawing a realistic picture of the 1990s in 
Press, such as the fact that he consulted a number of people only to find out what 
kind of bags were used in those years by Kurdish kids who were employed to 
secretly deliver banned issues of Özgür Gündem. This kind of meticulousness is 
something we find in all Kurdish films, in their effort to represent the Kurdish 
geography and culture authentically and depict certain historical periods and past 
events truthfully. In this regard we can say that the filmmakers treat their fiction 
films as ‘drama-documentaries’ or ‘re-enactments’. And when Press ends with a 
written note itemising some historical facts (the number of Kurdish journalists 
murdered in the period depicted in the film, the number of indictments filed against 
Özgür Gündem, and so on), special attention is placed in its authentic and realistic 
narrative, and one last time stakes a claim to truth-telling that is as bold as in any 
documentary film. In this context, the hybrid-genre films discussed above can be 
seen as simply employing the strategy of enunciating the claim of representing the 
reality a step further.  
 
What is the exact point in a fiction film where the reminders of reality interspersed 
within the story reach a certain level of intensity so that the film is no longer a ‘pure’ 
fiction film? Ultimately, this is a pointless question which demonstrates that the 
distinction between fiction and non-fiction is always subject to becoming vague 




interrogation forth, or they expose this vagueness, due to the way notions of reality 
and truth are evident in them. My argument is that it is the politics of the Kurdish 
issue that renders the fiction/non-fiction distinction in Kurdish films as a peculiarly 
complicated issue. In other words, the much-debated and theoretically vague 
distinction between fiction film and non-fiction film becomes even more indistinct in 
the case of Kurdish films due to the political context.  
 
What is significant for our discussion, with regards to Kurdish fiction films that 
deploy historical material in different ways and to varying extents, is the reality 
effect brought about by the infiltration of real history into fictional stories. In 
explaining why he integrated actual victim accounts in his fiction film, Özcan Alper 
says, “when you make a film that tackles sociological realities and political issues, no 
matter how fictional your story is, the reality keeps badgering you”, and he 
continues: “I wanted to avoid the audience to think that ‘the film is making 
propaganda’ and leave them alone with the reality” (Alper 2011a). An interviewer 
asks Orhan Eskiköy, the co-director of Voice of My Father, whether he particularly 
wants to highlight that the story of the film is a “true story”. Eskiköy’s response is, 
“What you are watching is not just a film; that is what I want to get through to my 
audience” (Eskiköy 2012b).This seems to be the essential issue for Kurdish 
filmmakers; finding the most effective mechanisms, in either fiction or non-fiction 
filmmaking, for getting this through to Turkish audiences. For Kurdish films that 
find their stories in real life, the fundamental concern seems to be that of retaining 
the intrinsic link between the ‘found real story’ and their filmic story, and thus 
representing reality in a way that maximises the reality effect.  
 
This concern may find response in a documentary film, a fiction film, or in a hybrid 
genre. For example, while thinking of making a film based on her true story, Müjde 
Arslan first starts working on a script for a fiction film. However, after working on 
the script for several years, she changes her mind and decides to make a documentary 
film, I Flew You Stayed, where she documents her journey following the traces of her 
departed father. In contrast, Voice of My Father, which was made the same year and 
which also comments on the Kurdish issue through the theme of a missing father, 
evolves in the reverse direction. Originally conceived as a documentary film by the 




story of Doğan’s family, with Doğan and his family playing themselves, and with the 
use of the actual sound-recordings of Doğan’s father. Here, the important point is 
that in Kurdish filmmaking there is always a true story at the initial point, which then 
becomes a fiction or non-fiction film. The quest to represent reality in a way that 
maximises the reality effect finds its response in both forms, and it can be said that 
there is ultimately no difference between fictional and nonfictional Kurdish films in 
terms of their relationship to ‘reality’, resulting from the chosen form for narrating 
true stories. 
 
To sum up, in both fiction and non-fiction filmmaking, filmmakers who address the 
history of the Kurdish issue are in search of the most effective ways of 
communicating to their audience that ‘what they are watching is not just a film’. In 
order to render the average Turkish audience more approachable, and in order to 
break down ideological barriers, they endeavour to firmly knit the films together with 
reality. In this regard, the message we see in some films saying “All characters and 
events depicted in this film are fictional and any resemblance to real events, locales 
or persons is purely coincidental” works in the opposite direction in Kurdish films. It 
is as if all Kurdish films start with an unspoken, unwritten yet ipso facto present 
message: “All characters and events depicted in this film are correlated with real 





As a consequence of the rigidity of state control over information and narratives on 
the Kurdish issue, the official interpretation of the conflict has been the dominant 
narrative shared by the vast majority of Turkish society for decades, while on the 
other hand the Kurdish political movement has gained in popularity and built up 
communication among the Kurds over the years; this, in turn, has led to the 
establishment of a shared narrative about the conflict in Kurdish society. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, this state of affairs resulted in an immense gap between the 
dominant Kurdish and Turkish perspectives in terms of knowledge, experiences, 





emerged and became increasingly public in Turkey during the period of the peace 
talks, their primary objective was to bridge the gap between Turkish and Kurdish 
interpretations of the conflict and in this way contribute to processes of social peace 
and reconciliation in Turkey. In attempting to reduce political polarisation, Kurdish 
films have drawn on convergences between ‘past and present’, ‘reality and 
representation’, and ‘personal and social’, and the political propositions of these 
films have taken shape mainly on the axes of these convergences.  
 
In treating true stories from history, without exception Kurdish films give priority to 
narrating the suffering of the Kurds in the past, and they bring to light evidence and 
speak of memories of state atrocities. While utilising film as a medium of social 
confrontation with the dark events of the past, filmmakers deploy Kurdish memories 
against the dominant historicisation of the Kurdish issue in Turkey and in doing so 
they have made those silenced Kurdish memories publicly available and accessible to 
the general Turkish public for the first time. It is important to underline that while the 
Turkish perspective on the conflict has always been known to the Kurds because it 
was imposed on them by oppressive state mechanisms, until recently Turkish society 
has been quite insulated from and unaware of the Kurdish perspective. During the 
internal war, the suffering of Turks brought on by ‘terrorism’ was amplified through 
official discourses and repeatedly displayed in the mainstream media, whereas 
Kurdish suffering was completely invisible in the west of the country. In this context, 
as they bring historical state atrocities to the screen Kurdish films not only push the 
limits of the AKP government’s understanding of peace by forcing it to acknowledge 
past wrongdoings, but they also address Turkish society at large in an attempt to 
influence the dominant thrust of Turkish public opinion about the Kurdish conflict by 
bringing into view the magnitude of Kurdish suffering.  
 
In order to display the prevalence of the consequences of the conflict in 
contemporary Kurdish society, Kurdish films tend to strongly link the personal to the 
social. They utilise the representative power of personal stories to attest to the wide-
scale social effects of the conflict in Kurdish society. And in doing so these 
filmmakers usually direct their cameras to the nearest stories available and thus 
speak of the Kurdish issue through their own stories or the stories of their families, 




concerning the Kurdish issue by using the private collections of items in Kurdish 
households that materialise personal memories of ordinary people in the form of 
photographs, family albums, letters, diaries, and sound recordings. Kurdish films 
highlight that departing from the story of one Kurdish individual, following the story 
of a single photograph, or just going through the diaries of a single person is 
sufficient to draw the larger historical picture of the Kurdish conflict, and thus they 
show that the personal and the social have been strongly interconnected in the 
Kurdish experience.  
 
Another commonly used strategy in peace-building via film is the revising of 
dominant image of the Kurdish region in Turkish public memory. The use of Kurdish 
cities and landscapes as settings, which previously hadn’t been done in cinema in 
Turkey, is one of the distinct characteristics of Kurdish films. While making familiar 
the unfamiliar Kurdish geography, Kurdish films aim to undermine prevailing 
negative image of the region which was disseminated through official discourses for 
many decades. On the other hand, these films also (re)introduce the Kurds to the 
Turkish public, humanising and fleshing out the Kurds against a background of 
Kurdishness as a negative discursive object. Some filmmakers give the floor to actual 
Kurdish people in the documentary format, placing the audience eye-to-eye with 
ordinary Kurds who have much to share with them, while others prefer to utilise the 
power of the identification mechanisms of fiction film, building fictional Kurdish 
characters based on real people and their true stories. While all of these films attach 
much significance to authentically representing Kurdish culture, some films 
particularly highlight the fact that there is also another fundamental element of 
Kurdishness: Kurdish political identity. Even though it is a dangerous zone for 
Kurdish films to enter as they aim to build up communication between the Kurdish 
and Turkish segments of society, these films nevertheless endeavor to humanise 
Kurdish militants, to show the strong ties between the Kurdish political movement 
and the Kurdish people, and they point to the socio-historical context that gave rise to 
the emergence of the Kurdish armed struggle.   
 
Quite aware of the power struggles over opposing interpretations of the past in 
Turkey in the days of political transformation, Kurdish films seek out ways to claim 




strategies of anchoring representations to reality and films to life in order to 
convincingly depict the history of the conflict from the Kurdish perspective. The 
predominance of the documentary genre in Kurdish filmmaking can be seen as one 
of the responses of filmmakers to the difficulty of overcoming some of the deep-
seated ideological prejudices ingrained in Turkish society. On the other hand, there is 
aremarkable convergence between fiction and non-fiction in the case of Kurdish 
films in terms of their relationship with the notion of reality, as the claim of ‘truth-
telling’ is observable not only in Kurdish documentaries but in fiction films as well.  
 
In this chapter, I approached Kurdish films as ‘political films’, which is an essential 
dimension of the overall exploration of the issue of ‘film and politics’ in this thesis. 
In the following chapter, I will discuss how these Kurdish films have been in the 
limelight in Turkey in recent years by taking up discourses which celebrate them as 
‘films for peace’ and assign them major roles in the building up of communication 
between the east and the west of the country. Hence, the following chapter will 
demonstrate that the apparent political aspirations of Kurdish films discussed in this 
chapter are grounded in and in harmony with the ongoing political transformation in 
the background. Whether that means Kurdish films are likely to have a positive 
influence in Turkey for the peaceful solution of the Kurdish conflict is one of the 




CHAPTER 6:  





In the previous chapter, I argued that the intense interplay between film and politics 
in the era of political transformation in Turkey produce convergences between ‘past 
and present’, ‘reality and representation’, and, ‘personal and social’ in the case of 
Kurdish films. In this chapter, I will add another convergence; the convergence 
between ‘text and context’ into my analysis of the political meaning of Kurdish 
films, which I argue is again a consequence of the over-determination of politics over 
Kurdish films in Turkey in the period of political transformation.  
 
The meaning of a film does not come to a close when the production of the film is 
completed. As Toby Miller (2010) discusses, the meaning of a filmic text undergoes 
a constant transformation during its social circulation, as it encounters other social 
texts that operate around the same subject. As the themes of Kurdish films are the 
themes of current affairs in Turkey, the process Miller talks about is something more 
readily observable in the case of Kurdish films. Inasmuch as the Kurdish conflict 
continues to be an ongoing political issue with ever-shifting political dynamics, the 
dialogue between Kurdish films and other social texts is a constant, instant and 
intense one. For this reason, any discussion of the meaning of Kurdish films should 
involve the impact of the political dynamics of the Kurdish issue on this meaning.  
 
In the previous chapter, I analysed some salient themes, patterns, discourses, and 
representations in Kurdish films that are explicitly deployed towards building certain 
political meanings, whereas, in this chapter I will ask what happens to those 
meanings once the films are out of the hands of their creators, once they start their 
social circulation and get into intertextual dialogues with other texts regarding the 




Turkey as ‘political films’, whereas this chapter focuses on the issue of ‘film and 
politics’ in the case of Kurdish films. On the one hand, as Chapter 5 demonstrates, 
Kurdish films intentionally enter into dialogue with the web of discourses on the 
Kurdish issue and they deploy intertextuality to position themselves within the 
struggle of oppositional, socio-political texts the intention of which is to exert 
influence on the Kurdish conflict. However, the politics of Kurdish films, and the 
interplay between film and politics, is evident beyond the fact that Kurdish films are 
literally ‘political films’. Thus what I find significant for this research is not only the 
intentional textual techniques these films exercise as a political strategy, but the 
unintentional encounters of diverse texts within the intertextual ground regarding the 
Kurdish issue in Turkey. These encounters render Kurdish films political not only in 
the sense that they are part of a political cinema movement, but by virtue of the way 
intertextuality functions.  
 
Here I must note that while deploying the concept of intertextuality, I do not refer to 
the contact between diverse film texts only, because, as Tom O’Regan remarks, “the 
intertextuality of film-making is not only an accomplishment turning on relations 
with other films but also on relations with other social and textual entities outside 
film” (1996: 173). Of primary interest to me is the mediation between filmic text and 
the social within the case of Kurdish films. And, my aim in relation to the analysis of 
Kurdish films is to apply the question Fairclough raises – that is, how do texts “draw 
upon, incorporate, recontextualize and engage in dialogue with other texts” (2003: 
17). The key question that shapes all other questions in this chapter is, “How exactly 
does the politics of the Kurdish issue in Turkey dominate the mediation between 
filmic text and the social in the case of Kurdish films?”  
 
As I emphasised in the previous chapter, one of the key emphases shaping this study 
is that Kurdish films make Kurdish memories and the Kurdish perspective on truth 
publicly available for the first time in Turkey. They incorporate Kurdish memories 
into the public memory of the nation and they introduce the Kurdish perspective on 
truth into the public debates regarding the truth of the Kurdish conflict. Accordingly, 
this chapter’s concern in a nutshell is how the Kurdish perspective on memory and 
truth represented in Kurdish films communicate to the society once they are public. 




incorporate with the political struggle over what is to be recognised as the truth of the 
history of the Kurdish issue, the way their meanings are affected by this struggle, and 
finally, how they might have an impact on this struggle. This interrogation is part of 
a much broader and crucial question on the potentiality of Kurdish films to play a 
role in a possible social peace in Turkey. For this inquiry, it is not adequate merely to 
analyse the textuality of Kurdish films; we also need to observe the power struggles 
between various social actors over how to contextualise these films in relation to the 
politics of truth and the politics of memory regarding the Kurdish conflict. In other 
words, we need to follow not only Kurdish films, but also the interaction between 
films and politics; not for suggesting definite answers perhaps, but for tracing the 
indicators of possible answers to the questions regarding the potential political 
influence of Kurdish films in Turkey.    
 
For this investigation, I will closely observe how the meanings of Kurdish films were 
interpreted, contextualised, manipulated, and appropriated by diverse social actors in 
Turkey, from filmmakers to festival organisers and from columnists to politicians 
and audiences. In doing so, I will concentrate only on those discourses which have 
become public, as I attach significance to analysing the dominant contextualisations 
of these films that were made available to the general public. Because in this period 
the media has functioned as the main channel for disseminating various receptions of 
Kurdish films by diverse social agents, I will broadly refer to the media in my 
discussions on the public reception of these films. And, in order to demonstrate the 
fact that Kurdish films of the period garnered much interest not only among a 
marginal section of the media but among the majority of media outlets from a broad 
political spectrum, I chose my references from a variety of printed and online media 
in Turkey from a similarly broad political spectrum; for example, from the pro-
Islamic Zaman to mainstream liberal Radikal, centre-right Milliyet, left-wing Bianet 
and also the Kurdish media that is available in Turkish such as the newspaper Özgür 
Gündem and the news agency ANF. However, I must clarify that I have not carried 
out a systematic media analysis for this research, but I do refer to the most 
pronounced and reiterated discourses and debates that can be widely found in the 
media coverage of Kurdish films. Likewise, I chose not to conduct an audience 
research myself, but I did take into account the prominent discourses and repeated 




repeatedly noted in the news and thus became publicly visible, extended beyond 
theatres, and were circulated (and constructed) as one of the potential dominant 
reactions to Kurdish films. What is significant for this research is the observation of 
the prominent discourses on Kurdish films that were widely circulated in Turkey in 
their immediate context of their release and the recognition of the predominant 
contextualisations of these films in relation to the politics of the Kurdish issue that 
were widely featured, highly visible, and publicly available not only to the actual 
audiences of these films but to the general public who had never seen them. 
 
 
Reception Studies and the Issue of Political Impact 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the main motivation behind Kurdish 
filmmaking in Turkey is a political one; to contribute to the peace-building process 
by participating in the public debates on the Kurdish conflict through the language of 
film. But how powerful are Kurdish films really in terms of challenging the 
nationalist and militarist sentiments fuelled in Turkish society for so many decades? 
To what extent do the historical facts narrated in these films have an impact on the 
public perception of the Kurdish issue in the present? How effective can they be in 
influencing the dominant public opinion on the Kurdish conflict, breaking down the 
deep-seated social polarisation, and repairing segregated interpretations of the 
conflict in Turkey? With their pervasive aspiration of playing a role in building 
social peace in Turkey and with their wide public promotion for their potential to 
influence public opinion in favour of a peaceful resolution of the Kurdish conflict, 
Kurdish films bring forth the more general and highly complicated question of the 
social influence of films. Although it is not possible to ‘measure’ the social influence 
of films, or to give definite answers to the questions articulated above, I find it highly 
significant to observe the interactions between films and politics, to examine the 
dialogues between cinema and society, with these questions in mind.  
 
While general comments assuming the social significance of films are commonplace 
in academic and non-academic cinema writing, how to observe, study, and theorise 




studies can be suggested as one viable method for addressing the questions raised 
above, as it focuses attention on the tangible and observable. Exploring the impact of 
certain films on their actual audiences can tell us something about the issue of social 
influence. And conducting audience research on Kurdish films in Turkey would no 
doubt be an interesting and valuable study. However, that is not the path I have 
chosen for my interrogation of the potential political influence of Kurdish films in 
Turkey. First of all, if we were to narrow down our understanding of social impact to 
the actual audiences, then all the optimistic comments emphasising the socio-
political significance of Kurdish films would prove to be unfounded, firstly because 
the number of people in Turkey who have actually seen these films is remarkably 
limited7.  Secondly, as I will later discuss further with reference to specific examples 
in this chapter, public screenings of the Kurdish films in question frequently meet 
with negative reactions from some Turkish audiences, who basically turn to some 
ingrained Turkish nationalist discourses and key Kemalist arguments in their furious 
criticisms of Kurdish films. As these reactions indicate, the immediate impact of 
films in general is usually not that powerful, or in other words, the influence of films 
on the opinions and beliefs of their audiences might not be that immediate or direct, 
especially when we are talking about films that embark upon breaking down some 
deep-seated opinions and conflict-driven sentiments, as Kurdish films do. And more 
importantly, the observation regarding the contribution of Kurdish films in the 
processes of social dialogue cannot be reduced to the concrete reactions of the actual 
audiences. In an article that particularly addresses the issue of the political impact of 
political documentary, David Whiteman observes:  
 
Investigations of the political impact of film have been almost entirely guided 
by an individualistic model of political impact, focusing on a finished film’s 
effects on individual citizens within the dominant public discourse. Such a 
model may actually prove to direct our attention to the circumstances under 
which film is least likely to have an impact. (2004: 54) 
 
                                                 
7The box office figures of some of the Kurdish films of the period were as follows: On the Way to 
School, 93,708; The Children of Diyarbakır, 23,748; Press, 25,832; The Storm, 56,854; Voice of My 
Father, 18,214; Future Lasts Forever, 38,589; and Shawaks, 6,859. Some of the Kurdish films 
addressed in this thesis circulated via the festival circuit and independent film screening organisations 





Consequently, he argues for the need to develop a “broader sense of impact” that 
takes into consideration “the importance of the context of the viewing, of the nature 
of interpersonal discussions surrounding the viewing, and of the media coverage of 
the film” (ibid: 53). In this research I am interested in certain dimensions of the 
relationships between film and society that cannot be measured through an audience 
study. What is far less observable yet more significant for this research is the way 
Kurdish films have become mediators for debating the Kurdish issue; the way their 
discourses have seeped into the dominant discourses on the conflict; the way they 
have influenced how the Kurdish issue is debated; the way they have provided the 
society with some topics and examples to discuss the Kurdish issue.   
 
In tackling the issue of political influence, I will appeal to the general approach of 
‘reception studies’, as it suggests directing attention to the contextual and intertextual 
analysis of film meaning. In Janet Staiger’s description, “reception studies tries to 
explain an event (the interpretation of a film), while textual studies is working 
towards elucidating an object (the film). Both activities are useful in the process of 
knowledge, but they explore different aspects of hermeneutics of cultural studies” 
(1992: 9). She highlights that reception studies aims at analysing “the historical 
context of the event of interpretation” and “seeks to understand textual 
interpretations as they are produced historically” (ibid: 9). Barbara Klinger 
emphasises that reception studies “redefined the object of literary analysis from the 
text to the intertext – the network of discourses, social institutions and historical 
conditions surrounding a work”, and states that “such contextual analysis hopes to 
reveal the intimate impact of discursive and social situations on cinematic meaning” 
(1997: 108). “Those pursuing issues of reception interrogate such contextual 
elements to understand how they helped negotiate the film’s social meanings and 
public reception, attempting to pinpoint the meanings in circulation at a given 
historical moment” (ibid: 114), she further explains. 
 
Tony Bennett talks about the interaction between “the culturally activated text and 
the culturally activated reader, an interaction structured by the material, social, 
ideological and institutional relationships in which both text and readers are 
inescapably inscribed”(1983: 12). Yet he admits that he is not altogether sure about 
the consequences of his argument that meanings embedded in texts can always be 
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“dis-embedded and re-embedded in alternative discursive formations through the 
ways in which texts are productively activated within different reading formations” 
(ibid: 14). He writes; “This question is troubling since, once the seductive facticity of 
the ‘text itself’ is challenged, there seems to be nothing to stop the total dissolution 
of the text into a potentially infinite series of different readings – in which case there 
seems to be nothing left for criticism to get hold of or to address” (ibid: 14). 
However, Staiger has no confusion regarding Bennett’s argument. She clarifies that 
“although many observations in reception studies might logically imply that 
everyone reads in individual ways, as a research area, reception studies seeks 
generalisations which, while applying to the individual situation, provide knowledge 
about large-scale processes” (Staiger 1992: 10). She stresses that reception studies 
rejects “the proposition that apparent uniqueness among readings implies freedom 
for readers”, as “controlling conventions, linked to ideologies, win out over our 
illusionary variety” (ibid: 10). So, as Roy Wagner remarks, meaning is not “a free-
floating intangible, but a phenomenon that stands in a certain relation to the 
conventions of culture. (1986: ix), and convention in this sense is simply “social 
contextualization” (ibid: 30). 
 
Here, we can also return to Willemen’s concept of “cultural specificity”, discussed in 
Chapter 2. Cultural specificity is a valuable concept not only for the textual analysis 
of films, perhaps more so in terms of the contextual and intertextual analysis of film 
meaning. Although the filmic text embodies various potential meanings, there are 
always socio-cultural contextualising powers over the text functioning for the closure 
of the text’s meaning in a certain direction, by encouraging, foregrounding, 
highlighting certain meanings among many potential meanings. And these forces that 
operate towards manipulating the meaning of a film can be studied only with 
reference to the cultural specificity of the particular time and place in which films 
travel. This is, in Miriam Hansen’s words, “the public dimension of cinematic 
representation”; “This public dimension is distinct from both textual and social 
determinations of spectatorship because it entails the very moment in which 
reception can gain a momentum of its own, can give rise to formations not 
necessarily anticipated in the context of production” (1991: 7). Hansen puts forward 
the notion of the “specific social horizon of understanding that shapes the viewer’s 




specificity within the context of reception studies; she underlines that “that horizon is 
not a homogeneous storage of intertextual knowledge but a contested field of 
multiple positions and conflicting interests, defined (though not necessarily confined) 
in terms of the viewer’s class and race, gender and sexual orientation” (ibid: 7). Like 
Hansen, Klinger also emphasises the importance of hearing the conflicting voices 
that interpret texts in multiple ways:  
 
A totalized view thus looks at the instabilities of the historical moment, its 
assembly of conflicting voices. At the same time, such a view considers the 
manner in which films are differently appropriated within the social 
formation by potentially contradictory ideological interests. A total history 
seeks to avoid reductively equating a text with an ideology (where the text is 
either reactionary or subversive). Researchers attempt instead to depict the 
many ideological interests that intersect with a film during its public 
circulation and to engage as fully as possible the range of its social meanings 
within its historical moment. (Klinger 1997: 122) 
 
These theoretical arguments developed in the area of reception studies are of 
significant value for the study of Kurdish films in Turkey; for investigating the 
political contextualisations of their meaning, for observing how their discourses get 
into dialogue with contemporary dominant discourses that influence public opinion 
on the Kurdish issue, and for reflecting on their potential positive political impact in 
a conflict-driven society.  
 
 
Politicisation of Film Culture in Turkey in the 2000s 
 
Carole Sklan defines the notion of ‘film culture’ by highlighting its multi-faceted 
character:   
 
It’s limited to talk about screen culture only in terms of the production and 
exhibition of commercial film and television. A country’s film culture 
encompasses the whole environment in which films are made, distributed, 
seen and discussed, and in which they create meanings. There is a more 
extensive, rich and diverse screen culture that is circulated through a variety 
of ways, such as film festivals, film societies, film reviews, screen education, 
discussions and screenings which take place everywhere from rural halls and 
suburban cinemas to coffee shops and bus stops. […] There is a creative 
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interaction between the films and the vitality of the culture from which they 
emerge”. (Sklan 1996: 229) 
 
When we put this definition together with the arguments mapping the scope and the 
methodology of reception studies, we can say that reception studies examines the 
material found in a specific film culture for studying the contextual and intertextual 
forces operating on the meaning and the social operation of certain films that 
circulate in that society at a given time. And, this is the perspective I adhere to in this 
chapter when I refer to film culture in Turkey in the 2000s.  
 
I argue that we can talk about ‘the politicisation of film culture’ in Turkey in the 
early 2000s, which is a result of the historical conjunction of two dynamics that took 
place in Turkey in this period: the political transformation addressed in Chapter 3 
and the revival of cinema discussed in Chapter 4. At a time when the country 
witnessed radical shifts in politics films came out that focused on the very issues that 
were at the heart of this political transformation and that had observable 
consequences in film culture. And, as explained in the previous two chapters, one of 
the most significant aspects of the political transformation in question was the policy 
shift in the state’s attitude towards the Kurdish conflict, while one of the most 
dynamic components of the new cinema in Turkey was the emergence of Kurdish 
films. This historical conjunction rendered Kurdish films a prominent means of 
debating the Kurdish conflict in Turkey. Kurdish films participated in the ongoing 
struggle over the future of the Kurdish conflict not only as a subject speaking out, but 
also an object spoken about; not only did they interrogate the Kurdish issue, but they 
also became an instrument for the public to interrogate the issue.   
 
On the other hand, what further complicated the picture was the emergence of the 
first examples signalling the proliferation and diversification of discourses on the 
Kurdish conflict in cinema in Turkey. Once the ban over representing the Kurdish 
issue and Kurdish identity in cinema was broken, films representing the Kurdish 
issue from different political angles started to emerge as a result. Breath, which will 
be discussed later in this chapter, was the first film in Turkey that tackled the 
Kurdish issue without speaking from a pro-Kurdish perspective. A few other films 
followed that represented different political opinions on the Kurdish issue on screen. 
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As a result, the on-screen dialogue on the Kurdish issue became more complicated 
with the participation of various voices representing diverse political approaches to 
the Kurdish issue, and that widened, exhilarated and complicated the  rising tendency 
of debating the Kurdish issue through films.   
 
Tom O’Regan observes:  
 
Diverse agents take up film stories using them for their own purposes: 
audiences in their discussions of the films; critics in their reviews, talks and 
essays on the films and the incidents they depict; film-makers to plunder 
ideas to make new films; journalists as they attach a prominent film to some 
social issue of the day; special interest groups to further their own aims and 
those of their members; and governments in their various capacities. Films 
are vehicles of social exchange among agents and they define the social 
(cultural) bond among them by their circulation. (1996: 15) 
 
Looking at Kurdish films and other Kurdish-issue-themed films in Turkey from this 
angle, and examining how different agents interpret, manipulate and contextualise 
film meaning in this case, is highly necessary. When we talk about diverse and 
sometimes conflicting interpretations of film meaning in a specific historical 
moment, here, ‘interpretation’ does not necessarily refer to what different viewers 
literally understand from a film, or how they make sense of the film meaning; it 
refers to how that meaning is contextualised, re-contextualised, manipulated, put into 
discourse and linked to other discourses by different social actors. It “provides a 
sense of what the historical prospects were for viewing at a given time by 
illuminating the meanings made available within that moment, [...] thus depicts how 
social forces invite viewers to assume positions, giving us a range of possible 
influences on spectatorship” (Klinger 1997: 114).  
 
If we return to the reception studies approach discussed above, we can say that this 
methodology is in fact suitable, relevant and significant in varying degrees to the 
study of different films and cinemas. Given that this approach is mainly interested in 
what actually happens in the material world and favours a “context-activated theory 
of reception” (Staiger 1992: 75), the film(s) in question must have a certain public 
significance of some sort or another, and the context must be giving some observable 
and significant material regarding the public interpretation(s) of the film meaning for 
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this theoretical approach to be particularly favourable in the study of certain films. 
Thus, when the subject of research is films that specifically bring forth issues that 
dominate the present-day agenda of the society – issues that are highly subject to 
public controversy – as in the case of this research, then we can say that, directing 
our attention from text to context and focusing on “the elements that define its 
situation in a complex discursive and social milieu” (Klinger 1997: 110) is necessary, 
even compulsory. When public debates contextualising, interpreting and 
manipulating the meaning of the Kurdish-issue-themed films in diverse and 
conflicting ways are so wide and rich, it is not justifiable not to study this richness. 
This is where incorporating the political contextualisation of a film into the 
interrogation of its political effect becomes crucial. What seems to be of vital 
importance for the study of Kurdish films in Turkey is, instead of judging the 
potential political impact of these films merely on the ground of their textual 
features, examining the context of reception and observing the public interpretations 
and political uses of film meaning, as they stretch and enlarge, or compress and 
constrict, highlight and encourage or understate and discourage, the innate potentials 
inherent in films. 
 
 
Films as a Means of Debating the Kurdish Issue 
 
The majority of the Turkish mainstream media, which played a central role in 
disseminating the discourse of terrorism for decades and otherwise kept silent on the 
Kurdish issue, responded to the shifting balance of power between the old and the 
new power elites and dramatically changed its language and attitude in the AKP era. 
Debates on the Kurdish issue were everywhere in the media following the launch of 
the Kurdish Opening, as the media took on the task of the acclimatization of Turkish 
society in the new era in the Kurdish conflict, and Kurdish films started to enjoy 
wide media coverage in this period. When a number of Kurdish films emerged in 
2009 to create the phenomenal boom in Kurdish cinema, their media coverage 
mainly contextualised them tightly within the context of the Kurdish Opening. As 
mentioned in Chapter 4, in those days, mainstream newspapers were in unison 
announcing the Kurdish films taking part in national film festivals with headlines 
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such as ‘Kurdish Opening on Screen’, or for instance, they were all referring to The 
Children of Diyarbakır’s screening at the Altın Portakal Film Festival as “Kurdish 
Language Opening at Altın Portakal”. This contextualisation was something that 
served the advocacy of the AKP’s Kurdish policy, as it turned the emergence of 
Kurdish films into one of the tangible evidences of democratisation.  
 
It was not only film critics who carried this media interest in Kurdish films into 
effect, but also other journalists and columnists originally specialising in politics. It 
was quite common to see political columns starting with the mention of a Kurdish 
film and then continuing with the discussion of the issues tackled in that film with no 
further reference to the film itself. Films were providing a context for the media to 
address the Kurdish issue and they were functioning as a lead-in to political 
arguments. The predominant media discourse on Kurdish films in those days widely 
promoted these films as ‘films for peace’. They were recommended to the society by 
prominent media figures as a way of understanding the Kurds and looking at the 
Kurdish issue from a different angle. For example, Asu Maro(2009) wrote: “To 
everyone commenting on the Kurdish Opening, to those supporting or protesting it 
for this or that reason, I will recommend a film. The name of the film is On the Way 
to School. You should definitely see it before you say one more word on the Kurdish 
Opening”. Recommendations similar to this one, attaching high significance and a 
peace-building role to Kurdish films were everywhere in the media.  
 
In 2012, the week Voice of My Father came out, Radikal8 newspaper conducted an 
interactive coverage of the film with its readers through what they called “editorial 
office live”. With a title saying ‘Give Your Voice to Voice of My Father’ (Radikal 30 
October 2012), they invited readers who had experienced the Maraş Massacre that is 
addressed in the film to share their own experiences with Radikal via email. They 
announced that the directors of the film would be in the editorial office on a specified 
day to chat with them live about the film as well as about their experiences related to 
the story of the film. A statement from the directors was attached to this invitation:  
 
We realised that when we talk about the massacres that took place in this 
country, we always focus on the ones that were murdered. Yet, we believe 
                                                 
8One of the major daily newspapers in Turkey that represents a mainstream liberal political view.  
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that we need to hear what the survivors of these events feel and what kind of 
a future they dream of. We are not only talking about the people who were 
directly exposed to the massacre either. The feelings of the ones who were 
affected from these massacres just because they are Kurdish or Alevi is 
important too. That is why we made this film. So that people who question 
their place in this society, when they see this film, would be able to find the 
courage and articulate their miseries.  
 
The outcomes of the live conversations between the directors and the Radikal 
followers were also reported later with highlights from the conversations (Radikal, 2 
November 2012). In this example, we see a newspaper going one step further from 
what the media had already been doing in this period and taking an active role in 
encouraging a public debate around Kurdish films, or, in fact, giving coverage to the 
already ongoing public debates around Kurdish films.  
 
Broadly speaking, in this period, Kurdish films were widely employed as a key 
‘source of reference’ on the subjects that they focus upon. When JITEM (the illegal 
counter-guerrilla organisation) came to the fore in current politics, The Children of 
Diyarbakır was immediately invoked, for example. Or, when the top current issue 
was Diyarbakır Prison, then it was Prison No: 5 that was used as a key reference in 
the debates. Thus Kurdish films started to get actively involved in the political 
debates on the issues which they dealt with. In short, as various aspects of the 
Kurdish conflict came to the fore, they also brought the relevant Kurdish films to 
public attention, turning films into “discursive events” (Kaes, 1992: x).  
 
There are some interesting examples which demonstrate how Kurdish films became 
the representatives of the issues they address. For instance, the title of one news 
report is ‘The Press Regulation: One Step Forward Two Steps Back’ (Radikal, 5 
April 2011), and it is about the new draft press law which increased penalties and 
introduced new crime definitions. The report mentions the concern that this 
regulation would escalate the oppression of the press. The visual used for this news 
report is the poster of the Kurdish movie, Press,whichfocuses on state oppression 
targeting the Kurdish press in the 1990s. However, there is no mention of the film in 
the actual news. In another example the news headline is “The Elective Mother 
Tongue Courses are Ready” (Radikal, 13 September 2012). It reports that some 
ethnic languages, including Kurdish, will be available in schools as elective courses.  
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The visual for this piece of news is from On the Way to School, which addresses the 
issue of mother tongue education through the real story of primary school children in 
a Kurdish village. But again, there is no reference to the film elsewhere in the news 
report; the film takes part in this report only via the use of its visual. Another 
example: the newspaper reports that European Court of Human Rights had decided 
that “Demanding education in the mother tongue cannot be a reason for closing down 
a union”, with regards to the Eğitim-Sen Union case. The headline is “On the Way to 
School Decision from ECHR” (Radikal, 28 September 2012). This time, the film On 
the Way to School gets involved in the news only in the headline. These examples are 
noteworthy in that they demonstrate the strength of Kurdish films as ‘key source of 
reference’ in debating the Kurdish issue. The way Kurdish films infiltrate into news 
just through a visual, or a shorthand reference in the title, suggests that Kurdish films 
become so intertwined with the issues they tackle that they become the ‘emblem’ of 
that issue.  
 
On the other hand, in this period, Kurdish filmmakers started to be regarded as 
‘experts’ on the issues they addressed in their films and on the Kurdish issue in 
general, and they were frequently given the floor to comment on current political 
debates. Thus filmmakers turned into public political figures in this period; the 
auteurs of cinema became the authorities in politics. In the interviews they gave, the 
conversation always digressed from their films and directly focused on their opinions 
on the politics of the Kurdish issue. In the Q&A sessions organised after the 
screenings of their films, more than cinema, they discussed politics with the 
audience, addressing the Kurdish issue in general and the latest political 
developments of the day in particular. In their festival speeches they always turned 
the festival stage into a political platform and took advantage of the opportunity to 
comment on some current political developments.   
 
It was not only filmmakers who had the opportunity of communicating to the public 
through the channels opened up through Kurdish films. For instance, other than the 
festival circuit, Prison No.5 was also screened in various places via independently 
organised events, and a group of former prisoners of the Diyarbakır prison 
accompanied many of these screenings; they directly shared their traumatic 
memories and discussed the present-day political meaning of the Diyarbakır prison 
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experience with the audience of the documentary. When On the Way to School came 
out, not only the filmmakers but also Emre, the inexperienced teacher in the 
documentary film, were interviewed by the media and he participated in some of the 
Q&A sessions about the film, discussing with the public his experiences portrayed in 
the documentary. In his interviews, Emre recounted that he was shocked and a bit 
scared when he learned that he was assigned to a remote Kurdish village to have his 
first professional experience as a newly graduated teacher (Aydın 2009a). He 
remarked that he had never been to ‘eastern Turkey’ before and no one had ever told 
him at university that he might be assigned somewhere where the students might not 
speak any Turkish at all. He said, “I was of course aware of the Kurdish population, 
but I never thought they would not know any Turkish”.  He further recounted that 
when the directors found him at the teacher’s lodge in the Kurdish city of Urfa, 
whilst he was struggling to find the village as “it was not even shown on the map” 
and asking around how to find it, he accepted their proposal for the documentary 
project, as he found the idea of going to the village on his own scary and decided that 
having some company would be a good idea, because the Kurdish village was “like a 
different planet” for him” (Aydın 2009b). Other than Emre, for instance, one of the 
villagers in the documentary was also interviewed, and he commented on various 
current political debates from the issue of mother-tongue education to how Kurds 
perceived the government’s Kurdish Opening (Melek 2009).With these examples, 
the true story represented in On the Way to School was expanding; the documentary 
film was not only communicating on the Kurdish issue itself; it was also giving the 
stage to ordinary people who had experienced different consequences of the issue; it 
was in a sense naming names of individuals who had relevant experiences to be 
shared with the wider public. 
 
When The Children of Diyarbakır was released, the debates on this film 
interpenetrated with the issue of the Kurdish children who had been sent to prison on 
the basis of the Prevention of Terrorism Act. These children were named as ‘stone-
throwing children’ in the Turkish media and it was one of the much debated cases of 
the time. Over four thousand Kurdish children were in prison as of 20109. Although 
                                                 
9A short amateur documentary film, Taşlaşan Vicdanlar/Brutal Consciences (2010, Cenk Örtülüand 
Zeynel Koç), which was produced and promoted by the established Kurdish filmmaker Hüseyin 
Karabey, tackled this issue. In the film, filmmakers interview some of the Kurdish kids who were sent 
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the story of The Children of Diyarbakır made no reference to this issue, just because 
its main characters were two little Kurdish kids who have witnessed the murder of 
their parents by the state forces, the film was discussed in relation to this hot topic of 
the day. The child actors of the film, both under the age of ten, shared their opinions 
on this issue with the media (Orak and Al 2010). Şenay Orak said; “The reason why 
children are involved in crimes in the region is that people are deprived of their 
rights. [...] Prison sentences drag children into another stalemate. The reason for 
throwing stones should be examined and a solution must be found. The second child 
actor of the film Muhammed Al said: “Like what Firat experienced in the film, my 
family was badly affected by the conflicts in the region. Our village was burned 
down. [...] Children in Diyarbakir, in the region, face very harsh conditions. [...] To 
this end, the police should not apply violence to children. This is later translated into 
hatred and to stones”.  
 
On the other hand, Press, a fiction film narrating the brutal state oppression on the 
Kurdish media in the 1990s through the story of a group of journalists working for 
the Özgür Gündem newspaper, coincidentally came out exactly in the days when the 
freedom of the press was a hot topic, because two prominent left-wing journalists 
had been arrested within the controversial Ergenekon operations. There was great 
public support for the two journalists and a large demonstration was organised in 
İstanbul solidarity with the journalists. And the media commonly covered Press in 
relation to this incident. Yet Sedat Yılmaz, the director of the film, and some 
commentators on the film, used this coincidence to point at the fact that Kurdish 
journalists never enjoyed such wide public support when they were arrested, even 
murdered. Sedat Yılmaz said, “The ones who are protesting for the journalists now, 
what were they doing in the 1990s? They did very well know back then what was 
going on. Yet, the mainstream media was the accomplice of the state” (Yılmaz 
2011c). One year later, in 2011, when dozens of Kurdish journalists were arrested 
within the KCK Operations targeting the Kurdish activists and politicians, Press was 
remembered again. Yılmaz’s comments on the arrests of Kurdish journalists 
highlighted that actually there has not been a dramatic change in the state’s attitude 
                                                                                                                                          
to prison to point at the unlawful treatment they have been subject to, while blurring the faces of the 
interviewees to protect them. Brutal Consciences was shown at the İstanbul Film Festival and the 





towards Kurdish journalists from the 1990s to the present. New screenings of Press 
were organised, one year after its first release date, in solidarity with the Kurdish 
journalists. The money raised from the ticket sales of a screening was sent to the 
Kurdish journalists in jail (Bianet, 15 February 2012).  
 
As manifested in these examples, the political debates which Kurdish films got 
closely linked with, and the way these films were politically contextualised, were 
highly dependent on the current political agenda of the time when the films were 
released. That is to say, when we talk about the interplay between text and context in 
the case of Kurdish films in Turkey, the term context here does not only refer to the 
general socio-political atmosphere of 2000s Turkey, but also to the very immediate 
context of the very days in which each film came to the fore. This is because, as 
previously emphasised, Kurdish films do not look back into the stories of an already 
resolved conflict. They emerged at a time when the issues they addressed became 
subject more than ever to power struggles between multiple actors; at a time when 
the political dynamics shifted almost daily with new events and developments. 
 
To sum up, Kurdish films played a key role in the era of political transformation, 
providing the society with topics of discussion by narrating various aspects of the 
Kurdish issue. The stories they tell, the political messages they convey, the 
propositions they make towards peace-building, transcended the finished films and 
extended via the debates they triggered. Although the actual audience they found was 
limited, owing to the huge interest of the media, the reach and the sphere of influence 
of Kurdish films was always far beyond the actual audiences at their screenings. As 
they came forward within the context of the political debates that were highly crucial 
to Turkish society at large, in a way they had the opportunity to communicate with 










Kurdish Films and the New Kurdish Policy 
 
In 2010, the government organised a meeting with a group of artists and filmmakers 
to ask for their support for the new Kurdish policy (Milliyet, 20 March 2010). At that 
meeting, Prime Minister Erdoğan remarked upon the impact of the films in raising 
social awareness. “Sometimes a scene, even a single frame can do more than a 
thousand pages when it comes to communicating with the people”, he said. And he 
claimed that the government’s aim is to produce concrete solutions to the problems 
represented in various movies made in Turkey: “It is thanks to you that those issues 
which were unspoken, invisible, dismissed, ignored, ostracised and marginalised 
took to the stage. You took notice of the pains, outcries, sorrows and demands first 
and showed them to the society before anyone else. What we are aiming at now is 
taking those social groups and those issues to the stage. [...] What have been in your 
frame for years are now in our frame, too”. He also mentioned the name of Yılmaz 
Güney and said “If the authorities of this country had lent an ear to the films of 
Yılmaz Güney, believe me, Turkey would have been at a totally different place 
now”.  
 
This meeting and the sudden public exposure of Kurdish films following the meeting 
sparked debates and created tension amongst Kurdish filmmakers. Özkan Küçük 
(2010) from Mesopotamia Cinema wrote an article in those days where he 
emphasised that the AKP’s Kurdish policy had been based on highlighting state 
atrocities in the past while drawing attention away from the present wrongdoings of 
the current government. Thus he claimed that recent Kurdish films have been in 
harmony with this attitude of the government, in that they only focused their 
attention on the past without commenting on the present. Some experiences of 
Mesopotamia Cinema filmmakers during the days of the boom of Kurdish films 
reinforced these controversial arguments. For instance, while the Altın Portakal Film 
Festival included two Kurdish films in the national competition programme for the 
first time in 2009, the same year, The Last Season: Shawaks, a documentary film 
made by Kazım Öz, the most established Kurdish filmmaker in Turkey, was rejected 





This is a blatant censorship, which in fact targets not the film, but me as a 
filmmaker. It is because of my political identity, my Kurdish identity. 
Though, you might say, “How come? This year there was a ‘Kurdish 
Opening’ at the festival”. We issued a press statement upon the rejection of 
our film, and there, I said “The state draws a distinction between the white 
Kurds and the dark Kurds”, and I asked, “Does Altın Portakal implement the 
same differentiation?”. Some Kurdish filmmakers who partook in the festival 
were offended at me because of this question. However, I think it is a valid 
question. (Öz 2010)  
 
With these arguments ‘film/filmmaker of the Opening’ turned into an accusatory 
label, with some films and filmmakers denounced for benefiting from the Kurdish 
Opening and aligning with the government. For instance, in almost all interviews 
they gave, the directors of On the Way to School felt the need to distance themselves 
from the government and to free their film from the label of ‘film of the Opening’. 
They said; “There are people who claim that the release date of our film was 
deliberately arranged to coincide with the government’s Kurdish Opening. That is 
not what we aimed for. We have no intentions to gain favour from such processes. 
We would have done different films if we had that stance” (Doğan and Eskiköy 
2009). 
 
In a short period of time, these arguments became irrelevant in a sense, as the 
positive atmosphere of the early days of the Kurdish Opening was marred by many 
disappointing political events, as explained in Chapter 3, turning optimism into 
pessimism and generating growing distrust among the Kurds in AKP’s new Kurdish 
policy. Thus, the government’s attempt at bringing Kurdish films into play quickly 
collapsed. With the constantly changing political dynamics in the background, 
Kurdish films continued growing, despite the deteriorating political situation 
concerning the Kurdish issue. And Kurdish filmmakers started to deploy all channels 
of communication to the public that they acquired through their films, such as 
interviews or festival speeches, to criticise the government and pressurise it to take 
convincing action towards building peace. Their opinions on the government’s new 
policy and the peace process was one of the fixed questions in all interviews and 
their responses always pointed at the ambiguity, instability, insincerity and 
implausibility of the government’s attitudes. In 2010, a group of filmmakers naming 
themselves the New Cinema Movement (Yeni Sinema Hareketi), including Kurdish 




government to the media. In the letter, entitled “Weapons Shall Go Quiet, People 
Should Speak”, the filmmakers stated that they used to follow the government’s 
democratisation process with hope, yet just one year of the process destroyed their 
hopes, as despite the government’s promises there had been no realistic steps taken 
towards confronting the Kurdish conflict. Expressing their concerns regarding 
escalating conflict and violence, they invited the Prime Minister to keep his 
promises.  
 
Three years after the Kurdish Opening, the creative team of On the Way to School 
made a new film, Voice of My Father, and won the Best Film Award at the Altın 
Koza Film Festival in 2012, when the peace process was particularly at peril, as 
explained in Chapter 3. In his acceptance speech, director Orhan Eskiköy reminded 
the audience of the meeting organised by the government after the launch of the 
Kurdish Opening, where Tayyip Erdoğan had particularly named and favoured a 
group of films, including their film On the Way to School. Director Eskiköy said; “I 
would like to address the Prime Minister from here. Three years ago, you organised a 
meeting with the filmmakers, and there, you asked them, “How can you contribute to 
the peace?” As filmmakers, all we can do is make movies. And, we do our part. But, 
you should also do your duty and keep your promise. End this war!” (Özgür 
Gündem, 24 September 2012). This award speech was everywhere in the media the 
following day.  
 
The conflict between the government and the Kurdish filmmakers was not only 
originating from the AKP’s political performance. The instabilities and 
contradictions of the government’s Kurdish policy manifested themselves in the 
government’s attitude towards Kurdish films as well. On the one hand, the Ministry 
of Culture funded many of the Kurdish films of the period. Yet, ironically, 
censorship and oppression over these films continued in the AKP era. One of the 
most controversial censorship cases was 38, Çayan Demirel’s documentary on the 
Dersim massacre. The Ministry of Culture’s inspection board refused to issue an 
official ‘exhibition certificate’ for 38 and thus officially censored the film. Some 
prominent film festivals flouted the ban and screened the film; it was even shown in 
the documentary film competition programme of the Altın Portakal Film Festival in 




prohibition of other screenings of the film, especially in the Kurdish region. For 
example, in 2007, 38 was in the programme of the Munzur Nature and Culture 
Festival that takes place in Dersim; however, the police invited Çayan Demirel to the 
police station and told him that they would intervene in the film theatre, if they 
insisted on screening the film, and Demirel decided to withdraw his film from the 
festival to avoid causing a violent scene (Demirel 2014). Demirel and his lawyer 
filed a lawsuit against the ministry which to this date has not been concluded. The 
documentary film Bir Başkaldırı Destanı: Bêrîvan/Berivan: A Legend of Revolution 
(2009, Aydın Orak), which was about the bloody Newroz in Cizre in 1992 where 
seventeen Kurdish civilians were killed by state forces, was also banned by the 
Ministry of Culture, on the grounds that it allegedly “falsified historical truths, 
incited hatred among Turkish people and made propaganda for a terrorist 
organization” (Orak 2014). When the Yılmaz Güney Film Festival in the Kurdish 
city Batman wanted to screen Berivan in 2011 despite the ban, the police raided the 
film theatre and forcibly stopped the screening (Hurriyet Daily News, 16 December 
2011).   
 
The suppression of Kurdish films continued in the AKP era, not only through cases 
of legal banning, but through different forms of censorship. Siyah Bant, a research 
platform documenting censorship in Turkey, conceptualize censorship “not just as 
the banning of artistic expression through legal means”; they also include processes 
of “delegitimization, threats, pressure, targeting and hate speech directed at artists 
and arts institutions that foreclose or delimit the presentation and circulation of 
artworks” (Siyah Bant 2014). One interesting case of censorship in the AKP era is 
Hüseyin Karabey’s project My Marlon and Brando. Karabey first received funding 
from the Ministry of Culture for the production of My Marlon and Brando. When the 
film was completed, it was selected for a festival in Sweden, one of whose sponsors 
was the Turkish Ministry of Culture. The festival was contacted by the Ministry and 
was warned that they would withdraw their sponsorship if the festival were to screen 
My Marlon and Brando (Karabey 2014).  
 
On the other hand, Kurdish films faced more primitive forms of suppression as well. 
In 2012, the Mesopotamia film crew was in Batman in the Kurdish region to shoot a 




interrogation (Etha, 3 September 2012). Many filmmakers describe the difficulties 
they experience during the production of their films, even in the days of peace talks, 
despite promises of democratisation. For instance, Sedat Yılmaz (2010) remarks that 
whilst shooting Press in Diyarbakır, they were always under police surveillance and 
the police even once attempted to take them to the police station for interrogation. He 
says, “I am going to speak about the oppression over Özgür Gündem in the film, yet 
I cannot even put a Özgür Gündem newspaper in front of the camera in Diyarbakır” 
(Yılmaz 2011b). He explains that this was why they ended up changing the shooting 
plan, left Diyarbakır, and completed some scenes in İstanbul.  
 
After travelling to the Mahmur Camp for her documentary film I Flew You 
Stayed,where she follow the traces of her father, director Müjde Arslan was arrested 
as part of the KCK operations, which targeted hundreds of Kurdish activists, whilst 
finalising the editing of the film for its premiere at the İstanbul Film Festival. While 
interrogating Arslan about her visit to the Mahmur Camp, the police also seized the 
film as evidence and examined it. Arslan sarcastically remarks that she ended up 
having the film’s premiere at a police station. “All I told them in the interrogation to 
defend myself was the story of my film” (Arslan 2012b), she says.   
 
As these incidents of censorship were widely reported, the issue of censorship in fact 
became one of the contextual frames in the cultural circulation of these films. 
Continuing oppression and censorship in the AKP era was one of the main issues 
addressed in the coverage of these films, and filmmakers always highlighted their 
suspicion and distrust towards the new Kurdish policy, finding justification in 
censorship attempts towards their films. While the government invoked the 
significance of Kurdish films in the early days of the Kurdish Opening, the 
relationship between Kurdish films and the AKP rapidly became strained, not only 
because of disappointing political developments, but also the censorship attempts 
that attested to the government’s policy of selective remembering, and signalled the 
limits of democratisation envisaged by the AKP. Thus filmmakers defied the 
contextualisation of their films with reference to the new Kurdish policy and adopted 
a critical distance from the government. In this regard, even though Kurdish films 
commonly narrated the past, their contextualisation by the filmmakers pointed at the 




support their discourse of blaming the Kemalist elites of the past and claiming to be a 
democratising force in the present, filmmakers tenaciously resisted this form of 
appropriation. Consequently, since the early days of their public exposure, Kurdish 
films have operated as a means of revealing the oppressive attitude not only of the 
‘old regime’, but also the new one.  
 
 
Political Camps and Films: Moviegoing as a Political Statement 
 
It was not only the government who appealed to cinema for its potential of 
influencing the public opinion on the new Kurdish policy. The potential political 
power of cinema was acknowledged and utilised by political parties active in the 
period, representing different understandings of the issue and proposing conflicting 
approaches to the solution to the conflict. In fact, three films that came out in the 
same period, during the early days of the launch of the Kurdish Opening, were turned 
into the representatives of the three main political views of the period, struggling 
with each other over the destination of the Kurdish conflict. Accordingly, Breath 
represented the traditional Kemalist view, I Saw the Sun the new Kurdish policy of 
the AKP government, whereas On the Way to School represented the Kurdish 
perspective. Each film was debated with reference to and in comparison with the 
other two and they were recommended in opposition to each other. Of course, these 
films had particular political approaches in their representation of the Kurdish issue 
that corresponded to one of the three main political views of the day on the issue; yet, 
how turned into direct representatives of certain political positions in those days was 
via their appropriation by political actors. Different political figures manifestly 
embraced and favoured one of these films in a way that almost staked a claim on that 
film. The premieres of these films turned into political platforms where each camp 
showed their support for ‘their film’ and made use of that film as a means of 
commenting on the Kurdish issue.  
 
When Breath, the first war film in Turkey to depict the conflict between the PKK 
(the Kurdish guerrilla movement) and the TSK (Turkish Army Forces), came out in 




Staff of Turkey at the time, together with Deniz Baykal, the leader of the CHP (the 
main opposition party and the parliamentary representative of Kemalism), were 
amongst the audience who went to the theatre to see the film in its first week, in the 
company of the media. What Başbuğ thought about the film was top news in the 
media next day. On leaving the film theatre, Başbuğ expressed his appreciation of 
Breath to the media, and he commented on the film with reference to the actual war 
between the PKK and the TSK, or rather, he commented on the actual war through 
his comments on the film. “I congratulate those who have contributed to this film for 
giving us the opportunity to remember the 1990s [...] I remember those days when 
we experienced two or three military station attacks a day. Yet, they [the PKK] do 
not have that power today”, he said (Yeni Şafak, 25 October 2009). However, these 
references to the past were actually comments on current affairs in the present. Thus, 
at the same time as commenting on the ‘war on terrorism’ in the past on the occasion 
of the screening of Breath, Başbuğ also directly addressed the political issues of the 
time, contextualising the film with reference to the government’s newly launched 
Kurdish Opening. The Mahmur Camp incident described in Chapter 3 had happened 
a few days before Breath was released. And, the picture of some delegations of 
Kurdish militants returning to Turkey as ‘peace groups’ and being welcomed by a 
jubilant Kurdish crowd was amongst the highlights of General Başbuğ’s comments 
following the screening of Breath: “No one could approve the latest events. It is 
indeed impossible that anyone in Turkey would approve what happened last week. I 
share the sorrow of our veterans and martyrs’ families due to these events. [...] 
Though they should not forget that if it wasn’t for those martyrs and veterans, one 
wonders, where Turkey would be at now, in terms of war on terrorism. We shall not 
forget this”10.  
 
I Saw the Sun, on the other hand, which came out at around the same time, was the 
film most acclaimed by the AKP. Although it was made by a Kurdish filmmaker, the 
film was widely and harshly criticised from the Kurdish perspective for representing 
the Kurdish conflict from a depoliticised angle with a hollow message of 
brotherhood and it was excluded from the category of ‘Kurdish cinema’ by Kurdish 
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 Ironically, Başbuğ, who had advocated Breath and warned the government about its new Kurdish 
policy within his comments on the film in 2009, was arrested in 2012 for allegedly being a leading 
member of the Ergenekon terror organisation, and was sentenced to life imprisonment. But he was 




film circles, as discussed in Chapter 4. The film was widely regarded as propaganda 
for the AKP; the prominent Kurdish journalist İrfan Aktan even claimed that, “the 
Kurdish Opening of the government was initiated with I Saw the Sun” (Aktan 2009). 
In fact, director Mahsun Kırmızıgül had been in touch with the government during 
the process of making this film and even re-edited some parts to soften its message in 
the light of feedback he received from the Deputy Prime Minister (ANF, 6 November 
2010). The premiere of the film was attended by a group of prominent AKP MPs 
who told the media that they recommended the film to everybody and that they wish 
to see more films like I Saw the Sun in the cause of peace. 
 
Breath and I Saw the Sun were big budget films, both benefiting from major 
publicity campaigns and this was reflected in their commercial success11. On the Way 
to School, on the other hand, was a low budget independent production. Yet many 
prominent public figures tried to utilise their influential power to support this film 
against the other two. It was widely contextualised in comparison to Breath and I 
Saw the Sun and was recommended against them.  Even the actor who played the 
main character Lieutenant Mete in Breath gave an interview (Horozoğlu 2009) where 
he stated that his personal approach to the Kurdish issue is in fact closer to that of On 
the Way to School. And he stressed that for a real ‘opening’, the millions of people 
who watched Breath must also see On the Way to School.   
 
Since 2009, there have been no other films made which have narrated the Kurdish 
conflict from perspectives particularly in line with the official approach of the old or 
the new state elites. Yet Kurdish films representing the Kurdish issue from Kurdish 
perspectives have continued to grow in number. And the screenings of these films 
have always turned into political platforms. Kurdish politicians have frequently been 
invited to the stage to make a speech following the premieres. For example, the 
premiere of Press was held in Diyarbakır, where Kurdish politician Gülten Kışanak, 
who like the characters of the film worked for the Özgür Gündem newspaper in the 
1990s, gave a speech after the screening. After the premiere of Voice of My Father in 
İstanbul, Selahattin Demirtaş from the Kurdish party BDP remarked on the 
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significance of representing the Kurdish issue through film art as an alternative to 
aggressive political rhetoric. He said:  
 
I wish everyone would watch this film, especially those who are prejudiced 
against the Kurdish and Alevi issues. Our political speeches have the risk of 
receiving biased reactions. Yet this film tells everything. If people can 
manage to leave their prejudices outside the film theatre, I’m sure their 
opinions would change after this film. And, it is important, because the state 
is able to leave this issue unsolved only because it relies on the fact that 
people do not know the issue; the society is uninformed” (Haber Türk, 24 
October 2009) 
 
In all these examples, we see dominant political voices of the day anchoring the 
film’s meaning to certain political positions, which undoubtedly had an impact on the 
public interpretation of the films by other social actors and ‘ordinary citizens’.  
 
The media showing interest in certain political figures watching films that narrate the 
Kurdish issue and regarding their comments on the films as highly newsworthy is a 
significant issue for the overall quest of this thesis in interrogating the social role of 
the films in times of political transition. We can say that from 2009 onwards a new 
tendency emerged in the highly politicised film culture in Turkey, where we 
observed political figures ‘making the scene’ and  publicly watching films related to 
the Kurdish issue as a political act; making political statements to the media through 
film comments; displaying their approval of certain films from a particular political 
perspective; recommending certain films to the public as a manifestation of 
preference amongst diverse political approaches and possible solutions to the 
Kurdish issue; and, assimilating certain films into their political position by 
expressing their appreciation, thus absorbing the film’s propositions into the 
discourses of that political paradigm. Thus, in the new era of the Kurdish issue in 
Turkey, a new tradition began in Turkish film culture, where movie-going functions 
as a political act, film comments as political commentary and film recommendations 







Direct Interactions between Parliamentary Politics and Kurdish Films 
 
While various actors exerted a contextualising force on films that tackle the Kurdish 
issue and tried to anchor certain films to their political camp, some films started to 
get into a direct dialogue with the parliamentary debates of the day on the Kurdish 
issue. For example, in 2012, during the Constitutional Reconciliation Commission’s 
meeting in parliament, where the constitutional article on education rights was 
discussed, the Kurdish MPs delivered DVD copies of the documentary film On the 
Way to School to all MPs from other parties to raise the issue of the Kurdish people’s 
right to mother tongue education. The spokesman of the BDP delivered a speech 
where he suggested arranging a screening of this documentary to watch it together 
with the members of the parliamentary commission (Akşam, 4 October 2012). 
 
The most noteworthy example of the direct dialogue between Kurdish films and 
parliamentary politics was the case of Çayan Demirel’s 38. The Dersim massacre, 
which is narrated in this documentary film, was one of the key historical issues in the 
Kurdish Opening debates, which provided the most vivid example of the political use 
of the past in the power struggles of the present day during the period of political 
transformation in Turkey. Demirel’s documentary suddenly came to the fore in 2009, 
three years after it was made, following a debate in parliament regarding the Dersim 
Massacre. In response to the newly launched Kurdish Opening, Onur Öymen, an MP 
from the Kemalist opposition party CHP, gave a speech in parliament. Opposing the 
government’s new Kurdish policy, Öymen made a reference to one of the main 
slogans of the Kurdish Opening; “Mothers shall not cry anymore”. He said, “Did 
mothers not cry in the Independence War? No one said, “Let’s keep mothers from 
crying and agree with the Greeks”. Did mothers not cry in the Dersim uprising? No 
one stood up and said, “Let mothers not cry and stop this struggle”” (Hurriyet Daily 
News, 17 November 2009). With this speech, Öymen touched upon one of the most 
traumatic and symbolic events for the Kurds in the history of Turkey and repeated 
the traditional Kemalist approach to the issue. Following this speech, Çayan Demirel 
immediately organised a screening of his documentary 38 and the screening was 
advertised as a response to Onur Öymen. The film was widely mentioned in the 




Moreover, numerous interviews with Çayan Demirel were held by different media 
with reference to the debates on the Dersim massacre. Thus, Demirel turned into one 
of the key authorities, who was widely given the floor to comment on the issue 
publicly.  
 
In those days, the AKP also attacked Öymen for his Dersim speech and expanded on 
the Dersim massacre issue. Because, as Onur Bakıner (2013) also points out, the 
Dersim 38 incident supported the AKP’s attitude towards the Kurdish issue, which 
was based on appropriating the Kurdish conflict as a ground for manoeuvre in its 
struggle against the Kemalist power elites. This historical event was particularly 
significant in terms of the conflict between the AKP and the Kemalists, because it 
had happened before the death of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the republic 
and the eponym of the Kemalist ideology, supposedly with his consent. Moreover, 
Sabiha Gökçen, Atatürk’s adopted daughter and a symbolic figure in the Kemalist 
imagination of modern Turkey, representing the modern Turkish woman for being 
‘the first female combat pilot in the world’, had participated in the bombing of 
Dersim in 1938. Therefore, the Dersim 38 debate was highly significant in the 
ideological battle between the old and the new state elites and it basically functioned 
in favour of the AKP. Moreover, it allowed the AKP to kill two birds with one stone, 
as acknowledging the state’s crime in 1938 was a significant move towards gaining 
the confidence of the Kurds. Thus, two years later in 2011 Tayyip Erdoğan would 
even apologise for the Dersim massacre on behalf of the Turkish state. However, the 
way he put this apology into words was revealing:  
 
If there is need for an apology on behalf of the state, if there is such a practice 
in the books, I would apologise and I am apologising. [...] Dersim is among 
the most tragic events in recent history. It is a disaster that should now be 
questioned with courage. The party that should confront this incident is not 
the ruling Justice and Development Party [AKP]. It is the CHP, which is 
behind this bloody disaster, who should face up to this incident. (BBC News 
Europe, 23 November 2011) 
 
However, the Dersim debate once again exposed the contradictions in the AKP’s 
Kurdish policy. The government’s Minister of Arts and Culture stated that Onur 
Öymen’s speech was “fascistic”, yet as discussed in the media, it was the same 
minister who had for years suppressed the documentary film 38(Mavioğlu 2009). 
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Hence, in his interviews, Çayan Demirel not only harshly criticised the Kemalist 
elites and their traditional Kurdish policy, but notably, he always made a point of 
directing criticism towards the current government and its new policy. For example 
he said; “Even though the AKP government talks about a Kurdish Opening, the 
documentary film 38, which tackles an issue that is at the heart of democratisation, 
has been banned for three years. Even when we leave aside all other problems, this 
censorship case is enough to demonstrate that the ‘opening’ is nothing but just a fairy 
tale” (Mavioğlu 2009). He also said; “A process called the Kurdish Initiative is on 
the table, but I am not persuaded because our memories are still constricted by red 
lines. Going beyond these lines is still dangerous in Turkey” (Hurriyet Daily News, 
20 December 2009). Thus, although the documentary itself was in fact something 
that could perhaps be conveniently employed by the AKP government, the director 
used his contextualising power over his film towards to avoid this. Instead, as a key 
figure actively participating in this political debate, he used the space given to him to 
highlight the continuities between ‘old Turkey’ and ‘new Turkey’ in terms of their 
attitude towards the Kurdish issue.  
 
Two Locks of Hair: The Missing Girls of Dersim was another documentary film 
focusing on the controversial Dersim massacre. Director Nezahat Gündoğan remarks 
that she believes it was the emergence of films narrating the Dersim Massacre that 
initiated the parliamentary debates on the issue and that were responsible for the 
Prime Minister using the term ‘Dersim massacre’ (Gündoğan 2010). Like 38, The 
Missing Girls of Dersim also sparked a big debate. The impact of the documentary 
had been so powerful that it deepened the research undertaken for the making of the 
film. Kazım Gündoğan, the film’s producer, remarks that after the film was released 
and received wide media coverage, the filmmakers were contacted by many women 
from Dersim who had been adopted back in 1938; they had reached seventy-two 
women when they completed the documentary, but within two years after the release 
of the film they had one hundred and fifty cases in hand (T24, 5 April 2012). In 
2012, a parliamentary commission was established to investigate the events in 
Dersim in 1938. A report on the missing girls of Dersim was submitted to this 
commission and Kazım Gündoğan was invited to parliament to share the information 
gathered during the research that they had conducted for The Missing Girls of 
Dersim. Also, Huriye Arslan, one of the two sisters whose story is the focus of the 
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documentary, made an appeal to the commission to share her memories with them 
(CNN Turk, 26 March 2012). Thus we can say that The Missing Girls of Dersim was 
not the final outcome of a completed historical research project; it rather functioned 
as the first step of a wider interrogation of the issue. 
 
Although it would be highly justifiable to suggest that these documentaries actually 
initiated the parliamentary debates regarding the Dersim massacre, as filmmaker 
Gündoğan does, we cannot conclusively claim that to be the case. Nevertheless, it is 
indisputable that these films were widely utilised as evidence in public debates, they 
infiltrated true human stories into the detached political arguments on a distant 
history, they brought the past to light through the testimonies of the survivors and 
personalised history. And they did influence the scope and the direction of the 
relevant debates amongst conflicting political parties.  
 
 
Segregated Receptions of Kurdish Films 
 
In Chapter 3, I explained how the history of the Kurdish issue engendered two 
segregated perceptions of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey, and in Chapter 5, I 
emphasised that one of the key political aspirations of Kurdish filmmakers, while 
bringing Kurdish memories to the screen and claiming to be telling ‘the truth’, is 
through their films to mend the segregation between Kurdish and Turkish memories, 
experiences, opinions, beliefs and emotions about the conflict. However, given the 
political atmosphere in Turkey as portrayed in Chapter 3, clearly this is not an easy 
task.  
 
Vivian Sobchack emphasises that “our consciousness is neither disembodied nor 
impersonal nor “empty” when we go to the movies” (1999: 244). Similarly, Jill A. 
Eddy remarks that, “political officials, reporters, and eyewitnesses who are telling 
and retelling the stories of a well-known public past are not writing upon a blank 
slate. Members of the audience will have personal memories of the past being 
described” (2006: 13). And Jay Winter writes; “Collective memory may be 
understood as a set of signifying practices linking authorial encoding with audience 
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decoding of messages about the past inscribed in film or in other sources”, and he 
continues, “the problem still remains as to how such messages, once imprinted on 
film and projected to a wide audience, are decoded by it” (2001: 864). This is a 
significant question, because as Lemke remarks, in highly polarized communities, 
where even a ‘neutral’ position may represent a special interest, we most clearly see 
“textual politics” in action:   
 
Every utterance, every text, represents a political act because it cannot 
ignore the polarization of the community. [...] Every text requires that we 
bring to it a knowledge of other texts (its intertexts) to create or interpret it, 
and members of different social groups (whether defined by gender, age, 
social class, religion, political affiliation, occupation, etc.) will in general 
bring different intertexts to bear, will speak with different discourse voices 
and listen with different discourse dispositions. (1995: 32) 
 
What makes these arguments particularly notable for Kurdish films in Turkey is their 
belated arrival in the realm of representation. Before the emergence of these Kurdish 
films, throughout the decades of the ongoing political struggle, the symbolic system 
of the society had been highly politicised; all kinds of cultural entities – from 
language to music, from dresses to landscapes, from moustache styles to colours – 
had become representations of certain positions, certain historical events or certain 
ideologies12. So when Kurdish films emerged in the 2000s, the audio-visual elements 
these films deploy were already overloaded with many cultural and political 
references, which evoked specific forms of knowledge regarding the Kurdish issue 
and which connected with the cultural archive accrued throughout the history of the 
Kurdish issue.  
 
So, while Kurdish films participate in the ongoing dialogue on the Kurdish issue, 
their words promptly draw upon and link with other codes, representations and 
discourses; they always have the potential of easily evoking memories and triggering 
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 Here, I would like to note a few incidents that demonstrate the extremity of this point: in 2001, a 
restaurant owner in İstanbul was arrested because the salt cellars he had on the restaurant tables, that 
were shaped like an overweight man with a big dark moustache, resembled Abdullah Öcalan, the 
leader of the PKK (Hürriyetim, 30 March 2001); in 2009, a lawyer’s office was raided by the police, 
who thought Öcalan’s picture was hanging on the office wall, yet it was a photo of the lawyer’s father 
(Cumhuriyet, 17 July 2009); the Governor of Batman changed the colours of traffic lights as the 
colours red-green-yellow represented the PKK flag (ETHA; 20 February 2012);  in İzmir, the police 
stopped issuing licence plates with the letters KCK; as it is the abbreviation of Koma Civakên 
Kurdistan, an organisation founded by the PKK (ETHA; 21 May 2011).  
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emotions – but different memories and emotions in the east and the west of the 
country. When we think about the highly symbolic mountain-image discussed in the 
previous chapter, for instance, what this image represents for the general Turkish and 
the Kurdish audiences would inevitably and dramatically differ; likewise a Turkish 
flag, a soldier, a poşu (the Kurdish scarf also used by Kurdish guerrillas) or red-
green-yellow colours (colours of the PKK flag). For instance, there is a short film 
entitled Toros Canavarı/The Monster Toros (2011, Fırat Yavuz) which is about the 
JITEM crimes and unidentified murders in the 1990s. In those years, white Toros 
cars with tinted windows were the official cars of illegal counter-guerrilla 
organisations and undercover ‘anti-terror’ police, so that in the eyes of the Kurdish 
people the image of this car turned into a symbol of state violence. Entirely based on 
this symbol, the short film The Monster Toros does not use any actors; all we see is a 
threatening white Toros portrayed like a living creature driving in the streets, 
kidnapping people, taking them to remote places to torture and kill them. Its doors 
open and close by themselves with no people seen to get in and out, while sounds 
guide the audience through what is happening. In this example, a simple car which 
has no referential value for the general Turkish audience assumes representational 
value for the Kurdish audience, so highly symbolic for the Kurds that it makes a 
short film subject.  
 
If we return to Paul Willemen’s notion of ‘cultural specificity’ again, we can say that 
the two dominant and segregated perceptions of the Kurdish issue in Turkey can also 
be read as two diverse cultural specificities within one country. Some codes are 
recognisable and significant to both Kurds and Turks, yet they communicate to two 
different and conflicting cultural specificities, like the mountain image for example, 
whereas, some codes are not even ‘readable’ from the Turkish perspective while 
being highly significant within the Kurdish cultural specificity, like the Toros car, for 
instance. An example of this point can be found in Sedat Yılmaz’s accounts on the 
filming process of Press. In the 1990s, in order to be able to deliver the Özgür 
Gündem newspaper despite constant prohibitions, little kids were employed to 
secretly deliver the newspaper and this historical fact was integrated into the 




Kurdish people have a very strong memory, they don’t forget. I have 
witnessed this whilst making the film. First, I was researching about what 
those kids used as a bag whilst delivering the Gündem newspaper in those 
days. Everybody remembered and said, black plastic shopping bags. So I 
used those bags in the film. And, when we were filming that scene, when the 
child actors were walking around with black plastic bags in their hands, 
ordinary people who were watching the shooting kept saying, “Look, those 
are the kids who used to deliver the Gündem newspaper”. We never told 
anyone even what the film was about. It was 2008 anyway; you wouldn’t be 
able to make this film if you were to let it fly around that you are making a 
film about Gündem newspaper. Yet people could tell just because of those 
bags.” (Yılmaz 2011b)  
 
More generally speaking, as filmmakers point out, there is generally a marked 
contrast between the reception of Kurdish films by general Kurdish and Turkish 
audiences. The directors of On the Way to School,for example,share their 
observations of the premiere of their film in the Kurdish city of Diyarbakır: “People 
in Diyarbakır showed a great interest in the film. Everyone who has seen the film in 
Diyarbakır has been through the same thing as those students” (Sağlam, 2009). Miraz 
Bezar (2010c) also talks about Kurdish people crying at the screenings throughout 
his film The Children of Diyarbakır and he remarks that it is because they all have 
memories of similar experiences. Çayan Demirel (2011) accounts that at most 
screenings of Prison No: 5 nearly half of the room leaves the theatre halfway through 
the documentary, as they cannot bear hearing about all the horrible techniques of 
torture and humiliation directly from the victims. Yet, he also notes that the survivors 
of the prison have found the film rather ‘soft’ compared to the brutal reality.   
 
The segregation between two diverse memories of the past has expressed itself 
strongly in the reception of Kurdish films with reference to the notions of ‘reality’, 
‘realism’ and ‘truth’. In the previous chapter, I argued that we observe a convergence 
between ‘reality and representation’ in Kurdish films and discussed how Kurdish 
films seek ways of tightly anchoring the stories of their films to reality. Yet there is 
another dimension of the relationship between reality and representation in the case 
of Kurdish films that needs to be considered. It is the fact that the transitional nature 
of the relationships between reality and representation, and the convergence between 
fiction and nonfiction, do not only derive from the intentions of Kurdish filmmakers. 
Due to the political character of the stories they depict, these films are perceived with 
reference to reality, inevitably, beyond that intended by the filmmakers. “How real is 
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the story of this film?” is a question that arises from the political conflicts in the 
Kurdish issue, and that question dogs Kurdish films wherever they go; it comes up in 
every Q&A session with the directors and in every interview with the filmmakers. 
Because, “How real is the story of this film?”, as a question, originates from other 
questions regarding ‘truth’ that the society has been actively debating. It actually 
articulates (or hides) another question: What is to be recognised as truth in relation to 
the Kurdish conflict? In this regard, investigating the superimpositions between 
‘reality in politics’ and ‘reality in film’ in the case of Kurdish films in Turkey 
generates fruitful questions regarding the relationships between ‘film and politics’. 
 
The confusion On the Way to School elicited a few years ago is a good starting point 
for addressing this issue. In 2009, this documentary film was selected for 
competition at both the Adana Film Festival and the Antalya Film Festival, the two 
most important film festivals in Turkey. It won the Best Film Award in Adana and 
the Best First Film Award in Antalya. This was a remarkable success: first of all in a 
political sense insofar as a Kurdish film is shown and wins awards at the biggest 
national film festivals in Turkey; on the other hand, the film’s success was 
remarkable also because it is extraordinary for a documentary film to be shown in the 
same programme as feature films at these festivals. In addition, On the Way to 
School was also distributed nation-wide in film theatres, which was again unusual for 
a documentary film, considering the place of documentaries in film culture in 
Turkey.  
 
As remarked earlier, following this success, On the Way to School attracted 
considerable public interest and achieved wide media coverage. However, there was 
an observable confusion about the definition of this film. Film critic and 
documentary filmmaker Necati Sönmez (2009) wrote an article tackling this issue, 
where he worked through the media coverage of the film and gave various examples 
that demonstrate the confusion created by On the Way to School. Sönmez’s article 
reveals that reviewers of the film had found many different ways to define the form 
of this film, such as a documentary mixed with fiction or a fiction film with some 
documentary elements, and, either way, almost all the reviews had regarded this 
documentary film as an example of a hybrid genre that mixes fiction and nonfiction. 
Sönmez also mentions many reviews talking about how powerful the ‘acting’ is in 
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the film, or how the story feels ‘real’, which sound absurd when the subject of 
discussion is a documentary film. Sönmez argues that On the Way to School is “a 
hundred per cent documentary film”; there is no trace of genre crossing in the film, 
and no elements that evoke concepts like docu-fiction. In conclusion, he approaches 
these misinterpretations with regards to the poor documentary film culture in Turkey.  
 
Film scholar Özgür Çiçek (2011), on the other hand, interprets this confusion with 
reference to the politics of the Kurdish issue in Turkey. She argues that the 
presumption that On the Way to School must involve some degree of fiction should 
be interpreted in relation to the political denial of the realities of the Kurdish issue. 
She asks: “Does the tendency to regard this film as fiction have anything to do with 
the tendency to believe that in the eastern part of Turkey people speak Kurdish? Is 
regarding this nonfiction film as fiction a way of disavowing the Kurdish problem in 
Turkey?” (Çiçek 2011: 8). Although Çiçek’s approach at first glance sounds like an 
over-interpretation, these questions are quite significant for our current discussion. In 
fact, they are meaningful questions to pose, regardless of the possible answers, 
because they invite us to draw attention to the way politics is at work in the reception 
of Kurdish films. They point at how the traditional audience perception of 
documentary and fiction film may become disrupted when it comes to Kurdish films, 
due to the political context in the background. 
 
Vivian Sobchack talks about the ““charge of the real” to the film experience” (1999: 
244). When we are addressing films that narrate stories of a yet unresolved conflict, 
and that circulate in a presently conflict-ridden society, we can especially talk about 
‘the charge of the real’ to the film experience. Kurdish films communicate within a 
highly polarised society on a highly politicised issue, and this situation induces 
convergences between reality and representation, film and life, fiction and 
nonfiction, not only in the hands of the filmmakers, but also in the eyes of the 
viewers. Douglas M. Kellner and Meenakshi Gigi Durham suggest that “audiences 
could perform oppositional readings, reacting negatively to what they perceived as 
prejudiced representations of their own social groups, thus showing themselves to be 





The segregated receptions of Kurdish films, that echo conflicting interpretations of 
the Kurdish conflict, have been evident and highly observable in the debates these 
films triggered at the public screenings of the films. For instance, following the 
screening of the documentary film Close-up Kurdistan at the If Istanbul Film 
Festival, some people from the audience argued with the director that his 
documentary distorts reality. “All peoples have equal rights in Turkey. There is no 
such thing as forbidden languages in Turkey”, one woman said, for example. She 
was challenged and ridiculed by some other viewers. The heated debates on what is 
true and what is a lie, and what actually happened in the past, continued for a long 
time.  
 
What is interesting is that fiction films also repeatedly received similar reactions 
from the audience. For example, the screening of The Children of Diyarbakır at the 
Antalya Film Festival in 2009 turned into a huge, tense event with great media 
interest. A group of people from the audience left the film theatre halfway through 
Bezar’s film, only to come back for the Q&A session to attack the film. There were 
security guards standing on the stage, brought in specifically for this event. And 
director Bezar was accompanied by (and physically supported by) a large group of 
people on the stage standing by him, including local Kurdish politicians from 
Antalya, other Kurdish filmmakers Hüseyin Karabey, Özcan Alper, Orhan Eskiköy, 
Özgür Doğan and some film critics. The protestors attacked the film; some talked 
about ‘foreign powers trying to divide Turkey’; some exclaimed, “You’ll never get 
your Kurdistan!” They all argued that the film was not ‘realistic’, because “Turkish 
soldiers would never do such things”. Hence, while Kurdish films are being 
questioned in terms of how realistic their stories are, a documentary film can get the 
reaction of “It is all fiction!”, whereas a fiction film can get the reaction of “This is 
not the reality!” 
 
What makes this issue more interesting is that Kurdish films have often been 
criticised harshly by the Kurdish audience, too, again with regards to how realistic 
their stories are. For example The Children of Diyarbakır, which was attacked by 
some viewers in Antalya, also received severe criticism from the Kurdish audience in 
Diyarbakır, on the same basis that it fails to represent the truth. However, the truth 
according to the Kurdish audience was of course completely different from the 
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Antalya audience’s truth. This time, the main claim of the criticism was that the 
Kurdish political movement would not abandon the orphaned children whose parents 
were killed by the Turkish state forces, and therefore the film was not a realistic 
portrayal of the Kurdish issue. The co-scriptwriter of the film, Evrim Alataş (2010) 
wrote an emotional article responding to the reactions triggered by the film. After 
recounting the audience reactions in Antalya, Alataş also mentions the criticisms that 
they received in Diyarbakır (which she calls “the motherland”), and says, “We 
cannot tell anyone that the story is inspired from a real story”. She complains that 
they could not manage to ingratiate themselves with anybody: “Two segregated 
societies and two utterly severed languages. Dare to intervene and see whether you 
are welcomed.” The Children of Diyarbakır is not the only example of this instance. 
Many Kurdish films have been fiercely criticised by the Kurdish audience in terms of 
realism. The intensity of these criticisms appears as if the Kurdish audience either 
gives licence to the filmmakers to tell their own actual stories, or rejects them. And 
when deciding whether a film is worthy to be licensed, realism seems to be one of 
the main criteria. 
 
It is a significant observation that these two disparate even conflicting audience 
reactions from the Turkish and the Kurdish dominant political perspectives are both 
centred on the notion of reality, or truth. These two conflicting receptions, both 
demanding ‘the reality’ from Kurdish films, yet conflicting with each other in terms 
of what that reality is, are indicators of the way the politics of truth is evident in the 
public reception of Kurdish films. We can say that, these heated debates in film 
theatres demonstrate how both sides of the conflict have been over-conscious about 
the power of representation, as a result of the intensity of the Kurdish conflict and the 
intense politicisation of Turkish society.  
 
From 2009 onwards, the film theatres in Turkey screening Kurdish films became an 
arena for debating the Kurdish issue, while the films turned into ‘discussion material’ 
for the general public to express their political opinions on the current political 
transformation and ventilate their disturbances, anxieties, angers and fears in an era 
of political turbulence. Panels on Kurdish films or Q&A sessions following the 
screenings were always occasions for heated political polemics amongst the 




arguments, to the point that moderators of these events would repeatedly invite the 
audience to focus back on the film, to comment on the film, ask questions related to 
the film. We can say that long before the ‘committee of Wise People’, which was 
established by the government to win the hearts and minds of Turkish society 
towards the Kurdish Opening, started to travel the country to discuss the Kurdish 
issue with Turkish citizens, the screenings of Kurdish films already functioned like 
the meetings organised by the ‘Wise People, where ordinary citizens had the 
opportunity to express their opinions, hear other views and confront each other.  
 
Inasmuch as this atmosphere in film theatres continued with each new Kurdish film, 
with similar arguments repeated in different theatres on the occasion of different 
films, this apparent dynamic within the politicised film culture in Turkey cannot be 
dismissed, while observing the indicators regarding the potential political influence 
of Kurdish films through their social circulation and public reception. On the other 
hand, audience reactions at public screenings of Kurdish films are also significant to 
address because these debates did not stay in the film theatres, behind closed doors, 
as they were widely reported in the media. In fact, the audience reactions these films 
received at national film festivals, for instance, have been deployed as a fixed feature 
of prime news within the festival coverage of the media since 2009. Thus, insofar as 
they were widely covered in the media, it meant that these audience reactions also 
contextualised the films; they represented one potential interpretation of the films; 




Breath: The Political Manipulation of a Hesitation 
 
Whether the picture of segregated receptions of Kurdish films in Turkey portrayed 
above is something that indicates that, despite their aspirations, it is actually unlikely 
for these films to escape ideological barriers and political prejudices and to be able to 
communicate their political messages to the wider public in Turkey, is a difficult 
question. But, with this question in mind, in the final part of this chapter I will 
specifically focus on the public reception of Breath, a film that directly focuses on 
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the Kurdish conflict but not from the Kurdish perspective, because the public debates 
on this film add different layers to the issues addressed in this chapter so far.   
 
Breath is the first film in Turkey to portray the armed struggle between the PKK and 
the Turkish army using the war genre structure. The story is set in the Kurdish region 
in a remote Turkish military station in the highlands near the Iraqi border, in 1993; a 
time when the war between the Turkish army and the PKK was at its peak. Breath 
was released a few weeks after the launch of the Kurdish Opening. It became a box 
office hit with a total of 2,436,780 viewers, which is quite a high figure considering 
average box office figures in Turkey. Although Breath’shigh budget had an 
undeniable role in the film’s popularity, it was also the film’s political stance and the 
congruity of the film’s political character with the political context that must be 
considered in understanding its success – not only its commercial success, but also 
its public reach; its operation as a means of stimulating a wide public debate with the 
participation of a great variety of political perspectives.   
 
Previously in this Chapter I emphasised that, from the perspective of reception 
studies, talking about diverse interpretations of a film does not simply refer to 
different understandings of a film’s meaning by different individual viewers.  
However, in the case of Breath, different viewers literally found different meanings 
in the film, deduced opposing political messages from the film, interpreted the 
political intentions of the film in conflicting ways. Whether it was a militarist and 
nationalist film, or an anti-militarist and anti-nationalist one, was the main thread of 
the discussions on Breath. The Breath debate provides an interesting case with 
reference to the main concerns of this chapter, for it brought forward certain 
questions regarding the cultural reception and political influence of films, which 
were different from those generated by Kurdish films that represent an unambiguous 
political stance, that address the Kurdish issue from the Kurdish political perspective 
in a non-contradictory manner, unlike Breath.  
 
Fatih Özgüven (2009), a well-known Turkish film critic famously regarded Breath as 
“a film of hesitance”. Özgüven argued that although Breath predominantly 
conformed to a Turkish nationalist discourse, there were many moments in the film 
where the film was “out of breath”, where there was a “slip of the tongue”, where it 
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failed to reproduce the nationalist discourse, and where it produced certain meanings 
that conflicted with its overall nationalist discourse. Özgüven certainly had a point 
while deducing a ‘hesitation’ within an otherwise nationalist film discourse. In order 
to make sense of the Breath debate and analyse it in the context of this chapter’s key 
concerns, we need to first briefly look at some key representations in the film which 
generated the confused debates about the film in 2009, in the very early days of the 
Kurdish Opening. Heated political debates surrounding Breath were of course a 
consequence of the specific political context, but on the other hand, Breath was a 
particularly suitable film in those days for discussing the Kurdish issue from various 
political positions.  
 
On the one hand, Breath is in fact by no means subtle in terms of the reproduction of 
nationalist and militarist discourses. It is full of overly emotional nationalist tirades, 
frequently accompanied by dramatic music in the background, vocalised by the main 
character Lieutenant Mete, who is also the voice-over narrator of the story and who 
at times directly addresses the audience, even reprimands them for not taking active 
responsibility to support the war against the PKK. In this war narrative, there is no 
doubt that Breath ‘takes sides’ with the Turkish army. The whole story is structured 
from their point of view, the audience is invited to identify with the Turkish soldiers, 
and the opposing camp is portrayed as the ultimate enemy. At no point in the film is 
there any sign of an interest in understanding the ‘other side’ of the conflict; in 
getting acquainted with the Kurdish militants. On the contrary, Breath adapts the 
conventional story-telling principles established in the Western, the war film and 
horror genres, in terms of the representation of the ‘other’, the ‘enemy’ or the ‘threat’ 
as unrepresentable. The most obvious manifestation of this approach is the recurring 
representation of the Kurdish guerrillas as shadows, where the camera frames only 
their threatening shadows falling onto the rocks of the mountains surrounding the 
military station, and leaving their actual bodies/faces out of the frame. This ‘dark’ 
and ‘blank’ image of the Kurdish guerrillas reiterates the official discourse in Turkey 
referring to ‘the enemies of national unity’ as ‘dark forces’ and dehumanising PKK 
militants as threatening objects, impossible to understand, or even know.  
 
On the other hand, Breath does not construct a heroic myth whilst portraying the 
struggle of the Turkish military against the PKK, and it certainly involves a degree of 
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criticism towards certain militarist practices and discourses that were deployed in the 
past decades of the war. And it was this aspect of the film that triggered a great deal 
of confusion and heated political debates regarding how to interpret the political 
message of the film. There are some apparent strategies utilised in Breath towards 
highlighting the weaknesses of the Turkish military, instead of drawing a heroic 
picture, starting from the visual representation of the Turkish military station, which 
is where the entire story takes place and which represents the Turkish state in the 
Kurdish region. In the establishing shots, where the station is seen from outside, the 
camera shows it in long shots from a high angle amidst the rugged landscape with 
tall, steep mountains surrounding the station. Positioned in such a composition, the 
station appears as a tiny, defenceless building engulfed by the menacing mountains 
(that stand for the PKK), and clearly, it does not represent power, or dominance in 
this picture. Though, contrastingly, the writing scrawled on the station’s roof claims 
the opposite: “Strong, brave, on guard”, it says in big letters. Thus, there is a visible 
contrast between the self-presentation of the station and its filmic representation. 
This pronounced contrast operates to highlight what this station is indeed not. Putting 
it simply, the visual discourse adds “not” to the beginning of “Strong, brave, on 
guard” in a way that is impossible to miss. The Turkish flag hanging on the post in 
front of the station is badly torn and the Atatürk bust standing outside is also 
damaged.  Both shown repeatedly in close-ups, the two key symbols represent why 
that military station, standing on its own at the top of the mountains in the middle of 
nowhere, simply cannot function there – there in the Kurdish mountains.  
 
Breath carefully differentiates the private soldiers from their commander, Lieutenant 
Mete, in terms of their nationalist attachment and militarist dedication to the fight 
against the PKK. The private soldiers are depicted in a way that foregrounds their 
ordinariness, rather than defining them as heroic warriors of the Turkish military. At 
no point do any of them comment on the war from one political perspective or 
another, or show any traces of nationalist or militarist dedication. We see them 
having fun, acting like adolescents sharing a dormitory; we witness their emotional 
phone conversations with their loved ones; and we see them struggling to fit into 
their role as ‘soldiers’. Conforming to the conventions of Hollywood-style 
storytelling, Breath structures the combat plot as a personal power struggle between 
the two leaders; Lieutenant Mete and the leader of the guerrilla group with the code 
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name Doctor. It can be argued that by structuring a blood-revenge plot that positions 
individuals in the centre of the narrative, the film on the one hand renders the socio-
political background of the war between the PKK and the Turkish army indistinct, 
and thus depoliticises its subject matter. However, on the other hand, as the two 
leaders of the Turkish Army and the PKK come to the fore as the only conscious and 
willing actors in this war, with certain ideological and political determination to their 
cause, the private soldiers of both sides are held exempt from any responsibility for 
war crimes, and only the two leaders are pointed out as taking full responsibility. 
Hence, one of the most overtly expressed political propositions of the film suggests 
that the actual conflict is in fact between the leading actors, and not between the 
ordinary soldiers of the war from either side. 
 
The main character, Lieutenant Mete, is a determined yet weary and bitter 
professional soldier with strong but confused opinions about the war. Throughout the 
film, he keeps needling the private soldiers with his bitter comments. He articulates 
his awareness that the private soldiers have a ‘real life’ outside of military service 
and that they are in fact ‘civilians’ doing their compulsory military service with no 
actual or strong attachment to the ideals of the army and no regard for the necessity 
of this war. In one of his lengthy monologues, the indignation of the lieutenant 
reaches its peak and reveals more about the origins of his issues with an explicit 
reference to the current political context: 
 
As if I don’t know that this is not the way to win the war. I know that, but 
what you don’t know is that if I lose here, then you lose in İstanbul, in 
Ankara. [...] Don’t worry; there is no war that doesn’t have an end. This will 
end, too. Though when it does end, you will file charges against me. So be it. 
Yet I don’t have anywhere else to go.  
 
This is an overt reference to the Ergenekon trials that started in 2008 where high-
ranking military officers were put on trial for allegedly being members of the 
Ergenekon terrorist organisation. Hence, these lines help the viewer understand the 
sarcasm of Mete better, as they put him forward as a lieutenant who is witnessing a 
political transformation that might lead to the end of the war. His bitterness is due to 
the anxiety of the emergent public disapproval of the war as a solution to the Kurdish 
conflict and of the main actors leading this war for decades; the anxiety of witnessing 
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the end of his era. In this sense, the Lieutenant is portrayed as a bitter ex-hero on his 
way out.  
 
As for the representation of Kurds, Breath draws a bold distinction between ‘militant 
Kurds’ and ‘ordinary Kurds’. In this regard, Kurds and Kurdishness appear in two 
carefully and overtly distinguished images in the film; one of them is the Kurds in 
the PKK forces, providing a negative image of the Kurds, and the other one is the 
positive image of an ‘ordinary’ Kurdish citizen who serves in the Turkish Army. The 
image of ‘approved Kurdishness’ comes forward through the depiction of a young 
Kurdish man doing his compulsory military service in the Turkish army and fighting 
against the PKK, just like his Turkish peers. However, the film is not interested in 
this Kurdish soldier as an individual, and his portrayal lacks any details to make him 
a rounded character in the story. He is rather just a figure functioning symbolically to 
convey one of the few incontestable political propositions of the film. The Kurdish 
soldier makes two appearances in the film. In the emotion-evoking montage-
sequence where segments from the phone conversations of different private soldiers 
with their loved ones are edited together, we hear one soldier speaking to his mother 
in Kurdish, which is given with Turkish subtitles. The second scene with the Kurdish 
soldier is more expressive and in fact extremely symbolic. Here, together with 
another soldier, the Kurdish soldier raises the Turkish flag up the flagpole while 
singing a Kurdish folk song. Watching this scene, anyone who has read Mythologies 
by Roland Barthes (2009) would immediately recall his analysis of the image on the 
cover of Paris Match of the young black soldier saluting the French flag. A Kurdish 
soldier raising the Turkish flag is almost a direct adaptation of the image analysed by 
Barthes. This scene is so symbolic that it comes along as an ‘inserted message’ into 
the text and renders the film’s political proposition unquestionably clear in terms of 
the issue of peace, suggesting ‘living together in peace’ under the same national flag. 
And, the loose insertion of the Kurdish soldier into the plot functions to break the 
equation of the Kurds with the PKK. While complying with the traditional state 
discourse in its portrayal of the Kurdish guerrillas as inhuman terrorists, Breath 
attempts to avoid racist understandings of the film through the involvement of the 




Keeping in mind the socio-political context of the political transformation 
investigated in Chapter 3, we can interpret the political discourse of Breath as a 
Kemalist-nationalist-militarist discourse that attempts to accommodate itself to the 
new era; a liberalised Kemalist approach adjusting its fundamental principles to the 
shifting power dynamics and the prevailing political tendencies of the ‘new Turkey’. 
In this sense, it can be said that Breath provides a filmic manifestation of traditional 
Kemalist nationalism’s response to emergent power relationships, to the emergence 
of a new actor taking over as the new dominating power, to the new Kurdish policy 
introduced by this actor and its reverberations in Turkish society. So, on the one 
hand, Breath retains the key characteristics of the Kemalist nationalist ideology, but 
at the same time, it attempts to integrate emergent political tendencies into this 
declining ideology. The diagnosed ‘hesitation’ in Breath, in this sense, can be seen as 
a reflection of an impossibility – the impossibility of coming to terms with the past; 
with the military tutelage in Turkey, the dirty war and the Kurdish conflict, without 
any confrontation with the foundations of Kemalist-militarist ideology. However, it 
is important that some political propositions in Breath, conveyed through the 
representations addressed above, have never had a place within the strict ideological 
frame of the traditional Kemalist/militarist/nationalist discourses in the past; state 
ideology has never been open to any criticisms and it has never shown a tendency 
towards revising and liberalising itself. Thus, with its attempt at injecting some 
degree of self-criticism into the Kemalist interpretation of the Kurdish conflict, 
Breath caused great confusion.  
 
Emre Aköz from Sabah newspaper found the difficulty of labelling Breath so 
extraordinary that he suggested it as an interesting case for academicians: 
 
[Breath] uses all the symbols of the dominant nationalist ideology in Turkey. 
[...] However, despite the deployment of all these symbols, the film still does 
not convey a nationalist/militarist message to its viewer. In other words, 
Breath is not the kind of film to be acclaimed by Turkish nationalists. 
Academicians studying the notion of ideology should see this film and then 
find an answer to the following question: How come this film, despite 
deploying all nationalist symbols, does not end up being a 




Aköz was slightly mistaken while claiming that “Breath is not the kind of film to be 
acclaimed by Turkish nationalists”, since reactions to the film were rather 
complicated. When we talk about conflicting interpretations of Breath, the conflict 
here was not only and simply between the views of people from diverse political 
positions, but also between people who actually shared the same or similar political 
positions. It was quite peculiar that one and the same film engendered such a variety 
of opposing understandings and even provoked differences of opinion within groups 
that actually shared the same or a similar political stance. It is in fact this aspect 
which makes the public debate about the political character of Breath particularly 
interesting for this study.  
 
One reception of Breath from a nationalist/militarist/anti-Kurdish movement/anti-
Kurdish Opening political perspective considered the film a nationalist-militarist film 
with no suspicion of it being anything else, and embraced it as a film that supports 
the anti-PKK and anti-Kurdish Opening views, whereas others regarded it as a film 
that deprecates the Turkish army and deviously supports the pro-Kurdish movement 
view and the Kurdish Opening. Even though, İlker Başbuğ, the Chief of the General 
Staff of Turkey of the time, acclaimed and promoted Breath,as discussed earlier, the 
film was found infuriating by many Turkish viewers due to its weak portrayal of the 
Turkish army, the depiction of the private soldiers as naive, vulnerable and callow 
young men, the overall sense of defeat in the film, the tattered, broken and neglected 
images of the taboo symbols of the Turkish Republic, as well as the depiction of a 
soldier speaking the prohibited Kurdish language under the roof of the Turkish 
military. Film scholar Sevilay Çelenk writes;  
 
There are many statements on the Internet revealing that Breath has been 
received as a profanity by the viewers who take a nationalist-militarist 
position with regards to the war in southeast Turkey. It is understood from 
these statements that the mentioned group takes umbrage, because the 
“soldier heroes”, especially the main character Lieutenant Mete Horozoğlu do 
not perform a determined heroism”. (2010: 95) 
 
Columnist Mehmet Ali Kışlalı, well-known for his columns discussing military 
strategies against the PKK and for his advocacy for the maintenance of the military 
tutelage, argued that the film “questions the legitimacy of the Turkish army” through 
its main character Lieutenant Mete (Kışlalı, 2009). He claimed that “although the 
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film is presented as an antithesis to the Kurdish Opening and to the pro-Kurdish 
films, on the contrary, it attempts to talk the nationalists into the Kurdish Opening”. 
And he wrote: “The film paves the way for the PKK to achieve its objectives by 
breaking the resistance of the nationalists without making them feel depreciated”.  
 
Reactions towards Breath from the left-wing/pro-Kurdish/anti-nationalist/anti-
militarist perspective were not homogeneous either. There were some voices 
thatharshly criticised the film by highlighting its nationalist, militarist and anti-
Kurdish character. Yet on the other hand, there were also other voices from this 
perspective that foregrounded and valued some anti-militarist and anti-nationalist (or 
at least non-militarist and non-nationalist) elements in the film and argued against the 
categorisation of Breath simply as a nationalist and militarist film. Although sharing 
a similar political view and the same anti-nationalist concerns with those who 
disparaged the film, they placed emphasis on the potential of Breath to break down 
dominant nationalist public opinion in Turkish society and support a peaceful 
solution to the Kurdish conflict– not despite not being a coherently anti-nationalist 
film, but on the contrary by virtue of its incoherent political stance that conveyed 
some anti-nationalist messages within a nationalist discourse.  
 
With reference to Özgüven’s argument of Breath as ‘a film of hesitation’, film critic 
Enis Köstepen remarked that he was curious about the potential power of Breath to 
reveal the ‘hesitations’ in Turkish society, arguing that “a film does not need to be 
anti-militarist to be able do this” (2009c). Film scholar Umut Tümay Arslan (Arslan, 
et al. 2009) observed that “the nationalist ideology is no longer capable of sustaining 
itself as it is and the film makes this fact visible”. She acknowledged the fact that 
Breath does not even touch upon the socio-historical realities of the Kurdish issue, 
but she argued that this might actually help the film to be able to communicate with 
the wider Turkish public, as the presumed audience of the film were ordinary 
Turkish citizens “that greatly believed in the righteousness of the war”. Drawing 
attention to the importance of the political confusions in the film, she said, “We 
might not be able to identify the true intentions of the film, but what we need to 
observe is, how a Turkish nationalist gets less confident in which of his strong 
opinions after seeing this film”. Another film scholar, Sevilay Çelenk, was also more 
interested in highlighting the anti-nationalist and anti-militarist elements in the film 
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than in criticising it for its nationalist and militarist discourses. In an article where 
she thoroughly analyses the film, she argued that, although Breath “does not have a 
radical criticism towards war, it is a significant film because of the ruptures it elicits” 
(Çelenk 2010: 97). She claimed that there was a “pro-peace voice” somewhere in the 
film, and, “in the conjuncture where the possibility of war has appeared, if through a 
thick fog, it is a responsibility to find that voice and bring it to surface” (ibid: 100). 
In an interview she elucidated her point: 
 
I cannot label this film as a militarist film. I feel a certain sense of 
responsibility whilst criticising this film. We are going through a very critical 
conjuncture. In this context, what would we gain from categorising this film 
as a militarist film and casting it aside? I cannot say it is an anti-militarist 
film, either. Though the commander’s lines saying ‘This is not the way to win 
a war’, for example, is something that pushes those people who have strong 
opinions about the war to think twice. (Arslan, et al. 2009) 
 
These interesting arguments touching upon the general issue of the potential political 
influence of film raise certain questions that are highly significant to my research. 
When we compare Breath with Kurdish films that speak from the Kurdish political 
perspective, it is clear that Breath reached as great an audience as a big budget 
popular film, and moreover, as a politically ‘confused’ film it communicated to a 
politically more heterogeneous audience. The debates triggered by Kurdish films 
have in general been more straightforward, eliciting a bipolarisation between two 
dominant views: one accusing Kurdish films for ‘distorting the facts’ and for 
‘propagating the PKK ideology’ and the opposite view supporting Kurdish films by 
highlighting the significance of understanding the Kurdish issue from the Kurdish 
perspective for a peaceful solution to the conflict. However, Breath brought out 
much more complicated dynamics of polarisation. While enabling conflicting 
interpretations of the film’s meaning, Breath allowed different political voices to 
speak up and express their opinions on the key issues of political transformation in 
Turkey.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the dramatic political transformation in Turkey, which 
disturbed the established chart of political ideologies and blurred the very definitions 




highly confused and overtly politicised ordinary citizens. In this sense, we can say 
that while passionately discussing what the political character of Breath really was, 
people actually discussed what ‘nationalism’ or ‘militarism’ or ‘racism’ means to 
them, or what they should mean, in this confusing political era. While interpreting 
the representation of the Kurds in the film, they actually discussed which discourses 
are to be interpreted as anti-Kurdish, and which are not. As the political 
transformation unsettled the ideological frameworks of all the long-established 
political wings, a film like Breath provoked differences of opinion even amongst 
people sharing the same political positions; in a sense, debates on Breath were 
actually debates amongst diverse political groups on how to adjust to the new era in 
politics, on which opinions need to be left behind or revised, and on how to 
(re)define some key political concepts from certain political angles.  
 
In final conclusion, does this picture imply that Breath was indeed more likely to 
have a positive political influence in peace-building than the Kurdish films addressed 
in this research were? While Kurdish films lost many potential audiences perhaps 
from the outset, as they touched on their political prejudices, or even simply because 
of their presentation as ‘Kurdish films’, could Breath manage to communicate to its 
audience ‘more gently’ and talk them into reconsidering their political views? Did 
the debates on Kurdish films create for and against camps and thus actually reinforce 
the existing social polarisation that they intended to break? It is not possible to give 
certain answers to these questions, yet there is something about this approach that 
conflicts with the approach developed in this research. As I discussed earlier, this 
research puts more emphasis on the more invisible and indirect dimensions regarding 
the political impact of Kurdish films; the way they legitimise Kurdish political 
identity; the way they influence the direction of current political debates; the way 
they make the Kurdish political perspective publicly available and accessible to the 
general public; and the way their discourses have an impact on the dominant 
discourses on the Kurdish issue. In this regard, it is important to remember a point 
made in Chapter 4: a film like Breath was made after, and only after, the emergence 
of films that tackled the issue from the Kurdish point of view. In other words, more 
generally, Breath can be seen as an outcome of the Kurdish political struggle that 
influenced the dominant discourses on the Kurdish issue and that obliged all 
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ideologies to revise their interpretation of the Kurdish conflict. Kurdish political 
discourses may have failed immediately to influence the general public opinion on 
the war and even provoked negative reactions, but in the long term they reconfigured 
the overall discursive domain in the country regarding the Kurdish issue.  
 
While some film critics and scholars suggested not dismissing Breath and focusing 
on its positive political aspects, many other pro-Kurdish/anti-militarist/anti-
nationalist public figures widely criticised Breath and they utilised it for debating the 
Kurdish issue through arguments highlighting why this film cannot be seen as pro-
peace. For example, although the depiction of the Turkish private soldiers as naive 
and innocent men who had nothing to gain in this war has been regarded as one of 
the main indicators of Breath’s anti-militarism, from the Kurdish point of view, this 
depiction was criticised for misrepresenting the Turkish army’s activities in the 
Kurdish region and distorting the realities of the war, especially when remembering 
that the film is set in 1993. Yücel Göktürk (2009), for example, criticised the 
unrealistic portrayal of the Turkish soldiers in the film as kind-hearted men, by 
recalling the actual soldiers making necklaces out of the ears of the Kurdish 
guerrillas they had killed, for example. And he draws attention to the specificity of 
the year 1993 in terms of atrocities towards the Kurdish people conducted by the 
TAF: “What kind of a year was 1993? [...] The days when the Kurdish MPs were put 
into prison and when the unidentified serial murders commenced. Days of the 
burning down of villages, evacuation of the villages, and forced migration. [...] The 
times when the notion of ‘dirty war’ emerged”; consequently, Göktürk remarks that 
“There is no mention of the ‘dirty war’ in Breath; on the contrary, the war in the film 
is ‘whiter than white’”. Kurdish politician Gülten Kışanak also argues against 
Breath’s reception as a pro-peace film, remembering the atmosphere in the Kurdish 
region in the 1990s, by recalling for example an infamous photo published by the 
Kurdish Özgür Gündem newspaper in those days, showing a group of Turkish 
soldiers posing proudly around the dead body of a female guerrilla shot to pieces 
(Arslan, et al. 2009).  
 
In the famous muster scene of Breath, which was the most popular scene applauded 
in all nationalist comments on the film, Lieutenant Mete reprimands the private 
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soldiers for not being ‘awake’ and continues with his famous line that he shouts at 
the face of each soldier one by one; “You die, if you sleep!”, and in the end he 
concludes with “Everyone dies, if you sleep!” Yet, in this challenging speech, the 
Lieutenant goes too far in threatening the private soldiers: “If I catch any of you 
doing anything wrong, I will kill you with my own hands, and then I will simply put 
my signature under it, reporting it as a ‘training casualty’”. Here, it is important to 
note that Breath came out at a time when the cases of the ‘suspicious deaths’ of 
private soldiers13 had started to be questioned in public. In this context, Nermin 
Yıldırım for example participated in the Breath debate by pointing at these cases: 
 
[In the trailer] the commander was telling the young soldiers why they should 
not sleep. Because it was a war and they always had to be on full alert. 
Everyone was moved by this trailer. I wonder if the commander of the team 
in Elazığ, Lieutenant Mehmet Tümer, has also watched it and was moved by 
it, too. As, exactly in those days [when the trailer became popular], he 
punished one soldier, who fell asleep whilst standing guard, by commanding 
him to hold a hand grenade with its pin pulled, and four soldiers died as a 
result. In fact, after this incidence, there were comments on the Internet 
claiming that one should watch Breath’s trailer in order to understand the 
psychology of that lieutenant. (Yıldırım 2009) 
 
Here, it is important to note that, in all these arguments on Breath, references to the 
historical facts and true events were deployed in inviting the audience to reconsider 
the film with the impact of these references to reality.  
 
On the other hand, the Breath debate was also utilised for giving voice to people who 
were affected by war. As discussed earlier, the week Breath was released, İlker 
Başbuğ, the Chief of the General Staff of Turkey, had seen the film in the company 
of the media and appropriated Breath to criticise the government’s new Kurdish 
policy. However, as the Breath debate evolved, left-wing/pro-Kurdish media figures 
with anti-nationalist and anti-militarist concerns counter-contextualised Breath by 
giving the stage to alternative Kurdish-issue-related names and by suggesting that 
                                                 
13
 The Human Rights Foundation of Turkey’s 2010 report reveals the number of suspicious soldier 
deaths, year by year, since the beginning of the 1990s and concludes that, in twenty years, the total 
number of suspicious soldier deaths amounts to “2 battalions, or 15-18 companies of soldiers”. The 
report also points at the remarkable fact that the majority of the soldiers losing their lives suspiciously 





their followers interpret the film together with these people, instead of Başbuğ; to see 
the film through their eyes instead of the eyes of the state actors.   
 
For instance, Pınar Öğünç conducted interviews on Breath with people “who cannot 
breathe”; a war veteran, a female ex-guerrilla, and a conscientious objector (Uçar et 
al. 2009). The war veteran, whose name is not revealed in the interview, had actually 
not even seen Breath, as he was scared that his traumatic war memories would flood 
back. As discussed in Chapter 3, the traumatic experiences of Turkish private 
soldiers had been completely silenced in Turkey throughout the decades of war and 
veterans were never given the opportunity to publicly recount their memories. In this 
regard, a war veteran being given the opportunity to speak out on the occasion of 
Breath is something highly notable. Thus, although not having seen the film, in the 
interview the veteran accounts atrocities towards Kurdish civilians committed by 
Turkish soldiers in the 1990s, and he recalls horrifying scenes he witnessed as a 
soldier, such as a military tank touring through a Kurdish village with the head of a 
murdered Kurdish guerrilla hanging on top of the vehicle, exhibited to the family and 
the villagers of the dead guerrilla. Gülten Uçar, the female ex-PKK guerrilla 
interviewed by Öğünç, comments on the scene where Lieutenant Mete tortures a 
wounded female guerrilla captured after a battle. In that scene, the Lieutenant 
throttles the female guerrilla while repeatedly and furiously asking her, “Doctor [The 
leader of the PKK group] fucks you, doesn’t he?” Discussing this scene, Uçar 
explains what a female guerrilla’s life is like in the mountains. Here, it is important 
to note how Breath was used to give voice to an ex-guerrilla in one of the top-selling 
mainstream newspapers, particularly because this was one of the first occasions 
where the public invisibility of the Kurdish guerrillas was broken and where for the 
first time they were given the means of directly communicating to the Turkish 
public.  
 
We can say that the political criticisms of Breath re-contextualised the meaning of 
the film and manipulated the film’s ambiguities, or ‘hesitations’. While arguing that 
Breath cannot be seen as a pro-peace film because it excludes certain issues and 
realities, these criticisms actually incorporated those issues and realities into the 
public debate on the film. Thus, the political critique of Breath from pro-Kurdish, 
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anti-militarist and anti-nationalist angles, in a sense, operated towards extending the 
political meaning of the film and manipulating the direction of its political impact. 
Not only through film criticism, but also through interviews with various people who 
are in some way related to/affected by the Kurdish conflict. Although some film 
critics and scholars suggested focusing on the anti-nationalist and anti-militarist 
aspects of Breath for giving strength to its ‘pro-peace voice’, on the contrary, it was 
possibly the counter-criticisms of the film which pointed at the nationalist and 
militarist aspects of the film that in fact gave power to the film’s potential positive 
political influence.  Because they utilised Breath as a vehicle for debating the issues 
that the film does not, for giving voice to those whose voices are silenced in the film, 
and for giving public visibility to the realities that are invisible in the film.  
 
Conclusions 
After exploring the political character of Kurdish films in the previous chapter, in 
this chapter I investigated the interplay between film and politics in this particular 
case. In attempting to formulate a way of addressing the issue of political influence, I 
deployed a methodological approach based on ‘reception studies’ and explored the 
convergence between ‘text and context’ in the case of Kurdish films by focusing on 
the immediate and intense intertextual dialogues between these films and other social 
texts that comment on the Kurdish issue. 
 
Although the immediate impact of Kurdish films on the opinions of their actual 
audiences might not be that powerful, immediate, or direct, these films nevertheless 
do have the potential to influence society through less observable mechanisms. 
Kurdish films emerged in Turkey in a context in which they were most likely to have 
an impact on politics; they were produced at a time when their determined 
aspirations to play a role in building social peace in Turkey were in harmony with the 
ongoing political transformation occurring in the background. In other words, at a 
time when the country was witnessing radical shifts in the politics of the Kurdish 
issue, these films focused on the very issues that were at the heart of this political 
transformation. Consequently, Kurdish films were situated at the centre of political 
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contestations as regards the future of the Kurdish conflict not only as a subject 
speaking out, but also as an object spoken about.  
 
From 2009 onwards, the theatres in Turkey screening Kurdish films became an arena 
of debate for the Kurdish issue, and the films became ‘discussion material’ for the 
general public to express their political opinions on the current political 
transformation and air their unease, anxieties, anger and fears in an era of political 
turbulence. The potential political power of cinema was acknowledged and utilised 
by political parties active in the period and they utilised such films to publicly 
comment on recent developments regarding the Kurdish conflict. As a consequence, 
in this period movie-going started to function as a political act, film commentary 
became political commentary, and film recommendations served as coded political 
messages for the public. Furthermore, Kurdish films started to engage in direct 
dialogue with the parliamentary debates of the day on the Kurdish issue and 
filmmakers were transformed into public political figures who were regarded as 
‘experts’ on the issues they addressed in their films and on the Kurdish issue in 
general.  
 
In this atmosphere marked by a politicised film culture, the stories that Kurdish films 
tell, the political messages they convey, and the propositions they make regarding 
peace-building all transcended the finished films and were drawn out via the debates 
they triggered. Although the actual audience they found was limited because of the 
massive public debates they triggered, the reach and sphere of influence of Kurdish 
films always went far beyond the actual audiences attending the screenings.  
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This thesis has concentrated on Kurdish films in Turkey which emerged in the 2000s 
in a period of political transformation. The main thrust of the study has been to 
examine the interpenetration between Kurdish films and the politics of the Kurdish 
issue in contemporary Turkey by asking questions regarding the relationships 
between films and their immediate socio-political context, between socio-political 
conflicts and the films that engage those conflicts. Focusing on the mediation 
between filmic texts and the social, this thesis has investigated the way in which 
Kurdish films incorporate the political struggle over the future direction of the 
Kurdish conflict in Turkey, the way their meanings are affected by this struggle, and 
how they might have an impact on this struggle. I have approached this inquiry by 
deploying a contextual film analysis approach and designating three main axes to 
examine the relationships between film and politics.  
 
Kurdish films emerged during a political transformation in Turkey which was 
launched and led by the pro-Islamic AKP which has been in government since 2002. 
The consequence of this transformation that concerned the very definition of the 
nation, national identity and national history was an unprecedented power struggle 
over who controlled the definition and narration of the nation. The long-standing 
Kurdish conflict in Turkey was one of the main issues which necessitated such a 
dramatic shift in the foundational state ideologies and policies and this was also one 
of the key areas of transformation. Emerging at a time when historical developments 
rendered the official policy of denial unsustainable and the war between the Turkish 
military and the PKK came to a deadlock, the AKP promised to develop a peaceful 
solution to the conflict. In 2009, the AKP government launched the Kurdish Opening 
which functioned as a manifestation of official recognition of the Kurdish conflict as 
an issue of democracy, official acknowledgement of the failures of earlier policies 
regarding the conflict, and an official declaration of the government’s will to come 
up with a democratic solution to the long-standing conflict. From the very beginning 
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the Kurdish Opening triggered unrest among much of the Turkish public on the one 
hand and disappointment amongst Kurdish citizens on the other hand. Heated 
debates on the Kurdish Opening and the Kurdish issue at large occupied 
parliamentary discussions, as well as media coverage and daily conversations 
amongst citizens. That was in a sense the most significant aspect of the official 
launch of the Kurdish Opening: lifting the strict ban on speaking about the Kurdish 
issue, breaking that imposed silence, and encouraging unprecedented broad public 
debates on the issue. 
 
The Kurdish films which emerged in those days of political turbulence in Turkey 
offer an abundance of intriguing material for a reflection on the complicated and 
recondite interactions between films and the political context as well as between 
films and the society to which they communicate. While engaging with this metarial, 
on the first axis of the thesis, before engaging with individual Kurdish films I 
explored the political operation and reception of Kurdish cinema as a concept 
specifically in Turkey in the context of the political transformation discussed above. 
My aim was to ask how the general questions, ambiguities and complexities 
surrounding Kurdish cinema at large translate into the context of Kurdish films in 
Turkey in a period of political transformation in which the (re)definition of national 
identity was already subject to power struggles and intense public debates as the 
result of the Kurdish conflict.  
 
Because Kurdish films in Turkey align with Kurdish films from elsewhere (and thus 
they are part of the construction and institutionalisation of Kurdish cinema as the 
national cinema of the Kurds), the emergence of Kurdish films touched a sensitive 
nerve regarding the Kurdish conflict in Turkey – a country where even the word 
‘Kurd’ has been something that evoked fears of ‘separatist terrorism’. Furthermore, 
the existence of Kurdish cinema put pressure on the definition of Turkish cinema. 
For that reason, I treated Kurdish cinema not only as a question but also as a 
questioner, and I drew attention to how the emergence of Kurdish cinema 
complicated and disconcerted the notion of ‘Turkish cinema’ to the extent that, as a 
consequence of debates triggered by the emergence of Kurdish films, a new concept 
known as Türkiye sineması (cinema in/of Turkey) was coined as a discursive means 
to oppose oppressive and exclusive connotations signalled in the concept of Turkish 
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cinema, for referring to films from Turkey without making references to Turkish 
ethnicity.  
 
Taking up Tom O’Regan’s suggestion that we analyse the national cinema of a 
country as ‘an object of knowledge’, I closely observed and interpreted such 
complicated theoretical questions as well as the politically-oriented public debates in 
Turkey on the concepts of Kurdish cinema, Turkish cinema and Türkiye sineması. I 
concluded that the intense dialogues that Kurdish films initiated with politics first 
started with the question of how to label these films, as this question coincided and 
converged with urgent issues in those times which bore witness to the recognition of 
Kurdish identity for the first time and that in turn sparked contestations about how to 
accommodate this identity in Turkey. Consequently, I argued that the newly 
emergent Kurdish films triggered wide public debates in Turkey not only on the basis 
of their topicality or their subject matter, which neatly overlapped with controversial 
issues occupying the political agenda, but that in fact prior to how they represented 
the Kurdish issue it was their emergence under the label of ‘Kurdish cinema’ that 
became subject to debate. And diverse reactions towards the concepts of Kurdish 
cinema, Turkish cinema and Türkiye sineması, either favouring or disfavouring them, 
mirrored public reactions regarding the policy change over the Kurdish conflict and 
the revision of national identity in Turkey.  
 
The second axis of the thesis focused on understanding the political character of the 
Kurdish films of the period. The directors of these films have always expressed their 
desire to take an active part in contemporary political debates on the Kurdish issue 
via their films. Questioning how these filmmakers act out this political motivation in 
their films, and examining how this aspiration to contribute to social peace in Turkey 
structures Kurdish films, is a necessary dimension of exploring the interactions of 
these films with the politics of the Kurdish issue. For this inquiry, I conducted a 
context-specific analysis of the prominent themes, representations, discourses and 
political propositions that are apparent in Kurdish films. Rather than discovering new 
or hidden meanings in Kurdish films through close textual analysis, the purpose of 
this section of the thesis was to take up the politically significant meanings in 
Kurdish films that have been central to the public debates these films triggered and 
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interpret them with reference to the specificities of the political context in 
contemporary Turkey in which they circulate.  
 
One of my propositions was that we can talk about convergences between ‘past and 
present’, ‘reality and representation’, and ‘personal and social’ in the case of Kurdish 
films in Turkey, and these concepts all originate from the politics of the Kurdish 
conflict and give the Kurdish films their political character. Bringing the dark history 
of the Kurdish issue in Turkey onto screen and into the present via Kurdish 
memories is the main aim of Kurdish films. In the days of memory wars in Turkey 
when the national past became a battleground, Kurdish films deployed Kurdish 
memories against the dominant historicisation of the Kurdish issue and they became 
one of the most significant means of rendering the Kurdish perspective on the 
national past visible and accessible to the general public in Turkey for the first time.   
 
One of the most commonly treated issues in Kurdish films is the state atrocities that 
have been committed against the Kurds in Turkey. While some filmmakers prefer to 
make oral history films with the aim of leaving the stage to the victims and 
eyewitnesses of state brutality, others create fictional characters that represent those 
real victims. Thus in both fiction and non-fiction films Kurdish filmmakers have 
given priority to exposing Kurdish suffering under state oppression in the past in an 
attempt to empower Kurdish political demands for official mechanisms of social 
confrontation with the state’s past wrongdoings. I have argued that, in effect, by 
screening state atrocities, Kurdish films actually took on that task by bringing these 
issues to the public agenda and thus utilised the medium of film as a mechanism of 
reconciliation and social justice without waiting for official mechanisms to be 
established. 
 
Another commonly used strategy in peace-building efforts via film is the revising of 
the dominant image of the Kurdish region in Turkish public memory in an attempt to 
narrow the angle between Kurdish and Turkish memories of the conflict. When the 
first Kurdish films emerged, they provided the first visuals from the region that were 
not war footage disseminated by the Turkish military. With these images they 
(re)introduced the Kurdish region to the wider public in Turkey with an alternative 




negative public image disseminated through official discourses. In general, as much 
as the stories they narrate, taking the audience to the unknown Kurdish region 
through film was one of the initial motivations of many Kurdish filmmakers in that 
period. In order to break down dominant imaginings of the region in western Turkey 
as an arid, ugly and dark zone of terrorism, some of these films seek to capture 
Kurdish culture and geography in its most intact form and spectacularise the beauties 
of the Kurdish landscape, while others turn their cameras to Kurdish cities. In 
making familiar the unfamiliar, Kurdish films also embark upon humanising and 
fleshing out the Kurds, thereby constructing a counter-image that disavows the 
dominant negative representations of Kurdishness. All Kurdish films pay special 
attention to authentically introducing Kurdish culture to audiences within narratives 
that expose the price paid by the Kurds as they tried to maintain that culture. In 
fleshing out the Kurds, some Kurdish films also make efforts to touch upon the 
political aspect of Kurdish identity. Even though that is dangerous territory when the 
goal is to break down the dominant image of Kurds in Turkish society, these films 
take up the challenge and seek out appropriate strategies for portraying the political 
identity of the Kurds by showing the strong ties between the Kurdish political 
movement and the Kurdish people, introducing Kurdish guerrillas as human beings, 
and pointing to the socio-historical context that gave rise to the emergence of the 
Kurdish armed struggle.   
 
While bringing forward a dark history, Kurdish films draw convergences between 
the personal and the social. Applying the representative power of personal stories to 
attest to the wide-scale social effects of the Kurdish conflict in Kurdish society, 
filmmakers usually direct their cameras to the nearest stories available and thus 
speak of the Kurdish issue through their own stories, or through the stories of their 
families and friends and villagers. As filmmakers often complain about the absence, 
paucity, or inaccessibility of relevant historical archives regarding the Kurdish 
conflict, they are left with what they can access: personal memories available to them 
through spoken words or private collections such as photographs, family albums, 
letters, personal diaries, and sound recordings. And while turning their cameras to the 
actual personal archives of ordinary Kurdish people, they demonstrate that the 
consequences of the Kurdish conflict are so prevalent in Kurdish society that a single 
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photograph, for example, or the diaries of one ordinary Kurdish individual, can be 
sufficient to draw a large-scale picture of the history of the Kurdish conflict.   
 
Another element that brings out the political character of Kurdish films is their 
commitment to the idea of ‘truth-telling’ in film. Quite aware of the politics of truth 
in contemporary Turkey, the filmmakers seek out ways of saying ‘This is really what 
happened in the past’. Thus, I argued that ‘truth-telling’ is one of the main 
motivations behind the making of Kurdish films, and that the ‘claim of truth-telling’ 
is one of the main characteristics of these films. Although the predominance of 
documentary is a reflection of this point, I have suggested that in the case of Kurdish 
films there is a remarkable convergence between fiction and non-fiction in terms of 
their claim to be representing the reality. This convergence starts with the pre-
production stage, as Kurdish fiction films often set off with thorough historical 
research like a documentary project in order to truthfully represent every detail while 
fictionalising true events and real characters based on the past. In this regard, the 
directors treat their fiction films as ‘drama-documentaries’ or ‘re-enactments’. In 
order to retain the intrinsic link between the ‘found real story’ and their filmic story, 
Kurdish fiction films use real locations, perform authentic representations of Kurdish 
culture, employ non-professional Kurdish actors, and fictionalise true stories. They 
widely deploy archival footage within fictional stories, and photographs, videos, and 
newspaper pages are interspersed within the fictional narratives as reminders of 
reality, contextualising the fictional narrative with reference to socio-historical 
realities. And, all these elements function in the role of positioning the textual fiction 
within a contextual reality, reminding the viewer of the reality in relation to which 
the film claims to be based. 
 
In my discussions about the centrality of the notions of ‘memory’ and ‘truth’ in 
Kurdish films, one important point of emphasis was that these films render hitherto 
silenced Kurdish memories publicly visible and publicly available; in other words, 
they functioned as one of the major mediums of publicising Kurdish interpretations 
of the truth regarding the history of the Kurdish conflict for the first time in Turkey. 
And once the Kurdish perspective on memory and truth represented in Kurdish films 
become public, they start to circulate in an overly politicised society and find 
themselves in the middle of ongoing power struggles over what is to be recognised as 
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truth in relation to the history of the Kurdish issue. This point led me to the third axis 
of this thesis. In the final stage of my exploration of the interplay between Kurdish 
films and the Kurdish conflict, I have focused on the convergence between text and 
context by concentrating on the intertextual dialogues between Kurdish films and 
other contemporary texts regarding the Kurdish conflict.  
 
I have argued that the case of Kurdish films in Turkey necessitates directing attention 
from text to context, examining the context of reception and observing public 
interpretations and political usages of film meaning. For this inquiry, while adhering 
to the framework of reception studies, I also suggested that Paul Willemen’s 
conceptualisation of ‘cultural specificity’ is a valuable concept not only for the 
textual analysis of films, but perhaps more so in terms of the contextual and 
intertextual analysis of film meaning. Although the filmic text embodies various 
potential meanings, there are always socio-cultural contextualising powers over the 
text that function for the closure of the text’s meaning in a certain direction by 
encouraging, foregrounding, and highlighting certain meanings among many other 
potential meanings. And these forces that operate to manipulate the meaning of a 
film can be studied only with reference to the cultural specificity of the particular 
time and place in which films travel. 
 
Through the analysis of specific cases, I demonstrated how Kurdish films became 
one of the major means of debating the Kurdish issue in Turkey at a time that 
witnessed a dramatic shift in the dynamics of the Kurdish conflict. Suggesting that 
we can talk about ‘the politicisation of film culture’ in Turkey in a period of political 
transformation, I discussed how the film theatres in Turkey screening Kurdish films 
became an arena for debating the Kurdish issue, while the films turned into 
‘discussion material’ for the general public as a means for people to express their 
political opinions on the current political transformation and air their unease, 
anxieties, anger and fears in an era of political turbulence. On the other hand, I 
observed that the potential political power of cinema was acknowledged and utilised 
by political parties active in the period who utilised films to publicly comment on 
recent developments regarding the Kurdish conflict. As a consequence, in this period 
movie-going started to function as a political act, film commentary became political 
commentary and film recommendations became coded political messages to the 
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public. Furthermore, some of the Kurdish films started to engage in direct dialogue 
with the parliamentary debates of the day on the Kurdish issue and filmmakers 
became public political figures who were regarded as ‘experts’ on the issues they 
addressed in their films and on the Kurdish issue in general.  
 
After investigating this rather extraordinary scenario, I concluded that Kurdish films 
have participated in the ongoing struggle in Turkey over the future of the Kurdish 
conflict not only as a subject speaking out, but also an object spoken about; not only 
did they interrogate the Kurdish issue, but they also became an instrument for the 
public to interrogate the issue. This is an argument that also touches upon the 
question of the potential political influence of Kurdish films in Turkey. Although it is 
not possible to ‘measure’ the social influence of films, with this question in mind I 
placed emphasis on the significance of observing the interactions between films and 
politics to examine the dialogues between cinema and society. Hence, based on my 
exploration of the instant dialogues and intense interpenetrations between Kurdish 
films and present-day politics, I proposed that the stories Kurdish films tell, the 
political messages they convey, and the suggestions they make regarding peace-
building transcended the finished films and extended outwards via the debates they 
triggered. Thus although the actual audiences were limited in scope, because of the 
massive amount of public interest they inspired and the wide public debates they 
triggered the reach and sphere of influence of Kurdish films always extended far 
beyond the actual audiences at the screenings. 
 
In the second chapter of this thesis, which revisited the national cinema debate, I 
argued that within the cinema of a nation we can explore not only how the nationalist 
myth of unity is imposed, but also how it cannot entirely be imposed; we can analyse 
how the imposition of homogeneity works, but also how it does not and cannot work. 
This study partly sought to contribute to the national cinema debate by treating the 
case of Kurdish films in Turkey as a new example which demonstrates that analysing 
films with regards to nationhood does not have to feed into myths of national unity or 
ignore the diversities and conflicts within the nation. On the contrary, as this thesis 
also demonstrates, the cinema of a nation is a territory of diversities and cleavages 
that bear the traces of the societal conflicts the nation embodies. In defending the 
continuing significance of the national context for film studies, I deployed Paul 
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Willemen’s (2006) concept of ‘cultural specificity’ as a means of examining the 
filmic text within the web of its intertextual relationships with other cultural texts 
that contribute to the shared ‘meaning system’ (Lemke, 1995) within the national 
sphere. Thus, this study of Kurdish films in Turkey makes a contribution to the study 
of ‘cinema and the national’ by demonstrating how the cultural specificity of the 
nation is one of the contextual powers that significantly influence the meanings of 
filmic texts, as well as the social operation and reception of those meanings.  
 
This thesis also contributes to the newly born field of Kurdish cinema studies, which 
at the time of writing consists of a very limited number of studies, not only by 
tackling questions regarding the definition of Kurdish cinema, but more importantly 
by illustrating the significance of focusing on specific localities, specific historicities, 
and specific questions that Kurdish films generate in different contexts. This also 
involves pointing to the significance of concentrating on the interactions of these 
politically oriented films with the politics of the Kurdish issue. On the other hand, 
the study of Kurdish films in Turkey also partly offers a contribution to the study of 
‘cinema in Turkey’, inasmuch as the newly emergent Kurdish films constitute one of 
the most significant and dynamic components of cinema in Turkey today. While the 
newly coined concept of Türkiye sineması has started to be commonly deployed in 
order to include Kurdish films in the cinema of Turkey, there is an increased need for 
scholarly research to theorise cinema in Turkey after the emergence of Kurdish films.    
 
Lastly, this thesis also makes a contribution to the general study of ‘film and 
politics’, and more specifically ‘socio-political conflicts and film’, as I have treated 
Kurdish films in Turkey as a case that generates various engaging questions 
regarding these broader fields of investigation. By developing a contextual film 
analysis approach on three different axes to understand the interplay between film 
and politics in the case of Kurdish films in Turkey, I sought to offer up a certain 
perspective that might be adopted in different studies that also examine how films 
that directly address contemporary social tensions and political cleavages in a certain 





The Kurdish films addressed in this thesis do not bring forward the history of a 
conflict that is already past and they do not circulate in a post-conflict society; they 
bring forward a past that has never become distanced from the present and they 
circulate in a society that is still driven by conflict at a time when intense power 
struggles are ensuing over the issues they address. This point has been central to all 
my key arguments in this study. Thus, on a final note, I would like to remark that as 
the politics of the Kurdish conflict are still subject to constant transformation, the 
socio-historical context depicted in this thesis will continue to evolve as rapidly as it 
has since the beginning of this period of political transformation. And consequently, 
the textual characteristics, the socio-political operation, and the reception of Kurdish 
films in Turkey will inevitably be influenced by significant political developments 
that will unfold in the future of this process. However, I believe that this does not 
mean that this thesis will become outdated or insignificant; on the contrary, it is my 
hope that it will offer a theoretical perspective for studying new Kurdish films with 
reference to the new context of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey because, at its core, 
the aim of this thesis was to develop a theoretical approach for an investigation of the 
immediate intertextual dialogues between films that tackle an ongoing conflict and 
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